


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GET THAT CAMERA OUTTA MY FACE: ETHICS IN DOCUMENTARY MEDIA

Matthew Hayes

In 2011, I completed a film project for a graduate seminar on ethnographic methodology. The exercise involved three hours of observant participation (Tedlock 1991; see also Castañeda 2006, 95-96), during which I set up my camera on a tripod in three different locations for an hour in each, in front of a sign that read: "If you wish to be in a film, please stand here." An arrow pointed down to the spot directly in front of the lens. I waited to see what would happen, and the results, frankly, surprised me.¹ What were most unexpected were the particular ethical considerations that arose. Among others, the opportunity for self-presentation (MacDougall 1992, 97); the significance of ethnographic refusal (Simpson 2007); and the (largely unfulfilled) promise of reciprocity (Jackson 2005, 169-170; Mauss 1990 [1950]).

This exercise led me to rethink my priorities when using visual methods to conduct research. I argue that, particularly in mainstream public consciousness, a major focus of the filmmaker while making and editing a film is placed on how well it will screen with the audience, and perhaps how much revenue it will produce (see Winston 2000). While this often coheres with the fact that

most documentary films struggle to simply break even at the box office (if they make it there in the first place), I think this focus is misplaced. Instead, I argue that more focus should be put back upon the participants of a film study: the subjects in front of the camera. This idea is in no way radical. It should be a first principle of carrying out social research: do no harm, and ensure the welfare of your subjects. However, I also think it is very rarely carried out to its fullest these days. The important point here is that the issues I raise in this paper do not apply solely to visual anthropology or the practice of using visual methods. They apply to all social scientific research, regardless of the scope (see Grimshaw 2011, 257). It is simply that, as I have noticed since I began using film, visual methods tend to make explicit many of the issues inherent in all social scientific research.

The issues I encountered while conducting the above-mentioned exercise made me aware of what exactly I was hoping would happen: I wanted streams of people lining up to sing and dance in front of my camera. I wanted action! As Simpson (2003, 105) writes: "Anthropology is a practice of desire." I desired for these things to happen,

¹ The concept was inspired by the last scene in David and Judith MacDougall's *Photo Wallahs* (1991). The seminar was taught by my supervisor Dara Culhane. The finished film based on the exercise can be viewed here: <http://vimeo.com/24566964>.

Graduate student, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University

Author contact: mrhayes@sfu.ca

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to prove to myself (and to prove a previous theory I held), that people in fact *love* being on camera. I was hoping this was true and was disappointed at times when this action did not occur. However, this disappointment was useful (Simpson 2007, 78). I realized that my goal should never have been to wish for dancing monkeys; this was unethical. At the expense of the agency of my imagined participants, I was too focused on the finished product and what kind of entertainment the viewer would see in the finished film. I should have initially placed my emphasis on ensuring that I do no harm to my participants, focusing on what *they* wanted from the exercise, not what *I* wanted (see MacDougall 1994). Thankfully, I do not believe I caused any harm. At least, no one angrily told me to get my camera out of his or her face. But this holds an important lesson, which I outline in this paper. I trace a history of documentary film in order to highlight from where some of this attitude of privileging the audience has come, and where filmmaking perhaps should have gone instead. Priorities need to shift. I think by doing so social researchers, including myself, can make more ethical use of documentary media.

FLAHERTY'S RECONSTRUCTIONS

I begin almost at the very beginning, with an example from Robert Flaherty. In 1922 he produced the world's first commercially successful feature-length documentary film, *Nanook of the North* (see Ruby 2000, 67). Flaherty was neither an anthropologist, nor was he in any way trained as a filmmaker. He was actually an American mining prospector who was conducting research in Northern Quebec for his employer prior to making the film (Grimshaw 2001, 47; Ruby 2000, 7). He ended up building relationships there with the people who later featured in *Nanook* (one of whom was his indigenous wife!). Flaherty's path to a filmmaking career seems somewhat typical of many ethnographic filmmakers. It seems that only recently have filmmakers of this type actually been trained as anthropolo-

gists. Most of the filmmakers who produced the body of work from which major aspects of visual anthropology developed were outside of the discipline altogether. Indeed, many of the most radical innovations and advancements in the discipline have come from either outsiders or "rebels" within the field, such as Jean Rouch and John Marshall (MacDougall 1998, 67).

Flaherty and his films have caused a great deal of debate over the years since their release (see Pink 2006, 24). Before his death in 1951, he had made, in addition to *Nanook*, two lesser-known documentaries of similar quality: *Moana* (1926) and *Man of Aran* (1934). The debate about these films often concerns the fact that everything, or nearly everything, in his films was staged (see Pink 2006, 23; Banks 2001, 148). The people are real and the places in which he shot are real, but all the scenes were planned out and scripted ahead of time. These "fabrications" were largely due to the technology available at the time: hand-crank powered cameras with no capacity for recording sound. These early film cameras had to be continually mounted on tripods because they were so heavy and awkward. This early technology did not allow the filmmaker to go mobile with the camera and follow the action like we can today with lighter, handheld camcorders. As was the standard at the time (see Winston 2000, 20), Flaherty thus had no choice but to reconstruct and dramatize the scenes for his film, simply because the camera was not mobile and flexible enough to do otherwise.

Two examples may suffice here to indicate the lengths that Flaherty at times had to go to in order to get his shot. There is a scene in *Nanook* in which the title character goes ice fishing and while holding his line, is thrown around on the ground by the seal that is apparently fighting for its life under the ice. The subsequent documentary film *Nanook Revisited* (Massot 1990) reveals that Flaherty actually had *two* holes cut in the ice, with a fishing line threaded from one hole

underneath to the other. While *Nanook* was pulling on the line from one end, two men were pulling on it from the other, causing his titanic struggle and the ensuing hilarity of the scene. A more infamous scene from the film is that of *Nanook* (whose real name was Allakariallak) and his family preparing for the night in an igloo. We see them get undressed, settling comfortably into their blankets. The igloo was actually built about three times as large as it normally would have been, and it was halved (Barbash and Taylor 1997, 25). Rather than being a full dome, only half of it was built, in order to let in enough light for the camera to record. Flaherty had attempted to film in a regular sized igloo, but it proved too dark and cramped to produce any footage that he deemed viewable. So he had *Nanook* build half of a giant igloo instead.

