In his ground-breaking 1979 book, *The Heretical Imperative*, Peter Berger argued that modernity signaled a turn away from fate towards individual choice.¹ “Modernity pluralizes both institutions and plausibility structures”² and forces the individual into epistemological reflection, examining what she knows, how can she know it, and on what basis does she believe the truths she holds. “The English word *heresy* comes from the Greek verb *hairein* which means ‘to choose’. A *hairesis* originally meant, quite simply, the taking of a choice. For modern man, heresy typically becomes a necessity. Modernity creates a new situation in which picking and choosing becomes an imperative.”³ Berger originally connected secularization as the inevitable outcome of the proliferation of plausibility structures but we may take his thesis in a new direction, looking at the increasingly common phenomenon of multiple religious belonging and hybridity.⁴

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² Berger, *The Heretical Imperative*, 17.
³ Berger, *The Heretical Imperative*, 27. Italics in original.
Multiculturalism is normative in Canadian society. With the proliferation of various ethnic and national groups in Canada, the general societal emphasis on liberalism and individuality, and the commonality of intermarriage among various groups, the lines between groups are becoming increasingly blurred; the boundaries increasingly permeable. The same trajectory can be witnessed in religious communities as well. The notion of multiple religious belonging or hybridity, once practically unheard of and considered “heretical” is now becoming more pervasive. Catherine Cornille points out that relying on one set of religious truths or the truths of only one religious tradition is no longer self-evident.\(^5\) Indeed numerous authors confirm the prevalence of multiple religious belonging in Japan, Sri Lanka, and China.\(^6\) Focusing on the West, Cornille notes the present tension within Christianity between the increasingly individualistic ethic of the members and the all-encompassing truth claims. While her particular volume focuses on Christianity, we can witness the same dynamic within Judaism. As will be noted shortly, many scholars within Jewish studies are now referring to Jewish identity through a constructivist approach wherein the individual constructs his identity from practices, traditions, and values he finds personally meaningful.\(^7\) If this is indeed the case and the individual is gathering

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\(^6\) See *Many Mansions?: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity*.

from various sources that which comprises his own tradition or worldview, we must ask about the boundaries within which the individual does this selecting. How long will it be before the individual Canadian Jew moves outside of what is normatively regarded as Judaism and selects aspects from Buddhism or Hinduism to comprise her identity? Can we still label this Judaism authentic? Does such a construct even exist?

While Cornille notes that one’s “primary tradition” will likely inform the belonging in other traditions, true multiple religious belonging will take place, first of all, when the individual identifies fully with another tradition. In order to accomplish this, the individual must first realize true pluralism in which one recognizes each religion as a different expression of the same reality or ultimate experience. Secondly, the individual must use the language of one religion to interpret the symbols and meanings of another.

Finally, for true hybridity, one must “recognize the complementarity of religions”; that they exist alongside one another. Thus, true multiple religious belonging or hybridity is not syncretism (the blending of more than one tradition to create a completely new construct) nor is it the idea of a Jewish or Christian person incorporating some Buddhist meditation into her practice, for example, though the latter may be the first step along the path to true hybridity. Examining

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the question of self and identity can shed light on this question of hybridity; how
an individual views herself and what sources does that individual galvanize in
order to create her sense of self.

**Construction of the Self**

We use words like ‘self’ and ‘identity’ on a quotidian basis, often referring
to the process of ‘finding one’s self’. Yet scholars now recognize that to speak of
the self as a singular unity is fallacious. Indeed, academics across a variety of
disciplines: social psychology, philosophy, and sociology recognize that the
individual person constructs his ‘self’ or selves from a variety of disparate
sources. Identity is a construct of plurality even within the singular individual.
Daphna Oyserman and Hazel Rose Markus recognize a “collection of conceptions
of self” within each individual and note that, of these conceptions “some are
tentative, fleeting, and peripheral, others are highly elaborated and function as
enduring, meaning-making or interpretive structure that help individuals lend
coherence to their own life-experiences.”\(^{12}\) Referring to the self, Morny Joy cites
Derrida’s concept of *différance* which signifies the “impossibility of absolute or
final pronouncements regarding any entity – be it Being itself or of personal
identity.”\(^{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Daphna Oyserman and Hazel Rose Markus, “The sociocultural self,” in J. Suls (ed.),
*Psychological Perspectives on the Self: The self in Social perspective* (4 vols; New Jersey:

Furthermore, scholars recognize that the selves with which we identify are constructed in dialogue with the other. Charles Taylor notes that “one is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it.”

For Taylor, selves only emerge from what he calls a “web of interlocution”. The self is defined in terms of background frameworks against which the individual makes moral judgments.

What differentiates us from our forbears is just that we don’t see all such questions as framed in these terms as a matter of course. But this also means that our identities, as defined by whatever gives us our fundamental orientation, are in fact complex and many-tiered. We are all framed by what we see as universally valid commitments and also by what we understand as particular identifications. We often declare our identity as defined by only one of these, because this is what is salient in our lives. But in fact our identity is deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible articulations of it.

