# Gender Gap or Gender Differences? Gender and Political Participation in Canada 

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#### Abstract

Unequal participation in certain types of political engagement creates unequal influence on political and civil matters (Boulianne, 2022). Studies find that men and women tend to do a similar amount of political participation, with women engaging in more private and flexible forms, and men participating in more direct and collective forms (Bode, 2017; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010; Van Duyn et al., 2019; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019). However, more data is needed when considering Canadian trends, especially when it comes to the causes of these trends. In this study, I conduct statistical analysis of secondary data from a February 2021 Canadian survey ( $\mathrm{n}=1,568$ ) designed by Dr. Shelley Boulianne. I determine which forms of political participation have gendered participation gaps and whether or not these are related to conflict avoidance tendencies and having political female role models. I find few gender differences in political participation. Some small gender differences persist in online forms of political participation, such as signing petitions online and commenting on news sites. Men were more likely post comments on news sites, compared to women; women more likely to sign online petitions, compared to men. As such, political participation moves online, the gender gap may be reproducing itself in online spaces.


Keywords: gender; political participation; socialization; conflict-avoidance; role models

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## Introduction

The binary division between men's and women's roles has been apparent and socially enforced for centuries in Westernized cultures. Women's work spheres have been more private and surrounding family well-being, whereas men's spheres have been public and perceived as more essential (Coffé, 2013, p. 325). Although gender quality has increased over time, evidenced by gender-egalitarian law, the political realm often remains male-dominated in terms of political representation and in conventional political participation of citizens (Bäck et al., 2014, p. 505; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 35). There exist "cultures of masculinity" in politics that can be deterrents for people presenting as more feminine (Bäck et al., 2014, p. 507), and even elementary-aged children "associate men and masculine traits with success in politics" (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475).

While some studies find a gender gap in political participation (Beauregard, 2016, p. 92; Bozogáńová \& Vyrost, 2019, p. 121; Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017, p. 191), other studies show gender differences in the forms of political activities that women and men participate in, rather than an overall gap (Bode, 2017, p. 598; Brundidge et al., 2013, p. 13; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45; Van Duyn et al., 2019, p. 10). Altogether, these studies do tend to show that women participate more in private and individual ways than they do in collective, conventional, public forms, which are more prevalent among men (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 370; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45). However, results are not consistent across studies, nor is the literature extensive. There are differences depending on the group in question, the country in which the research is conducted, and other demographic considerations (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 370; Beauregard, 2016, p. 82; Bozogáñová \& Vyrost, 2019, p. 120; Harell \& Panagos, 2013, p. 424).

This quantitative data analysis examines Canadian political participation patterns and the possible effects of female role models and conflict-avoidance tendencies. Throughout the following definition of political participation will be used: "political participation [is] citizens' voluntary activities aimed at influencing other citizens' political views and political institution's policies and leadership, as well as indirectly influencing the political process through participation in politically-oriented networks, groups and organizations" (Boulianne \& Belland, 2021, para. 3). These activities can be offline or online, private or collective (Boulianne \& Belland, 2021, para. 3). Using logistic regression, frequency, and correlational analysis, I examine males' and females' participation in the following political activities, categorized as public or private: marching or demonstrating, political meeting attendance, commenting on news sites, posting political content on social media, contacting officials, political consumerism, voting, and petition signing.

Analyzing the political participation of males and females is important because inequalities in political participation can create unequal influence on political and civil matters, undermining the democratic process (Boulianne, 2022, p. 2). Higher levels of engagement are also linked to numerous beneficial social and political outcomes such as policy changes and community programs (Boulianne, 2022, p. 2). Unfortunately, when it comes to gender and political leadership, most modern democracies do not have equal representation of men and women in politics, even in some of the most gender-egalitarian countries (Bäck et al., 2014, p. 115; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 35), which directly impacts political expression and interests of female citizens and the func-
tioning of democracy itself (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 319; Nir \& MClurg, 2015, p. 561). The greater participation of women, especially in voting, could lead to more females in elected positions since women tend to have less bias against female politicians (Carreras, 2018, p. 43). In turn, this could lead to higher levels of female participation in local politics due to the higher number of female representatives (Coffé, 2013, p. 325). As well, children's subsequent political habits are more affected by their mother's political participation habits than their father's (Dotti Sani \& Quaranta, 2014, p. 272). This means that the participation of mothers bears outcomes on future generations' political participation. For all of these reasons and more, it is important to analyze women's political participation.

## Literature Review

## Gendered Political Socialization

When studying gender and political participation, vital aspects to consider is the reasons for the gender gap or differences. Many studies highlight political socialization or conflict avoidance as possible explanations for their findings (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 371; Beauregard, 2016, p. 87; Bos et al., 2020, p. 477; Carreras, 2018, p. 40; Caudillo, 2017, p. 128; Coffé, 2013, p. 325; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 149; Dotti Sani \& Quaranta, 2014, pp. 264-265; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45). Political socialization is "how children learn not only about the world generally but also about politics," which is a gendered process from youth to adulthood (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475). This process affects how people view politics, often reconstructing it as an activity meant for men.

Participation in politics can be viewed as opposing women's learned traditional gender behaviours because of its inherent conflict (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 149; Bode, 2014, p. 591). Even in the present day, women are socialized to be polite, nice, nurturing, and relationshiporiented, all characteristics that encourage harmonious interactions with others (Bode, 2017, p. 591; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 149). Gender roles have also positioned women in the private and local spheres, which could be related to women's higher levels of interest in local politics and men's in international and national politics (Coffé, 2013, pp. 325, 329). These factors can contribute to political conflict-avoidance and lead to a lack of interest or sense of efficacy in nonlocal politics (Bos et al., 2020, p. 477; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 149).

To study political socialization, some researchers focus on children to analyze gendered political habits (Bos et al., 2020; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019). While Albanesi et al. find no gender differences in adolescent's levels of interest in politics (2012, p. 366), Bos et al. find that elementary-aged girls associate politics with masculinity and perceive it to be a domain more for boys than for girls (2020, p. 475). This could be because female youth tend to receive less support in political matters in school, peer, and home settings than boys do (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475). Perhaps consequently, studies have also found that female youth have less political confidence, interest, and desire for a career in politics than male youth (Bos et al., 2020, pp. 475-477; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45). The authors' findings of gendered political trends and attitudes in children can help to explain gender differences found in adults through a lens of socialization because they remove socio-economic factors such as income and education disparities, which impact adult's
politcal participation behaviours (Bos et al., 2020, pp. 475, 477; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 35).
Likewise, traditional ideologies, including conservatism and traditional gender values, are associated with lower levels of political participation, especially in women (Bozogánová \& Vyrost, 2019, p. 122; Valentova, 2005, pp. 174-175). The family is where identity and attitudes are primarily formed, and therefore, it can be a promoter of these traditional values, especially for girls (Bozzano, 2017, p. 3). Lorenzini and Bassoli find similar results showing that more genderegalitarian attitudes are associated with higher levels of political consumerism for employed and precariously employed women (2015, p. 474). However, studies are not unanimous. While Bozzano does find that higher levels of religiosity are negatively correlated to women's empowerment in politics, she does not find this to be the case for more traditional ideologies (2017, pp. 31-32).

## Gender and Political Participation

Many studies find that men and women tend to have similar levels of political participation; however, they tend to engage in different ways (Bode, 2017, p. 598; Brundidge et al., 2013, p. 13; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45; Van Duyn et al., 2019, p.10). This can be seen in other relevant political measures. For example, Stolle and Gidengil found that women tend to be as knowledgeable, if not more knowledgeable, than men when it comes to practical political knowledge about government benefits and programs that aid in family wellbeing and that have more relevance to the traditional female role in a family (pp. 94, 100). However, men tended to have more traditional political knowledge, such as knowledge about levels of government and names of officials (Fraile, 2014, p. 283; Stolle \& Gidengil, 2010, p. 97, 100). The pattern of women possessing less conventional political knowledge could affect their sense of efficacy and, therefore, their participation in conventional forms of politics.

Women tend to engage in more private and flexible forms of political engagement, including voting and signing petitions, whereas men tend to participate more in collective and direct forms (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330). This is keeping with the findings of Pfanzelt and Spies, who found that girls tend to be more involved in non-institutional forms of political participation like protesting and boycotting, whereas boys tend to do more institutional forms of participation, like campaigning, and expressive actions, such as participating in political discussions (2019, p. 45). Albanesi et al.'s study found that while there were no gender differences in political participation in non-confrontational forms of participation, young men tended to participate more than young women in confrontational forms of political participation such as demonstrating and attending public meetings (2012, p. 370).

Overall, studies of offline behaviours show that men tend to participate more than women in forms of political participation that are public, visible, and coordinated, whereas women tend to participate more in exclusive and flexible forms (Beauvais, 2020, p. 325; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45), with online trends showing corresponding results. As the popularity of online political participation grows, Brundidge et al. find that women are shifting from offline to online activities, effectively widening the offline political participation gender gap (2013, p. 13). Online activities tend to be more flexible and can offer more privacy.

However, online activity trends, like offline trends, are also dependent on the form of par-
ticipation and the working definitions of the activities at hand. When looking at online platforms, Heger and Hoffman find that women tend to engage less overall when compared to men (2019, p. 9), but Bode finds no significant differences besides in two particular activities (2017, p. 598). The discrepancy between Heger and Hoffman's results and those of Bode (2017, p. 598) could be due to the former defining online participation as "the production and distribution of content on the internet that is driven by a political purpose, and directed towards a specific audience ... delineated from passive forms of online behaviours" (2019, p. 3). In contrast, Bode considers both passive and audience-directed forms of online political participation (2017, pp. 593-594). Their working definition of online political participation and their subsequent results further demonstrates that women tend to participate more passively than men.

Likewise, some literature does find an overall gap in political participation between men and women (Beauregard, 2016, p. 92; Bozogáńová \& Vyrost, 2019, p. 121; Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017, p. 191). However, these studies seem to ignore the different forms of participation and instead focus on the types of participation that other research has found to be most popular for men, like campaigning, attending meetings, joining a political party, and demonstrating (Beauregard, 2016, p. 92; Beauvais, 2020, p. 325; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45, Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017, p. 191). While some studies such as Beauregard (2017), Beauvais (2020), Bozogáńová and Vyrost (2019), and Pyeatt and Yanus’ (2017) do show that there are significant gender differences in favour of men in some or most of their measures, most of the forms of participation studied are very public and collective (See Appendix A).

However, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) find that men participate more in almost all political activities, even the flexible and private ones such as voting and boycotting. These results contrast with the very same authors' previous study done in 2010, which shows that women and men participate at similar rates (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330). Their different data collection locations could explain this. Their first study was conducted with participants from 18 different countries, whereas their second study was conducted in the United Kingdom only (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 322; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 140).

Demographic factors can create discrepancies in the findings of some specific forms of political participation as well. Albanesi et al. (2012, p. 370) find no gender gap in meeting attendance for young adults, but other studies consistently find that men attend meetings at higher rates (Beauregard, 2017, p. 92; Beauvais, 2020, p. 262; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 232; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 155; Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017. p. 190). Albanesi studied people ages 16-26, which could lead to different results than those studying the general population (2012, p. 363). Harell and Panagos find that women have higher rates of political party membership, which is contradictory to the results of Beauregard (2017), and Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010; 2017). The locations and scale of these studies could affect their results. Harell and Panagos also find more significant differences in political participation trends between Indigenous people in Canada and the Canadian population as whole than between men and women in either group (Harell \& Panagos, 2013, p. 433). They also found little gender gap in political participation when looking at the Indigenous population (Harell \& Panagos, 2013, p. 424). This finding corresponds with Beauvais', which found no gender gap in Indigenous people's meeting attendance (2020, p. 325).

On a related note, some studies show that participation is also dependent on the level of politics to which it relates. Women tend to comment less on state, national and international news
than men but are more likely than men to comment on local news articles (Van Duyn et al., 2019, p. 10). Coffe's study finds no gender difference in interest in local politics but does find that men have a higher interest in national and international politics than women do (2013, p. 329) Coffé explains some of her results in connection to more female representation in local government than in national or international politics (2013, p. 325), corroborated by research showing a positive correlation between female representation in government and women's rates of opinion expression (Nir and McClurg, 2015, p. 561). These trends can also be connected to social norms specializing women in private and familial spheres (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 320).

In terms of Canadian contexts, few studies focus on Canadian trends specifically. Though Beauregard (2017), Beauvais (2020), Harell and Panagos (2013), Harell (2009), Boulianne (2021), and Nonomura (2016) conduct their studies exclusively in Canada, none of their studies are robust enough to form conclusions about Canadian political participation trends. While Coffé \& Bolzendahl (2010), Bozogáñová and Vyrost (2019), and Boulianne (2022) do include Canadian data in their research, they do not yield results focused on Canadians. Therefore, more research is needed regarding political participation and gender differences in a Canadian context.

Based on this and the other research presented in my literature review, I pose the following research questions:

## RQ1: Is there a gender gap in overall political participation amongst Canadians?

As mentioned, findings show that men engage in or plan to engage in institutional, conventional, formal (except for voting), collective, and expressive political participation rates more than women (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p.45). However, women tend to be more likely to participate in non-institutional, unconventional, informal, and private political activities (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45). To sort particular activities into these categories, Pfanzelt and Spies describe expressive activities as "activities primarily giving voice to the political aims and intentions of citizens," (2019, p. 35). Some of the activities that they include in this category are: participating in public or online political discussions, joining a political group on Facebook, or posting pictures/videos with political content (Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 37). Likewise, Coffé and Bolzendahl describe political contact actions as being "actions in direct political contact, or the effort to project an individual opinion to a wider group or higher authority" (2010, p. 322). In this category, they include contacting politicians, media, or joining an internet forum (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 322). In another category, they group collective activities, which are "actions involving a public, or grouporiented activity" and include demonstrating and attending political meetings or rallies (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 322). Pfanzelt and Spies' category of expressive participation (2019, p. 35) and Coffé and Bolzendahl's political contact actions and collective participation categories (2010, p. 322) all depend on a certain amount of visibility, influence on other, or contact with others. They are more public in nature, and thus, for the purposes of this study, some of the activities listed above in these categories will be further classified as public forms of participation throughout this paper. These public activities include: demonstrating, political meeting attendance, commenting or posting online, and contacting a politician.

In contrast, I will use Coffé and Bolzendahls' category of private political activities to group activities that are done with less contact with others and do not require a public expression of opinion. Coffé and Bolzendahl define their category of private activities as activities that are "private in nature and involvement," and they include signing petitions, boycotting, and buycotting in this category (2010, p. 322). I will consider these activities to be private political activities throughout this paper. However, I will also include voting in this category. Though Coffé and Bolzendahl characterize voting as a formal activity (2010, p. 322), and Pfanzelt and Spies consider it to be a form of institutional political engagement (2019, p. 37), it also fits this paper's category of private political participation because it is an individual activity that does not require communications or public expression of opinion (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 139). Therefore, private activities will include signing petitions, political consumerism (boycotting and buycotting), and voting.

## Gender Differences in Public Activities

Demonstrating: Previous studies have identified personal constraints such as employment, marriage, and family responsibilities to explain individual participation in protests. Family responsibilities and full-time employment decrease one's free time and may also lead an individual to not risk possible consequences of protesting, such as arrest (Schussman \& Soule, 2005, pp. 1084-1085). These are gendered factors as women tend to be primary caregivers at home but are less likely to be working than men are (Beauregard, 2016, pp. 75-76). However, other research shows that employed people are more likely to participate in protests, rather than what the resource models predict (Schussman \& Soule, 2005, p. 1085).

Table 1: Gender and Demonstrating

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Albanesi et al. 2012 | Attend a public meeting or demonstration <br> dealing with political or social issues | No |
| Beauregard 2017 | Demonstration | No |
| Caren et al. 2011 | Ever attended a protest, march, or <br> demonstration | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Demonstrated | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Demonstrate | No |
| Corrigall-Brown et al. 2014 | Participated in a protest event since the last <br> survey | No |
| Schussman \& Soule 2005 | Taken part in a protest, march, or <br> demonstration related to a local or national <br> issue | No |

Further, demonstrating is inherently public and usually collective. Demonstrations require an outward display of opinion. Because women tend to be socialized to avoid conflict, they may participate less in demonstrations due to their reluctance to express opinion publicly and the possibility of encountering conflicts with others (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, pp. 136-142).

However, as seen in Table 1, many studies find no significant gender gap in demonstration activities. Based on these previously completed studies, I hypothesize the following:

## H1: There will not be a significant gender gap in Canadians' participation in political demonstrations.

Attending Political Meetings: Previous studies show that white and visible minority women (except for Indigenous women) tend to attend fewer political discussion groups than men (Beauvais, 2020, p. 325; Harell \& Panagos, 2013, p 433), and, when in attendance, tend to speak proportionately less than their male counterparts (Beauvais, 2020, p. 325).
Beauvais (2020, p. 325) and Pfanzelt and Spies (2019, p. 45) both found that men generally participated more in political discussions than women did. Similarly, these results have also been found outside of the general public and within the political elite. Bäck et al.'s study found that even with equal numbers of women and men in Parliament, women tend to make fewer speeches than men (2014, p. 511). This corresponds with other studies showing that political conflict avoidance reduces female participation in political arguments (Coffé \& Bolzendhal, 2017, p. 142). Not surprisingly, most studies find that men tend to attend political meetings at significantly higher rates than women. Based on this, I hypothesize the following:

## H2: Canadian men will attend political meetings significantly more than women.

Table 2: Gender and Political Meeting Attendance

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Albanesi et al. 2012 | Attend a public meeting or demonstration <br> dealing with political or social issues | No |
| Beauregard 2017 | Attend a public meeting | Yes (Men more) |
| Beauvais 2020 | Attend a public meeting | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Attended a political party meeting/rally | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Attend political meeting | Yes (Men more) |
| Pyeatt \& Yanus 2017 | Attending a meeting | Yes (Men more) |

Political Commenting and Posting Online: Though online environments tend to add a layer of anonymity, commenting and posting about politics online is still a public behaviour. Past research has shown that women are more likely to discuss politics with those closest to them, whereas men are more likely than women to discuss politics in public, which like general political participation, could lead women to different forms of online political expression (Koc-Michalska et al., 2021, pp. 198-199). In terms of posting and commenting online, the audience of these posts should be taken into consideration. On more public sites such as Twitter, there is no mutual agreement of connection versus sites such as Facebook, where members "friend" each other to see each other's posts (Koc-Michalska et al., 2021, p. 199). The platform used to post and comment should be taken into consideration.

Studies have also looked at women's representation in online political discussions. While upcoming elections tend to affect their rates, men tend to outnumber women in online political discussions (Koc-Michalska et al., 2021, p. 199). Other research suggests that having more female representation in government encourages women's political expression (Nir \& Mclurg, 2015, p. 561). Therefore, positive female representation in online environments should be considered.

Table 3: Gender and Commenting and/or Posting Online

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Abendschön \& García-Albacete 2021 | Used the internet to discuss politics | Yes (Men more) |
| Bode 2017 | Political SNS postings | Yes (Men more) |
|  | Political SNS comments | No |
|  | Online political expression | Yes (Men more) |
| Koc-Michalska et al. 2021 | Posted your own political opinion on Facebook | No |
|  | Posted your own political opinion on Twitter | Yes (Men more) |
|  | Shared political content online via Facebook or <br> twitter | No |
|  | Commented on any political content on online <br> platforms | Yes (Men more) |
|  | Commented on any political content on Facebook | No |

Further, Van Duyn et al.'s (2019) study found somewhat mixed results regarding commenting on online news stories. They found that gender differences depend on the level of government at which the news story relates, but that overall, men tend to comment more often than women (Van Duyn et al., 2019, p.10). These mixed results are in line with other studies regarding
political commenting and posting online. Overall, results seem dependent on the behaviour itself - commenting versus posting - and the platform on which it is done. Based on this, I hypothesize the following:

## H3: Canadian men will comment and post online at higher rates than Canadian women.

Contacting politicians: Contacting officials can require skill and time in order to properly prepare and become informed enough to express one's opinion on matters at hand (Boulianne 2022, p.3). It consists of some form of opinion expression and therefore is not completely private, though it is not generally a collective activity. Factors such as age, socioeconomic status, and gender are important factors that affect contacting rates (Boulianne, 2022, p. 17). Consistently though, it is shown that men tend to contact officials at higher rates than women (see Table 4). This is true for both online and offline modalities, though Boulianne finds less of a gender gap when looking at online forms of contacting officials (2022, p. 17).

