Book Reviews/Comptes rendus

Charles Lemert and **Anthony Elliott,** *Deadly Worlds: The Emotional Costs of Globalization*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 2006, 208 pp., $US 21.95 paper (978-0-7425-4239-6), $US 72.00 hardcover (978-0-7425-4238-9).

In this book two well-known sociologists and social theorists with strong interests in psychoanalysis, one American and the other British, employ a psychosocial approach to get at the dialectical relationship between globalization and human emotions. Their analysis is shaped heavily by an array of social theories as well as a wide set of data derived from, among other things, interviews and informal discussions (some conducted by the authors) going back to the 1980s, case studies of their daughters and other personal acquaintances, autobiographical reflections, and even dramatizations and inventions as they relate to the various characters discussed in the book. The methodology (as well as much else about the book) is, to put it mildly, extremely loose and highly personal. It is in many ways a very personal book to the authors, and while this gives it some power, it also leads the reader to be dubious about many of its conclusions.

As the title suggests, the main point of this book is that globalization is toxic to individuals and their emotional lives. The big problem for the authors is the "new individualism" including, among other things, hyper-individualism, privatization, and the decreasing solidity and durability of personal identity caused by globalization (although they recognize that globalization also brings with it the possibility of more open and flexible selves).

While globalization is singled out as the cause of the problems detailed by Lemert and Elliott, that idea (like much else in the analysis) is underdeveloped, underanalyzed and undertheorized, although a detailed analysis is promised (p. 65). Furthermore, it is *not* at all clear that globalization is the cause of these difficulties. In fact, throughout the book other causes, only partially related to globalization, are discussed including modernization (including "liquid modernity"), postmodernization, the new information and communications technologies (especially the global mass media), corporate downsizing, technological change, mass consumer culture, the sexual revolution, confessional therapeutic culture, and multiculturalism. The analysis lurches back and forth among and between these causes, but exactly what the role of each might be,

and how they relate to one another, is never discussed. More importantly, it appears that all of these are related in some way to globalization, but those relationships are never specified. For example, two cases of greater choice and fluidity in sexual relations (although with costs such as addiction) are discussed in Chapter 4, but rather than demonstrating the role played by globalization in this, it is much more about the role of new technologies (cell phones, the Internet) in permitting and encouraging, in Freud's terms, the "polymorphous plasticity of sex." Overall, in spite of the authors' assertions that globalization is the cause of the new individualism and the advantages and costs associated with it, it is not clear that globalization plays such a central role. In fact, most of the analysis focuses on the other causes discussed above and it is simply assumed that all are somehow related to globalization. That *might* be the case, but it is nowhere demonstrated in this text. Such complex linkages need to teased out with great care and detail, but such analysis is lacking and instead there is a heavy-handed assumption that globalization overarches, and is a surrogate for, all of them.

The book concludes with a discussion of surviving the emotional damage caused by the new "globalized individualism" (earlier ideas on the new individualism were "manipulated individualism" as described by, for example, the critical theorists) and "isolated privatism" (characteristic of the 1950s and work of that era such as David Reisman's *Lonely Crowd*). What the authors suggest as a survival mechanism is *aggression*, albeit aggression that leads not to violence, but to "rich and powerful living" (p. 168). Several examples of those who survived as a result of aggression are discussed including C. Wright Mills, Phyllis Whitcomb Meadow (a student of, and researcher for, Mills; she became a noted psychoanalyst), and Norman Bishop (one of the authors' case studies). It may be that such aggression is a viable way of responding to the new individualism, but is not at all clear what the problems experienced by these people had to do with globalization (two of them lived most or all of their lives before the current explosion in globalization) and therefore how their aggression relates to it.

The implication of this book seems to be that aggression is a useful and healthy response to the contemporary world. Let me close and take their advice as it relates to my analysis of this book. This is a weak book and that weakness is underscored by its title, since the book does not really deal with globalization and the worlds described are, as the authors are at pains to show, not just "deadly," but also empowering. The "data," such as they are, are weak and unconvincing. The theorizing is all over the place with many theories invoked superficially (including, most damningly, globalization theory) *and* there are uncomfortable

fits among and between the theories, especially the high modernism of psychoanalytic theory and the postmodern orientation of the authors, especially as demonstrated in much of Lemert's other work. It is difficult to understand how two such noted social thinkers could have gone so wrong in their analysis, but perhaps it is traceable to the process that was presumably the centerpiece of this book. That is, the importance of globalization in the contemporary world has led them to a hasty analysis of it and to combine haphazardly under that heading a variety of social processes and causes that require separate analyses; their relationships to globalization need to be demonstrated far more convincingly.

University of Maryland College Park George Ritzer

Patricia Clough with **Jean Halley**, eds., *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007, 328 pp., $US 23.95 paper (978-0-8223-3295-0), $US 84.95 hardcover (978-0-8223-3911-3).

Clough is a well-established voice within extended qualitative sociological traditions. With all due respect to the contributors to this edited volume, it is to Clough's introductory essay that I believe most readers will turn. Her essay, simply entitled "Introduction," is as strong a primer for what is intended by the "affective turn" in sociology as one could wish. It is the sort of summary statement that any doctoral student preparing for a comprehensive examination in the area of qualitative sociology or the sociology of emotion should be encouraged to attend to.

As Clough writes, "The affective turn invites a transdisciplinary approach to theory and method that necessarily invites experimentation in capturing the changing co-functioning of the political, the economic, and the cultural, rendering it affectively as change in the deployment of affective capacity" (p. 3). This volume attempts to move beyond a philosophy of affect to a social science of the affects. By attending to the simultaneous engagement of the body and the intellectual, and the reciprocity between both, our understanding of the social is enhanced by the affective turn in much the same way as the linguistic turn and the postmodern turn have done previously.

Classical theorists can be forgiven for noting that we have been here before — and that this new turn is, in many respects, a very old one. It may be dressed up in new language, but the interest expressed here is very much a part of classic Greek scholarship. It is indebted to the analysis of the human condition found in Aquinas, it is steeped in Marx's implicit social psychology, and it shares Cooley's lack of willingness to make a clean break between the concepts of individual and society. How-

ever, collectively, the authors of the text are more conceptually aligned to Freud and Lacan than they are to Weber and Mead.

Fair enough — academic freedom means nothing if it does not allow one to opt for one intellectual harbour over another. But the form of expression that some authors opt for in this text will, in my opinion, limit it in developing a wider readership. To what extent do we, as members of an academic community, wish to use language that is so deliberately subculturally derived that it excludes others? This is a particular challenge for those from critical theory traditions who actively pursue exclusionary rhetoric. Reading this text is a small glimpse into a subcultural rhetoric that has developed among this sub-set of scholars. It is not my intent to single out individuals here, but the following quotations are representative of my general point:

> The thing (whatever it is, (quasi) subject/(quasi) object, *furet*, cell, scrap of code, regulator gene) comes into being — solidifies, is made real, that is, present (presents itself as a gift) — at a moment of time, and then becomes invisible (p. 97).

> It is the thresholding of force, temporality, and matter through intention and the intension of affect, capture, and recursion by design, a design that is always exceeded in its very recursion, that makes technoscience the open-ended "reality studio" (p. 67).

I could go on with multiple examples like these two. Suffice to say that this is not a text to bring students or colleagues to an interest in the affective turn. It is, in many respects, for converts who have learned the language of the group and are comfortable with its exclusivity (whether intended or not). Additionally this is a text that freely moves into forms of expression more traditionally reserved for our colleagues in the humanities — notably poetic verse and autobiography. For example, here is a section of the contribution entitled "Myocellular Transduction: When My Cells Trained My Body Mind."

> *Speed*
> speed-slow
> swishshwish
> smooth
> sailing
> legslide
> shoulderswing
> slightly forward tilting side to side
> head straight upon the spine (p. 108)

I am simply not in a position as a reviewer to pass comment on poetry — it is not my area and were I to do so I would be stating mere prefer-

ence. But as sociologists move towards adopting a variety of forms of expression to shed light upon diverse aspects of the human condition, they correspondingly raise important issues for full and fair peer review processes. Minimally, if one is seeking recognition as a playwright, a poet, or a dramatist, then the high standards of the academy for these areas should apply to sociological newcomers as well.

Clearly this is a challenging text — one that tests boundaries, encourages us to ask what constitute the reasonable limits of our discipline, and pushes what transdisciplinary discourse is and does. That is the purview of the editor, but its result is a text of narrow appeal. I highly recommend the opening essay to those wishing to frame the affective turn in their own work. However the accompanying essays will likely have a much narrower interest base.

Brandon University Scott Grills

Scott Grills currently serves as the Vice-President (Academic and Research) at Brandon University. He is a professor in the sociology department and has recently published articles in the areas of folk music, the sociology of doubt, and sociological theory. He was the guest editor of the August 2007 issue of the journal *Sociological Focus* that honored the work of Herbert Blumer. He is the co-author (with Robert Prus) of *The Deviant Mystique* and the editor of the book *Doing Ethnographic Research*. grillss@brandonu.ca

Marcel Fournier, *Marcel Mauss: A Biography*. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, 448 pp., $US 37.95 hardcover (978-0-691-11777-5).

Originally published in French in 1994, Marcel Fournier's biography renders more visible in anglophone circles the innovative social science paradigm of Marcel Mauss (1872–1950), his uncle Emile Durkheim, and the French school of sociology. Conventional histories of sociology focused on great men —Durkheim, Weber, Marx — have obscured the collaborative character of the group. Mauss became its organizational and intellectual leader after Durkheim's death in 1916.

Fournier's biography is less about the personal life of Marcel Mauss (which is not particularly remarkable) and more about the seminal network of scholars that assembled around Durkheim. Mauss's collaborations are both academic (cross-cutting conventional disciplines of sociology, anthropology, philosophy, history) and political, largely a politics of engaged socialism to which sociology aspired to provide critical force.

French intellectual life depended more on lectures to colleagues and students than on formal publications, requiring Fournier's retrospective

context. Mauss, like Durkheim, was a passionate advocate of sociology's "positive" method. The comparative sociological method focused on the description, observation, and systematization of facts, with the verification of theories secondary. "Harsh critique" (p. 116), an objective stance of the observer, and an avoidance of final truths facilitated a "strict inductive discipline" arising from "comparative, in-depth monographs" (p. 116) on specialized topics. Durkheim moved sociology from Marxist study of economic causes based in class relations to the study of religion, Mauss's specialty. Mauss sought a voluntarist and idealist socialism subordinating material facts to social ones. His was a politics of collective action, often based in voluntary cooperatives.

The French sociologists were activists; almost all were active in one or more socialist parties or organizations. Mauss, a bachelor until late in life, spent much of his time with his students, treating many as friends and colleagues. He was an Anglophile with strong ties to British anthropology (C.S. Seligmann, Sir James Frazer, Bronislaw Malinowski).