Thus, our ‘selves’ are ever-evolving, constructed from a variety of sources dependent on our interpersonal histories and identifications. Taylor argues that selves are constructed through dialogue and through narrative, i.e. making sense or understanding our selves is an on-going process of construction and narrative. This process is never complete as our situations, dialogues, identifications, and spatial orientations change throughout the course of our lives.

Some scholars speak in terms of self-1 and selves-2. Rom Harré avers that there are two aspects of self, the “continuous unified psychological social singularity (self-1) and a cluster of discontinuous and diverse psychological and

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social multiplicities (selves-2).”\textsuperscript{18} The self-1 is that which constructs the narrative, does the reflecting, and manages the multiple selves-2, according to what is salient temporally and spatially. Oyserman and Markus speak of the “socially embedded self” in which there is an overlap and interweaving of “historical, national, economic, ethnic, gender, social class, religious, family, friends…all interweave to create the complex socially embedded self”.\textsuperscript{19} Thus the self-1 constructs “itself”. “The resulting self is some melding, collaging, or weaving together of one’s various sociocultural influences. For example, being Asian American is experienced not as separate from being a woman or separate from being a 19-year old, but from the perspective of a 19-year old Asian American woman.”\textsuperscript{20}

Within feminist thought and critical race theory, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw uses the theory of intersectionality to explain the complex interplay of factors and causes the interaction of which shapes the identities and social environments for Black women.\textsuperscript{21} Intersectionality argues for the rejection of the notion that identity is a single causal factor, asserting that race, class, sexuality, and, by extension, religion, are merely tools for understanding identities, but not identities in and of themselves.\textsuperscript{22} While this theory was not originally intended

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{19} Oyserman and Markus, “The sociocultural self,” 93.
\textsuperscript{20} Oyserman and Markus, “The sociocultural self,” 95.
\textsuperscript{22} Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins,” 358.
\end{footnotesize}
for application in the arena of Jewish thought or studies, it is nevertheless both applicable and insightful.

Cultural critic Stuart Hall now speaks in terms, not of temporal identity, but of a spatial one. (i.e. one’s identity changes and is contingent upon where one is, one’s context, the role one plays, and the position one occupies). “Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies.”

Given this construction of self or selves from a variety of social frameworks, we must ask what the implications are for those social frameworks. Specifically examining Canadian Judaism, how does this sense of a constructed, dialogical self impact Judaism in the 21st century? If a postmodern Jewish individual is constructing her identity, perhaps taking aspects of Judaism as one part of that identity at various times and in various places, does this leave Judaism open to hybridity and multiple religious belonging or is there some sort of boundary wherein Judaism stops being “authentic”?

Within the social science of Jewish identity, there has been a methodological shift over the past few decades. While identity was once examined in terms of assimilationist, generational, or survivalist models, scholars like Bethamie Horowitz, Arnold Eisen and Steven Cohen are discussing Jewish

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identity using a constructivist approach. Israel Scheffler noted the primary fallacy to which sociologists fall prey: believing that there is a fixed normative form of identification. 24 So too does Laurence J. Silberstein assert the need to avoid essentialist definitions of Jewish identity. 25 Just as scholars recognize that the self is constructed from a variety of sources and will change and evolve depending on time and place, scholars of Jewish studies also posit a constructed Jewish self.

For Michael Krausz, identity is that which follows as “an individual emerges through the processes of social interaction, not a relatively fixed end product but as one who is constituted and reconstituted through the various discursive practices in which they participate.” 26 Herbert C. Kelman notes that an individual’s connection to his Jewishness depends on the extent to which he internalizes and amalgamates his Jewish heritage into the center of his personal identity. 27

Many North American Jews express their Jewishness in ways that are personally meaningful and less based in religion or ethnicity. 28 Cohen and Eisen assert that Jews celebrate the ability to make choices and create their own

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28 See Bethamie Horowitz, “Reframing the Study of Contemporary American Jewish Identity,” in Contemporary Jewry 23 (2002), 22; idem, Connections and Journey; Cohen and Eisen, The Jew Within.
journeys and do not question the authenticity of said choices or journeys. “The Judaism to which she is currently attached is not one that she has simply grown into or inherited, but one that she herself has fashioned from the large repertoire of possibilities available.”

Jews..., compared to predecessors a generation or two ago, define themselves far less by denominational boundaries (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox) or institutional loyalties (Hadassah, Jewish community centers, synagogues). Their Jewish identities are not constituted by organizational activity, do not center on concern for the state of Israel, and do not arise out of anxiety about anti-Semitism. Nor do they manifest any traditional sort of Jewish religious commitment (particular beliefs in God or revelation or the chosenness of Israel). Nor did we meet many individuals who expressed their Jewish commitment primarily by performing a fixed set of behaviours.