Table 4: Gender and Contacting Officials

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Beauregard 2017 | Contact Politicians | Yes (Men more) |
| Boulianne 2022 | Contact officials online | Yes (Men more) |
|  | Contact officials offline | Yes (Men more) |
| Brundidge et al. 2013 | Contact a politician in person, phone, or letter | Yes (Men more) |
|  | Contact a politician through email | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Contacted a politician | Yes (Men more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Contact a politician | Yes (Men more) |

The resource-intensive nature of contacting officials, along with its inherent expression of opinion and political discussion should be considered when looking at women's behaviour. In this, is a potential for conflict, which women tend to avoid more than men (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 143). Further, women prefer to discuss politics with close relations, making it less likely that they would want to discuss politics with an official (Koc-Michalska et al., 2021, pp. 198-199). Following resource models, women's lower-socioeconomic status and lower political skills could make contacting officials less likely (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 320). Indeed, all studies shown in Table 4 find men to contact officials at significantly higher rates than women. Based on these previous studies, I predict the following:

## H4: Canadian men will contact officials at higher rates than Canadian women.

## Gender Differences in Private Activities

Political Consumerism: Typically, political consumers buycott and boycott to emphasize certain principles or beliefs to create change (Neilson \& Paxton, 2010, p. 5). However, consumerism is dependent on socio-economic status and therefore is not an accessible form of participation for all. Indeed, women's lower socioeconomic status compared to men is a factor when considering their political engagement (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 319). Men tend to favour resource-dependent participation, whereas women tend to avoid straining their resources (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 320).

Table 5: Gender and Political Consumerism

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Albenesi et al. 2012 | Boycott or buycott for political, ethical or environmental <br> reasons | No |
| Beauregard 2017 | Boycott | No |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Boycott/bought items | Yes (Women more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Boycott products | Yes (Men more) |
| Boulianne 2021 | Buycotting | No |
|  | Boycotting | No |
| Neilson 2010 | Boycotted certain products | No |
|  | Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical, <br> or environmental reasons | Yes (Women more) |
| Neilson \& Paxton 2010 | Boycotted and/or Buycotted | Yes (Women more) |
| Nonomura 2016 | Boycotted a product or chosen a product for ethical <br> reasons | Yes (Women more) |

Nonetheless, typical gender roles place women in the private and familial spheres, leading them to incorporate their political participation into daily activities (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 320). Political consumerism can easily be done through grocery shopping or other errands, shifting into a more women-dominated sphere. Indeed, women who do most of the family shopping are more concerned with their consumer choices and are more likely to engage in political consumerism (Neilson \& Paxton, 2010, p. 10).

Appropriately, studies on gender gaps in political consumerism behaviour see conflicting results (See Table 5). While some studies show that women participate more (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010), some find that men boycott more often (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2017), while others show no gender gap (Albenasi et al., 2012; Beauregard, 2017). Based on the information above and on Table 5, my fifth hypothesis is the following:

## H5: There will be no significant gender differences in political consumerism rates of Canadians.

Voting: Voting trends have consistently been without a gender gap, and some studies even find a reversed gap with women voting more than men (Carreras, 2018, p. 37; Harell, 2019, p. 5). Voter turnout is an interesting phenomenon in this respect, as it creates a paradox of political interest and voting behaviour (Carreras, 2018, p. 37). While some attribute this to the fact that few resources and time are needed to vote, women's higher levels of conscientiousness and feeling of civic duty should also be considered when looking at their high rates of voter turnout (Carreras, 2018, pp. 37-41). Carreras explains that these qualities could be due to processes of gendered socialization (2018, p. 40).

Table 6: Gender and Voting

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Albenasi et al. 2012 | Vote in elections | No |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Voted in last election | No |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Vote | Yes (Men more) |
| Corrigall-Brown et al. 2014 | Voted in elections in survey period | No |
| Harell 2009 | Voted in last election | No |
| Harell \& Panagos 2013 | Voted in last federal election | No |
|  | Voted in last provincial election | No |

Furthermore, though Coffé \& Bolzendahl (2010) found that men and women voted at similar rates, they also found that women were more likely to vote than men once they controlled for attitude towards politics (p. 330). They suggest that if women were more interested and felt more efficacious about participation in politics, women would vote at higher rates than men (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330). Nonetheless, most studies find no gender gap in voter turnout. Table

6 shows similar results, with only one UK-based study finding a very small gap (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017). Based on the results shown in Table 6, I predict the following:

## H6: There will not be a gender gap in Canadians' voter turnout.

Signing Petitions: Many considerations for gender gaps in political participation include resource models, wherein women's lower socio-economic levels make it more difficult for them to participate in highly-skilled, time-consuming, or other resource-demanding activities (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 320). Signing petitions, in this case, should be relatively gender-equal due to its low demand and ease. This activity is considered a form of private activism by Coffé \& Bolzendahl, who consider this an individualistic activity that can be easily incorporated into daily life and does not require many resources (2010, p. 330). They find that women actually participate more than men in petition signing, though their study does not differentiate between offline and online behaviours (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 322).

Table 7: Gender and Petition Signing

| Study | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Beauregard 2017 | Sign Petition | No |
| Brundidge et al. 2013 | Sign a paper petition | Yes (Women more) |
|  | Sign an online petition | Yes (Women more) |
| Caren et al. 2011 | Ever signed a petition | Yes (Women more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2010 | Signed a petition | Yes (Women more) |
| Coffé \& Bolzendahl 2017 | Signed a petition | No |

Other studies (shown in Table 7) also find that women tend to sign petitions at higher rates than men. Based on these findings, I predict the following:

## H7: Canadian women will sign petitions at higher rates than Canadian men.

## Explanations for Gender Differences in Politics

Conflict Avoidance: Why do these differences still exist in today's society? Some litera-
ture positions the onus of gender gaps and differences in political participation on women's socialized tendencies to be non-confrontational and therefore, avoid conflict (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 144). Women tend to show more characteristics of extraversion, consciousness, and, most notably, more agreeableness than men, which includes tendencies toward "prosocial behaviours and the need for pleasant and harmonious relations with others" (Wang, 2013, pp. 168,173). Indeed, one study shows that women are significantly more likely to avoid conflict than men are (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 143), leaving women out of politics, which are inherently conflictual and often include unpleasant topics and conversations. This same study also found political conflict avoidance to be a significant predictor of political participation (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 144). Those who avoided political conflict more - a group with significantly more women than men - also participated less in politics (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, pp. 143144).

Similar results have also been found in youth studies. When it comes to confrontational forms of political participation, young women were significantly less likely than young men to participate, but this gap was not found in less confrontational forms of political participation (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 370). Coffé and Bolzendahl conclude in their study that women's higher levels of political conflict avoidance can help to explain gendered patterns in political participation (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 144). They explain that cultural stereotypes and scripts surrounding gender expectations "differentially reward men and women for engaging in public, conflictual political discourse," socializing women into being more reluctant to conflictual situations, such as politics, which can be defined by its conflict (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 144, Wolak, 2020, p. 133). This connection between gendered socialization, conflict avoidance, and lack of political participation is related to Bos et al.'s finding that girls tend to see politics as masculine and are less interested in them than boys are (2020, p. 475). These general "cultures of masculinity" in politics can thwart femininity within it (Bäck et al., 2014, p. 507), discouraging those with more feminine characteristics.

Based on this previous research, I propose the following questions:

## RQ2: To what extent do views about politics being conflictual explain gendered differences in political participation in Canada?

## RQ2a: Are there gender differences in viewing politics as conflictual in Canada?

Role Models: Similarly, other studies focus on adults’ upbringing to analyze the relationship between political participation and political socialization (Caudillo, 2017). The family acts as a primary site of socialization, including political socialization (Dotti Sani \& Quaranta, 2014, p. 264-265). Women's political participation is more positively affected by parental models and family capital than men's, making family even more crucial for examining political participation trends and gender (Albanesi et al., 2012, pp. 370-371). Dotti Sani and Quaranta also found a positive correlation between children's political participation and their parents', especially their mothers', who act as positive role models (2014, p. 269, 271). Caudillo's study finds that women who grew up with a mother in full-time employment tend to believe that women are
suitable for politics and tend to participate more in political organizations than women who grew up with unemployed mothers (2017, p. 127). Though these results were only significant for women who grew up in low socio-economic homes, Caudillo looks at the experiences of women growing up and, therefore can use socialization as a possible explanation for her results (2017, p. 128). These studies of people's upbringing, experiences with female role models, and opinions in their early years point toward political socialization taking place well before people's adult years and actual involvement in politics (Bos et al., 2020; Caudillo, 2017; Dotti Sana \& Quaranta, 2014, p. 269; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019).

Fortunately, Nir and McClurg's study showed that more female representation in government can decrease the gender gap in political expression, thereby increasing women's tendencies to engage in potentially conflictual situations (2015, p. 561). Indeed, when a highly visible woman is up for election, teenage girls show increased interest in politics (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475). These studies demonstrate the importance of women's visibility as role models in politics for women's political participation and interest. Related, the government socialization theory posits that people are biased towards political parties that were in power when they were teenagers, assuming that the politics in play during one's impressionable years affect their preferences as adults (Shorrocks, 2016, p. 239). The basis for this theory could be applied to gender influences as well. Due to this possibility, and previous research on the subject, my third Research Question is as follows:

## RQ3: To what extent do female role models affect Canadian women's political participation?

## Methodology

My research adds to and clarifies aspects of the existing research on gender differences in political participation. I explore the extent of gender differences in Canadians' political participation using secondary analysis of existing data. Using this method, I examine data that is already collected for another study (Symbaluk, 2019, p. 229). This quantitative method is ideal for this honours thesis because it is a time-saving method to analyze large quantities of data. It is also unobtrusive and non-reactive because I do not interact directly with any subjects (Symbaluk, 2019, pp. 212, 233). This mitigates any risks typically associated with research involving subjects (Symbaluk, 2019, p. 189). I use survey data collected in the form of a questionnaire and analyze it using Jamovi. Using questionnaire survey data, I can analyze large amounts of data efficiently and examine multiple relationships between variables at once (Symbaluk, 2019, p. 188). Results of logistic regression analysis were interpreted.