L'Année Sociologique, with twelve volumes appearing between 1898 and 1913, aspired to review the international literature in all branches of sociology and to publish the original work of Durkheim's collaborators. The sheer mass of bibliographic work often threatened to overwhelm the individual scholarship, much of it collaborative, of the core editorial group. The regular contributors, "the Année team," were almost invariably referred to as "collaborators"; most were students or former students of Durkheim, and later of Mauss. Mauss and Henri Hubert were key figures from the beginning. Division of labour among the collaborators produced something like a research institute (p. 66), although the members remained dispersed and their work never deeply integrated. Nonetheless, Durkheim hoped a theory would emerge from the comparative method. Sacrifice (Hubert and Mauss) and primitive forms of classification (Durkheim and Mauss) were key works. *Le Don* in 1926 stands as exemplar to the *L'Année* method.

During World War I Mauss served in the army for four and a half years, mostly in combat units, and enjoyed the life of a soldier. Fournier depicts a man ill-suited the life of the mind and its need for concentrated solitary work. Mauss remained optimistic about the political future of a revitalized socialism, not succumbing to the malaise of much French intellectual life in the interwar years.

Wartime, however, signalled the end of an era, with many losses. Henri Beauchat died on a Canadian expedition to the Eskimo in 1914 (although Mauss later analyzed the seasonal variations in social morphology of the nomadic Eskimo). Maxime David, Antoine Bianconi, and Jean Reynier were killed in the war. Demoralized by these losses and the

death of his son André, Durkheim died in 1916, leaving Mauss as the undisputed leader of the remaining group. Mauss, with Henri Hubert, spearheaded the post-war revival of *L'Année Sociologique*. Mauss and the other survivors felt obligated to defer their own scholarship to publish the ideas of deceased collaborators.

Mauss was the "primitive sociologist" among the Durkheimians. He accepted the shared position that so-called "primitive" societies, by virtue of their simplicity, provided a laboratory for sociological generalizations about human structural universals. Although his model remained evolutionary, Mauss responded to the increasing international relativism of anthropology. He opposed pejorative use of the term "primitive" and dissolved Durkheim's binary contrast between mechanical and organic solidarity, identifying elements of both in all societies. The differences were qualitative rather than quantitative, with "social solidarity" and what we would now call "agency" operating at all levels of societal organization. His evolutionism was functionalist because "the social fact" was indivisible across the institutions of a society. Mauss was disturbed by Lucien Levy-Bruhl's claim of a discretely "primitive" mind; he envisioned a human cognitive capacity realized according to its particular social context.

Mauss did no fieldwork, although he was a keen observer of other lifeways during his travels. He developed questionnaires for the use of others, and his students brought back the results of their fieldwork. Albert Metraux imported Americanist participant-observation methodology. Michel Leiris used ethnography to counter the merely literary character of Durkheimian sociology in the eyes of more positivist colleagues. Maurice Leenhardt, with his extended fieldwork in New Caledonia on religion and the concept of the "person," became Mauss's alter ego. Mauss was a firm believer in ethnography's responsibility to serve French colonial interests. His later work deployed exemplars from "archaic" societies to critique the nation and nation-state in the context of two world wars. "Exotic ethnology" was another favoured rubric.

At the Institut d'Ethnologie in the late 1920s and early 1930s, ethnographers in Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific included Marcel Griaule (leader of the Dakar-Djibouti Expedition of 1931–33), Georges-Henri Rivière (Musée d'Ethnographie du Trocadéro), Jeanne Cuisinier (Malay States), Paul-Emile Victor (Greenland), Alfred Metraux (Argentina), Georges Devereux (Moi Sedang), Charles Le Coeur (Morocco), Jacques Soustelle (Mexico), Thérèse Rivière (Algeria), Denise Paulme (Dogon). Other students and heirs included Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis Dumont, André-Georges Haudricourt, Georges Condokminas and Pierre Bourdieu.

Canadian sociologists will find this book an erudite and informative contextualization of French sociology, particularly of the ethnological school which was the particular contribution of Marcel Mauss.

University of Western Ontario Regna Darnell

Donald G. Dutton, *Rethinking Domestic Violence*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007, 432 pp., $34.95 paper (9780774810159), $85.00 hardcover (9780774813044).

Rethinking Domestic Violence takes on the challenging proposition of being "… a modern history of social-intervention on a specific problem [domestic violence] that shows how such intervention can be misguided by the political conceptualization of the problem" (p. xi). In fact, it is a review of the academic literature on domestic violence selected to demonstrate that existing understandings and responses (especially feminist approaches) are inadequate. While there is a need for a critical review of the literature in this area, and while an integrated understanding would be welcome, Dutton's rendition is little more than feminist bashing. As a result, he fails to include issues raised by feminist scholars into his integrated (nested) model of intimate violence. Thus, an opportunity to build insights and develop truly integrated understandings is squandered.

Dutton begins with an historical review. The review is neither balanced nor complete. For example, it fails to contextualize why the "problem" of domestic violence has focused on male assaults on women. Dutton criticizes feminist research because "[h]istorically, feminists have focused on wife assault to the neglect of violence perpetrated by women and violence in same-sex relationship (Dutton: 3)," but neglects to mention that, historically, men ignored the problem. It took feminist activity, on an issue important for women, to have the profile of violence against women raised in the academic, community, and political arenas.

Dutton argues for an integrated, multi-level approach to the issue of intimate violence. This is an interesting frame and has potential; a potential not realized within this book. The key failure is the absence of the macro-level as an essential component of the nested ecology. Abusers are, for Dutton, harmed human beings who require support and treatment. There is, apparently, no need to address any wider social factors that might contribute to the prevalence of violence of a variety of types. Consider the following example. Dutton argues that feminists have "misinterpreted" the event — it is not about violence against women, but the outcome of severe emotional harm and the absence of treatment. He contrasts the feminist view of Marc Lepine's murders at Ecole Polytechnique to those of other mass killers (e.g., the killings in the Quebec

National Assembly in 1984) and argues that our understandings are political gestures in which we exploit the actions of a "mad man" to further a feminist agenda. Dutton is, apparently, unable (or unwilling) to grasp the fact that the choice of victims is not random. Lepine's assault and his own words about that assault are based in a persistent set of negative attitudes about women. He does not invent these beliefs; rather they are part of a gendered discourse and vocabulary around which to understand and speak of killing a group of women he viewed as "a bunch of feminists." It is naïve to conflate this claim with a general attack on men. It is an attack on a particular gendered understanding that is available and has a wide range of impacts, most of which do not result in mass murder. However, such vocabularies are important elements in perpetuating and justifying violence against women in a variety of contexts.

Dutton's failure to give a social dimension its due place in the understanding of domestic violence weakens his overall argument. It is clear from the research that violence is a multidimensional problem requiring a multisectorial response. The social dimension is a critical aspect in understanding how victims are chosen and how actions are interpreted. In addition to weakening Dutton's overall argument, the failure leaves a major gap in the understanding of domestic violence: how to conceptualize women and men as both actors capable of violence and victims of that harm.

Dutton challenges us to come to terms with the reality that women hit — to stop focusing on women as simple victims in domestic violence to seeing them as being "as bad as men." What we need to do is to see abused women as important actors in the drama of their own lives. This is a critical issue in studying interpersonal violence. But, the result of speaking of women using violence, exercising a potential to do harm, is that instead of building a better theoretical understanding we get what Dutton is offering — feminist bashing and a denial of the problem of woman abuse. Theory must go beyond such oversimplified and unproductive approaches. Dutton has not achieved this. There's nothing new here and that's a pity because Dutton's detailed review of the literature offers the potential for a more nuanced understanding of interpersonal violence.

Carleton University Katharine Kelly

Molly Andrews, *Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 234 pp., $US 29.99 paper (9780521604697), $US 85.00 (9780521843652).

Inspired by C. Wright Mills' sociological imagination, Molly Andrews writes that *Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change* is about

"people who have become active participants in their own history, people who have consciously engaged with the key political movements of their day and who have tried to help shape the future of the societies in which they live" (p. 206). How do activists understand historical events and how do they conceptualize their identities and political action in relation to history? Why do they act politically and what sustains their activism throughout their lives, especially as times change? How does the researcher's own biography colour interpretations of activists' life stories? These are the guiding questions of Andrews' short book.

Drawing together and reconsidering twenty years of biographical-narrative research, *Shaping History* is mostly a series of political ethnographies of activists who were interviewed amidst major historical events. First, Andrews returns to her research on lifelong socialist activists in England, who, in their eighties, reflect on what sustained their socialist perspectives and activities throughout their lives, especially as they witnessed their efforts undermined so completely by Thatcher. Some of these activists became dear friends and Andrews considers how these friendship influenced her own lifecourse and future research. Next, Andrews writes about peace and patriotism in Colorado Springs during the first Gulf War. She challenges contemporary claims that 9/11 narrowed the definition of American patriotism. Her interviews reveal that even in the early 1990s any criticism of the country's war involvements — especially in a town dependent on the military — was considered anti-American, and activists often faced brutal retaliation from those seeking to restrict the meaning of the country's national symbols (e.g., the flag). While many contemporary commentators claim that 9/11 changed everything, Andrews reveals that rhetorical strategies to undermine peace activism in the US have been fairly consistent.

Andrews' thoughts on peace and patriotism are followed by a chapter on how East German "oppositional activists" and "internal critics" experienced the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic. Based on interviews in 1992, she warns of the dangers — and ethics — of assuming a Western view of oppositional politics: in the course of her research she found that East Germans were wary of Western academics and their bourgeois assumptions of political activism. She concludes the chapter with a thorough and insightful discussion on forgiveness and the Stasi Files.

Thoughts on national forgiveness and reconciliation link this chapter with one on South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Here, Andrews considers "narratives of forgiveness." Rather than restricting her analysis to publicly available statements made to the TRC, Andrews explores how story-telling itself can be a national "talking cure" and purveyor of collective memory. She does not, however,

paint an overly rosy picture of the TRC. She discusses how the retelling of stories can bring to the present national and individual traumas. She is also sensitive to the fact that many stories are left untold: that the TRC selected some types of stories over others and that there is thus no consensus on the importance of the TRC in postapartheid South Africa.

Shaping History chronicles Andrews' reinterpretation of her own scholarship from that of a doctoral student at Cambridge through to her contemporary research. She asks herself how her own biography and historical (and geographical) location(s) influence her understandings, scholarly interpretations, and thus her ethnographies. Weaving her own story throughout, Andrews reflects poignantly on how her biography influences the selection of her research topics and her philosophical assumptions.

Andrews's book may be of limited use to those interested in nationalism, collective identity, collective memory, and social movements, as the reader will not find many new ideas in these areas. Andrews's main goal is to accentuate the problems and advantages of conducting narrative-based, or biographical, ethnographic research. That noted, the chapter on South Africa's TRC contains an interesting analysis of national storytelling. The chapter on American patriotism and the two Gulf wars is also very interesting and worth much more than a casual read.