These assertions follow Taylor’s argument that while our selves are necessarily created against a backdrop of frameworks, “no framework is shared by everyone, can be taken for granted as the framework tout court…”

A Challenge to Monolithic Judaism

It is an oft-proposed assertion that modernity, sparked by the French Revolution, caused a radical shift in Judaism. And indeed, this is far from a specious claim. Count Clermont-Tonnerre outlined in 1789, “The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals.” With this statement, he delineated an era of open choice and, with it, the proliferation of identity and identification possibilities for Jews, one that continues today. The

29 Cohen and Eisen, The Jew Within, 14.
31 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 17. Italics in original.
modern Jew had a new choice, he could remain a Jew as he had been before but be denied the rights of a modern European citizen, or he could give up the totality of Jewishness (nation, religion, and peoplehood) to become an equal citizen. Thus, Judaism was no longer the whole story, but rather a religion, that which was fundamental but only a part of the story, one that left room for interpretation.

While this is certainly an appropriate characterization of the change for the individual that was brought by modernity, it is vital to recognize that, just as the self is fluid and constructed from a variety of discrepant elements, so too must Jewish history, society, and culture be recognized as heterogeneous. If we are indeed to approach the question of multiple religious belonging and plurality, we must first recognize that there is no singular entity that is Judaism.

In 2006, Judaism is neither a state religion nor an ethnic religion. It is neither solely a nation nor is it solely a religion. One can be a practicing Jew without being born Jewish, without speaking Hebrew, and without living in the state of Israel. Because one can become Jewish through conversion, Judaism cannot be solely a matter of ethnicity. But not all those halakhically Jewish (born to a Jewish mother) practice Judaism. There are also Jews who continue to identify as Jews but who are practicing Buddhists, for example. Furthermore, there exists great division within Judaism between the various denominations. The ultra-Orthodox Jews do not recognize the legitimacy of the practices of Conservative or Reform Jews while Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox disagree on essential aspects of the Jewish tradition. Therefore, we cannot speak of Judaism as a
monolithic whole. We must instead refer to Judaisms and specify about which one we speak. Not only that, we must speak of any Judaism in historiographical context.

Even before the modern era, Judaism was not a static entity. While Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, two preeminent scholars in the field of Jewish studies assert that, “[i]ntegrated in western, secular culture, contemporary Jews do not, as their forbears did, conduct their lives according to norms and criteria exclusively derived from Judaism and the Jewish experience…”, they did not specify what they meant by “Jewish experience”.  

It is true that Jews would not have questioned their Jewish identities as Jews might today, yet to talk of an exclusively Jewish experience is certainly contentious.

**Historical Precedents**

In his essay on Hellenistic Judaism, Erich S. Gruen demonstrates that the permeable boundaries of the ‘Jewish experience’ have a precedent that goes back two thousand years. Examining Jewish culture in Hellenistic times, Gruen illustrates how Jews borrowed from the Greek culture and used Greek paradigms and models to distinguish Jewish identity. For example, Jews used Greek epic poetry to promote Jewish ideals. Thus, what was then Jewish culture could not be separated out so neatly from the dominant culture of the society. This fact in

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itself points to methodological uncertainty for, as Gruen notes, there was not any “pure strain of Greek culture” either.  

Gruen notes that “Judaism’, it need hardly be said, is at least as complex and elastic as term [as Hellenism]. The institution defies uniform definition. And changes over time, as in all religions render any effort to capture its essence at a particular moment highly problematic.” Furthermore, Gruen asserts that embracing the Hellenic culture reinforced rather than diluted Jewish identity.

Gruen contradicts assertions of impermeable Jewish culture. “The Jews forever refashioned their identity and adjusted their self-perception with an eye to the cultural milieu in which they found themselves.” Just as Jews today see their identities as part of a journey, one that continues to evolve and is constructed based upon both temporal and spatial variables, so too does this paradigm hold for Jews two thousand years ago, perhaps not necessarily on an individual basis, but nevertheless proving a lack of mutual exclusivity between Jewishness and the outside cultural norms.

Raymond P. Scheindlin supports this idea of a long standing interaction within Jewish identity and the paradigms of the host culture. Scheindlin notes that Jews in the Muslim Mediterranean basin from the seventh to sixteenth centuries eagerly embraced Arab language and culture just as they had adopted

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38 Gruen, “Hellenistic Judaism,” 123.
Hellenistic culture earlier. “The Jews were similar to Muslims in most aspects of style, ideas, and taste, and their leaders were affected by the same intellectual trends in theology, philosophy, and literature; furthermore, Jews of all classes benefited from the prosperity of the Islamic world.”

The Jews of this era were not a marginal community; they were not citizens of the Islamic state but were protected under the law as People of the Book. Scheindlin highlights a perfect example of the synthesis of two cultures. Though the Jews and Muslims shared Arabic as a common language, the Jews used Hebrew characters to write the Arabic language. Scheindlin writes of “the Arabization of the Jewish culture” wherein the Jews added Arabic models and techniques to their practice of poetry, to cite but one example. The community was autonomous and self-governing and could freely adopt Arabic forms with impunity because there was no fear of losing Jewish identity.