This survey data was provided to me by Dr. Shelley Boulianne, who designed the survey questions based on her reading of the literature on gender, conflict, and political participation. The survey questions and data remain the intellectual property of Dr. Shelley Boulianne, who has exclusive rights to publish the data and any forthcoming publication. I was added to the Research Ethics application as a secondary user of the data and do not have permission to publish the data or my research beyond my honours thesis.

I focused on the Canadian data only (country=4) from a 2021 Kantar administered study. This study was funded by Canadian Heritage and administered to an online panel from January to February, 2021. The online nature in which this data was collected increased the efficiency of the data collection and did so in an inexpensive manner (Symbaluk, 2019, p. 196). However, respondents required an internet connection, making the sample not completely random and excluding those who did not have access to the internet (Symbaluk, 2019, p. 196). All participants in the study were above 18 years of age, and the Canadian data included 1,568 participants, a large enough sample to infer Canadian trends ( $n=1,568$ ). A quota sampling method was used to ensure that sex and age demographics matched that of the population of the country at hand. This form of non-probability sampling, though practical, is not completely random and, therefore may not be representative of the population beyond demographics (Symbaluk, 2019, pp. 138-139). In order to obtain accurate results, questions in the survey were closed-ended questions with mutually exclusive and exhaustive response options, ensuring that all possible responses were present (Symbaluk, 2019, pp. 203-204).

## Measures

Dependent variables: Different forms of political participation were measured in this survey. Consumerism was measured by asking how often respondents had either bought or refused to buy/boycotted "a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that provides it." Respondents were measured on an ordinal scale from never=1 to often $=4$. This was recoded to be a dummy variable in order to facilitate logistic regression analysis, where 1 was recoded to $0=$ have never, and 2 through 4 were recoded to $1=$ have. Participation in elections was measured by asking how often respondents vote. Options included a scale from 1-4, where $1=$ "In all elections" to $4=$ "I never vote." There was also an option for "there have been no elections since I have acquired the right to vote" and "I am not eligible to vote in elections." Respondents choosing these categories were coded 5 for the former and 6 for the latter. This variable was also recoded to ease logistic regression interpretation so that $0=$ Don't always vote and $1=$ Always vote. Respondents were also asked simple yes or no questions about whether or not they had participated in a political meeting, march or street demonstration. In addition to these questions about political participation, respondents were also asked about the following forms of participation: contacting an elected official online and offline and signing petitions online and offline. The answers to these questions were ordinal from 1 to 4 , where $1=$ never and $4=$ often then dichotomized to reflect whether or not they had done the activity in the past 12 months (have not=0 and have=1).

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics

|  | Min, <br> Max | Percentage | Mean | SD |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Females | 0,1 | $52 \%$ | 0.52 | 0.5 |
| Education | 1,4 |  | 1.97 | 0.99 |
| Kids | 0,1 | $23 \%$ | 0.23 | 0.42 |
| Married | 0,1 | $41.3 \%$ | 0.413 | 0.49 |
| Full time Employment | 0,1 | $33.8 \%$ | 0.338 | 0.47 |
| French | 1,2 | $23 \%$ | 1.23 | 0.42 |
| Age | 18,94 |  | 48.37 | 17.40 |
| Income (25k groupings) | 1,6 |  | 1.98 | 1.62 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 1,6 |  | 3.37 | 1.25 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 1,2 | $47.4 \%$ | 1.47 | 0.50 |
| Interested in politics | 1,4 |  | 2.54 | 0.91 |

Statistical Controls: Furthermore, the variables of age, education, language, and employment status have been mentioned as a predictor of political participation in previous studies (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 370; Beauregard, 2016, p. 7; Fraile, 2014, p. 275; Lorenzini \& Bassoli, 2015, p. 463). Control variables such as these as well as gender, marital status, number of children in the household, and household income were measured. The descriptive statistics of these variables can be seen in Table 8. The control variable of gender will be of particular interest in my analysis as it directly relates to my research questions. Initially, gender was measured in "Qsex" by asking "Are you..." with the values being $0=$ male, $1=$ female, and $2=$ non-binary. However, this was later dichotomized for logistic regression analysis to only include females (1) and males (0), as measured in the variable "femalesl." This was recoded because of the low number of nonbinary respondents ( $\mathrm{n}=6$ ), who made up only $0.4 \%$ of the total sample. As such, this group was removed from logistic regression analyses as to not misrepresent it.

Independent Variables: In order to investigate my Research Questions 2 and 3, regarding the explanations for gender differences in political participation, I included related survey questions in my analysis. How people perceive the civility levels of politics was measured with the question: "To what extent do you see politics as civil or uncivil?" Answers ranged from $1=$ "extremely uncivil" to $6=$ "extremely civil."

And finally, a question asked respondents about their interest in politics. Questions ranged from 1="not very interested" to 4="very interested." To measure the effects of political role models growing up, the following question was asked: "When you were growing up (a teenager), were there any: a) female politicians?" Respondents were coded no=0 or yes=1. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between having female political leaders present while growing up and being female (see Table 9). Approximately $55.0 \%$ of males, $40.4 \%$ of females, and $66.7 \%$ of non-binary people say that there were female politicians when they were growing up. There is a 14.6 percen-
percentage point difference between males and females. As well, there is a positive correlation between having female political leaders while growing up and interest in politics (Pearson Correlation=.159, $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ). Political interest is significantly negatively correlated with being female (see Table 9), and approximately $20.1 \%$ of males, $10.7 \%$ of females, and $33.3 \%$ of nonbinary people said that they were very interested in politics, leaving a 9.4 percentage point difference between men and women.

## Findings

Firstly, correlation analysis reveals negative correlations between being female and a few other variables, such as having full-time employment ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), voting ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), commenting on news sites $(\mathrm{p}=.021)$, and most importantly, interest in politics ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), and having a female political leader present while growing up ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ). There is also a positive correlation between being female and signing online petitions ( $\mathrm{p}=.03$ ). These results can be seen in Table 9.

Logistic regression and contingency analysis reveal gender differences in some political behaviours, but not in others. Results are dependent on the specific analytic tool used. Model 1 in all logistic regression tables in this paper controls for only gender. Model 2 controls for demographic characteristics including variables such as gender, education, and income, among others. And finally, Model 3, which is used as the primary model of analysis, controls for gender, demographics, and views about the civility of politics, having female political leaders present while growing up, and interest in politics.

Table 9: Correlation Matrix for Females1 Variable

|  |  | Female |  |  | Female |  |  | Female |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Education | Pearson <br> Correlation | . 005 | Viewing politics as civil | Pearson <br> Correlation | . 013 | Contacting officials | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 003 |
|  | p-value | . 833 |  | p-value | . 613 |  | p-value | . 915 |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1561 |  | N | 1562 |
| Kids | Pearson <br> Correlation | . 071 | Female political leaders while growing up | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 146 | Contacting officials offline | Pearson Correlation | . 014 |
|  | p-value | . 005 |  | p-value | <. 001 |  | p-value | . 592 |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1561 |  | N | 1562 |
|  | Pearson Correlation | -. 121 | Interest in politics | Pearson Correlation | -. 148 |  | Pearson Correlation | -. 003 |

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| Married | p-value | <. 001 |  | p-value | <. 001 | Boycotting | p-value | . 894 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1561 |  | N | 1562 |
| Fulltime employment | Pearson Correlation | -. 108 | Marching or demonstrating | Pearson Correlation | -. 01 | Buycotting | Pearson Correlation | . 013 |
|  | p-value | <. 001 |  | p-value | . 683 |  | p-value | . 597 |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1562 |
| French | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 055 | Meeting attendance | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 043 | Voting | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 105 |
|  | p-value | . 030 |  | p-value | . 089 |  | p-value | <. 001 |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1561 |  | N | 1562 |
| Age | Pearson Correlation | -. 204 | Commenting on news sites | Pearson Correlation | -. 058 | Signing online petitions | Pearson Correlation | . 055 |
|  | p-value | <. 001 |  | p-value | . 021 |  | p-value | . 03 |
|  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1562 |
| Income | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 049 | Posting on social media | Pearson <br> Correlation | . 001 | Signing offline petitions | Pearson <br> Correlation | -. 033 |
|  | p-value | . 061 |  | p-value | . 96 |  | p-value | . 194 |
|  | N | 1444 |  | N | 1562 |  | N | 1562 |

## Demonstrating

Approximately $7.8 \%$ of males, $7.2 \%$ of females, and $0 \%$ of non-binary people have participated in a march of street demonstration in the past 12 months. There is a 0.6 point percentage difference between men and women (see Figure 1). Only Model 2 shows a gender gap whereby women are $35.1 \%$ less likely to participate in marches or demonstrations than men are $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.649, p=.04)$. Models 1 and 3 do not show gender differences in this form of participation. In Model 3, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, only speaking English, and being interested in politics are positively related to participating in marches or street demonstrations ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). No other variables, including marriage, parental, employment status, views about politics as conflictual, or having a female political leader present while growing up are related to likelihood to participate in marches and demonstrations ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell
r-squared for Model 3 is 0.062 (see Table 10). These results are supportive of H1, which suggests that there will be no gender differences in marches or street demonstrations.