A very good application and extension of narrative theory, *Shaping History* is a wonderful addition to any qualitative methods course. Andrews's writing is personable, clear, and free of jargon. In an apparent effort to preserve the words of other scholars, however, she quotes extensively and often. The result is a somewhat distracting cacophony of voices, and her own voice is muffled in places. Nonetheless, key ideas and issues in researching and writing narrative-based research are highlighted. She succeeds very well in outlining the advantages and pitfalls of this type of research by discussing the development of her own techniques over the years. As theorizing and researching emotions is the latest fad is social movement research, I suspect (and hope) we will see more political ethnographies in the near future. Scholars will do well to mind Andrews's observations on how best to encourage activists to tell their stories.

University of Toronto Randle Hart

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Norbert Elias, *Involvement and Detachment*. Edited by Stephen Quilley. Collected Works of Norbert Elias, Vol. 8. Sublin: University College Dublin Press/Dufour Editions, 2007, 252 pp., $US 99.95 hardcover (978-1-90455-842-2).

Norbert Elias, *An Essay on Time*. Edited by Steven Loyal and Stephen Mennell. Collected Works of Norbert Elias, Vol. 9. Dublin: University College Dublin Press/Dufour Editions, 2007, 192 pp., $US 102.95 hardcover (978-1-90455-841-5)

A unique and most remarkable feature of the career of Norbert Elias (1897–1990) is that he was able to strike the keynote (*Grundton*) of his life's work — now being painstakingly edited, translated, and collected in 18 volumes by the University College Dublin Press — in his first and most influential book: *On the Process of Civilization*, first published in 1939. Although Elias did not complete the two volumes under review here until the last decade of his life, they advance the central thesis of his earlier work: that the "civilizing process" proceeds by coupling the sociogenesis of the nation-state with the psychogenesis of self-constraint. In fact, he notes that these later works should be understood to form a trilogy of interweaving arguments which draw together the synthesizing strands of the whole of his project: "So, in a sense the circle is closed. The three studies — on the civilizing process, on the relation of involvement and detachment, and on time, address related and often the same problem from different sides" (*An Essay on Time,* p. 28; hereafter *ET*). In other words, the long-term historical dynamics of state formation, economic integration, social differentiation, and psychic regulation are here shown to entail the generational transmission and accumulation of increasingly scientized knowledge-from-a-distance, on the one side, and ever higher levels of organized power-on-a-large-scale exercised through the symbolic coordination of time and space, on the other. If "the human being is a process" (*Involvement and Detachment,* p. 107; hereafter *ID*), as he argues in each of these works, then statements about civilizing change are necessarily historical, statements about involvement and detachment must be comparative, and statements about time are always relative.

Elias's thesis concerning the varying degrees of involvement and detachment in the arts and sciences constitutes his most systematic and comprehensive contribution to the sociology of knowledge. Here he extends the third of Simmel's celebrated "sociological a prioris" of engagement and distantiation outlined in his 1908 masterpiece *Soziologie*, while at the same time refining his teacher Mannheim's studies of the reflexive stance of the free-floating intelligentsia in *Ideology and Utopia*, and an-

ticipating Luhmann's ideas on second-order observation in *Observations on Modernity*. Briefly stated, his argument is that the greater the danger that people perceive, and the more intense their emotional response to a given situation, the more difficult it is for them to view themselves with a degree of "reality-congruence" (rather than "fantasy-content") and thus to rationally know and critically assess their conditions of existence with a measure of detachment (rather than enchantment). In this regard, physics and biology currently achieve higher levels of detachment and realism than do sociology and the humanities, whose discoveries concerning the conditions and consequences of human action nevertheless increasingly provoke feelings of regret and disappointment:

> What we call "science" is merely an expression of people's ability to break the hold of the double-bind process in their relationships with inanimate nature: to lower at the same time the fantasy level of their knowledge and the danger level of natural events, and thus to put the double-bind process into reverse gear (*ID* p. 162).

Elias discusses at length how the post-war "double-bind" of the arms race and the global threat of atomic catastrophe must induce a sense of urgency and commitment in any socially responsible intellectual; nevertheless, foresight, dispassionate observation, and analysis *sine ira et studio* (to use one of Weber's favourite expressions) are needed to comprehend the figurational dynamics of power which intensify the threat of mutual annihilation and to change the relations of functional interdependence in ways that reduce that danger.

In addition to the discussions of early modern science and 20th century interstate politics which are the main focus of *Involvement and Detachment*, the most illuminating (and surprising) examples he provides concern painting and literature. A chapter called "The Fisherman in the Maelstrom" takes the Poe tale of that title as an allegory for how government at a distance and the scientific accumulation of knowledge may yet offer salvation from the brewing storm of unplanned consequences spiraling out of control (here echoing McLuhan's use of this story in 1951 in the preface to *The Mechanical Bride*). Even more telling is Elias's magisterially detailed examination of the artistic innovations of Massaccio and Alberti (who introduced techniques of perspective in the service of realism), Van Eyck (especially the so-called *Anolfini Portrait* which depicts the minutiae of everyday life with new clarity), Rembrandt (whose self-portraits document the changing self-as-other), and above all Valasquez (particularly his *Las Meninas*, which exposes the private life of court to the public while drawing attention to the craft of the artist, an analysis which complements and surpasses Foucault's use

of this painting in the opening pages of *The Order of Things*). In each case, the surface of the picture projects both a virtual space of an other reality and a reflective image of the world inhabited by the viewer.

> The use of a mirror [for example] as a means of painting one's self-portrait shows particularly well that at the root of the new style of painting was also a new attitude of people towards themselves. A mirror shows one to oneself in a manner which one can never achieve without such a technical aid. It shows people to themselves in the manner in which they are normally only seen by others. The ability to see oneself through other people's eyes, and also the aim of so perceiving oneself, presupposes the ascent to a fairly high level of detachment. In order to achieve it one has, as it were, to go away from oneself and then again to look back at oneself at a distance (*ID,* p. 45).

For Elias, the extremes of involvement and detachment are not ethical imperatives, metaphysical polarities, or aesthetic alternatives, but rather indices of a shifting civilizational dynamic which requires new ways of knowing and seeing the world.

His *Essay on Time* can be read as a further elaboration of these key insights: "The conversion of the external constraint coming from the social institution of time into a pattern of self-constraint embracing the whole life of an individual is a graphic example of how a civilizing process contributes to forming the social habitus which is an integral part of each individual personality structure" (*ET,* pp. 10–11). This more dense formulation of the larger argument proceeds by steering clear of both an objectivist conception of time as a biological and physical datum (which leads to an excess of analytic reification) and a subjectivist conception of time as a universal and inborn principle (which leads to an excess of synthetic speculation). Just as Kant's reflections on the temporal a priori were punctuated by his afternoon walks through the town square of Königsberg, so Darwin's observations on the scope of evolutionary change were inspired by the patient labours of pigeon breeders. From the longer view of large-scale biohistorical development, the modern notion of physical time can be seen to be a product — rather than the material substrate or effective cause — of social time. Timing and dating — that is, sorting and coordinating natural and cultural events into sequences of past/present/future and before/during/after — serve in the first instance a *civic function*: they enforce social codes of communal conduct and personal sentiment while transforming the experience of time from a cyclical flux to a unidirectional flow. The pressure of external constraints regulated through clocks, calendars, and timetables may be "unobtrusive, even moderate, and without violence," Elias points out, but at the same time this pressure is "omnipresent and inescapable" (*ET,* p. 19). Generally

speaking, any measurement or standardization of the fourth dimension of time-scales is therefore ultimately unthinkable apart from the distinctive "fifth dimension" of the time-consciousness of human experience.

Elias's examples are characteristically framed in broad terms and yet vividly depicted in precise detail. The claim that "almost everywhere in the long development of human societies priests were the first specialists in active timing" (*ET,* p. 45), for instance, is illustrated in terms of the pragmatic and symbolic functions of a variety of premodern timing practices: from precolonial America and Africa (the former examined with reference to accounts of mainly French missionaries and the latter though an extended discussion of scenes from Achebe's novel, *Arrow of God*), Stonehenge (which archaeologists have shown to be a sociocentric and not simply helio- or theocentric timing device), Roman calendar reforms in the 4th century AD (conventionalizing the role of officials to "call out or announce" [*calendare*] a new moon), and the fine-tuning of leap years by Charles IX and Pope Gregory XIII in the 16th century (a task taken over in recent decades by the calculations of astronomers). Galileo's acceleration experiments in particular, which quantified the time-distance ratios of downward moving bodies, constitute the most significant innovation in these developments by marking a new departure from theo- or anthropocentric to physiocentric conceptions of time:

> Galileo's innovatory imagination led him to change the function of the ancient timing device by using it systematically as a gauge for the flux not of social but of natural events. In that way a new concept of "time," that of "physical time," began to branch off from the older, relatively more unitary human-centred concept. It was the corollary of a corresponding change in people's concept of nature. Increasingly, "nature" assumed in people's eyes the character of an autonomous, mechanical nexus of events which was purposeless, but well-ordered: it obeyed "laws" (*ET,* p. 94).

The idea of an evolving nature governed by its own rules is in turn enhanced by the cognitive and practical mastery over time and space, diminishing the fantasy-content of myth while advancing the reality-congruence of scientific knowledge. Speculative formulations of temporal duration and historical development, from Baudelaire to Bergson and from Hegel to Heidegger, can therefore be understood to constitute an attempt at synthesizing the analytical claims of physical and social scientists: the latter, however, have been late in tackling the exceedingly difficult problem of time, which they assume is already "known," but have difficulty in saying precisely how.

In many ways the notes by the editors which preface these volumes can likewise be read as biographical illustrations of Elias's own ongoing intellectual meditations on the tensions between involvement and detach-

ment, and of his continuing personal and professional confrontation with the problem of time. His work on the sociology of knowledge was largely drafted in English but first appeared in 1983 in German translation (as *Engagement und Distanzierung*), with materials dating from as early as 1956 and incorporating addenda and fragments written (or dictated to a secretary) from the late 1970s; then the book was posthumously reissued in 2003 in revised and expanded German and English editions with a new introduction which Elias had drafted (in German) in 1986. The text on time was also first written mainly in English, in 1974–1975, but was first published as an article in a Dutch journal in 1985, and then reissued in 1992 in a complete English edition with Elias's long introduction (in German) written in 1984. Shadowing the development of these works was the curious fate of his masterpieces on *The Court Society* (written in the early 1930s but only revised and published in the late 1960s) and *The Civilizing Process* (first issued in the late 1930s while he was in exile and then with an additional synopsis in the late 1960s, but only appearing in a complete English edition in 1994). Despite his fractured and eclectic writing and publishing career, Elias pursued this project with the singular aim of constructing a "model of models" which would be synthetic and analytical, empirical and theoretical, structural and processual, but without ever intending to be either timeless or disinterested. By integrating the achievements of the arts and the social sciences with those of the humanities and the physical sciences, his ultimate hope was to explore the human capacity for alterity and identity and the limits of sociality and individuality. The three pillars of this monument of 20th century social thought are well worth the dedicated study and patient reflection they demand of readers.