Jews of early Christian Europe did not live isolated in ghettos but rather were free to intermingle with their neighbors. This group also used paradigms of the host culture to express their own Jewish identity and version of Judaism. Ivan G. Marcus argues against the notion that violence and persecution were the primary narratives of the Jews and notes that the Jews and Christians were


41 Scheindlin, “Merchants and Intellectuals,” 361.

42 Scheindlin, “Merchants and Intellectuals,” 361.
“socially interdependent” in this time of great creativity. Marcus argues against another common paradigm in Jewish studies, the lachrymose conception of history. He asserts that persecution, though certainly present, was sporadic.

Through Marcus’ discussion of the interaction between the Jews and the Christians, we can see another example of a refutation of Jewish isolation. Marcus’ concept of “inward acculturation” does point to a strong Jewish identity but one that adopts and internalizes Christian paradigms, genres, and forms. Just as had occurred during the Second Temple era and in the Middle Ages under Muslim control, the Jews maintained a strong Jewish identity, yet it was an identity that was affected by the surrounding culture. To accurately speak of Jewish identity in these times requires recognition of the permeable boundaries that existed and the appropriation of paradigms from the surrounding culture.

**Authentic Judaism?**

Ultimately, we cannot look at the question of Judaism as a whole. Just as the individual Jewish person constructs herself, so too are various denominations and conceptions within Judaism constructed from a wealth of sources. Speaking

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44 The term was coined by Salo W. Baron who adamantly asserted its inaccuracy and fervently denounced its ubiquitous use by Jewish historians. See Salo W. Baron, “Ghetto and Emancipation: Shall We Revise the Traditional View?” *The Menorah Journal* 14.6, (1928), 515.

45 The idea that Jews resisted the outside culture by creating a strong, cohesive Jewish identity and then expressing it with the host culture’s models.

in generalities simply ignores the vast differences and various evolutions of each tradition.

Thus, it may be argued that Jewish particularism is methodologically litigious. Reflective of poststructuralism, we are here rejecting the essentialist view of Jewish identity in any of its forms (be they individual, cultural, or religious). Jean-François Lyotard argued for the rejection of “metanarratives.” Here too, the existence of a Jewish metanarrative must be called into question and with it, the sagacity of positing Jewish particularism.

Yet given this variety, this vast array of possibilities from which both individual Jews construct their identities and from which various concepts of Judaism are constructed, must there not be some sort of authentic core? If every aspect of Judaism is a specific blend or a personal collection, does this negate the notion of authenticity within Judaism entirely?

Claims of authenticity abound. One merely has to execute a perfunctory internet search to find a handful of examples.

These missionaries, (Jews for Jesus, Chosen People Ministries and a host of other such organizations), share the belief that Jesus was Messiah and G-d. In so doing, they are espousing a belief system which is Christian, not Jewish. You should know: Jewish scholars and religious leaders from all four streams of

48 Metanarratives are narratives or theories that offer a comprehensive explanation for an entire culture or phenomenon.
49 While the scholarly accuracy of much of the material on the internet can certainly be called into question, if not serious doubt, these examples demonstrate the ubiquity of the concept of authenticity as seen on a quotidian basis.
Judaism agree that ‘Hebrew-Christian’ is in no way related to authentic Judaism.  

But he had also found another great rabbi with whom he allied himself. Rabbi Samson Rafael Hirsch (1808-1888), who had just arrived in Frankfurt to head a tiny group of Orthodox Jews aiming at legally separating themselves from the general Reform congregation so that authentic Judaism could be practiced and perpetuated in Frankfurt.

The author does a good job expressing her difficulty in being a Jew and a Buddhist, and then tries to squeeze in a few ideas that try to bring the two together. I have studied Judaism for many years and I can say that she doesn't really know much about Authentic Judaism all she knows is what a Jew is in the modern western world, but that is not true Judaism.

At the same time, the form of Judaism commonly practiced today is not authentic Judaism but “Talmudism.”

Speaking about authenticity, Stuart Charmé notes that “[i]n its basic form, this model of associating authentic Jewish identity with the essence of Jewish tradition is rooted in the German romantic idea of volksgeist, or ‘spirit of a people’, which treats an ethnic, national, or religious group as a distinct species with its own unique cultural outlook to which it tries to remain true.” Tradition then becomes the expression of that volksgeist and authenticity, by extension, is connected to faithfulness to that tradition, viewed as largely homogeneous.

“Located in some idealized past, this tradition offers a means to resist the alienating and corrupting effects of other cultures or modern civilization in general.”

Authenticity has been defined in light of this idealized past by adherence to a proposed ‘normative’ set of actions and values. This construct is obvious when examining earlier formulations of the study of Jewish identity wherein a fixed, normative set of behaviours was the measurement for the salience of one’s Jewishness. Charmé cites Ephraim Shmueli who suggests that the question of Judaism’s essence, or “authentic” Judaism, frequently occurs when there is a dearth of communal consensus within the ‘tradition’ and “when borders between acceptable and unacceptable practices have become unbearably fuzzy.”