Many have criticized Flaherty for this approach. The American filmmaker Emile de Antonio has remarked: "The charm and power of [Flaherty's] camera are marred by distortions, lies, and inaccuracies which pander to a fake romantic, fake nature-boy view of society" (cited in Barbash and Taylor 1997, 25). It has been said that Flaherty's films were lies because he used reconstruction, because he set up the scenes he filmed as in a fiction film, and because he did not actually film his participants like a documentarian "should". He also at first did not reveal to his audience the way in which he created the film, leaving them to believe what they were seeing was "authentic" Inuit life. Many of those criticizing Flaherty and his films say that he misled his audience and did not in fact portray the "truth". Because of the staged scenes, the documentary was in fact a fiction and did not represent what a documentary should be: it did not show real life; it did not show the truth. Thus, the criticism against Flaherty and his films, against reconstruction and the manipulation of footage in documentary media, rests on ontological and epistemological assumptions about what documentary is and how it produces knowledge.

I argue quite the opposite of critics like Antonio. I think that anyone who criticizes a documentary for telling lies or not telling the truth because it has, for example, used reconstruction or has not let the action unfold as it "normally" would, or has not used "natural" light, retains a misguided view of what documentary is in practice, and how it started. I think these critics do not fully understand what documentary is for and how a documentary film is produced (see Winston 2000). Fieldwork and the use of visual methods involve selection. It inevitably occurs, as you cannot record everything and you cannot report on everything when the project is complete, whether in a book, article, film, photo essay, memoir, etc. There is a bit of a paradox here, an irony. Every documentary film is a subjective interpretation of the filmmaker's view of the world. This has been acknowledged now in academic circles, but is ironically the very realization that caused so much criticism of documentary film not long after its invention (MacDougall 2006, 228; also see Malinowski 1967, 22). This realization is also why I believe so many people have criticized Flaherty's films, and why the general public can sometimes take offence with documentaries that reconstruct events, and therefore apparently "lie" to them (Winston 2000).

SCIENTIFIC ORIGINS

Here I backtrack a bit, because I want to emphasize the use that film and photography were initially put to in the social sciences. This was a scientific, positivistic use. The camera was thought of simply as a good recording device, a machine that could produce objective pictures of observable phenomena, which one could later look back to for confirmation of what occurred that day, at that time, in that place. The camera could be used to record unmediated "reality". The underlying idea was that a camera was a mirror held up to the world. This underlying idea did not recognize that the person holding the mirror holds it in a very specific way that af-

fects what the mirror shows. Especially in public perceptions of documentary media, this notion of the camera portraying “real life” still exists, despite the evidence we now cite against it.

The first significant use of a camera in this positivistic sense was in 1877 by the Englishman Edward Muybridge, who was working in San Francisco at the time of his experiment (MacDougall 1998, 126, 138). He used photography in an attempt to solve the most frustrating scientific question of the day: did a horse have all four hooves off the ground at once while galloping? After being commissioned to solve this riddle, he set up on a racetrack a series of cameras rigged to tripwires, which the galloping horse activated as it moved along (Gray 2010, 4). This series of photos clearly displayed the answer to the riddle: the horse did indeed have all four hooves off the ground at once! So the camera became useful as a scientific measure of body movement and the natural world, resonating with early anthropology’s fascination with physical (read: racial) traits.

Fifty years later, Margaret Mead, working with her third husband Gregory Bateson, produced a monumental photographic study of Balinese body techniques entitled *Balinese Character* (1942). As a result, Mead concluded that one could produce objective images of individuals if one simply left a camera running (see Bateson and Mead 1976). Yet Mead’s assumption reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how cameras work.² She forgot that there was nothing objective about choosing to leave the camera running untouched while it was pointed at, for instance, a group of children, rather than a group of adults. Someone was still pointing the camera and making selections based on a subjective interpretation of what was happening in front of the lens. However, Mead maintained confidence in the use of the camera as an objective aid to social scientific

research right up until her death (e.g. Mead 2003 [1974]) and indeed, this notion still persists today. These assumptions of objectivity stand in stark contrast to Flaherty’s own uses of the camera. He had no qualms about manipulating—some would pronounce it “tampering”—with his subjects and the subsequent footage. Flaherty put into practice an entirely different set of ontological and epistemological principles. He knew the camera was as fallible as any individual human’s vision and so he accordingly exemplified a more subjective and participatory approach to filmmaking, one that is largely unacknowledged as the predecessor of much later attempts (Pink 2006, 24; Ruby 2000, 83).

NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW PRACTICE

To jump ahead: in the 1960s in America, this notion of the camera recording unmediated reality gained strength. It is believed the camera can record “truth”, even while it is handheld and mobile. Brian Winston (2000, 21-22), a British documentary theorist and journalist, traces to this decade what he considers to be a major turning point in the practice of producing visual media. This turning point arose as a direct result of new technology: smaller, lighter, handheld camcorders and, even more importantly, the capacity for recording synchronous sound. All of a sudden, documentary filmmakers could go out onto the street and record both video *and* audio of their subjects without having to create soundtracks in the studio in postproduction. They could record people’s voices *as it happened*. As a result, two major movements developed: cinéma vérité and direct cinema.

The definitions of these movements I find most satisfactory are found in Brian Winston’s book *Lies, Damn Lies and Documentaries* (2000, 169 note 2), which provides a cursory indication of the subject matter. Cinéma vérité is a reflexive mode of filmmaking whereby the process of filmmaking

² What Grimshaw (2011, 248) calls her “simple-minded scientism”.

ing itself is made apparent to the audience. Films of this type may include footage of the cameraman and audio recorder (Loizos 1997, 94), the filmmakers themselves asking people questions, and most importantly declaration (explicit or otherwise) of the use of reflexive principles in the making of the film from the start (MacDougall 1998, 89-91; see also Strathern 1987).³ These types of films attempt to include some of the elements that you would need to see in order to understand how the film was made. Cinéma vérité goes even further at times by making the very act of filmmaking the subject of the film itself, rather than just a part of the film seen alongside a different subject. The classic exemplar of this is the film by Edgar Morin and Jean Rouch: *Chronique d'un été* (1960). Others include many of the Yanomamö films by Timothy Asch and Napoleon Chagnon, such as *The Ax Fight* (1975).

Direct cinema, on the other hand, is quite distinctly American. This latter approach is observational: a filmmaker using it may claim to be a fly-on-the-wall, privileging the action unfolding before the camera, while attempting to maintain distance from this action (Winston 2000, 169 note 2). Direct cinema presumes that one can actually film something without interfering or affecting whatever it is being filmed.⁴ Thus it tends to carry on the positivistic goal of objectivity in filmmaking arising in the work of Muybridge and other early practitioners. Several examples include Robert Gardner's *Forest of Bliss* (1985), set in Benares, India, and the better-known works by Albert and David Maysles, such as *Salesman* (1969), and Frederick Wiseman's *Hospital* (1970).