University of British Columbia Thomas M. Kemple

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Norbert Elias, *The Genesis of the Naval Profession*. Edited by Rene Moelker and Stephen Mennell. Dublin: University College Dublin Press/Dufour Editions, 2007, 172 pp., $US 84.95 hardcover (978-1-9045-5880-4).

The Genesis of the Naval Profession is a "reconstruction" by editors Rene Moelker and Stephen Mennell "from a large number of un-

finished typescripts" (p. xi). Only the first chapter of the book was published by Elias, in the *British Journal of Sociology* (1950). Two related articles on the same issue were supposed to appear in the same journal, but when the first article did not provoke any response the others were never published. Why should we care now about the publication of these texts on such a 'marginal' topic?

Because its main ideas have been already expounded in other texts by Elias, this book will never become a classic in sociology. However, we should care about it, precisely because Elias's analysis of the genesis of the naval profession is a clear illustration of the main principles and concepts developed by this atypical sociologist. *The Genesis of the Naval Profession* is an interesting illustration of what relational sociologists try to do. As Moelker and Mennel explain in their introduction (pp. 2–3), the "sociogenesis" of the naval profession in England was founded on the rivalries between divergent groups — military gentlemen and professional seamen. Similarities to *The Civilizing Process* and other books from Elias are evident. We are not talking about the usual spectacular class conflicts found in Marxist theories. We are instead dealing with the prolonged and chaotic evolution of social processes: "The growth of the English naval profession … took the form of a slow, but fairly continuous sequence of changes with many ups and downs" (p. 91). We are at the level of "rows and quarrels of a very ordinary kind such as almost everybody occasionally encounters in their everyday life" (p. 52). Seamen and gentlemen were struggling for commanding positions on board ship. Generally speaking, the evolution of this figuration reflected a changing balance of power due to the relative decline of the old nobility. It took more than a century "of tensions and struggles" to stabilize the figuration "in the early part of the eighteenth century" (p. 52). This book illustrates the kind of relational approach Elias proposed: "In fact, a similar phase, an initial antagonism and struggle for position between rival groups, may be found in the early history not only of professions, but almost every institution. If one attempted to work out a general theory of the genesis of institutions one would probably have to say that the initial conflict is one of the basic features of a nascent institution" (p. 49) It is not so clear that we are dealing with a "general theory." It might be more accurate to talk about the discoveries of similar "elementary screw mechanisms which play such an important part in every kind of historical development" (p. 116). Elias's approach thus shares ontological and epistemological affinities with the works of sociologists like Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, who help us to understand that specific conflicts are related to larger conflicts (p. 73); or even better: specific conflicts are the components or building blocks of what we can perceive as larger conflicts. Therefore,

sociology and history are not so far away from each other, even if they have been so often opposed as nomothetic (sociology) and ideographic (history) disciplines. There is no social law to discover, but history is not simply a suite of individual actions. There are social mechanisms to study, and these mechanisms are the unintended effects of relations between interdependent actors.

Methodologically, the study of these mechanisms pushes us toward a historical and comparative sociology. Different social processes produce and explain different social situations. In France, "the caste-like exclusiveness of the hereditary military class" prevented "the antagonism between gentlemen and seamen from taking, for any length of time, the form of an open feud as it did in England" (p. 93). The same phenomenon happened in Spain. The result is that "these differences in structure and attitude … led to corresponding differences in the development and the structure of the three naval establishments and of the naval profession" (p. 93). By having more contacts with them, by being obliged to recognize and learn the skills and know-how of professional seamen, English military gentlemen became more proficient than their French and Spanish counterparts. In the English navy there was a (better) "measure of equilibrium between seamanship and military virtues" (p. 94). This figuration explains why and how the English navy achieved maritime supremacy. This is another example of the "unintended effects" caused by the evolution of figurations.

How good is the book? It has the same strengths one can find in Elias's other studies. Elias significantly contributed to the emergence of a relational approach by explaining and showing that: (1) actions are interdependent; (2) human sciences have to move beyond the "egocentric" perspective in favour of a "figurational" (or a relational) perspective; (3) as Goudsblom explains in *Sociology in the Balance* (1977) the evolution of the social world is the effect of "long-term developments taking place in human social figurations [which] have been and continue to be largely unplanned and unforeseen" (p. 6); (4) we can identify and study patterns, tendencies or social processes but their evolution is always fluid, dynamic, and unstable. By fusing sociology and history, we can explain the mechanisms behind the evolution of past or ongoing social processes, but there is no social law to discover in the social universe.

In terms of teaching, it might be enough to say that this book helps to improve our knowledge about Elias's approach and can be suggested to students as a short text. Many of them will enjoy its brevity, and take pleasure in stories such as the dramatic struggles between Drake and Doughty. However, most of students will appreciate this book only after

they are introduced to other major works by Elias, such as *The Civilizing Process*.

Laurentian University François Dépelteau

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Dorval Brunelle, *From World Order to Global Disorder: States, Markets, and Dissent*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007, 224pp., $29.95 paper (9780774813617), $75.00 hardcover (9780774813600).

Dorval Brunelle's ambitious new book takes on some of the most controversial and pressing topics of the day. These issues are of interest not only to sociologists but also political scientists, political economists, and social activists. The rise of market liberalism, globalization, and multinational corporations, and the decline of the welfare state, as well as the changing role of the state within that global economy, are all featured characters in this slim volume. The "world order" is meant to describe the institutions founded during and immediately after the Second World War. In this arrangement, states were handed the responsibility of overseeing the economy, an approach strongly influenced by Keynes and Beveridge. In the first few decades following the Second World War this system proved to be relatively successful and the state was able to provide "security, justice, and welfare" to all its citizens. The national system, however, increasingly grew to be in conflict with pressures from the global economy; that is, the movement of commodities and capital outside of national borders. Notably, the other factor of production, labour, remained nationally bound and this is where the crux of the problem lies. Lack of mobility has meant that many social problems, such as unemployment, need to be dealt with at the national level, and more importantly, this is where they are funded. Put slightly differently, governments are saddled with the responsibility of attending to social problems, yet they have no control over the origins of these problems, often international in character. This tension between the national and international appears to have been resolved in favour of the global domain, which explains the second part of the book's title. The "global disorder" refers to the contemporary arrangement where markets are firmly

ensconced in the driver's seat of a global economy where capital is able to determine what states are able to do.

Brunelle identifies Canada as setting the pace for the rest of the global economy. Negotiations for the Canada United States Free Trade Agreement that began in 1985 and became effective in 1989 served as the inaugural contract that ushered in the current "global disorder." This agreement broke new ground by going beyond the mere trading of goods to include sections on private and government services, investors' rights, and intellectual property rights. This, Brunelle claims, puts both governments and public corporations in a position subordinate to capital.

In accord with much of the globalization literature, he states that capital has outgrown the confines of the state and multinational corporations have been successful in evading national control. However, he differs with the bulk of this literature by insisting that "a new world order … will necessarily fall within the purview of the nation-state" (146). He contends that international organizations are not up to the task of combating global market liberalism. In his words, "the nation-state still remains the sole instrument through which universality at both the national and international levels can be pursued" (146). This conclusion is both realistic and optimistic, in that it allows for change at a more manageable level. However, I do think that Brunelle somewhat exaggerates the success of the so called neoliberal agenda, particularly when it comes to the domestic sphere. While in some countries, and particularly in the United States, a considerable number of services have been privatized and social programs have been cut back, in many countries, including Canada, the welfare state remains generally intact. Furthermore, the scourge of unemployment that afflicted industrial economies over the past thirty years seems to have abated and the burden on the social assistance segment of the welfare state has consequently declined. This means that the biggest problems facing the welfare state today are primarily demographic (such as an aging population) and there is no need to go beyond national borders to hunt for more complex explanations. Still, this book has much to offer. Brunelle makes a good case for how free markets are often trumped by issues of national security. He points to how competitive markets were thwarted by the need for regional security during the cold war. In Canada, this development shifted the centre of commerce and industry to Toronto and Ontario and away from Montreal and the Maritime provinces.

Overall, the issues that Brunelle tackles in this book are vast, complex, and impossible to resolve. But this should not deter academics from studying these problems and trying to make some sense out of this chaos. The author does an admirable job of theorizing some of these

issues. The book's theme consists of nothing less than the evolution of the global economy since the closing of the Second World War and he posits some novel and interesting connections on how this behemoth has changed over the past two decades. Some, maybe even many, may not agree with Brunelle's analysis but it is important that these debates take place, particularly in universities. The book is likely a bit too theoretical for undergraduate students but it would serve as a perfect vehicle for igniting some lively discussions in graduate classes. In short, this volume provides an important overview of the global political economy and where it is heading in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

University of British Columbia Okanagan Peter Urmetzer

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Yossi Shavit, Richard Arum, and **Adam Gamoran**, eds., *Stratification in Higher Education: A Comparative Study*. Stanford University Press, 2007, 504 pp., $US 65.00 hardcover (0804754624).

For Canadians in higher education, this is a timely collection of articles on stratification, inequality, and postsecondary education in developed economies. The authors place this as one in a continuing series of cross-national comparisons of the relationship between education and stratification, focused entirely on tertiary education in the 1990s. They describe it as the fourth generation of comparative stratification research. Theoretically, they come from a positivist, empirical perspective. In it, they test a series of hypotheses drawn from the literature through the analysis of carefully collected statistical data and back these up by rich contextual materials of fifteen country systems. This work is carried out by 34 researchers, among whom are leading experts of long standing as well as newcomers to this important field of study.

The country comparisons cover eight systems in Europe, Russia, three Asian countries, Israel, Australia, and the United States. In each chapter, the data sources, methodologies, recent history of changes and reforms and population issues are described. The special interests and hypotheses of the authors as they examine their country studies make each country chapter stand on its own as well as link back to the overall comparative purpose.

A particular focus is the forms of expansion of postsecondary education (binary, diversified, or unified) and social stratification. Canada has been in a period of rapid expansion of postsecondary education since the end of the Second World War. But there is no chapter on Canada and indeed the word "Canada" does not even appear in the index. Yet the questions of tiering, diversity, government control, educational markets, and the ongoing issues of stratification and inequality are widely debated topics in Canada and the subject of political campaigns among students as well as politicians. This is why this collection will be of such interest to scholars, government bureaucrats in higher education, and students of comparative studies.

So why is Canada omitted? One might speculate that our constitutional division of powers with provincial control over postsecondary education, which requires the analysis of ten systems and with no national policy or analytic capacity, makes Canadian postsecondary education simply too difficult for this type of comparative research. Many other countries find our lack of even a national government clearinghouse astonishing and frustrating. Whatever the reasons for the exclusion of Canada from this research it is most certainly our loss.

Begun in 2000, the editors selected teams from the chosen countries and put out guidelines for each chapter. The teams met a few times in some suitably exotic places such as Prague and Rio de Janeiro — these are ISA participants after all — to review and edit what has become a marvelously clear and consistent volume.