Through this assertion, we can see how authenticity would now be an issue with this notion of hybridity becoming more pervasive. The fear of assimilation ties into this issue and will be discussed momentarily.

Yet even if we recognize a lack of essentialism within Judaism, we must also understand the possible parameters. “Here we should distinguish essentialism – the doctrine that there are ahistorically fixed conditions for a thing to be that thing – from what, at particular moments in historical evolution, are

taken to be necessary conditions for a thing to be that thing.”

Thus, there must be certain requisite aspects of the Judaisms, perhaps not all-encompassing, but certainly within the various denominations and constructions. Charmé posits that “the pluralism of American Judaism is an implicit testimony to the idea of multiple forms of authentic Jewishness.” But is every version of Judaism acceptable?

Charles Liebman adamantly and resoundingly said no. In his book The Ambivalent American Jew, Liebman argued that, in order to be authentic, the basis for understanding modern Judaism had to be “traditional Judaism” which he understood as the chiefly European, pre-modern, text-based organization of Jewish praxis and values. Thus, Liebman does posit an authentic, essentialist Judaism, calling for a return to foundational constructions of Jewish identity, fearing above all the “absurd” notion that “there are as many Jewish identities and as many paths to them as there are Jews.” He quotes Rabbi Joseph Glaser: “If we are to survive…we must have some kind of a base. For this to be provided, we have to know who is committed to the basics of Judaism, so that when…they represent us, we will know that they are doing so Jewishly. To allow for less is to

eliminate authenticity and put integrity at severe risk. There is a line. Its name is Commitment.”

Potential Criteria for Authenticity

Liebman’s criteria for authentic Judaism is “commitment” to “traditional Judaism”. Livia Bitton-Jackson avers that the core criterion for Jewish authenticity is “its perpetual, ongoing prophetic encounter with God.” “From the early days of their emergence as a people, the Jews have defined themselves within the context of this relationship. All inner struggles of the Jews as a people have focused around their ethical concepts - their multifaceted interpretations of their dialogue with God.” Yet while this is certainly a pervasive aspect for many versions of Judaism, it does not hold for all of them. Secular Zionism does not focus upon an ethical engagement with God. While one might argue that this is beyond the scope of religion, it is possible to counter that argument by bringing up Reconstructionism. A relatively new expression of Judaism, and still limited to a handful of congregations in Canada, Reconstructionist Jews do not hold belief in God as a necessary condition of their practice. Beyond

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64 Bitton-Jackson, “Women and Feminism,” 85.
Reconstructionism, not all Jews believe in a traditionally Jewish (i.e. theistic) conception of God, nor, for that matter do all Jews profess belief in a god at all.\textsuperscript{65}

Are there proposed identity criteria that are more inclusive, perhaps more theoretical? Indeed both Jewish studies scholar Krausz and Raimon Panikkar, a leader in the Hindu-Christian dialogue, offer a dualistic conception of what it means to belong to the specific religious group. Krausz recognizes that “there is no essence of the Jewish people as such. Rather, there are people in Jewish positions, or positions that are bestowed as Jewish. Jewishness is understood as a set of characteristic positions in which certain people are cast or ascribed – by themselves and by others.”\textsuperscript{66} Krausz avers that Jewishness requires ascription by both self and others. Panikkar, in his discussion of Christianity, posits the same type of criteria, that we cannot rely on an entirely objective method (for Judaism, identity as prescribed by Halakhah) or the strictly subjective method (personal feeling). For Panikkar, the answer must be pluralistic wherein there is a convergence of personal confession (personal recognition of belonging) and acceptance by the community.\textsuperscript{67} Neither context nor content need be fixed.

“Christian identity expressed itself differently in different times and places, according precisely to the peculiar self-understanding of both individual


\textsuperscript{66} Krausz, “On Being Jewish,” 266. Italics in original.

and community. \textsuperscript{68} In this way, identity is dialectic and recognizes no absolute boundaries. Panikkar cites Hindu identification to shed light on the Christian case (which, in turn, will inform the Jewish one). Just like his argument for Christian identity, a Hindu is not defined by her beliefs or practices but rather by confession that she is indeed a Hindu and by acceptance into the Hindu community. “It is well known that a theist, a deist, a polytheist, an atheist, etc., all can be Hindus without finding any conflict or contradiction therein.” \textsuperscript{69} And while he recognizes that one cannot equate Christianity with Hinduism, he does point out that Eastern Orthodox, Catholics, and Baptists would all recognize each other as Christians. \textsuperscript{70}

However, there is a problem with making a direct parallel to the Jewish scenario. There is a decided genetic factor to Jewish inclusion. Every person born to a Jewish mother is Jewish. \textsuperscript{71} Thus with this simple assertion, wherein Panikkar recognizes the ways in which Christian identity differs from Jewish identity, the problematic nature of trying to categorize Judaism becomes highlighted. Being Jewish is not just a religious identity; therefore, questions of religious belonging become increasingly complex.