Figure 1: Marching or Street Demonstrating Contingency Table Analysis


Table 10: Logistic Regression of Participation in Marches or Street Demonstrations ( $\mathrm{n}=1,443$ )

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -.07 | 0.197 | 0.932 | .721 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: $<0.001$ |  |  |  |$]$


| French | -0.061 | 0.267 | 0.941 | .818 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Age | -0.053 | 0.008 | 0.948 | $<.001$ |
| Income | -0.037 | 0.069 | 0.964 | .592 |
| Viewing politics as civil | -0.02 | 0.083 | 1.020 | .811 |
| Female political leaders while | -0.083 | 0.214 | 0.920 | .697 |
| growing up |  |  |  |  |
| Interest in politics 0.395 0.125 | 1.485 | .001 |  |  |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.062 |  |  |  |

## Attending Political Meetings

Approximately $7.5 \%$ of males, $5.4 \%$ of females, and $16.7 \%$ of non-binary people participated in an offline political meeting in the past 12 months. There is a 2.1 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 2). Only model 2, which controls for demographic factors, finds a gender gap in attending political meetings whereby women are $46.5 \%$ less likely than men to participate ( $\operatorname{ExpB}=0.535, \mathrm{p}=.006$ ). Only having higher education, being younger, having less income, and being interested in politics are positively correlated with political meeting attendance ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). Parental, employment, and marriage status, along with views about the civility of politics and having female politicians present while growing up are all unrelated to this form of participation ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared for model 3 is 0.074 (see Table 11). These results are not supportive of my hypothesis, which assumed that Canadian men would attend political meetings at higher rates than women. When considering personal characteristics like interest in politics, such as in Model 3, there is no significant gender gap for this type of political participation.

Figure 2: Offline Meeting Attendance Contingency Analysis


Table 11: Logistic Regression of Offline Meeting Attendance ( $\mathbf{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 2 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.274 | 0.212 | 0.76 | . 195 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.001 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 l |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.626 | 0.226 | 0.535 | . 006 |
| Education | 0.415 | 0.109 | 1.515 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.545 | 0.248 | 1.725 | . 028 |
| Married | -0.329 | 0.263 | 0.719 | . 210 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.038 | 0.244 | 1.039 | . 876 |
| French | -0.650 | 0.314 | 0.522 | . 038 |
| Age | -0.028 | 0.008 | 0.972 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.148 | 0.079 | 0.862 | . 059 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.039 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.351 | 0.237 | 0.704 | . 138 |
| Education | 0.293 | 0.114 | 1.341 | . 01 |
| Kids | 0.471 | 0.259 | 1.601 | . 069 |
| Married | -0.253 | 0.27 | 0.776 | . 348 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.133 | 0.254 | 1.142 | . 6 |
| French | -0.616 | 0.323 | 0.540 | . 057 |
| Age | -0.031 | 0.008 | 0.969 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.225 | 0.082 | 0.798 | . 006 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 0.156 | 0.088 | 1.169 | . 075 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 0.381 | 0.235 | 1.464 | . 105 |
| Interest in politics | 0.881 | 0.148 | 2.414 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  |  | r-squar |  |

## Commenting and Posting Online

Approximately $4.4 \%$ of males, $3.3 \%$ of females, and $0 \%$ of non-binary people commented on a news website often in the past 12 months. There is a 1.1 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 3). In Model 2, which controls for demographic variables, women are $34.2 \%$ less likely to comment on news sites than men ( $\operatorname{ExpB}=0.658, \mathrm{p}<.001$ ). In model 3, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, women are $22.4 \%$ less likely to comment on news sites than are men $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.776, \mathrm{p}=0.042)$. However, when no demographics are accounted for in Model 1, no gender gap is found ( $\mathrm{p}=.051$ ). In Model 2, having kids, a higher education, being younger and having less income are all positively related to contacting officials online ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). In Model 3, having higher education, kids, being married, speaking French, being younger, having a lower income, and being interested in politics are all positively related to this form of participation ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). The Cox and Snell for model 3 is 0.149 (see Table 12).

However, when it comes to sharing or posting political or campaign information online, there is even less of a gender gap. Approximately $3.5 \%$ of men, $3.7 \%$ of women, and $0 \%$ of nonbinary people posted or shared political or campaign information on social media in the past 12 months. There is a 0.2 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Commenting on News Websites Contingency Table Analysis


Table 12: Logistic Regression of Commenting on News Sites ( $\mathrm{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 3 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.212 | 0.109 | 0.809 | .051 |  |  |
| Model fit |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.003 |  |  |  |  |
| Model 2 | -0.418 | 0.119 | 0.658 | $<.001$ |  |  |
| Females | 0.217 | 0.06 | 1.242 | $<.001$ |  |  |
| Education | 0.897 | 0.143 | 2.451 | $<.001$ |  |  |
| Kids | 0.21 | 0.131 | 1.233 | .110 |  |  |
| Married | 0.058 | 0.131 | 1.06 | .657 |  |  |
| Full Time Employment | 0.126 | 0.136 | 1.134 | .354 |  |  |
| French | -0.019 | 0.004 | 0.981 | $<.001$ |  |  |
| Age | -0.108 | 0.041 | 0.897 | .008 |  |  |
| Income |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.082 |  |  |  |  |
| Model fit |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model 3 | -0.263 | 0.126 | 0.768 | .037 |  |  |
| Females | 0.117 | 0.063 | 1.124 | .063 |  |  |
| Education | 0.919 | 0.148 | 2.506 | $<.001$ |  |  |
| Kids | 0.286 | 0.136 | 1.331 | .036 |  |  |


| Full Time Employment | 0.164 | 0.138 | 1.178 | . 235 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| French | 0.282 | 0.144 | 1.326 | . 05 |
| Age | -0.026 | 0.004 | 0.975 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.156 | 0.043 | 0.856 | <. 001 |
| Viewing politics as civil | -0.058 | 0.048 | 0.943 | . 224 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | -0.066 | 0.122 | 0.936 | . 588 |
| Interest in politics | 0.731 | 0.074 | 2.078 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.149 |  |  |

Figure 4: Sharing or Posting Political or Campaign Information on Social Media Contingency Table Analysis


There is no gender gap in any model regarding posting or sharing political content on social media ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). In Model 3, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, having more education, having kids, speaking french, being younger and being interested in politics are all positively correlated with sharing and posting political content on social media ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). Being married, having full time employment, and views about politics as conflictual, and having female political role models present while growing up have no relationship to this form of participation ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared for Model 3 is 0.157 (see Table 13).

Table 13: Logistic Regression of Sharing or Posting Political or Campaign Information on Social Media

|  | b | SE | ExpB |  | p -value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.006 | 0.109 | 1.007 |  | . 952 |
| Model fit |  |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: <0.001 |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Females | - | 0.118 | 0.812 |  | . 079 |
|  | 0.208 |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.311 | 0.06 | 1.365 |  | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.574 | 0.142 | 1.776 |  | <. 001 |
| Married | - | 0.131 | 0.934 |  | . 601 |
|  | 0.069 |  |  |  |  |
| Full Time Employment | 0.065 | 0.13 | 1.068 |  | . 616 |
| French | 0.288 | 0.135 | 1.334 |  | . 032 |
| Age | - | 0.004 | 0.977 |  | <. 001 |
|  | 0.023 |  |  |  |  |
| Income | - | 0.040 | 0.922 |  | . 044 |
|  | 0.081 |  |  |  |  |
| Model fit |  |  |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.079 |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Females | - | 0.127 | 0.96 |  | . 749 |
|  | 0.041 |  |  |  |  |
| Education | 0.209 | 0.063 | 1.232 |  | . 001 |
| Kids | 0.571 | 0.149 | 1.769 |  | <. 001 |
| Married | -0.01 | 0.137 | 0.99 |  | . 94 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.178 | 0.138 | 1.194 |  | . 198 |
| French | 0.459 | 0.145 | 1.583 |  | . 001 |
| Age | - | 0.004 | 0.97 |  | <. 001 |
|  | 0.031 |  |  |  |  |
| Income | - | 0.042 | 0.876 |  | . 002 |
|  | 0.132 |  |  |  |  |
| Viewing politics as civil | - | 0.048 | 0.988 |  | . 810 |
|  | 0.012 |  |  |  |  |
| Female political leaders | - | 0.123 | 0.866 |  | 0.239 |
| while growing up | 0.144 |  |  |  |  |
| Interest in politics | 0.806 | 0.076 | 2.239 |  | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  |  |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.157 |  |

These analyses about commenting on news sites and posting on social media are not fully supportive of H3, whereby I hypothesized that men would engage in these activities more than women. Though there is not a significant difference in the frequency at which women and men comment on online news sites, when controlling for demographic and personal characteristic factors in Models 1 and 2, men do have a higher likelihood of commenting. However, my analysis of posting political content on social media finds no significant gender differences in any models.

## Contacting Officials

Approximately $25.6 \%$ of males, $25.4 \%$ of females, and $33.3 \%$ of non-binary people have contacted an elected official online in the past 12 months. There is a 0.2 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 5). All three models do not reveal a gender gap between men and women's rates of contacting officials online ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). In Model 2, which controls for demographic variables, all variables except for gender and employment are correlated to rates of contacting officials online ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). Model 3 sees similar results, with education, being married, speaking English, being younger, having a lower income, and being interested in politics all positively correlating with rates of contacting officials online ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). In Model 3, parental status, employment, views on the civility of politics and having a female politician around while growing up are not related to likelihood of contacting officials online ( $p>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared for Model 3 is 0.116 (see Table 14).

Figure 5: Contacting Elected Officials Online Contingency Table Analysis


Table 14: Logistic Regression of Contacting Officials Online ( $\mathbf{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 3 \text { ) } ) ~}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.004 | 0.120 | 0.996 | . 975 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: <0.001 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.182 | 0.127 | 0.834 | . 153 |
| Education | 0.239 | 0.063 | 1.27 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.236 | 0.152 | 1.266 | . 120 |
| Married | 0.137 | 0.141 | 1.147 | . 331 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.136 | 0.142 | 0.873 | . 336 |
| French | -0.341 | 0.155 | 0.711 | . 028 |
| Age | -0.018 | 0.004 | 0.982 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.062 | 0.043 | 0.940 | . 149 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.035 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.022 | 0.137 | 1.022 | . 872 |
| Education | 0.122 | 0.067 | 1.13 | . 068 |
| Kids | 0.199 | 0.159 | 1.22 | . 213 |
| Married | 0.218 | 1.147 | 1.243 | . 139 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.039 | 0.150 | 0.962 | . 794 |
| French | -0.232 | 0.164 | 0.793 | . 158 |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.004 | 0.975 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.117 | 0.045 | 0.89 | . 009 |
| Viewing politics as civil | -0.006 | 0.051 | 0.994 | . 9 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | -0.033 | 0.132 | 0.968 | . 802 |
| Interest in politics | 0.860 | 0.082 | 2.362 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  | C | r-squar |  |

Results are similar when it comes to contacting elected officials offline. Approximately $18.9 \%$ of males, $20.0 \%$ of females, and $50.0 \%$ of non-binary people have contacted an elected official offline in the past 12 months. There is a 1.1 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 6). None of the models show any significant gender differences in contacting officials offline ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). In Model 3, which controls for demographics and personal characteristics, as opposed to Model 2, which only controls for demographic factors, being younger is actually negatively correlated with contacting officials offline ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ). Interest in politics is positively associated with this form of participation ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ). In model 3, having kids, being married, having full time employment, viewing politics as civil, and having female political leaders while growing up are all unrelated to contacting officials offline ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared is 0.102 (see Table 15).