The country chapters are well worth reading but the time-strapped reader will benefit most from the first chapter in which the editors lay out the theories and propositions, define their terms and variables, and summarize their methodologies and their findings. This chapter is a model of clarity.

The researchers all collected data on carefully defined variables of expansion, differentiation and privatization, and a series of education transitions indicating inequalities. The latter include the probabilities of students becoming eligible for entry to postsecondary education, entering any form of higher education, and entering the "first-tier" institutions. Except in the "unified" system where every postsecondary student goes into university academic programs (Italy and the Czech Republic) first-tier differentiation exists in systems that are differentiated (like Korea or the United States) or binary (such as Britain or Russia).

The statistical results allow the test of a series of hypothesis about inequality and expansion. The details are interesting and make the case studies even more important. At a very general level, the findings are that educational expansion in itself will not reduce inequality unless near

saturation (the maximally maintained inequality hypothesis familiar in the literature from the work of Raftery and Hout, 1993), that institutional differentiation with expansion provides greater opportunities or reduces inequalities, that private funding increases enrolments but otherwise increases inequalities, and finally, that with expansion gender inequality in postsecondary attendance decreases. Each of these findings is far more variable and nuanced than a short summary can suggest. The case studies then increase our understanding of the interaction among all these variables since countries have expanded their systems with different objectives, at different rates, with different forms of tiering and different mixes of public and private support and intervention.

These findings and examples will be of great interest to policy makers and critics contemplating forms of educational change. In Canada, we are in a constant state of study of post-secondary systems, province by province and as governments change. Some provincial administrations are seized with international competitiveness, others with governance, or rates of entry or graduation or cost containment. In some studies it is simply difficult to tell. This volume would suggest that differentiated systems, somewhat market driven, with a focus on human capital development will help reduce inequalities without diverting elites to separate institutions (or foreign institutions in the case of Canada).

One would like to have seen the role of governments at different stages and levels in postsecondary institutions and the lives of students more deeply analyzed in these findings. For example, Canada's student loans system is a curious mix of government and private action that affects enrolment or access in complex ways at different times. The chapters on Australia and the USA shows the complexity of their financial aid systems, which are sometimes held up as models for Canada. But more generally, government policy may influence demand as well as rationing spaces and costs. While these data may not allow such an exploration, the authors do not really bite into the results at this level and so do not shed light on the competing theories in a totally satisfying way. At the other end of the scale, the movement of peoples in the globalized economy cannot be explored in full by studies at the national level. For example, are "first-tier" institutions global in their capture of talented students, even if regulated at the national level? If so, how does this affect national inequalities?

However, this work is so engrossing and enlightening that quibbles should be set aside and one hopes it will lead to studies in Canada in the near future, especially if the comparative work is among the provinces.

What is surprising is to find a hard copy volume in this era of on-line publishing and in a field in which change is occurring at a smart clip.

Japan, for example, facing the rapidly shifting demographics of their age distribution is in a six-year process of change that may have dramatic effects on the number of universities and the division of labour among them. They are not alone in dealing with the consequences of low birth rates and immigration. So a hard copy volume seems startling and yet, as these chapters make clear, the underlying thesis of the relations between stratification and higher education plays out quite slowly despite such dramatic changes. The role of governments is strong even in "free market" economies because inequality is impossible to ignore in democratic societies. In the end, this volume is about the exploration of competing theories and long term social change in inequalities. If the findings presented here were to be carefully studied, thought through and applied to changes in our postsecondary systems, a welcome drop in inequality might result.

York University Lorna R. Marsden

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Randy K. Lippert, *Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents, Power, and Law.* Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2005, 240 pp., $85.00 hardcover (0-7748-1249-4).

The increasing difficulties experienced by asylum seekers and other migrants attempting to settle in peaceful states are only occasionally the stuff of front pages. It is thus good to see that this important issue is addressed thoughtfully and with much original research in three of the fifteen books published in 2005 by Canada's premier sociolegal publisher, the University of British Columbia's "Law and Society" series. Two of these document recent changes in law and policy but break with legal scholarship in providing a great deal of information about the on-the-ground impact of Canadian law and policy. Catherine Dauvergne's *Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws in Australia and Canada* shows that the "minor" details of how refugee hearings are organized and run make a big difference to the process. Anna Pratt's *Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada*, while mainly concerned with policy, contains a memorable description of the conditions

under which the Department of Immigration detains some noncitizens prior to hearings or to deportations.

Randy Lippert's study of sanctuary also contains an excellent overview of recent legal and policy changes, focussing on the plight of those who do not qualify for formal, UN refugee status, and is even more ambitious than the other two works in the thoroughness of the empirical research. Dozens of interviews with church members, lay refugee activists, and others are supplemented by a careful reading of hundreds of documents, newspaper articles, and relevant materials. The findings are then presented in close relation to and dialogue with recent theoretical debates in sociolegal studies and in Foucault-inspired social theory.

The innovative decision to focus not on government but on extra-state actors, namely those who decide to provide what is known as "sanctuary," gives Lippert an opportunity to explore the relation between state power and what he calls nonstate "sovereignty." The use of the term "sovereignty" to cover the selfless work of Canadians who spend a great deal of time, effort, and money to support deserving refugees may seem odd. But one of Lippert's key findings is that far from welcoming all asylum seekers with open arms, sanctuary providers are as selective as the immigration authorities. "Most often the answer is no" one activist told Lippert, commenting on the practices of the Southern Ontario Sanctuary Coalition (pp. 70–71). If the sovereign is he who decides on the exception (as Carl Schmitt famously put it), then sanctuary providers, despite being private and often humble citizens, are acting as sovereigns.

Of course it would be impossible for a small group of private individuals to look after all those who fall afoul of the technicalities of immigration/refugee law. But Lippert argues (a tad too critically, in my view) that sanctuary providers are re-enacting the old philanthropic practice of separating the few deserving poor from the mass of the ordinary, undeserving poor. In the work of sanctuary, he argues, the refugees are turned into objects of Canadian charity. This, he says, makes the provision of sanctuary into a perfect example of what Foucault called "pastoral power" — the power exercised by gurus over the faithful who follow and obey them.

The practices of sanctuary are thus shown to combine pastoral power and sovereignty. In this sense, the book makes an important contribution to Foucaultian sociology, especially governmentality studies. Lippert tends to overstate the Foucaultian case, however, often treating the actual people and practices studied as "instances" of concepts. Readers learn a great deal about how pastoral power and sovereign power work in sanctuary but not much about, say, how the Catholic church's sanctuary work is different from that of Unitarians or Anglicans. The rather clunky title,

which the series editor ought to have changed, will also put off potential readers, even though it is very theoretically precise, as Lippert explains.

Despite going a little overboard on Foucaultian theory, and thus alienating some readers (e.g., immigration law scholars) who just want to know how sanctuary works, Lippert is to be commended for attempting to write theory, social research, and legal studies at the same time and in the same text. It would have been easier to separate these literatures and these styles of writing. It is extremely difficult to get the balance right — if there is a "right" balance at all, given disciplinary tensions and existing chasms between theoretical and empirical work. Thus, Lippert's quest to undertake a large empirical research project on an important policy issue, and to write up the resulting findings so as to contribute to theoretical debates, will no doubt become a model for others doing work in the sociology of law, and not only in Canada.

University of Toronto Mariana Valverde

Tanya Titchkosky, *Reading and Writing Disability Differently: The Textured Life of Embodiment*. University of Toronto Press, 2007, 192 pp., $24.95 paper (0-8020-9506-2), $55.00 hardcover (0-8020-9236-5).

From an interpretive theory perspective, Tanya Titchkosky examines the discursive practices and normalizing discourses that inform the way both disabled and nondisabled readers read and write disability in our everyday lives. Astutely, the author makes the case that attitudes toward, beliefs about, and images of disability permeate our lives and affect how we interpret our relationship with it. Avoiding the temptation to impose the binary of disabled and nondisabled, Titchkosky reminds readers that eventually disability will affect all of us (if we live long enough we will become disabled), and illustrates how the discourses and narratives of disability affect our present lives whether disabled or not. According to Titchkosky, the act of reading this book means that the reader has a relationship with disability.

She remains committed to analysis of the "now" of disability through textual analysis. Titchkosky writes:

> The term 'textured' refers not merely to the fact that the disability abounds in texts. Textured also refers to the fact that the weight, substance, and sense of disability x are put together by texts that are woven into readers' lives in a variety of ways.... In scrutinizing our textured lives resides the possibility of responding to disability as something more complex than an undesired-embodied-difference.... I make use of the concept of enactment to pursue the possibility of scrutinizing what we *are doing* to make

> disability, and thus our lived-embodiment, present and apparent to ourselves and others in the here and now. (17)

Yet the author is not content in analyzing the status quo; rather Titchkosky sees the materiality of disability open to various interpretations depending on the individual's social location. Titchkosky begins her book analyzing how she/we do/make disability during the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. Her social location as a white professor in Nova Scotia who experiences dyslexia informs how she does "make sense" or "make meaning" of the intersection of race, poverty, and disability during and after the Katrina disaster. For Titchkosky, how we make meaning is a matter of our interaction with others and our social location.

She invites the reader to make sense of disability by interacting with "lived experience" that has been textualized into documentation. Methodologically, the author employs case studies concerning government documents, newspaper documents, and medical case studies to bring interpretive theory to life. Whether disabled or nondisabled, the reader creates a double movement: first, the reader engages with the "lived experience" of disability through the interaction with case studies, newspaper articles, and government documentation. Through the reflexive process (the key to the interpretive theory employed by Titchkosky), the reader can not only empathize with the people written about but be critical of the discourses that create the "lived experience" of disability. Taking it a step further, Titchkosky asks readers to read their social location as a text. This reflexive and critical process creates another text which interplays with *Reading and Writing Disability Differently*. Through this interaction readers can read and write disability differently.

As a teaching tool, *Reading and Writing Disability Differently* offers in content and method an interactive way for students to think differently about disability. Too often, theoretical analysis is a "bird's eye view" of a concept to be resolved. Tanya Titchkosky stresses that she views disability not as simply a concept or a "problem" to be analyzed or resolved. Rather, for the author the meaning of, and more importantly how we live disability is dynamic and open to interpretation. I would be remiss if I were not to applaud the Canadian content in the book that will add to its vivacity for many of my students. This book will be invaluable for students in Disability Studies, sociology, and public policy, and for any reader interested in how people "make sense" of the "lived experience" disability.

Wilfrid Laurier University James Overboe

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Nandita Sharma, *Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of "Migrant Workers" in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, 216 pp., $30.95 paper (0-8020-4883-8), $60.00 hardcover (0-8020-3840-9).