Whereas earlier filmmakers like Flaherty had to set up all shots with the camera on a tripod, the filmmakers of the 1960s could take the camera in their hands and on their shoulders into the field and record action as it

unfolded, without a script. As a result, many filmmakers could now record intimate moments in peoples' lives, apparently without interference. One could crouch in the corner of a bedroom and film undisturbed, such as what Canadian filmmaker Allan King (1969) seemingly accomplished with *A Married Couple* (see also Druick 2010). All of a sudden, the camera was a mirror, projecting unmediated, scientific reality, at least for some. Others felt differently. Especially in Europe, as a result of the prolific ethnographic filmmaker Jean Rouch, the more dominant feeling was that an observational approach was misguided and unethical, as the very act of filming changed behaviour. Having a camera in the room meant the scene was *not* unmediated, but that the camera was probably the main event in the first place. In some ways this latter movement tends to carry on the pioneering work of Flaherty, who from the start practiced a participatory approach, albeit behind the scenes, by showing Nanook the daily rushes and eliciting his feedback and suggestions for the next day's filming (Barbash and Taylor 1997, 24; Pink 2006, 24). Reflexivity and participation have always been as much a part of anthropological filmmaking (and ethnography in general!) as observation, even if it is not widely recognized. As the film critic James Hoberman rhetorically asks: "Who is more self-conscious than an anthropologist with a movie camera?" (cited in Barbash and Taylor 1997).

WHAT THE MAINSTREAM LOOKS LIKE

I have attempted to trace a brief and specific history of documentary film suited to the purposes of this paper. I now present three "mainstream" examples that illustrate some of the concrete ethical dilemmas that those using visual methods have encountered and which indicate what I consider to be more ethical priorities in filmmaking. Canonical ethnographic films can be difficult to ac-

³ Jay Ruby, in this regard, distinguishes between "films *about* anthropology" and "*anthropological* films" (1975:109).

⁴ For a humourously cynical portrayal of this belief, see Weinberger (1994, 3-4).

cess and so I hope these more popular films will resonate with contemporary audiences. I use the term “mainstream” loosely, to refer to films that have had either theatrical distribution and accessibly-priced DVD releases, and/or have had a successful run through the popular film festival circuit.

Winnebago Man

The first is Ben Steinbauer’s *Winnebago Man* (2009). The film is about Jack Rebney, a Winnebago salesman, who is what some would call the “hero” of a viral video featuring outtakes of his quite energetic and enraged profanities used while shooting an industrial sales video. The film raises significant interest over reflexivity in the relationship between the filmmaker and the subject. Steinbauer features in the film as much as Rebney, if not more. The film is just as much about the filmmaker’s personal experience dealing with Rebney as it is about the Winnebago salesman. What is particularly interesting is that the film raises the ethical dilemma that Steinbauer encounters over exposing this man to even more publicity through the making of this documentary. After leaving his job as a Winnebago spokesman, Rebney, also a former corporate news producer, secluded himself in a cabin in Northern California and cut virtually all ties with his past and what he considers morally depraved civilization. It took Steinbauer some time to track Rebney down and the filmmaker seems to understand the irony in making one last film about him and his infamy. This is particularly significant considering the trailer and the film both feature Rebney stating to Steinbauer and his filmmaking crew: “If you don’t like it, pack up. Get the fuck out.” Indeed, the film begins with the quote and works it into the climax. In terms of the polarization of observational and reflexive filmmaking,⁵ it is fascinating that the film documents this part of the filmmaking process as an integral

aspect of the relationship. It is safe to say that the film raises perhaps the most fundamental question when using visual methods: is it ethical to even use them at all? It may be the case that they are entirely inappropriate, particularly if the subject of the film has past experience, negative or otherwise, with visual methods, such as Rebney did in several capacities. This dilemma may involve scrapping a project altogether.

Considering Rebney’s past, the question is: should Steinbauer have made the film at all? A criticism could be leveled that this decision is the difference between producing an admittedly hilarious portrait of “the angriest man in the world” and shifting the priority to an ethical consideration of the man and his past, present and future. I would argue that Steinbauer was justified in making the film, not because of the hilarity it produced, but because of the relationship he seems to have developed along the way. *Winnebago Man* is an excellent example of how the theory laid out above becomes translated into actual practice and ethics on the ground. The representation of Rebney, or any subject in a documentary film, photograph, or written monograph, is inextricable from ethical practices. When producing the image or written word, what type of relationship are you representing? Are you adopting an approach that fetishizes the subject and creates a world for them in which the filmmaker does not exist? In this case, the film portrays an individual that has no interaction with the filmmaking crew and thus creates the illusion that the subject cannot exercise his or her agency when moving through his or her surroundings. Or, do you take a more reflexive, participatory approach? Steinbauer opted for the latter, wherein he made no pretensions that he was invisible and made it clear from the beginning that Rebney was not a passive subject moving through the world, but one actively

⁵ David MacDougall, however, has argued against this polarization, writing that observation is, and always has been, not the opposite of, but a component of a participatory, reflexive approach (2003 [1994]: 128-130).

interrogating his surroundings, which included, first and foremost, the filmmaking crew. In other words, style is inextricable from theory (Howes 2003, 27); both have a significant impact on how one's subject is represented to the world.

Gates of Heaven

Errol Morris' film *Gates of Heaven* (1987) provides a second example that makes a strong case for the construction of documentary footage bordering on fictionalization, similar to the kind Flaherty practiced. There is one scene in particular that has caused some controversy, known as the "trophy room". In it, a man sits behind his desk, surrounded by an inordinate amount of trophies, as he ruminates on the significant meaning they hold for him, their inspiration for his work, and how he came to have them. In the more recent documentary film *Capturing Reality* (Ferrari, 2008), a National Film Board venture, Morris admits that the trophy room was entirely constructed; it did not exist at all. Morris and his crew found the trophies in a dusty attic, brought them into a studio and created a set in which they placed the man. This is not unlike Flaherty's creation of the halved igloo. This type of "reenactment" involves creating a world for one's subjects and filming how they react to it: an intense provocation, designed to elicit something more than (potentially) superficial observation. Morris has remarked that, when making a film, truth is not discovered; it is constructed (see Bloom 2010). His remark clearly denounces a purely observational approach that attempts to uncover a truth already embedded in society. Rather, it acknowledges that truths are processual, co-constructed, and they must be wrung from the cloth of social relations.