Figure 6: Contacting Officials Offline Contingency Table Analysis


Table 15: Logistic Regression of Contacting Officials Offline ( $\mathbf{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 3 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.094 | 0.132 | 1.098 | .478 |
| Model fit |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: $<0.001$ |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.092 | 0.141 | 0.912 | .514 |
| Education | 0.284 | 0.069 | 1.329 | $<.001$ |
| Kids | 0.336 | 0.163 | 1.399 | .04 |
| Married | 0.358 | 0.156 | 1.43 | .022 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.017 | 0.156 | 0.983 | .912 |
| French | -0.559 | 0.182 | 0.572 | .002 |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.005 | 0.979 | $<.001$ |
| Income | -0.098 | 0.048 | 0.907 | .042 |
| Model fit |  |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.048 |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.073 | 0.15 | 1.076 | .623 |
| Education | 0.179 | 0.072 | 1.196 | .013 |
| Kids | 0.299 | 0.169 | 1.348 | .078 |
| Married | 0.434 | 0.161 | 1.544 | .007 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.054 | 0.162 | 1.055 | .740 |
| French | -0.507 | 0.189 | 0.602 | .007 |
| Age | -0.027 | 0.005 | 0.974 | $<.001$ |
| Income | -0.14 | 0.049 | 0.869 | .005 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 0.081 | 0.056 | 1.084 | .150 |


| Female political leaders while -0.121 0.144 0.886 <br> growing up    | 0.743 | 0.089 | 2.102 | .401 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Interest in politics |  | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.102 |  | $<.001$ |
| Model fit |  |  |  |  |

Overall, these results are not supportive of H 4 , which suggests that Canadian men will be more likely to contact officials than Canadian women. In fact, for both online and offline contacting methods, none of the models saw a gender gap.

## Political Consumerism

Approximately $48.9 \%$ of males, $49.3 \%$ of females, and $33.3 \%$ of non-binary people have boycotted a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the campany that provides it in the past 12 months. There is a 0.4 percentage point difference between men and women's rates of boycotting (see Figure 7). None of the models find any gender differences in boycotting behaviour ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The only variables that are positively correlated to this behaviour in Model 3 is having a higher education, being younger, having a female political leader present while growing up, and being interested in politics ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). None of the other variables are related to boycotting ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared for Model 3 is 0.117 (see Table 16).

Figure 7: Boycotting Contingency Table Analysis


Analysis of buycotting behaviour shows similar results. Approximately 58\% of males, 57\% of females, and $33 \%$ of non-binary people have buycotted in the past 12 months. There is 1 percentage point difference between men's and women's rates of buycotting (see Figure 8). None of the models find any gender differences in buycotting behaviour ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). In Model 3, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, having a higher education level, having kids, being younger, and being interested in politics are all positively correlated with buycotting behaviour ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). Marital and employment status as well as views about the civility of politics and having a female politician present while growing up are all unrelated to buycotting behaviour ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox and Snell r-squared for Model 3 is 0.132 (see Table 17).

Table 16: Logistic Regression of Boycotting ( $\mathrm{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 3 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.002 | 0.105 | 1.002 | . 988 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: <.0.001 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.135 | 0.112 | 0.873 | . 229 |
| Education | 0.299 | 0.058 | 1.349 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.001 | 0.141 | 1.001 | . 994 |
| Married | -0.053 | 0.124 | 0.948 | . 668 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.01 | 0.126 | 0.990 | . 938 |
| French | 0.012 | 0.129 | 1.012 | . 929 |
| Age | -0.019 | 0.004 | 0.981 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.058 | 0.039 | 1.060 | . 131 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.048 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.068 | 0.119 | 1.071 | . 567 |
| Education | 0.204 | 0.061 | 1.226 | . 001 |
| Kids | -0.053 | 0.146 | 0.948 | . 714 |
| Married | 0.017 | 0.129 | 1.017 | . 897 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.110 | 0.132 | 1.117 | . 404 |
| French | 0.166 | 0.137 | 1.181 | . 225 |
| Age | -0.024 | 0.004 | 0.976 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.011 | 0.041 | 1.011 | . 790 |
| Viewing politics as civil | -0.075 | 0.046 | 0.928 | . 105 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 0.245 | 0.115 | 1.278 | . 033 |
| Interest in politics | 0.66 | 0.069 | 1.935 | <. 001 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.117 |  |  |  |

Figure 8: Buycotting Contingency Table Analysis


Table 17: Logistic Regression of Buycotting ( $\mathrm{n}=1, \mathbf{4 4 3 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.09 | 0.106 | 1.094 | . 398 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: <0.001 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.115 | 0.115 | 0.892 | . 321 |
| Education | 0.402 | 0.059 | 1.495 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.354 | 0.142 | 1.424 | . 013 |
| Married | -0.133 | 0.128 | 0.875 | . 297 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.097 | 0.129 | 0.907 | . 450 |
| French | 0.103 | 0.133 | 1.108 | . 438 |
| Age | -0.023 | 0.004 | 0.978 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.021 | 0.039 | 1.021 | . 59 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.077 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.051 | 0.122 | 1.052 | . 677 |
| Education | 0.312 | 0.061 | 1.367 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.311 | 0.146 | 1.365 | . 033 |
| Married | -0.089 | 0.131 | 0.915 | . 501 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.005 | 0.134 | 0.995 | . 971 |
| French | 0.184 | 0.139 | 1.202 | . 186 |
| Age | -0.027 | 0.004 | 0.973 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.021 | 0.041 | 0.979 | . 605 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 0.067 | 0.047 | 1.069 | . 150 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 0.145 | 0.117 | 1.156 | . 216 |
| Interest in politics | 0.596 | 0.07 | 1.814 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  |  | r-squar |  |

Overall, my analysis of consumerism is supportive of H 5 , which assumes that there will be no gender differences in consumerism behaviours. Indeed, for both boycotting and buycotting, no models found any gender differences.

## Voting

Approximately $60.1 \%$ of males, $49.6 \%$ of females, and $83.3 \%$ of non-binary people vote in all elections. There is a 10.5 percentage point difference between men and women (see figure 9). In Model 1 of Table 18, which does not control for any other variables, women are $34.2 \%$ less likely to always vote than men $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.658, \mathrm{p}<.001)$. However, upon controlling for other variables in Models $2(\mathrm{p}=0.571)$ and 3 ( $\mathrm{p}=0.428$ ), the gender gap is no longer significant. In the third model, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, being married, Francophone, older, and having a higher income are all positively related to the likelihood of always voting. As well, those who are interested in politics are $89.4 \%$ more likely to report always voting ( $\operatorname{ExpB}=1.894, \mathrm{p}<.001$ ). Having kids, having full time employment, viewing politics as civil, and having female politicians present while growing up are not related to voting behaviour, when controlling for other factors ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox Snell r-square for Model 3 is 0.238 (see Table 18). These results support H1, which assumes that there will be no gender difference in Canadian men's and women's voting behaviour. Although the frequency of voting is low for women, once accounting for control variables, the gap becomes insignificant.

Figure 9: Voting Behaviour Contingency Table Analysis


Table 18: Logistic Regression of Always Voting ( $n=1,443$ )

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.418 | 0.106 | 0.658 | <. 001 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.011 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.069 | 0.122 | 0.933 | . 571 |
| Education | 0.106 | 0.063 | 1.111 | . 094 |
| Kids | 0.164 | 0.152 | 1.179 | . 28 |
| Married | 0.227 | 0.137 | 1.254 | . 09 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.023 | 0.137 | 1.023 | . 867 |
| French | 0.474 | 0.142 | 1.606 | . 001 |
| Age | 0.051 | 0.004 | 1.053 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.224 | 0.004 | 1.252 | <. 001 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.192 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.102 | 0.129 | 1.107 | . 431 |
| Education | -0.008 | 0.066 | 0.992 | . 9 |
| Kids | 0.093 | 0.156 | 1.097 | . 554 |
| Married | 0.299 | 0.139 | 1.349 | . 031 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.12 | 0.141 | 1.127 | . 394 |
| French | 0.597 | 0.15 | 1.817 | <. 001 |
| Age | 0.05 | 0.004 | 1.051 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.2 | 0.044 | 1.222 | <. 001 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 0.047 | 0.05 | 1.048 | . 347 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 0.005 | 0.126 | 1.005 | . 970 |
| Interest in politics | 0.637 | 0.075 | 1.892 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  |  | r-squar |  |

## Signing Petitions

Approximately $46.0 \%$ of males, $51.5 \%$ of females, and $66.7 \%$ of non-binary people have signed a petition online in the past 12 months. There is a 5.5 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 10). In Table 19, Model 1, which does not control for any other variables, and Model 3, which controls for a number of demographic and personal characteristic variables, shows that women are significantly more likely than men to have signed an online petition in the past 12 months ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). In Model 2, which controls for demographic variables and in which there is no participation gender gap ( $\mathrm{p}=0.381$ ). In Model 3, having higher education, speaking French, and being younger are all positively associated with signing online petitions. Those who view politics as civil are $13.2 \%$ less likely to have signed an online petition in the past 12 months compared to those who view it as uncivil $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.868, \mathrm{p}=.002)$. As well, those who are interested in politics more likely to sign online petitions than those who are not interested in politics ( p <.001). In Model 3, having kids, employment, being married, and having a positive female politician present while growing up are all unrelated to online petition signing ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). The Cox \& Snell r-square for Model 3 is 0.112 (see Table 19).