Returning to Krausz’s assertion of Judaism by descent and assent, Krausz asks two questions: the question of descent is “how to identify a Jew versus a non-Jew?” while assent refers to “how do we characterize someone’s

\textsuperscript{68} Panikkar “On Christian Identity,” 123.
\textsuperscript{69} Panikkar “On Christian Identity,” 125.
\textsuperscript{70} Panikkar “On Christian Identity,” 125.
\textsuperscript{71} Some denominations also recognize the legitimacy of patrilineal descent but that criterion is not ubiquitous.
Jewishness? Krausz maintains that by descent, Jewishness centers on the Halakhically prescribed aspects of Jewish identity: matrilineal descent or conversion, and lacks any correlation to any particular beliefs a Jew might have or practices in which he might be involved. Jewishness by assent, however, involves “identifying oneself with a history of a people, heritage, tradition, or culture”. Further, “one is Jewish if one identifies with Jewish history as one’s own.” Yet Krausz notes, as has been shown here, a multiplicity of Jewish histories. There is no singular Jewish history. Therefore, even this criterion does not denote singularity.

Furthermore, one must also ask about the group ‘Jews for Jesus’ or Messianic Jews who do identify with Jewish history yet assert belief in Jesus as the messiah. Would Krausz include these Jews as Jewish by assent? Perhaps this is where Panikkar’s categorization fits more appropriately. These individuals may have a sincere confession of Jewishness yet would likely not be recognized by the community.

While it may be impossible and even deleterious to posit criteria for authenticity that would encompass all aspects of Judaism, Efraim Shmueli’s delineation of three fallacies to which Jewish historians commonly fall prey should serve as a warning of erring on the side of relativism. The first fallacy is the trap of taking the concepts from one period and arguing them as archetypal for

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all cultures. The second fallacy illustrates one of the relativistic traps: viewing the entirety of the tradition as transhistorical, i.e. all concepts are equally valuable. Modernity created the stage for the final fallacy, that of radical relativism, emphasizing a complete lack of consistency, positing that, as Liebman feared, everything done or thought by a Jew is considered authentic to Judaism.

Once again we should recall the differentiation made by Krausz between essentialism as the doctrine positing “ahistorically fixed conditions” for Judaism and the “necessary conditions” within particular historical moments that make certain aspects of Judaism what they are.

**The Question of Assimilation**

Returning to Liebman’s emphasis on commitment, it is clear that part of Liebman’s push for a return to “traditional Judaism” stems from fear of the dissolution of Judaism through assimilation and loss of continuity. It is possible that some might parallel hybridity and assimilation, seeing the two as part of the same diluted trajectory. Yet even the concept of assimilation must be called into question. Krausz avers that there is nothing inherently wrong with assimilation because, by its very nature, assimilation cannot denote betrayal of any essential essence of Judaism.

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76 Shmueli, *Seven Jewish Cultures*, 2.
77 Shmueli, *Seven Jewish Cultures*, 2.
This assertion reinforces the polemic of Gerson Cohen whose lecture on "the blessings of assimilation" has as its thesis that assimilation and acculturation have acted as stimuli to continuity and ingenuity. Cohen stresses the need to challenge the conventional beliefs that Jewish survival and vitality are resultant of a strict faithfulness in the past to the "all basic traditional forms". In order to refute this, he cites a claim by Bar Kappara (and includes the popular interpretation thereof) who announced that Jews were redeemed from Egypt because they retained their Hebrew names, they did not change their language, and they kept their distinctive form of dress. Cohen refutes each of these in turn. The Hebrews did change their names to Egyptian names. New languages were adopted as well. In Mishnaic times most Jews did not speak Hebrew but rather spoke Aramaic and Greek. Under Muslim rule, as previously mentioned Jews spoke Arabic. Rashi’s French commentaries are renowned, while Yiddish is a form of German. Clearly there has been no exclusively Jewish language.

Cohen cites Elias Bickerman who notes that the Alexandrian Jews were the only community to survive as a culture precisely because they were able to adapt it. The Septuagint is an example of an adaptation that permitted survival

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82 Cohen, “The Blessings of Assimilation,” 147.
84 Cohen, “The Blessings of Assimilation,” 149.
and longevity. Because of the translation into Greek, the text remained accessible to the people, whose language had changed as has been shown, and to the outside culture. Cohen illustrates that even our modern critical view of assimilation must be called into question.

**Hybridity: The Next Step in Jewish Construction?**

As much as one might understand the concern about complete dissolution of Jewish identity and assimilation, it is vital to recognize that hybridity does not mean assimilation. Hybridity involves maintaining the Jewish identity as well as incorporating another religious tradition.

Krausz notes that a Jew who converts to another religion is still considered a Jew. Because of the unique construction of Jewish identity, a construct which can include religion, ethnicity, nationhood, peoplehood, and culture, perhaps Judaism is more readily adaptable to the question of hybridity. Examining the case of Japanese multiple religious belonging, Jan van Bragt notes that the Japanese people have been living for fifteen hundred years with multiple religions and that within Shinto, it is the social group, the family, that is the subject of the religion. “A Japanese “belongs” to the Shinto religion by the fact of birth in Japan, very like a Jew belongs to the Judaic religion by the fact of belonging to

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87 Though it is possible that the issue of exogamy and the accompanying fear of utter dissolution of Judaism that might stem from it alter the nature of this challenge.
the Jewish race.”