Morris seemed to succeed in bringing out of the man sitting in the trophy room something deep inside him: who he wanted to be, or who he thought he really was. For Morris, it seems this is an even greater truth than he would have achieved otherwise, by

filming the man as if the camera was invisible, intangible, and unaffecting. The subjectivity of this situation, even if it was not explicitly relayed to the audience, indicates a specific underlying epistemological stance: truth is not objective. It must be created, and the camera is an integral component of this construction. This truth is constructed with the participation of the subject, acknowledging that he or she is a living, breathing, agentic human being that does in fact interact with his or her surroundings, rather than a passive creature one can film and explain without being seen.

Herzog and Ecstatic Truth

Werner Herzog is famous for blurring the boundary between fact and fiction in his films. As he has said, "I have never made a distinction between my feature films and my 'documentaries'. For me, they are all just films" (Cronin 2002, 95). Instead, Herzog often makes the interesting distinction between *fact* and *truth*. In his "Minnesota Declaration" of 1999, a manifesto for documentary filmmakers, he declares that *cinéma vérité* "is devoid of *vérité*. It reaches a merely superficial truth, the truth of accountants." This is not to say that Herzog is not in favor of reflexivity and participatory filmmaking. He features prominently in all of his films, clearly interacting with his subjects. Rather, he thinks that it is an illusion that we may access truth *simply* by revealing how we are implicated in creating the film. We must go beyond this, he thinks, and turn to fictionalization in order to arrive at a deeper meaning, an essence, as he is fond of calling it. This is not unlike Jean Rouch's (2003, 6) own statement that "fiction is the only way to penetrate reality." Herzog calls this deeper meaning "ecstatic truth", and it is practiced not just in filmmaking, but also even in mainstream academia. This notion of truth necessarily involves manipulating footage (or data). Yet, even if you are writing an academic paper, this is what you are doing. Writing involves synthesizing ma-

terial and manipulating it in a certain way in order to bring it together and offer a fresh perspective, or to argue a point that would not necessarily be apparent if you simply left everything the way it was.

So it goes with documentary media. Brian Winston, in particular, has written on the difficulty of implementing a strategy such as Herzog proposes, because in films this idea is often manifested in reenactments or in changes to the chronology of the events filmed in order to make a point or shed light on something that otherwise would not have been apparent (see Winston 2000, 36). Yet, if you take as the basic premise that documentary media portrays a subjective interpretation of events, and is not, and never could have been, striving for an objective representation of unmediated reality (what accountants are after, in Herzog's mind), then many of the criticisms against such strategies lose footing. Much of the uproar over reenactment of the kind Flaherty utilized is based on a vestigial epistemological understanding of film: the assumption that the camera is a mirror that does not lie. But we know now this is not quite accurate, as Winston (2000, 166) remarks: "The camera can most assuredly lie. Indeed, it can do no more than tell a truth; *the* truth is beyond it."

Little Dieter Needs to Fly (1998), one of Herzog's earlier documentary films, provides several cases in point that illustrate his concept of the ecstatic truth. The film is a biographical tale about Dieter Dengler, a German soldier who was shot down over Laos in 1966 while flying for the U.S. Navy. After being taken prisoner, forced by his captors to run for days on end to evade enemy fire, then chained inside a bamboo prison, Dengler escaped and lived to tell his tale to Herzog. Dengler reenacts portions of this harrowing experience in the film, directed by Herzog, in order to evoke a feeling. Herzog hired Laotian actors to play Dengler's captors, who "forced" him to run through the jungle, much like he was forced to do in 1966, caus-

ing him to relive for the camera some of his feelings of terror and isolation. In addition, at the end of the film, Dieter "recalls" coming home after his torture and having to be put to bed in the cockpit of a fighter jet every night, packed into a cradle of pillows. He remarks that this was the only place he felt safe at night. What is interesting is that this entire scene is completely fabricated. Dengler was never put to bed in a cockpit cradle. Like the trophy room in *Gates of Heaven*, this situation did not exist. In Herzog's accounting terms, it did not happen. However, Herzog says this is beside the point. His films are about drawing out an essence, and what better way to illustrate the feelings and tribulations Dengler suffered than by creating a world in which these emotions surface for us to grasp? Otherwise, we may never come close to understanding what he went through.

EXPERIENCE, NOT OBJECT

The above examples contain elements of a more subjective, participatory approach, not just to filmmaking, but to social scientific research in general. They privilege a methodology inextricable from an ontological and epistemological position that assumes knowledge is co-constructed in a process of *doing* social relations; that people are *not* passive beings that one can observe while remaining unseen oneself, but are instead agentic individuals that interact with their surroundings in a meaningful way. As a result, I argue that the priority of a documentary film, photograph, or written essay should rest more with the participant of the study than with the audience. This is not to say the audience is unimportant; it plays a significant role itself, but this role, as Vivian Sobchack elucidates, can be quite difficult to discern.

Sobchack (1999, 249) writes that documentary film in particular should be interpreted as an experience rather than an object. A documentary film, in this sense, is not a *thing*, but a learning *experience*; a very short apprenticeship of comprehension. Sobchack advocates for a phenomenological approach

to theorizing documentary, one that recognizes that everyone's viewing experience is subjectively situated, much like the very process of making the film. This recognition can make it incredibly difficult to discern how any given audience member will respond to a film, as this response depends entirely upon their past experiences and the way in which these experiences will affect their means of interpretation (Sobchack 1999, 247). The film is not a passive object from which one can leach meaning, but rather something one must work to construct in the moment: truth thus becomes something *made*, and entirely subjective.

One conclusion to draw from this model of "cinematic identification" is the indeterminacy of audience reception (see MacDougall 1998, 69; MacDougall 2006, 19).⁶ Again, I do not recommend ignoring the audience altogether, but I believe that if audience reception is so hard to predict, then (often scant) resources should instead be focused on the relationship with (and ethical responsibility towards) one's subjects. It is safe to say these are the individuals that will be directly affected by the film in measurable ways, both during and after its production. The audience is often an unseen, vaguely conceptualized entity that, to be frank, may not care in the least if a film portrays so-called "objective" truth or not: "Unlike the audience, the vast majority of which remains usually unaffected (in measurable ways, at least) by any documentary it sees, participants are engaged in an exercise that could be life-changing" (Winston 2000, 158).