Multiculturalism, immigration, the Canadian way of life — these are touchstones of popular debate in Canada, and of many mainstream media reports and academic analyses. The oft-heard refrain of much media and academic commentary is that the Canadian model of "diversity" has been unsuccessful because "we" have failed to emphasize that immigrants must play by the same rules as everybody else. However, as Nandita Sharma convincingly demonstrates, there has been a great deal of effort expended in making sure that many people entering Canada do not get to play by the same rules as everyone else. Indeed, in the context of neoliberal economic restructuring, there has been a clear shift in the treatment of those entering Canada. Increasingly, permanent status has been denied in favour of temporary status. The migrant worker program grants people the right to enter Canada to work as part of a low-waged, flexible labour force without any of the rights or benefits of other residents of Canada. Strikingly, those who are granted temporary status as migrant workers are not a small minority of the incoming labour force, but the vast majority, averaging between 65 to 75 percent of all those entering Canada to work (p. 118). Migrant workers are not free to choose their employer, type, length, or location of employment — all these are preauthorized and cannot be changed without risk of deportation. The tightening of restrictions on immigrant workers is in striking contrast to the restructuring and easing of barriers to transnational capital investment.

In *Home Economics*, an analysis of nationalism and migrant workers, Sharma begins by analyzing the relationship between nation, race, class, and home. She argues that the very idea of home "has been both occupied by nationalist practices and colonized by nationalized imaginations" (p. 4). Sharma demonstrates how nationalist ideas of home have been central to the maintenance of national borders and the exclusion of racialized others. Drawing on Foucault, Gramsci, and Dorothy Smith,

Sharma focuses on social practices of governing, rather than on state structure or policy. Here she highlights nation-building as a project that has constructed Canada as the homeland of some and not others, and that has acted as a central technology in making and regulating differences under globalization (p. 55). The book's title can now be seen as a striking and succinct summary of the place of nationalism and home in the management of transnational migration and labour markets. The treatment of migrant workers is justified by their supposed homelessness, by their status as outsiders to the nation — even as they reside within its borders.

Sharma then undertakes a careful analysis of Canadian state discourses and practices on immigration and labour, detailing the debates leading up to the creation of the Canadian migrant labour program in 1973 (the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program, NIEAP). Parliamentary debate in the 1970s shows that the creation of the category of migrant worker depended on nationalist and racialized discourses of a white nation. In particular, parliamentary debates grappled with the problem of foreigners and their supposed threat to Canadian prosperity — whether in relation to capital, labour, or culture. Sharma examines this debate, demonstrating that the state-defined solution was not to simply close down Canadian borders, but rather to ensure that the majority of migrants entering Canada would remain foreigners, with no legitimate claims to being at home in Canada. Here it becomes clear that Canada's migrant worker program has acted as a "legal tool that helped to define unequal social relationships of nationality within Canada" (p. 102).

This book's strength lies in its skillful weaving together of wide-ranging theoretical explorations of home and nation, and detailed statistical, discursive, and historical analysis specific to Canada. Also striking is the last chapter, in which Sharma extends her reflections into a broader theoretical and political challenge to "practices of difference-making" (p. 140). How, in other words, Sharma asks, might we actually achieve a measure of social justice? She produces a radical re-thinking of notions of home, rejecting home as place of origin, place of similarity, or shared identity. Sharma instead explores some of the conditions for us to be able to be at home anywhere. Her clearest political proposal is that "just as borders and other social, economic, and political boundaries need to be imaginable, then, so does a world without them" (p. 165). Here a discussion of activist and community groups working on these issues would have been welcome, particularly as Sharma has herself been active in this political arena. This might have been an appropriate place to highlight those networks and groups, such as No One is Illegal or Solidarity Across Borders that take up some of the challenges that Sharma makes.

Home Economics is an important addition to Canadian scholarship on migration, labour, and transnationality, and would also be useful for teaching within advanced university seminars. We will be discussing it in my own graduate course, Transnational Theories of Race, Gender and Sexuality, and I imagine that such a comprehensive Canadian analysis could also form the basis for interesting discussions or essays in undergraduate courses on race, nation, and labour, though the theoretical content and writing style make it appropriate only for senior students.

Queen's University Sarita Srivastava

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Michael T. Martin and **Marilyn Yaquinto**, eds., *Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and their Legacies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007, 728 pp., $US 34.95 paper (978-0-8223-4024-9), $US 99.95 hardcover (978-0-8223-4005-8).

The assertion of "reparations" has risen to the fore of social movement claims-making in recent decades. The term is used to broadly characterize demands for monetary compensation and restitution and also for symbolic forms of repair, such as apologies, memorials, and days of commemoration. In *Making Whole What has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics* (Harvard University Press, 2006) John Torpey expressed concern that "reparations politics" represents a narrowing of justice demands befitting our post-Socialist times. Indeed, the rise of reparations claims seems indicative of a prevailing ethos of compensatory justice, which privileges juridical and actuarial confrontations with past wrongdoing over more "transformative" challenges.

The battles over reparations politics are perhaps nowhere more heated than in demands for slavery redress in the United States. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that American slavery cannot be reduced to a singular event. From the mass loss of life during transport across the Atlantic to the crimes against humanity committed through the institution of slavery, from the injustices of Jim Crow to today's continuing disparities of wealth, health, and opportunity, the harms of slavery are multiple and still unfolding. Moreover, slavery is something that most Americans prefer to locate firmly in the past. For many, a decisive end to this "peculiar institution" is imagined to have come with the end of the

American civil war. As well, the civil rights movement is perceived to have resolved the question of race in America.

The contributors to *Redress for Historical Injustice in the United States* seek to disrupt this facile sense of closure (e.g., Brown et al.). In this volume, the historical and legal cases for slavery reparations are presented, the scope and style of potential material and symbolic repair is debated, and strategic proposals for achieving redress are offered. As is the case for any large edited volume, there is some repetition; nonetheless, for the most part, each paper makes a distinct contribution. In addition, the chapters are accompanied by a final section that contains numerous important documents related to the issue of slavery reparations, including legislation, government resolutions, lawsuits, activist declarations, and case study summaries. For the casual reader, this surfeit of information may be overwhelming; however, for the reparations researcher it is extremely useful to have all of these documents compiled into one source.

For the sociologist, the volume contributes to our empirical and sociolegal understanding of slavery reparations. The chapters are too numerous to discuss in any detail, but a few examples will illustrate some key insights. First, much of the historical and contemporary discussion of the harms of slavery offers a clear indictment of abuses of slavery and Jim Crow (e.g., Lyons, Kerr-Ritchie), alongside case studies of lesser known slave trade beneficiaries such as New York City or American and Canadian railroad companies (e.g., Singer, Kornweibel Jr.). Moreover, the contemporary consequences of these institutions are examined not solely in terms of their physical crimes and human rights violations; indeed, several authors clarify the negative consequences of slavery and Jim Crow for African Americans in terms of inheritable property and wealth, as well as housing, health, and other necessities of social survival (e.g., Brown et al., Oliver and Shapiro, Darrity Jr. and Frank, Williams and Collins, Massey). Second, complex legal arguments are provided about how reparations claims might fit within the dictates of existing US law (e.g., Bolner, Bittker and Brooks, Ogletree Jr.). For example, Davis examines how slavery might be litigated using the Thirteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, and several authors offer comment on Deadria Farmer Paellmann's lawsuit against FleetBoston, Aetna, and CSX for the profits they received from the slave trade (e.g., Martin and Yaquinto, Biondi, Henry). Third, slavery reparations are situated within a broader transnational and neoliberal framework (e.g., Darrity Jr. and Frank, Biondi, Horne) and contrasted to other reparations efforts, such as those the US government paid to Japanese citizens who were interned

during WWII (e.g., Yamamoto, Henry) or those Germany paid to slave labourers after the Holocaust (e.g., Martin and Yaquinto).

What is missing, in this as in much of the reparations literature, is detailed analytical attention to the amorphous concept of reparations. For the most part, the authors are content to define reparations based upon the forms reparations might take: compensation, restitution, etc. The editors further this confusion by proposing the term "redress" as an even larger umbrella under which to locate the multiple dimensions of reparations politics (p. 3). However, these efforts provide little insight into what unifies these responses as a common form of social action. For example, what relational and interpretive qualities allow us to define an act as "reparations?" Are there interactive or formal principles that characterize reparations that allow us to distinguish it from juridical responses to harm, such as trials? A similar problem follows from the widespread acceptance among authors in this volume that reparations are the best course of action for those seeking slavery justice, although there are certainly differing opinions over what shape these reparations should take (e.g., Fulwinder, America, Corlett, Kelley, Browne). Thus, the concern that the judicial and actuarial nature of reparations provides a rather narrow conception of justice is too rarely discussed. However, those authors who are wary of reparations that individualize slavery's injustice and offer purchasable redemption for American society (e.g., Yamamoto, Oliver and Shapiro, Kelley, Nuruddin), rightly suggest that rather than an end in themselves, reparations are an opportunity to obtain the resources needed to carry the quest for justice toward transformative goals. The challenge of how to sustain the movement for transformative justice, if and when modest reparations are achieved, requires greater discussion.

University of Manitoba Andrew Woolford

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Suzanne Staggenborg, *Social Movements*. Oxford University Press, 2007, 173 pp., $39.95 paper (978-0-19-542309-9)

I have little doubt that this slim volume will be widely used for teaching undergraduate classes in social movements in Canada. It is organized

perfectly for a twelve-week course with ten chapters, six highlighting particular movements. The choice of movements includes the protest cycle of the 1960s, aboriginal protest in Canada, the women's movement, gay and lesbian movements, the environmental movement, and the global justice movement. These will correspond with the interests of many university and college students today, and Staggenborg (and Ramos) do a great job describing the movements, while identifying the links between them in a savvy way.

While Staggenborg's presentation of the different theoretical perspectives is balanced, she is obviously sympathetic to the contentious politics approach of Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow. Their emphasis on identifying recurrent processes and mechanisms that underlie the ebb and flow of social movements is reflected here. I am pleased to see the McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly approach used in a Canadian text and I suspect its arrival will introduce many Canadian sociology students to this approach for the first time. There has been limited interaction between it and the Canadian emphasis on political economy, and this text will hopefully allow for more and better conversations between scholars using the two approaches.

The second chapter focuses on "Theories of Social Movements and Collective Action" and reviews collective behaviour theory, resource mobilization and political process approaches, new social movement theory, and recent synthetic moves. The theoretical material is summarized admirably. In order to use the text most effectively, undergraduate readers or readers new to the material would benefit from outside readings if they are going to be able to comprehend the years of debates and research that underlie these approaches. In a theoretically oriented course, I might make this chapter recommended reading, using it in conjunction with longer, but less dense readings. However for courses with a less theoretical bent, this would work as an introduction to the field.

The chapter on aboriginal protest is written by Howard Ramos of Dalhousie University. This chapter is an excellent addition to the text, focusing on one of the most contentious movements in the current Canadian context. Ramos highlights three key events that provided mobilizing opportunities to those communities: the White Paper of 1969 that proposed eliminating Indian status, the Constitution Act of 1982 that sought to renegotiate Canadian state-society relations, and the protests of Indian Summer 1990. Like Staggenborg's chapters in the book, Ramos uses rich substantive material in ways that value both the particularities of single movements and the dynamics that link them.