We will not take the time here to delve into the problematic nature of referring to “the Jewish race”, but what is important to note is that this notion opens up the possibility of viewing Jewishness as one factor within multiple religious belonging.

Thus, returning to this question of hybridity, can a Canadian Jew remain committed to Judaism, to her version of her Jewish identity, and still venture beyond Judaism to explore other faiths? Halakhically, the answer is yes.

The concept of Jewish identity, interpreted strictly as the halakhic concept of Jewishness, has a curious affinity with the philosophical concept of identity. For both are permanent traits, eradicated only when the person is. No matter what changes I undergo, it is I who undergoes them and one of these cannot be a change of mother. So I remain me and I remain my mother’s child, that is, Jewish, so long as I exist.

John B. Cobb Jr. recognizes three types of Multiple Religious Belonging: the person in one tradition who is attracted to aspects of another tradition, i.e. the Jew who practices Zen mediation; the convert who seeks to discover his original tradition; and those who explore religiosity without any initial tradition of their own. Examining this first construct, the Jew who is proudly Jewish, though perhaps not religious, could seek out other aspects of other traditions to further her own sense of religiosity or spirituality. This move is precisely what Judith Linzer demonstrates in her book *Torah and Dharma: Jewish Seekers in Eastern Traditions*. Linzer’s study shows a number of Jews who are strongly connected to

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91 Beyond any possibly destructive connotations, there are multiple racial groups represented within Judaism: Sephardim, Ashkenazim, for example.
their Jewish heritage though seek out an enhanced sense of spirituality that they feel is missing from their practice of Judaism.\textsuperscript{94}

Cobb Jr. understands that individuals may feel it is impossible to completely surrender to a single tradition if they find aspects of that tradition antithetical to them and therefore he sees hybridity as a new possible option.\textsuperscript{95} This paradigm fits with the current construction of the Jewish self, one who picks and chooses what is personally meaningful. Cobb Jr. is positing the possibility of individuals venturing outside the traditional array of choices (i.e. those within the various forms of Judaism) and including aspects of other religious traditions among the possibilities to be selected.

With the profusion of cultural and religious information available to us and the individualistic dynamic in our society, hybridity becomes a feasible option for those seeking to make religiosity or spirituality personally meaningful to them. Less bound by what may be considered traditional belonging, multiple religious belonging, or at least experimentation, offers a potentially exciting invitation into a new spiritual paradigm. This notion follows Francis Clooney who notes that “in contemplation we construct a path of religious belonging that suits our own spiritual imagining; we do this according to our traditions but also

\textsuperscript{94} See Judith Linzer, \textit{Torah and Dharma: Jewish Seekers in Eastern Traditions} (New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1996).

\textsuperscript{95} Cobb Jr., “Multiple Religious Belonging and Reconciliation,” 20.
the possibilities available in our time and place.”96 Yet Clooney argues that we cannot create these new paths without first recognizing our original framework (to borrow Taylor’s language) and how that framework functions in shaping our identities.97 Thus, returning to Taylor, the individual must have access to the language of the culture in order to be in the position to reject it.98

Given the nature of Jewish self-construction, it is possible to examine many constructions of Jewishness as having hybrid characteristics, though perhaps most would subsume the category of intra-religious hybridity. If we can extrapolate from the American case, we can apply Wade Clark Roof’s notion of the “spiritual marketplace” to Canadian Jews as well. Roof noted that what characterizes American religiosity is the individual spiritual quest; looking beyond the traditional boundaries of religious institutions and borrowing elements from the various practices that have become available to them.99 A possible example of this intra-religious hybridity is Jewish Renewal which defines itself as “transdenominational” and incorporates aspects of ecological awareness, feminism, acceptance of gay and lesbian participants, meditation, mysticism, and ancient wisdom.100 This movement is yet another illustration of the evolution of

97 Clooney, “God for Us,” 52.
98 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 140.
Jewish consciousness and organization and an attempt to offer something personally meaningful to modern Jews.

**The Future of Jewish Identity: In-Between the Boundaries**

This paper began with an exploration of Berger’s *Heretical Imperative* and its relevance for religiosity today. Yet while the proliferation of possible identity choices is indeed in keeping with Berger’s thesis, he did not recognize that this multiplicity of options does not necessarily negate the original identity of the one making the choices.

Suddenly, to be Jewish emerged as one choice among others. Ethnicity internally and anti-Semitism externally served to brake this development, but it went quite far in central and western Europe in the nineteenth century. The fullest development was reached in America in the twentieth century. Today, within the pluralistic dynamic of American society, there must be very few individuals for whom being Jewish has the quality of a taken-for-granted fact.  