This paper provides examples of filmmakers and films that have paid attention to the relationship between researcher and participant in meaningful and ethical ways. *Winebago Man*, a more overt example, makes explicit this relationship, whereas the trophy room scene in *Gates of Heaven* implicitly re-

veals underlying ethical assumptions. If one takes as a first principle that the camera does not uncover "Truth", but rather any number of constructed truths, a panoply of documentary techniques, such as reenactment and a degree of fictionalization, become viable options for exploring ethnographic situations. As Flaherty once said: "Sometimes you have to lie. One often has to distort a thing to catch its true spirit" (cited in Rotha 1983). Of course, these techniques are useful only insofar as the subjects of the study are comfortable with them, and this should always be the measure of whether or not an ethical relationship is on the right track. At the very least, consideration of the issues presented in this paper may preempt your subjects from screaming at you to get your camera out of their faces.

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⁶ For a study that explored unexpected, aberrant readings to ethnographic films that caused some controversy in the 1990's, see Martinez 1990.

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NON-MODERN AFRICA AND MODERN NON-AFRICA: INTERTEXTUAL DISCOURSE ABOUT WHO WE ARE AND WHERE WE CAME FROM

Mat J. Levitt

The idiom no man is an island might be rewritten as no text is an island, meaning that no text exists in literary isolation and that every piece of writing instead belongs to a landscape of others. References, endnotes, footnotes, bibliographies, and the use of phrase, term, or definition will situate a text within a discursive network of understandings, theories, paradigms, and genres. Intertextual discourses about the origins of humanity often cross generic boundaries between religion, science, informative media and entertaining fiction through the sharing and borrowing of words and concepts. These genres, however reluctantly, inevitably engage with one another in what emerges as a single discourse about who we are and where we came from. Throughout this discourse, certain concepts have formed as time, place, and identity are linguistically associated with one another. The dichotomy of Non-Modern Africa as Other and Modern Non-Africa as Self is one such concept. Caution must be exercised by researchers who wish to talk about human origins, as these types of concepts may have very real implications in political, economic, social, and cultural arenas.

INTERTEXTUALITY, DISCOURSE, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAMING NAMES

The idiom “no man is an island” might be rewritten as “no text is an island,” meaning that no text exists in literary isolation and that every piece of writing instead belongs to a landscape of others. References, endnotes, footnotes, bibliographies, and the use of phrase, term, or definition will situate a piece of writing within a network of understandings, theories, paradigms, and genres. Not only that, popular media forms part of the picture, too. A text can (and in many cases, will) participate in a discourse—an ongoing conversation—involving television, radio, cinema, the internet, etc. Thus, genres can be crossed, intentionally or unintentionally, through the use of a name, a phrase, an idea, or essentially any word that can be found anywhere else. A scientific journal article and a political debate can become reluctant kin through the use of common language. An audience can be transported from fiction to non-fiction by the use of a single term, like *Mars Rover* or *Louis Pasteur*. Briggs and Bauman (1992) call these referential relationships—whether implicit or explicit—*intertextuality*. The term describes texts that reference other texts; that is, “discourses that represent

other discourses,” (Briggs 1996,449). The authors explain that intertextual relations “are closely linked to social, cultural, ideological, and political-economic factors” (Briggs and Bauman 1992, 132). Let me give you an example.

In 2004, Brown et al. (2004) announced the discovery of some skeletal remains on the Indonesian island of Flores and a possible new addition to the *Homo* genus. Although they assigned it as *Homo floresiensis*, it wasn’t long before people were calling the small hominin a “hobbit.” Referencing the *Lord of the Rings* novels by J.R.R. Tolkien, as well as the recent movie trilogy based on them, as Gregory Forth explains, this term was no doubt used “in order to communicate effectively with a wider public” (Forth 2005, 16). As Forth points out, though, “curiouser still, the designation was not a creation of the popular press, but of the scientific discoverers themselves” (Forth 2005, 16). Forth describes the implications and consequences of establishing an intertextual relationship between *Homo floresiensis* and Tolkien’s hobbits:

Casting *Homo floresiensis* as ‘hobbits’ potentially obscures the essential difference between an empirical species, designated a member of the genus

Graduate student; Department of Anthropology, University of Alberta

Author contact: mlevitt@ualberta.ca

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Homo like ourselves, and the images of literary fiction. Like hobbits, both *Homo floresiensis* and *ebu gogo* are products of human imagination, but the images have different bases: tangible, skeletal and archaeological evidence in one case, and the testimony and traditions of local people in the other. Rather than simply assuming that these traditions are as fantastical as Tolkien's fiction, the challenge for social anthropologists is to discover the correct relationship between the palaeontological and ethnographic images and the true source of their resemblance [Forth 2005, 16].

Now, certainly the hobbit-izers didn't intend on all that, but therein lies the point: our words have consequences. The language we use has real significance. As researchers, the terminology we dish out about what we study affects not only ourselves, our work, and our community, but what we study and those who—whether they mean to or not—become associated with what we say and how we say it. So, unlike Flores, no text is an island, but, like Flores, every text has the potential of being mixed up in the grand drama of humanity.

Let me give you another example. Goebel et al. (2008, 1497), for instance, use the term “homeland” when referring to Asia in relationship to those populations who migrated to the Americas across Beringia from Siberia. Goebel et al. use the term to establish a near instantaneous understanding amongst their readers. We all know that a “homeland” is where we come from, so referring to Asia as a homeland for early Americans utilizes this common knowledge with a single word. But the use of such terms can be problematic. The word “homeland” conjures much more than a simple definition of geographic origin; it harkens to ideas relating to identity, destiny, and belonging. Did the “first Americans” think of Asia as “home”? Would modern Native American populations appreciate the assertion that Asia is the homeland

of their ancient ancestors and that they are, perhaps by semantic default, Asian? This may not have been what the authors meant to imply, but by using the term, they place themselves against a background of highly contentious subject matter.

A linguistic convention that perhaps best illustrates the process of intertextuality is the term “Out of Africa.” The theory, which refers to the modern human dispersal from the African continent into Eurasia, comes with its own literary lineage. The common usage of the phrase in archaeological contexts refers primarily to the 1985 film *Out of Africa* starring Meryl Streep and Robert Redford. The film was based on Karen von Blixen's colonial memoir recalling her experiences in Kenya, published in 1937 under the pen name Isak Dinesen. But the phrase wasn't invented by Blixen. In fact, it was used as the title of a 1934 travelogue by a writer known only as “H.W.,” *Something New Out of Africa* (Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 255). And it goes back even further. In 1924, a retired civil servant from Cape Colony in South Africa—one Edward A. Judge—wrote to Senator W.E.M. Stanford: “‘Cotton, in fact, as a friend wrote to me the other day, is going to be another surprise from South Africa. ‘*Ex Africa semper aliquid novum*’, as the old Romans used to say.” Essentially, the Latin phrase he used translates as “There is always something new out of Africa” (Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 256). But to what “old Romans” was he referring? A form of the phrase first appears in text with Aristotle's fourth century BC *Historia Animalium*. In a discussion about the strange hybrids that seem to found on the African continent, Aristotle writes, “‘a certain proverb is current, that Libya always produces something new’” (quoted in Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 257). Occurring in a similar connotation, the phrase was textualized next by Pliny the Elder sometime early in the first century AD and then by Zenobius, a Greek philologist, in the second century, although Zenobius altered it to “Libya is