The substantive chapters on the women's movement, gay and lesbian movements, the 1960s protest cycle, the environmental movement

aboriginal protest and the global justice movement each combine short readable histories of each movement, its key events and campaigns with a seamless exploration of theoretical questions around emergence, mobilization, decline, organizational dynamics, and strategy. The book ends with a general chapter that emphasizes the challenges facing social movements as they try to bring about social change. Bringing together the threads of the book, Staggenborg emphasizes the recurrent themes of organization, political context, strategy, and tactics.

There have been a number of new social movements texts released in the last few years including two that are also aimed at Canadian educators. Rod Bantjes (2007) of St. Francis Xavier offers a set of adapted lectures within a political economy approach that reflects on activist dilemmas of bureaucratization, repression, and co-optation, while looking at the environmental, anti-poverty, labour, and sovereigntist movements. A volume edited by Miriam Smith (2008) of York University also uses a political economy approach to present a set of case studies that examine a similar set of movements. Both are excellent additions to the teaching toolkit of social movement scholars. One could easily imagine combining either of them with Staggenborg's volume in order to stimulate debate, and provide more substantive material on contemporary Canadian movements.

Social Movements is an excellent anchor for a course on social movements. In addition to the readable prose, instructors will appreciate useful teaching aides include bolded terms, discussion questions and suggested readings, as well as a list of abbreviations. In the end, it is likely to encourage students to delve deeper and want to read more, which is as much as anyone could ask.

York University Lesley J. Wood

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Eva Illouz, *Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism*. Oxford: Polity Press, 2006, 144pp., $23.99 paper (978-0-7456-3905-5), $71.99 hardcover (978-0-7456-3904-8).

Comprised of papers prepared for the Adorno Lectures in Frankfurt, *Cold Intimacies* traces the development of psychological knowledge of emotions and how this knowledge has come to reorganize commonsensical understandings of experience itself. The purpose of *Cold Intimacies* is to continue the Frankfurt School method of cultural critique: "when we focus on this dimension of capitalism — on its emotions so to

speak — we may be in a position to uncover another order in the social organization of capitalism" (p. 4). The rise of capitalism, representative political institutions and individualism taken to characterize "modernity" are conventionally thought to mark the decline or negation of emotions. Illouz argues the making of capitalism was in fact intertwined with the manufacture of a specialized emotional culture, or an emotions industry. Psychological knowledge provided a vocabulary for the self that made therapeutic emotional styles and emotional hierarchies of capitalist management intelligible.

Emotional capitalism, for Illouz, is a culture "in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually shape each other" (p. 5). The first example of emotional capitalism Illouz documents is the growth of management as a system of governing workplaces, wherein the language of emotionality became enmeshed with productive efficiency. For managers and corporation owners in the early 20th century, the language of psychology allowed them to "neutralize class struggles by casting [those relations] in the benign language of emotions and personality" (p. 17). Illouz argues Elton Mayo's use of psychotherapeutic interviewing in assessing workers was a key moment of integrating psychological knowledge into corporate management. "Communication" became a management technique aiming to align workers' emotions with the goals of capital. Corporate selfhood was described as a communicative ethic that decreased class conflict.

In the United States during the 1950s, psychologists intervened into marriage and family relations, to promote "harmony." Illouz argues that second-wave feminism and psychology were commensurate as far as they advocated a therapeutic intimacy mobilized in the language of rights that equated sexual pleasure for heterosexual partners with affirmation of those rights. In the words of Illouz, "because feminism and psychotherapy instructed a wide number of psychological, physical and emotional strategies to transform the self, their recoding of the psyche entailed a 'rationalization' of women's conduct inside the public sphere" (p. 30). Manuals and surveys regarding marriage produced an intellectualization of intimacy. As with workplace management, emotions became an object to be controlled. Traditionally the spheres of publicity and labour belonged to men, and the spheres of privacy and domesticity to women, but Illouz argues emotional capitalism creates emotional androgynization as capitalism taps the cooperative *cum* passive emotions of workers while feminism calls on women to be assertive and independent in their relationships *à la* economic exchange.

Illouz contends that Maslow's psychological writings on self-realization were a precursor to the late 20th century talking cure culture of self-

help that would arise in the United States. Self-help is based on narratives of suffering, victimization, and emotional damage that purportedly need to be therapeutically addressed. Construction of the pathological through the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* and commodification of mental health as a response occurs in what Illouz calls "emotional fields." The ability to display an emotional style defined and promoted by psychologists is what Illouz defines as "emotional competence," which acts like a form of capital in emotional fields. Emotional capital allows one to evade definition as "pathological" and the accompanying stigma. Drawing from Bourdieu, Illouz argues the social currency of emotional capital is an embodied form of cultural capital that allows one to be a player in emotional fields. Thus emotional hierarchies exist inasmuch as emotions become an instrument of social classification and stratification (p. 73).

The final example of emotional capitalism Illouz documents concerns fantasy and Internet dating. Surveys regarding emotional competence are used on Internet dating sites to match users according to their profile compatibility. This textualization of subjectivity leads to a situation where knowledge precedes physical attraction. The virtual encounter of online dating is organized again according to a market mentality, since site users are put into direct competition with one another based on their emotional attributes. The rationalized partner selection of Internet dating "unleashes fantasy yet inhibits romantic feelings" (p. 104). This fantasy, Illouz adds, is sterile, as emotional life becomes the compass of instrumental reason. The culture of emotional capitalism makes emotions "entities to be evaluated, inspected, discussed, bargained, quantified and commodified" (p. 109).

Cold Intimacies is important as an analysis of emotions that draws from broader trends in social and cultural theory. Illouz's demonstration of how "communication" under emotional capitalism has become the hub of corporate selfhood and in fact brackets the "emotional glue that binds us together" (p. 38) is a ruinous critique of another Frankfurt School disciple — Habermas. The attempt to use Bourdieu's theoretical schema to discuss emotions is innovative and demonstrates more fully than current positions in the sociology of emotions how profoundly social and cultural emotions are. Illouz's comments on romantic webs and love as systematized, standardized, and rationalized is a critique of Beck and Beck's writing on chaos and love.

At the same time I wonder about a few of Illouz's claims. She treats psychology as a unitary entity without examining how it is composed of fractured sets of knowledges. More critically, at several points Illouz uses the terms "emotions," "affect," and "feeling" interchangeably. This

melée of terms reflects broader lack of conceptual clarity in the sociology of emotions.

There is a discrepancy in the way Illouz defines emotions in relation to theories of the human subject and capacities for resistance. On one hand, emotion "is the inner energy that propels us towards an act," though emotion also concerns the relationship of the self to culturally situated others (pp. 2–3). This definition locates emotions in the body of individuals who are relationally situated and reflexive, and so is consistent with anthropological definitions of emotions. On the other hand, culture ends up on top since the systematized, standardized, and rationalized cultural forms in which individuals experience emotions are fully constitutive of emotions in Illouz's model. She does not account for resistances to emotional subjectification, and gives too much credence to cultural determination. We are left only with cultural dupes or "hyperrational fools" (p. 113) disconnected from reality, relishing in fantasy.

Illouz's position concerning the subject is further complicated by the notion of "emotional capital" itself. For Bourdieu, capital is the basis of domination. He seeks to break from the economism and objectivism of Marxism, which ignores symbolic processes. Symbolic capital — the power to represent and create official versions of the social world through translation of social, cultural, or economic capital — is the most important form of capital in Bourdieu's schema, yet Illouz does not investigate the connection between symbolic capital and emotional capital. Illouz does say emotional capital is wedged between social and cultural capital as an embodied and enduring form of cultural capital. The idea of emotional capital forwarded by Illouz could be a key concept for sociologists of emotions, especially if put into dialogue with discussions of emotional labour. The problem is that Illouz does not distinguish her notion of emotional capital from Bourdieu's comments on symbolic capital and distinction. Emotional capital is discussed as the "least reflexive aspects of habitus" (pp. 63–64), but Bourdieu's notion of habitus suffers from a latent structuralism and does not really allow actors to stand back from rules and relations of the field to assess and perhaps resist them. Moreover, Illouz demonstrates how taken-for-granted structures of necessity that produce the habitus emerge, but does not explore emotional fields in the plural, thus imposing a totalizing logic of emotional capitalism that Bourdieu's analysis of multiple field specificities would avoid. Elaboration concerning theories of the human subject would be needed to overcome the cultural determination evident in Illouz's Bourdieu-inspired formulation of emotional fields and capital. Accounting for resistances to emotional subjectification without falling into the trap of voluntarism would be a way to supplement Illouz's work.

Cold Intimacies provides a critical perspective somewhat lacking in the sociology of emotions at present time. This well-written and concise book will be appreciated by historians of psychology, sociologists of emotions and cultural studies scholars.

Carleton University Kevin Walby

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Neil J. Smelser, *The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 292 pp., $US 29.95 hardcover (978-0-691-13308-9).

It is a rare author who takes on the task of investigating a phenomenon which is rarely out of the headlines, but which he almost despairs of defining. Neil Smelser, professor emeritus of sociology at Berkeley, has a daunting record of scholarship devoted particularly to collective behaviour, social movements, cultural traumas, and social change in general. He notes that, before 9/11, terrorism was not included in his agenda. However, after the attack, he became one of two social scientists included on the US National Academies' Committee for Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, and drafted the chapter on terrorism and human populations in its report. He was also subsequently heavily involved in other National Academies' activities in research and policies on terrorism, and found that his broad interdisciplinary background in a range of humanities and social sciences was very helpful here. A major paradox for him was that, although terrorism is rooted in history and is the most worrisome form of contemporary combat, it has never been well defined and rarely well studied. Late in the book, he points to a study which offered 109 overlapping definitions, so no wonder he devotes an appendix to what he calls "the infernal problems of definition and designation."

In the appendix, Smelser offers a brief, pared-down definition of terrorism and fits into it four major forms of terrorism which have dominated the scene for the past half century. These are ethnonationalist-separatist terrorism such as by Basques in Spain, or that in Northern Ireland; domestic ideological terrorism such as perpetrated by the Red Army faction in Germany; single-issue terrorism such as the extremes of the antiabortion or animal rights movement; and international vio-

lence as typified by Al-Qaeda. His definition focuses on the irregularity of these forms' acts of violence or disruption, or their threat, carried out in secret with the intention of causing fear and anxiety in a group (and constant fear and threat is a vital element of terrorism) and thereby exciting political response or political change. Parenthetically, note that state-sponsored terrorism is not ignored by Smelser, but is considered a very nasty animal of another stripe.

The point in raising such items from the appendix at the beginning of this review is that they reflect, in part, the culmination of over 200 pages of painstakingly analytical, and largely nonpartisan, exploration of the major social and psychological dimensions of contemporary terrorism. The exploration is intended to yield some long-term predictions and policy proposals, though with little hope that poll-blinded American politicians will show much interest in them.