Figure 10: Online Petitions Signing Contingency Table Analysis


Table 19: Logistic Regression of Signing Online Petitions ( $\mathbf{n}=\mathbf{1 , 4 4 3 \text { ) }}$

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.226 | 0.105 | 1.253 | . 032 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.003 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.098 | 0.112 | 1.103 | . 381 |
| Education | 0.23 | 0.057 | 1.258 | <. 001 |
| Kids | 0.156 | 0.140 | 1.169 | . 266 |
| Married | -0.243 | 0.124 | 0.784 | . 05 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.270 | 0.127 | 0.763 | . 033 |
| French | 0.385 | 0.130 | 1.470 | . 003 |
| Age | -0.015 | 0.004 | 0.986 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.081 | 0.039 | 1.084 | . 037 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.041 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | 0.295 | 0.119 | 1.344 | . 013 |
| Education | 0.136 | 0.061 | 1.146 | . 024 |
| Kids | 0.131 | 0.145 | 1.14 | . 367 |
| Married | -0.185 | 0.129 | 0.831 | . 15 |
| Full Time Employment | -0.178 | 0.132 | 0.837 | . 178 |
| French | 0.602 | 0.138 | 1.825 | $<.001$ |
| Age | -0.02 | 0.004 | 0.98 | <. 001 |
| Income | 0.041 | 0.04 | 1.042 | . 309 |
| Viewing politics as civil | -0.142 | 0.046 | 0.868 | . 002 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | 0.04 | 0.115 | 1.04 | . 731 |
| Interest in politics | 0.687 | 0.07 | 1.988 | $<.001$ |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.112 |  |  |  |

These numbers differ slightly when it comes to offline petitioning. Approximately $25.7 \%$ of males, $22.9 \%$ of females, and $33.3 \%$ of non-binary people have signed a petition offline in the past 12 months. There is a 2.8 percentage point difference between men and women (see Figure 11). There is no significant gender gap in signing petitions offline in Models 1 and 3 ( $p>.05$ ). However, in Model 2 of Table 20, which controls for demographic variables, women are $24.1 \%$ less likely than men to sign offline petitions $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.759, p=.035)$. In Model 3, having kids, being married, being younger, and being interested in politics are all positively related to signing offline petitions ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ). Being in full time employment, and viewing politics as civil are all not related to signing offline petitions ( $\mathrm{p}>.05$ ). Having a female politician present while growing up is negatively correlated with signing offline petitions $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.738, \mathrm{p}=0.21)$. The Cox \& Snell rsquare for Model 3 is 0.067 (see Table 20).

Figure 11: Offline Petition Signing Contingency Table Analysis


Overall, these results about signing petitions are not fully supportive of H7, that Canadian women will sign petitions at higher rates than men. Indeed, though the different models wielded different results regarding gender gaps in this form of political participation, Model 3, which controls for demographic and personal characteristic variables, finds that women sign more online petitions than men, but that there is no gender gap in signing offline petitions.

Table 20: Logistic Regression of Signing Petitions Offline (n=1,443)

|  | b | SE | ExpB | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.120 | 0.122 | 0.887 | . 323 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.001 |  |  |  |
| Model 2 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.275 | 0.131 | 0.759 | . 035 |
| Education | 0.163 | 0.065 | 1.177 | . 012 |
| Kids | 0.438 | 0.151 | 1.549 | . 004 |
| Married | 0.270 | 0.144 | 1.310 | . 061 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.069 | 0.142 | 1.072 | . 625 |
| French | 0.124 | 0.149 | 1.132 | . 407 |
| Age | -0.022 | 0.004 | 0.979 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.023 | 0.044 | 0.977 | . 596 |
| Model fit | Cox \& Snell r-squared: 0.044 |  |  |  |
| Model 3 |  |  |  |  |
| Females | -0.21 | 0.135 | 0.801 | . 102 |
| Education | 0.104 | 0.067 | 1.109 | . 12 |
| Kids | 0.424 | 0.153 | 1.528 | . 006 |
| Married | 0.303 | 0.146 | 1.354 | . 038 |
| Full Time Employment | 0.107 | 0.145 | 1.112 | . 462 |
| French | 0.182 | 0.154 | 1.199 | . 237 |
| Age | -0.025 | 0.004 | 0.975 | <. 001 |
| Income | -0.037 | 0.044 | 0.953 | . 402 |
| Viewing politics as civil | 0.027 | 0.051 | 1.028 | . 596 |
| Female political leaders while growing up | -0.304 | 0.131 | 0.738 | . 021 |
| Interest in politics | 0.423 | 0.076 | 1.536 | <. 001 |
| Model fit |  |  | r-squar |  |

## Conflict-Avoidance, Role Models, and Interest in Politics

Without controlling for factors that could be developed as children such as political interest, conflict avoidance, and having female politicians present while growing up, such as in Model 2, there is more of a gender gap in a few activities. In Model 2, we see a gender difference that is not present in Model 3 in demonstrating ( $\mathrm{p}=.04$ ), meeting attendance ( $\mathrm{p}=.006$ ), and signing petitions online ( $\mathrm{p}=.035$ ). In all of these activities measured by Model 2 , men participate more than women, meaning that viewing politics as conflictual, having female politicians around while growing up, and interest in politics act as measures that increase women's participation in these activities and diminish the gender gap.

Viewing politics as conflictual was only a significant factor in signing petitions online ( $\operatorname{ExpB}=.868, \mathrm{p}=.002$ ). Approximately $46.4 \%$ of males, $45.4 \%$ of females, and $66.7 \%$ of non-binary people view politics as being civil. There is 1 percentage point difference between men and women. There is no significant correlation between gender and views about the civility of politics
(see Table 9). Having female political leaders present while growing up was only a positive significant variable for boycotting ( $\mathrm{ExpB}=1.278, \mathrm{p}=.033$ ) and a negative significant variable for offline petition signing $(\operatorname{ExpB}=0.738, \mathrm{p}=.021)$. However, there is a positive correlation between having female political leaders while growing up and and interest in politics (Pearson Correlation=.159, $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), which is a predictor for all forms of participation and is significantly negatively correlated with being female (see Table 9).

## Discussion

These analyses found no gender differences in marching or demonstrating, consumerism, or voting, thereby confirming hypotheses 1,5 , and 6 , respectively. However, I found no gender gap in political meeting attendance and in contacting elected officials, which is unsupportive of hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively. While Albanesi et al. also did not find a gender gap in their analysis of political meeting attendance, they measured "Attend a public meeting or demonstration dealing with political or social issues," which is inclusive of other activities (2012, p. 367). They also only used youth in their sample, thereby limiting their findings to a specific cohort (Albanesi et al., 2012, p. 364). All of the other studies in my literature review that measured political meeting attendance found that men had a higher likelihood of attending (Beauregard, 2017; Beauvais, 2020; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017; Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017). While I did find that men were more likely to attend meetings than women in model 2 , which controlled for demographic variables, once controlling for personal characteristics like political interest, these gender differences were no longer present (see table 11). This form of participation is classified within this essay as a public activity as it involves direct contact with others and a public expression of opinion.

While all of the studies in my literature review that measured the behaviour of contacting elected officials found that men are significantly more likely than women to engage in this form of political participation, I found no gender differences in any of my models for both online and offline methods of contacting (Beauregard, 2017; Boulianne, 2022; Brundidge et al., 2013; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017). Contacting officials is a public behaviour since it requires contact with others and the expression of opinion. However, it does not require that the citizen be in public spaces, nor does it require any sort of collective action and is flexible since an email or phone call may be made at almost any time and is reasonably accessible to everyone. These factors may help to explain part of the found gender equity since women tend to engage more in these types of activities (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330).

Furthermore, I found that men tended to comment on online news sites more than women but that there was no gender gap in posting political content online. These findings disconfirm and further complicate Hypothesis 3. Gender trends differ regarding commenting online and posting online. In this case, the trends could be affected by the site the user is on - a news site or social media - or the content of sharing personal thoughts via commenting or sharing any sort of political or campaign content. Indeed, Lilleker et al. found that men tend to participate more than women when measuring for participation on any type of online platform, whereas they found no difference when measuring for participation on social media platforms only (2021, p. 2046-2047). Further-
more, Koc-Michalska et al. also found that their results differed depending on whether they were asking about posting on Twitter or Facebook (2021, p. 205). And Van Duyn et al. found that men tended to comment more on news sites than women (2019, p. 9). Referring to these studies, it is evident that gender trends are dependent on the online platform on which the user is posting or commenting.

As well, when looking at commenting on news sites specifically, Van Duyn et al. found that while men commented more overall, women did tend to comment more than men on local news stories (2019, p. 9). This ties into other findings that show that women tend to comment more on topics regarding the private sphere (Van Duyn et al., 2019, p. 11). Indeed, Coffé finds that women are more interested in local politics compared to men, who are more interested in national and international politics. Women's learned roles centered around the private and home sphere could be related to this finding (Coffé, 2013, pp. 325, 329).

Furthermore, gender differences regarding political participation may not only be dependent on the platform but also on online versus offline methods. I found that women tended to sign online petitions at higher rates than men but found no significant gender differences when it came to offline petitions. This finding complicates Hypothesis 7, which assumed that women would be more likely to sign petitions than men. According to Boulianne, the internet should offer more ease in political participation, thereby possibly decreasing inequalities in participation (2022, p. 1). Moreover, signing a petition offline on paper (such as was measured in this study) requires the presence of someone else and a certain degree of opinion expression, whereas people may sign petitions online anonymously and completely privately online. This makes petition signing offline more of a public activity than online petition signing, which can be done completely privately. This differentiation between online and offline methods can be used to explain the gender trends since women tend to prefer private activities (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330).

Overall, I only found gender gaps in two specific forms of political participation. All other forms have no significant gender differences. This is contrary to much of the previous research done on this subject, which finds gender differences in many different behaviours (Beauregard, 2017; Bozogáñová \& Vyrost, 2019; Brundidge et al., 2013; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017; Harell \& Panagos, 2013; Pyeatt \& Yanus, 2017; Van Duyn et al., 2019).