always producing something evil” (Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 258). The convention appears over a thousand years later in western Europe with the writings of Erasmus, although he was likely the one to assign the phrase its more current form and connotation, changing “Libya” to “Africa,” and using the term in a more charming context, one of admiration rather than revulsion or reservation (Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 259). With Erasmus’s usage, the phrase propelled throughout Renaissance texts, being cited, for instance, by Rabelais, who wrote, “you know well that Africa always brings something new” (quoted in Feinberg and Solodow 2002, 260). By the time the phrase appears as the title of Blixen’s memoir, it had changed meanings a number of times but always carried with it the burden of its textual heritage, a genetic paper trail leading back thousands of years. Initially a statement of bewilderment and curiosity, it came to be one of revulsion, then wonder and awe. It has changed from colloquialism to literary obscurity to academic convention. When archaeologists/anthropologists, geneticists, or biologists use the phrase today, might they consider the palimpsest of meaning and context behind the words? This is but one example of how our words, no matter how benign they may seem, are often precariously laden with an intertextual past.

Let me give you another example of how the use of a name or phrase—whether flippant or flagrant—can be a ticket to a centuries old debate. In January of 1988, *Newsweek* published the cover story “The Search for Adam & Eve: Scientists Explore a Controversial Theory About Man’s Origins”. The cover featured “sophisticated and attractive nude portraits of a black Adam and Eve sharing the apple, with the snake looking on approvingly” (Oppenheimer 2003, 45). In a single illustrated statement, science and religion, material fact and sacred mythology, can once again become entangled in an authoritative argument over humanity that has

been going on since the time of Galileo, the Enlightenment, and even longer. Conduct a simple internet search for “mitochondrial Eve” and one is likely to be bombarded with a heated multivocality, finding a plethora of multimedia engaged in a discourse about the origins of humanity, with scholarly and journalistic articles, lay-person blogs, satirical cartoons, television documentaries, radio programs and podcasts, and any other form of human expression, all referencing each other to form a polemical web of ideas and discussion. Curiously, intertextually referencing Biblical terms seems to be a common temptation among social and physical scientists. We find Steven Oppenheimer’s *The Real Eve: Modern Man’s Journey Out of Africa* (2004) and *Out of Eden: The Peopling of the World* (2003), Robert Ardrey’s *African Genesis: A Personal Investigation Into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man* (1977), or Richard Dawkins’ *River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life* (1996), among others.

So, why is it necessary to discuss Biblical myth in a scientific book? Why use Judeo-Christian terminology in what is supposed to be a scientific arena? Certainly, a scientific journal article that frames itself with a title playing with Biblical allegory engages in a precarious game of ‘religion vs. science’ where we are unsure if the two are combatants or teammates. As Wiktor Stoczkowski (2002, 5) points out, scientists of the 18th and 19th centuries “set out to conquer a prehistoric past that had been recently re-discovered. Having as their only enemy the errors of religious beliefs, all they had to do was to choose: either they could reject the biblical Genesis, which might ultimately be transformed into an allegory of obscure significance, or they could adopt a hostile stance towards the naturalist view, in defense of the Christian doctrine.” So why do modern scientists engage in this old polemic? The answer is that, whether it is science or myth or religion, these disciplines are concerned with the same subject matter, and thus they form

a single discourse, one ongoing discussion about who we are and where we came from. It is then impossible for any one text to escape the family tree of which it is a part and so intentional intertextuality and overt reference become necessary. Rather than pretending that Biblical myth and scientific theory are of different concerns, we must engage the other in a dialogue, or at least acknowledge its voice. Stoczkowski (2002, 197) explains that innovative theories of anthropogenesis are provided for by the “raw materials” of earlier conceptions and, at the same time, are influenced by the historical and cultural contexts which framed those earlier conceptions. In this way, “every new act is played here on a stage that is already constructed, prepared by the past. Continuity and discontinuity, innovation and tradition represent two sides of the same coin.”

Intertextuality is not necessarily a choice but, rather, an inevitability. New things cannot be said without communicating with what has been said. As Culler (1976, 1382) explains:

...the notion of intertextuality names the paradox of linguistic and discursive systems: that utterances or texts are never moments of origin because they depend on the prior existence of codes and conventions, and it is the nature of codes to be always ready in existence, to have lost origins. It is difficult to explain what it is that enables is to make sense of a new instance of discourse, but whatever intelligibility a discursive sequence achieves depends on intertextual codes.... Intertextuality is less a name for a work's relation to particular prior texts than an assertion of a work's participation in a discursive space and its relation to the codes which are the potential formalizations of that space.

Culler (1976, 1393) goes on to say that intertextuality “leads one to think of a text as a dialogue with other texts, an act of absorption, parody, and criticism, rather than an auton-

omous artifact which harmoniously reconciles the possible attitudes toward a given problem.” Past and current theories form not a binary system but an analogue continuum of discourse, a space that one may enter with the mention of a single word. But this is not to be avoided or lamented. The intertextual space is one that often serves rather than hinders a discursive engagement. Stoczkowski (2002, 198) writes:

Contrary to what is often thought, scientists do not draw their conclusions from empirical data, any more than they rewrite history in terms of prevailing ideology. In fact, they rather try to organise the heterogeneous conceptual materials that society places at their disposal, and these include new facts and recent ideologies just as much as ancient commonplaces.... It is not a question of some liberation from the past, but rather of learning to make good use of it.