Simply because Judaism is a choice among many, does not mean that is does not still compromise an intrinsic aspect of an individual’s identity. Berger’s last statement calls into question the entire connection to tradition, family, and culture. He is also, by extension, positing his own version of Jewish essentialism. Simply because the pluralistic dynamic exists does not negate the identity. Indeed, this is surely part of the reason for Berger’s aforementioned rejection of his secularization hypothesis.  

Being Jewish may still be a “taken-for-granted” fact for the majority of Jews. It becomes a question of how they practice their Judaism, how they construct their Jewish selves, and what Judaism means as a

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102 See Berger, “Secularization and De-secularization.”
personal journey to them. Not only have the Jews changed with the pluralistic society, but Judaism has and will continue to as well. Identity, as has been shown, is not merely found within a culture or within the variations of that culture, it is also found in the intersection of more than one aspect of a person’s identification and is most often a construction of factors unique to that individual.

Isaac Deutscher’s famous polemic “The Non-Jewish Jew” provides examples of men (Freud, Spinoza, and Marx) who “transcended Judaism and went beyond Jewry to the highest ideals of mankind.”\textsuperscript{103} It is in their very act of transcending the confines of Jewry that these individuals were able to seek out and articulate a universal ethic or spirit.

Though Deutscher dismisses the idea of a specific Jewish “genius”, thus dismissing essentialism, he does assert that these non-Jewish Jews are actually an accurate reflection of a fundamental characteristic of Jews.

They “dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures. Their mind matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other. Each of them was in society and yet not in, of it and yet not of it. It was this that enabled them to rise [above] their societies, above their nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future.”\textsuperscript{104}

It is this dynamic that allowed these men to accomplish what they did, not confined to an essentialist dogma, they were able to grasp other parts of their cultures and use them to engender new ideas. While it would be fallacious to claim hybridity in these cases, the point of this inclusion is to demonstrate the

\textsuperscript{103} Isaac Deutscher, \textit{The Non-Jewish Jew and other Essays} (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 22.

\textsuperscript{104} Deutscher, \textit{The Non-Jewish Jew}, 27.
possibility, and indeed perhaps the necessity, of transcending boundaries to find one’s true genius, or, a construction of one’s true self.

This particular thesis parallels Homi K. Bhabha’s assertion that cultural identity is found in the ‘in-between’ space,\(^{105}\) perhaps like Derrida’s *différance*. For Bhabha, it is in this in-between space, where hybridity becomes reality, that culture is truly articulated, where both the fluidity and evolution of the culture and the construction of the self are recognized. “The theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an *international* culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the *diversity* of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s *hybridity*.”\(^{106}\) Therefore, not only does this lack of essentialism in Judaism become recognized, it is welcomed for its ability to open itself and its adherents up to a new culture entirely. Thus, the question of authenticity becomes one of recognition of the process of transformation and negotiation.

Rather, authenticity is not about finding one's ‘true self’ or the ‘real tradition’ but about maintaining an honest view of the process by which we construct the identities and traditions we need to survive. It requires lucidity about the lack of essence of all identities, and vigilance against the idea that it can be realized. A position can be authentically Jewish only by realizing its own potential inauthenticity: that it is historical, may be given different meanings at different moments in history, and becomes fixed or congealed only at the price of bad faith. Authenticity is surely not present when it is claimed to have been fixed, or acquired. But it may be glimpsed in moments of self-awareness of the inevitable process of deconstructing and reconstructing all cultural identities.\(^{107}\)

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\(^{105}\) Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 38.

\(^{106}\) Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 38. Italics in original.

With respect to authenticity, Kelman is more concerned with the authentic individual than the authentic group construct. A personal identity is inauthentic when the individual simply adopts roles based on the expectations of others.\textsuperscript{108} An authentic identity implies that the individual has taken the roles and expectations given from social, dialogical interaction and incorporated them into her own personal construction of her self.\textsuperscript{109} Thus, if we cannot accurately speak of a singular authentic Judaism, perhaps we can recognize an authentic Jew as one who looks to aspects within the various traditions of Judaism to construct what is personally authentic to him or her self.\textsuperscript{110}

The possibility of Jewish hybridity emerges out of the genuine recognition of a lack of both essentialist Judaism and a static, singular self. As has been demonstrated, Judaism has evolved and changed, adopted new forms and borrowed from ‘host’ cultures. Many individual Jews in Canada are committed to finding their own personal journeys and meaning both within Judaism (whatever that means to them) and within the larger society. Hybridity may turn out to be a new construction of Judaism, like Jewish Renewal, or it may be less formal, simply be the means by which the individual continues to find his own sense of religiosity and spirituality. What becomes evident is that the multiplicity of

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\textsuperscript{108} Kelman, “The Place of Ethnic Identity,” 7.
\textsuperscript{109} Kelman, “The Place of Ethnic Identity,” 7.
\textsuperscript{110} Though this construction would surely demand recognition by the community as posited by Panikkar and Krausz.
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Judaisms and Jewish selves negates any assertion of a singular authentic Judaism and that true inauthenticity would stem from any entity making this claim.
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