Table 21: Findings Summary of Logistic Regression Model 3

| Category | Measure of participation | Are gender differences <br> significant? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Participated in a march or street demonstration | No |
|  | Participated in a political meeting | No |
|  | Commented on news websites | Yes (men more) |
|  | Shared or posted political or campaign information on social media | No |
|  | Contacted an elected official offline (by letter or telephone) | No |
|  | Contacted an elected official online (via emails, social media) | No |
|  | Boycotted | No |


| Private Activities | Buycotted | No |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Voting | No |
|  | Signed an online petition | Yes (Women more) |
|  | Signed a petition on paper (offline) | No |

Some larger studies categorize the types of behaviours in which women tend to participate more and those in which men participate more. I recategorized these as private and public activities, respectively. Contrary to the observations of Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) and Pfanzelt and Spies (2019), I did not find that these categories followed gendered trends. In sum, in regards to Research Question 1, which asks whether there is a gender gap in Canadians' political participation, once controlling for demographic and personal characteristics, there was only a gender gap in two forms of participation, with men commenting more on news sites, and with women signing more online petitions. This leaves us without a gender gap in Canadians' political participation.

Regarding personal characteristics, I found no significant correlation between gender and viewing politics as conflictual. I also only found a connection between viewing politics as conflictual and online petition signing, unlike Coffé and Bolzendahl, who found that those who avoid political conflict participate less in politics overall (2017, p. 144). However, a similar study by Wolak found that the enjoyment of conflict explains political behaviour more than an aversion to conflict (2020, p. 152). In short, views about politics alone do not explain gender gaps, answering Research Question 2. Further, Research Question 2a asked if there are gender differences in viewing politics as conflictual, to which my analysis shows there are not. Perhaps a more multi-dimensional model of views about the nature of politics and one's own avoidance tendencies are needed to properly evaluate this question.

In terms of having female politicians present while growing up, previous research on role models shows that having female representation in government can increase women's political engagement (Nir \& McClurg, 2015, p. 561). However, I found that having female political leaders present while growing up was only a positive significant factor for boycotting and a negative significant factor for signing offline petitions. However, this variable is actually negatively correlated with being female, meaning that women remembered having a female politician present when they were teenagers less than men did. Though it did not affect their participation, it is interesting that fewer women than men said there were female political leaders while they were growing up. In terms of Research Question 3, which asks about the effect that having role models has on political participation, having a female political leader while growing up does not seem to affect political participation, but more men than women say that there were female politicians around while they were growing up.

In spite of that, I found a positive correlation between having female politicians while growing up and one's interest in politics, which is positively related to all forms of political participation (see tables 10 through 20). Though having female political leaders present while
growing up may not be directly related to political participation, it is correlated with political interest, which affects participation. This finding is backed by Bos et al., who found that teenage girls' interest in politics increases when a highly visible woman is running for election (2020, p. 475).

## Socialization

Some research utilizes the study of youth, upbringing, and ideology to link gender differences in political participation and attitudes to the effects of socialization (Bos et al., 2020, p. 477; Bozogáńová \& Vyrost, 2019, p. 122; Caudillo, 2017, p. 128; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 149; Valentova, 2005, pp. 174-175). The social construction of gender in society produces cultural stereotypes about gender roles and attitudes (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 138). These cultural shifts reward men and women differently for the same behaviours (Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 138). Family is a primary socializing agent and, therefore, a transmitter of gender roles and norms (Dotti Sana \& Quraranta, 2014, p. 266). As such, families, along with other agents of socialization are involved with political socialization, which can be responsible for predispositions for political awareness and participation (Dotti Sana \& Quaranta, 2014, p. 266; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 38). However, gender roles and norms are reproduced through political socialization. Evidence shows that girls and boys do not experience the same political socialization (Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2014, p. 38). At home, parents talk to their daughters less about politics than to their sons (Pfanzelft \& Spies, 2019, p. 38). And outside of the home, girls receive less encouragement for political careers, receive less information about politics, and are exposed to fewer females in public-sphere roles - more specifically, fewer females in political roles, as evidenced by this study (see Table 9) (Bos et al., 2020, p. 2020; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 38). This socialization process could lead girls to have less political interest than boys, as shown in the adult sample in this study (see Table 9).

Indeed, when studying school-aged children, Bos et al. found girls to be less interested in politics than their male classmates (2020, p. 475). Though my findings did not yield significant gender differences after controlling for personal characteristics such as political interest, more differences were found before controlling for these in Model 2. Political interest was a significant variable for all of the forms of political participation and was also negatively correlated with being female (see Table 9). Females are less likely than males to be interested in politics. This has been explained by gender socialization, which encourages boys and girls to develop certain traits (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475). These processes shape social norms that could prevent girls from engaging in politics in order to maintain their prescribed gender role (Abendschön \& García, 2021, p. 2057). And, according to social role theory, when men and masculine traits are featured prominently in politics, children infer that these are what is needed to successfully participate (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475). Using these theoretical stances on the social construction of gender and political socialization, one can infer that my results showing that adult women are less interested in politics than adult men may have started as children, and could be due to processes of socialization. More specifically, my finding that people's experiences with female political leaders when they were teenagers is directly related to their political interest is further evidence that political socialization related to gender matters for future participation in politics.

## Conclusion

Previous research shows that women and men tend to participate in politics differently (Bode, 2017, p. 598; Brundidge et al., 2013, p. 13; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2010, p. 330; Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 45; Van Duyn et al., 2019, p. 10), and that conflict-avoidance tendencies and having role models while growing up may account for some of these gender differences (Bos et al., 2020, p. 475; Coffé \& Bolzendahl, 2017, p. 144; Nir \& McClurg, 2015, p. 561). My results show very few gender differences in political participation and no overall gap. I also found that views about politics as conflictual and having female political leaders present while growing up do not affect participation. However, the latter is reported by more males than females and is directly related to political interest. Women tend to be less interested in politics than men, and political interest is a significant covariate in all forms of political participation.

## Limitations and Future Research

Since this study used secondary analysis of previously collected data, there were limitations to the data that could be used. The effect of conflict avoidance could be better studied had the survey offered an additional question about one's tendencies to avoid or seek out conflict. Wolak found that political participation was not very related to conflict avoidance but instead to the enjoyment of conflict, which was more often the case for men than for women (2020, p. 152). Future research should measure both people's views about the civility of politics, their tendencies toward conflictual situations, and their feelings about conflict in politics specifically.

Further, political behaviour is affected by language due to its connection to income, education and employment (Beauregard, 2016, pp. 74-75). Within a Canadian context, different political socialization based on culture may play a role in political participation outcomes among Francophone women (Beauregard, 2016, p. 75). Beauregard finds that Francophone women have the lowest political participation levels when compared to Francophone men and Anglophone men and women (2016, p. 82). She found this to be true even when considering the resources available to these groups (Beauregard, 2016, pp. 84-85). Using logistic regression analysis, I found that language was a significant factor for demonstrating, commenting and posting online, contacting officials offline, voting, and online petition signing, signifying that language is an important consideration in political behaviours. Overall while looking at Canadian political participation trends, an intersectional approach should be considered, and the differences between gendered trends in Canadian Anglophone and Francophone populations should be compared.

Additionally, this study used adult data only, limiting the implications of any findings in regards to the causes of any significant factors. Future research should evaluate children and adolescents' political interest, political-type activities, and conflict-avoidance tendencies to better relate political gender trends to gender socialization and gender role expectations. Using youth and children is ideal for this type of research since it greatly decreases resource disparity as a potential explanation for any gender differences (Pfanzelt \& Spies, 2019, p. 35). Studies like that of Pfanzelt and Spies (2019) and Bos et al. (2020) should be replicated on a larger scale to better understand the full effects of gender socialization on political habits.

Lastly, most previous research, including this study, operates using a gender-binary model. Though the survey data used in this research included an option for respondents to choose nonbinary as their sex, it was recoded to a female-male binary for the uses of this study due to the small number of non-binary respondents. The low number skewed analysis and may have resulted in misrepresented results. Future research, particularly on gender trends, should remain inclusive in their research when possible in order to get the best possible examination of the topic.

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## APPENDIX A: Gender Differences in Political Participation by Study

| Study | Location | Data <br> Year | Relevant <br> Table | Political Participation Measure | Are gender <br> differences <br> Significant? |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  <br> García-Albacete <br> 2021 | Germany | 2017 | Table 1 | Used the internet to discuss politics <br> Discussed politics with friends, family or <br> people they know | Yes (Men more) |



|  |  |  |  | Demonstrate | No |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


|  | USA, UK, France |  | Table 3 | Commented on any political content on online platforms | Yes (Men more) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | Commented on any political content on Facebook | No |
| Neilson 2010 | Europe countries | $\begin{gathered} 2002 \\ - \\ 2003 \end{gathered}$ | Table 2 | Boycotted certain products | No |
|  |  |  |  | Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons | Yes (Women more) |
| Neilson \& Paxton 2010 |  | $\begin{gathered} 2002 \\ - \\ 2003 \end{gathered}$ | Table 2 | Boycotted and/or buycotted | Yes (Women more) |
| Nonomura 2016 | Canada | 2008 | Table 3 | Boycotted a product or chosen a product for ethical reasons | Yes (Women more) |
| Pyeatt \& Yanus 2017 | USA | 2010 | Table 1 | Attending a meeting | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Posting signs | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Campaigning | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Donating | Yes (Men more) |
| Schussman \& Soule 2005 | USA | $\begin{gathered} 1998 \\ - \\ 1990 \end{gathered}$ | Table 2 | Taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration related to a local or national issue | No |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Van Duyn et al. } \\ & 2019 \end{aligned}$ | USA | 2015 | Table 2 | Online news commenting behaviour | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Comment on stories about neighborhood and community | Yes (Women more) |
|  |  |  |  | Comment on stories about State government | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Comment on stories about U.S. politics or domestic policy | Yes (Men more) |
|  |  |  |  | Comment on stories about International news | Yes (Men more) |