Because we cannot avoid them, we must keep in mind how our intertextual references form relationships between texts, ideas, people, and actions. We must “make good use” of our words. One way of doing so is to keep in mind the story we are telling when we write an academic text. What narrative arises from our data and interpretations? In a sense, we are *telling* the story of humanity, a performance which cannot be treated frivolously. These tellings belong to a genre of discourse—perhaps the *oldest* genre of discourse—about where we came from. Misia Landau (1991, x) has suggested that palaeoanthropological texts from the time of Charles Darwin “are determined as much by traditional narrative frameworks as by material evidence” and that these texts, considered as narratives, “approximate the structure of the hero tale,” featuring “a humble hero who departs on a journey, receives essential equipment from a helper or donor figure, goes through tests and transformations, and finally arrives at a higher state.” She goes on to point out that “this

narrative schema can accommodate widely varying sequences of events, heroes and donors corresponding to the underlying evolutionary beliefs of their authors.” When we write or read a journal article or a book, who are “the heroes” of the tale? What is their journey? Where is it taking them, from where are they departing, and why? Even if one rejects the idea that a scientific text can be thought of as a mythic narrative, one might not so easily be inclined to dismiss the idea that our words tell a story, no matter what that story might be. And so, what to do? Landau (1991, 175) offers this advice: “Given that evolutionary explanation is by definition a kind of narration, paleoanthropologists might consider wrestling with the ‘story-telling dragon,’ rather than avoiding it altogether. Some literary scholars would argue that there is no escape. It is storytelling that makes us human.” But how will we, as Stoczkowski (2002) suggests, make good use of the current data, be it genetic or archaeological, and how will the stories we tell about our beginnings relate to the narratives we construct about our lives and the world we live in now?

THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVE: LIVING STORIES

In the collection *Rethinking the Human Revolution*, Sally McBrearty (2007) authors a chapter entitled “Down with the Revolution”. McBrearty (2007, 145) explains that the conceptual term “Human Revolution” is a “serious misnomer,” as it is based upon erroneous interpretations of Middle to Upper Palaeolithic data. Despite this, the idea of some kind of revolution has persisted, and scientists continue to seek one out. This idea is so compelling because it presents “a single extraordinary moment that defines what it is to be human and explains all or most of subsequent events in prehistory.” McBrearty suggests that “this quest for this ‘eureka moment’ reveals a great deal about the needs, desires, and aspirations of archaeologists, but obscures rather than il-

luminates events in the past” and “continues to put Europe on centre stage, casting it either as the arena where the actual events of human origins were enacted, or as the yardstick by which human accomplishments elsewhere must be measured.” McBrearty’s statements, though directed as critique, are apt, and apply not only to the archaeologists, but their audiences—indeed, to humanity as a whole. Everyone has needs, desires, and aspirations, and in many ways these are met through a process of reinterpreting the narratives that surround us, that inform our identities and experiences. As White (1980, 5) explains, “narrative might be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate *knowing* into *telling*, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific.” This is perhaps one of the performative functions of intertextuality, where a text builds on others that describe what a culture *did* in order to articulate what a culture is capable of (Culler 1976, 1383). The narratives we tell, and the way we incorporate other narratives into our own, are integral to our sense of who we are and what we are about. Johnson (1993, 150) writes, “the self is defined by not only its biological makeup as a physical organism, but also by its ends, its interpersonal relationships, its cultural traditions, its institutional commitments, and its historical context. Within this evolving context it must work out its identity.” Narratives of human evolution are discourses of identity. We are all authors of those narratives, always asking, “Of what story or stories do we find ourselves a part?” and, in response, “What are we to do?” This is why the intertextual process must be carried out with a purposeful consideration. Braid (1996, 6) tells us,

Because of parallels between lived experience and the process of following a narrative, the listener’s struggle to follow

a narrative must be seen to be an experience in its own right. Part of this experience of following involves a recontextualization of the narrative imagery and events in terms of the listener's own life experience. In this sense personal narratives can generate experiential resources for the listener – resources that may be “thought with” and “thought through” in the struggle to make sense of the world.

In this way, life is a narrative, and what informs and frames that narrative are the foundational aspects of place, belief, and action. Just as story can inform identity, both can inform action. Economic and political policies can be built on the interpretations of scholars, as can social and cultural understandings and opinions. Our *beginnings* will likely influence our ends and the interpretation of the means to those ends. Zerubavel (2003, 101) explains,

the special mnemonic status of beginnings is quite evident from the disproportionately high representation, in our general memories from college, of the first few weeks or our freshman year. It also explains the significant role of ‘origin myths’ in defining social communities as well as in solidifying the legitimacy of political regimes. Origins help articulate identities, and where communities locate their beginnings tell us quite a lot about how they perceive themselves.

We might think of origin myths not as archaic artifacts but as ongoing processes of identity-establishment. Those origin myths, those stories we tell ourselves about our beginnings, are unavoidably interconnected with scientific interpretation and vice versa. Landau (1991, 183) writes, “In the final analysis, the *truly* significant test of scientific theories of human evolution may lie in their workability in everyday practice.” How we live those scientific theories and narratives *about* the human species may ultimately prove their relevance *to* the human species.

DRAWING LINES BY SAYING WORDS: THE INTERTEXTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF DICHOTOMIES

My fate is to live amid varied and confusing storms. But for you, perhaps, if as I hope and wish you will live after me, there will follow a better age. This sleep of forgetfulness will not last for ever. When the darkness has been dispersed, our descendants can come again in the former pure radiance [Petrarch. *Africa*, IX, 451-57].

The language used in the discourse surrounding the origins of humanity, whether implicit or explicit, cannot avoid the reification of certain concepts or conventions. Within narratives of human evolution we find the formation and solidification of particular binaries, dualities, or dichotomies. Historically, perhaps the most important or persistent are that of *Self* and *Other*, *Human* and *Non-Human*, or *Human* and *Animal*. In contemporary scientific narratives, the study of human development hinges primarily on two more recently established dichotomies: *Modern* and *Non-Modern* and *African* and *Non-African*. Again, though, these dichotomies, I will argue, are essentially part of the same intertextual discourse as that of *Self* and *Other*. As I will discuss further, the intertextual association of the dichotomies with one another, thus forming the conceptual time-places of *Non-modern Africa* and *Modern Non-Africa*, may have certain ramifications and so must be disseminated with some amount of self-reflexive caution.

Modern and Non-Modern

The idea of modernity is central to current discussions of human evolution. Anatomical modernity and behavioral modernity are the two main signifiers of our understanding of who we are and what distinguishes us from earlier members of our genus. And in conceiving of ourselves as modern, there exists the obvious opposition to something non-modern—that state of humanity prior

to the advent of modernity, before *we* were truly *us*. But where does the concept of modernity come from?