Smelser's book is divided into three parts. The first is a brief introduction outlining his credentials, and noting his inclusion of a series of statements of "entrapments" throughout the book. These are warnings aimed at democratic societies, notably the United States, pointing out how efforts to combat terrorism can readily backfire. He points also to a series of boxed notes consisting mainly of personal observations and experiences, including the work of some other social scientists, in research on terrorism. For example, the National Academies consist largely of experts in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine; Smelser, as a social scientist, was obviously considered something of an outsider. Where else, he notes, would a physical scientist consider it a compliment to tell him "I used to think that sociologists were worthless, but now that I've got to know you, it's all but one" (p. 193)? The second part focuses on the "causes and dynamics" of terrorism and contains three chapters devoted to its conditions and causes, ideological bases of terrorist behaviour, and issues of motivation, social origins, recruitment, groups, audiences, and the role of the media. The third part, "consequences and control," also has three chapters: anticipating, experiencing, and responding to terrorist attacks; discouraging terrorism; and its long-term international context. It is impossible to do justice here to more than a sprinkling of his observations. I will focus briefly on Smelser's views on ideology, on the role of the media, and on discouraging terrorism in a democracy, before concluding with some general observations.

Smelser is at his best in his analysis of terrorism and ideology. Ideology, he notes, structures the complex world for the believer and potential believer. It also "provides a structure for the affects of anxiety, despair, indignation, hope, anticipation, and elation, and weds them to a selective existential picture of the world" (p. 89). It is an invitation to feel and be-

lieve, and may lead to terror "when other conditions are present and the time feels right." Those conditions are most likely to occur amongst potentially supportive audiences "whose situation is uncertain, confusing, threatening, desperate, and seemingly overwhelming" (*ibid.*). Clearly, such a "cultural resource," as he calls ideology, would better fit desperate Palestinians or Chechens than extremist animal rights advocates. But it is not automatically internalized, and where it is, may only be referred to periodically to justify actions. In turn, those who are the subject of attack may utilize their own all-inclusive ideology — for example, the unthinking application of "democracy" by the Bush regime to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Terrorist ideologies require enough flexibility to explain changing circumstances. They can, however, cease to have salience (witness the end of the Irish "Troubles") and Smelser wonders how long the complex anti-Americanism of Islamic extremism will survive growing literacy in the Middle East, declining birth rates, and the rise of India, Russia (again), and China as world powers. This important question is rarely asked, as the media broadcasts the latest suicide bombing. But then, as Smelser notes, since 9/11 the media have been central to "strategic appeals to world audiences" by the United States and terrorist organizations, both aimed at "courting public opinion through propaganda and actions" (p. 110). Very often, however, the publicity given by the commercial media in the United States to terrorism leads to accusations of complicity, and hotly-contested demands for control. Smelser considers this an entrapment leading to "partisan and ideological postures" on both sides. A fair point, but since he opposes censorship, all that is left is a half-hearted proposal for "a systematic code of responsibility" in reporting terrorist acts.

The structural framework within which Smelser writes is one of "democratic institutions," American-style. He leaves no doubt that 9/11, like the Holocaust and the Kennedy assassination, was a "cultural trauma," and the immediate reaction was to strike out against perceived perpetrators at home and abroad. Combined with continuing fear of further violence, this leads to over-heated rhetoric by political leaders, and (Smelser's entrapment 2) to counterterrorist ideologies which both narrow the range of strategies available, and stimulate aggression, which loses potential supporters domestically and abroad. In light of this, Smelser's chapter on discouraging terrorism is perhaps the most vital in the book. He points to those counterterrorist measures that have proved inadequate so far. He notes that it is important to attack world poverty but naïve to believe that terrorism can be resolved thereby. He observes that American willingness to resort to high-tech warfare that harms civilians

should be used very sparingly because it is counterproductive. Indeed, going further, his examination of American involvement in recent wars, as well as his experience on the National Academies' committee, has led him to recognize the pervasiveness of the disastrously misguided view that anything could be solved through "technocratic fix-it." In contrast, Smelser calls for "patience and death by strangulation" which, whilst recognizing that some forms of discouragements are not feasible (e.g., media censorship) and others too costly, would selectively "harden" potential domestic targets against terrorism, encourage better international intelligence cooperation, repress illegal actions of protest groups, sanction nations supporting terrorists and overall take *measured* rather than wholesale action. Good points again, but nowhere does he mention allied states such as Saudi Arabia as sources of terrorist money, and can one see the US government sanctioning that nation?

In his final chapter, Smelser looks over the plethora of books written during the past few years, mostly critical of the United States, which examine its role as a world power. He calls his account "superficial and not inaccurate," but since the books start from different political and ideological premises, and reach different conclusions, the result is "a jumble" (p. 204). He tries to do better with some pages devoted to "a synthetic assessment of the origins, nature and dilemmas of American power." Included in this, on the basis of two very restrictive definitions of the concepts of "colonialism" and "imperialism" as pertaining to past empires, he prefers to use the term "dominance" for American global power rather than either of these terms or hegemony or domination. This is clearly because he sees the United States as, in many ways, a reluctant power, bound by alliances, even uneasy as it extends its sway. If his review of recent books had included Chalmers Johnson's *The Sorrows of Empire* (2004), which focuses centrally on the global spread of US military bases, Smelser might have been less forgiving. But this sums up the cautious tone of his book. It criticizes American security institutions where the need is evident. It is critical of the Bush administration's foreign policy for losing friends and making enemies. It concludes by fearing that partisan politics puts the nation at risk. But consider this typical comment following the statement that military assaults on nations should be used sparingly because they are often counterproductive: "to advance this conclusion is to ask that political authorities in threatened or attacked countries act against their perceived short-term political interests, so the idea is advanced with limited hope of its consideration, despite its merit" (p. 173). Smelser is almost begging not to be treated seriously, despite the veracity of the comment; and there are many more

in similar vein. It is a pity because the book is full of valuable ideas and should be taken seriously.

Queen's University Robert Pike

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Charles N. Darrah, **James M. Freeman**, and **J.A. English-Lueck**, *Busier Than Ever! Why American Families Can't Slow Down*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 296 pp., $US 19.95 paper (0804754926), $US 50.00 hardcover (0804754918).

In *Busier Than Ever!*, Charles N. Darrah and colleagues develop the concept of "busyness" to explain the current state of the American family. For the authors, busyness is more than the myriad strategies and technologies families employ in determining, for example, who picks up which child, where to volunteer, when to eat dinner, or how long to stay at work. The busyness of planning is "ordinary," the authors admit, but the "hidden work" that busyness implies is also "remarkable," for it "reveals issues that reach to the heart of who we are and wish to become" (p. 5). The primary goal of the book is to uncover the latent processes entailed in this hidden work and to theorize the meaning people attach to it. For the most part, however, the motivations of work, hidden or otherwise, in the home, on the road, or in the office are taken for granted by the authors, and who people are in a deeper sense as a result of so much work is never adequately addressed. As the subtitle to the book suggests, American families "can't slow down." Despite the subtitle, *why* they can't slow down is less examined than the question of *how*. Description of the planning, execution, and sometimes neglect of mundane tasks is a valid contribution in its own right, though readers seeking an analysis

of the driving forces, big and small, personal and social, might feel dissatisfied.

The authors base their findings on observations of 14 dual-career middle-class families in Silicon Valley. No two families are the same, and that most challenge popular definitions of the "normal" family is one of the study's subtle, though important, themes. The families share a commitment to balance multiple personal, social, and physical domains. They are described not simply as survivors of a harried world with increasing competition for jobs, quality education, and other resources, but as purveyors of the new status quo. Their lives are described over the book's four sections, with the substantive material laid out in the middle two sections, "Coping" and "Building Buffers," each comprising three chapters. A closer look at two chapters, one from each of these middle sections, gives an idea of the type of observations the authors make and the value and limits of their analysis.

In chapter 5, "Making Manageable Worlds," the authors reveal two practices families use in managing their lives: eliminating irrelevant activities from daily routines, and dividing activities into manageable fragments. This is how families "tinkered with their busyness" (p. 109). In a common practice throughout the book, the authors select a handful of families to emphasize the theme. Humberto Mendoza, a firefighter, and Suzanne Jones, a marketer for a high-tech company, closely evaluate any purchase or person that enters their home, in order to exert control over their lives. The authors relate itemizing receipts and maintaining cleaning schedules and to-do lists to the couple's assumptions and values. Humberto, for example, thinks it a "fallacy" that he or his wife needs to purchase the latest, biggest consumer item to be happy. For her part, Suzanne's to-do lists, often never finished in a day, help her to find meaning in her life, even if these lists add "another layer of invisible work" (p. 117). Pat Carlsberg and her husband Alex use lists and schedules not so much to find meaning as to find time. A researcher for a private company, Pat consciously divides her time into short "chunks" written up on Post-Its or kept in an old address book that she says she would "die without" (p. 116). Her husband, Alex, a systems analyst, prefers a whiteboard.

There is certainly a value to highlighting processes and means of organization, if only to show the various ways families cope. This reviewer, however, wishes that the authors had laid out substantive questions up front and probed the families for answers, or at the very least returned to the families after these questions became clear to them, so that they could confirm or adjust their interpretation. Husbands and wives making lists, however revealing, seems secondary to why they make lists in

the first place and what this activity means to them beyond the practical purpose of getting through the day.

Too often, as in chapter 5, the authors emphasize description over interpretation. In chapter 7, "Using Things," the authors negotiate a balance between the two. The result is the most innovative chapter of the book. Here the authors show how families use objects or institutions as a buffer to lessen the pressure and imposition of everyday life, while at the same time developing a theory to explain the role of objects and institutions in the everyday life of the families they portray. For Karen Jackson, her church is a convenient location to work for her company and to satisfy her commitment to the community; for Rajiv Mohan, PDAs, mobile phones, and a personal computer help him to negotiate major family decisions over long distances or pursue business opportunities anywhere, anytime, even at the expense of a personal life; and for the Trans and their three children, a catering truck is both a means of income and a center of family activity. For these individuals and their families, the church, mobile phone, and catering truck, respectively, provide a "material infrastructure" to enable coping. Recognition for this type of infrastructure is an important and often overlooked dimension of family life. The authors do well to highlight the connection between the social relations of the family and the material world that makes these relations concrete.

Busier Than Ever! is a highly readable book full of accessible anecdotes of families adjusting in a modern world. Yet the analysis does not adequately connect the "humdrum minutiae" of everyday life to wider economic and political trends. The families portrayed do not live in bubbles, and the authors say as much. At the same time, however, the families seem largely immune to the economic boom and bust of the 1990s or the restructuring of employee-employer relations that are now a staple of the modern workplace. The reality of outsourcing or downsizing is handled by the authors in a sensitive, thoughtful way, but descriptions of how families cope or build physical or social buffers to manage in the face of this reality receives far greater prominence in the narrative. Even this criticism, however, cannot detract from what is certainly a welcome addition to the sociology of work and family.

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