Matei Calinescu (1987, 13) explains that the idea of modernity first appeared in the Middle Ages, when the adjective and noun *modernus* was coined from the adverb *modo*, which meant “recently, just now.” The major antonym of *modernus* was *antiquus*, meaning ‘ancient, old.’ By the tenth century, the words *modernitas* and *moderni* became popular, meaning ‘modern times’ and ‘men of today,’ respectively. Calinescu (1987, 14) suggests that “the distinction between *antiquus* and *modernus* seems to have always implied a polemic significance, or a principle of conflict.” Previously, the classical Latin language had no opposition between *modern* and *ancient* because the “classical Latin mind” had no interest in “diachronical relationships” (Calinescu 1987, 14). And it wasn’t until the Renaissance that the dichotomy became acute within sociocultural awareness. This was in part due to the invention of the mechanical clock in the late thirteenth century, along with the development of a concept of “practical time” in regards to “action, creation, discovery, and transformation,” as opposed to the medieval sense of theological time, which was vast, immeasurable, and entirely abstract (Calinescu 1987, 19-20).

Calinescu (1987, 42) goes on to say:

[The] bourgeois idea of modernity...has by and large continued the outstanding traditions of earlier periods in the history of the modern idea. The doctrine of progress, the confidence in the beneficial possibilities of science and technology, the concern with time (a *measurable* time, a time that can be bought and sold and therefore has, like any other commodity, a calculable equivalent in money), the

cult of reason, and the ideal of freedom defined within the framework of an abstract humanism, but also the orientation toward pragmatism and the cult of action and success—all have been associated in various degrees with the battle for the modern and were kept alive and promoted as key values in the triumphant civilization established by the middle class.

With the inception of practical time came the practicalities of time; past, present, and future became conceptually graspable and even observable. In a sense, the idea of progress became not only pragmatic, but essentially so. The current state of things became a litmus test of progress and human development; only if we had noticeably moved away from *what we were* could we have any confidence that we could become *what we wanted to be*. As Svetlana Boym (2001, 22) explains, “Modernity and modernisms are responses to the condition of modernization and the consequences of progress.” The future was seen as a time of reason, of self-control, of refined humanity, and this future was conceptualized both temporally and geographically as a Utopia; a time-place that represented the ends of modernity and progress:

Indeed the rage for utopia—either directly and positively or by way of reaction and polemicism—pervades the whole intellectual spectrum of modernity from political philosophy to poetry and the arts.... *Utopian imagination as it has developed since the eighteenth century is one more proof of the modern devaluation of the past and the growing importance of the future.* Utopianism, however, would hardly be conceivable outside the specific time consciousness of the West, as it was shaped by Christianity and subsequently by reason’s ap-

¹ It is interesting to note that the diachronic view of time facilitated not only the conception of *modern* and *non-modern* and of progress but also the very idea of ‘revolution.’ Revolution, however, linguistically and conceptually denotes something that scholars who promote the Human or Cultural Revolution theory like Richard Klein, a major proponent of the Human Revolution model, would likely reject: a cyclical model of time alternating between utopias and dystopias, with revolution implying a “return to a purer initial state” (Calinescu 1987, 22).

propriation of the concept of irreversible time [Calinescu 1987, 63, my italics].¹

The movement toward reason, seen as a forward movement through time, established a “devaluation of the past”—the “past” being a time when a lack of reason seemed to rule our species. Modernity became what we strived for, and pre-modernity—or non-modernity—was what we moved away from in our natural progression through time toward reason and refinement.

Africa and Non-Africa

Over the past couple of decades, Africa has been situated within the scientific mind as the place of origin for the *Homo* genus and the modern human species. But Africa has become much more than a geographic region. By “Africa,” we refer not only to geography but to genetics, which become anchored to one another by association, like Adam who was made of the dust of the Garden, or the peasant whose soil is in his veins. Africa has, in a sense, likewise become more than geography or genetics. It has become a mindscape—a conceptual domain that involves ideas about human identity, capacity, and potential. But a clear definition of just what “Africa” is lacks explicitness. It is something that people who participate in the discourse must discern based on the usage of the term—on its textual context—and how “Africa” passes from one text to another, from one theory to another. In any event, what has become clear is that the world has begun to be conceived of as consisting of two parts: Africa and Non-Africa, the place we came from and the place we went to. Referring to the Out-of-Africa replacement model, the multiregional model, and the trelis model of recurrent genetic interchange, Lansana Keita (2004, 1) writes, “despite important differences the three major theories of human anthropological evolution all subscribe in greater or lesser degrees to what one might call ‘the Africa-Rest-of-the-World’ evolutionary hypothesis, although there is no

supportable epistemological and scientific basis for making this dual distinction.” Keita (2004, 5) goes on to say, “The conclusion one is led to after an epistemological analysis of the extant evolutionary models and theories is that ideological considerations are at work here. The implicit goal on grounds of a naïve hierarchical racialism is to make of Africa’s population a special case in the world’s genome bank.” While I wouldn’t necessarily accuse any researchers of an “implicit goal on grounds of a naïve hierarchical racialism,” I would venture to point out that the Africa-Rest-of-the-World (or Africa and Non-Africa) duality does persist in the discourse regarding current genetic research. McBrearty and Brooks (2000, 453) might agree. They write:

Because the earliest modern human fossils, *Homo sapiens sensu stricto*, are found in Africa and the adjacent region of the Levant at >100 ka, the “human revolution” model creates a time lag between the appearance of anatomical modernity and perceived behavioral modernity, and creates the impression that the earliest modern Africans were behaviorally primitive. This view of events stems from a profound Eurocentric bias and a failure to appreciate the depth and breadth of the African archaeological record.

A quick review of some current literature will help to illustrate the Africa and Non-Africa linguistic binary. For instance, the article “An X-Linked Haplotype of Neandertal Origin Is Present Among All Non-African Populations” by Yotova et al. (2011) makes a distinction between, as the title suggests, African and non-African populations. The authors discuss evidence that “Neanderthals contributed to the genetic makeup of modern human populations outside Africa,” which may have facilitated “adaptations to novel environmental conditions that actually contributed to the successful expansion of human migrants from Africa to other continents” (Yotova et al. 2011, 1961).

What the authors are suggesting is a type of “hybrid vigor” among all non-African populations. This theory is significant because, not only does it posit a genetic difference among African and non-African populations, it proposes the idea that non-African populations may be better suited to non-African environments on the genetic, rather than the phenotypic, level. This is worrisome, especially when one considers the fact that many people of recent African ancestry do indeed reside in non-African parts of the world. Would we say, then, that they are “less suited”? Likely not, but perhaps the danger lies not in explicitness but in those naïve interpretations based on perceived implications.

The article “African Origin of Modern Humans in East Asia: A Tale of 12,000 Y Chromosomes” by Ke et al. (2001) provides a diagram of Y chromosome haplotypes throughout the world’s populations. The diagram distinguishes African-specific haplotypes, non-African-specific haplotypes, and shared between Africans and non-Africans. The phrase “African and other world populations” is also used (Ke et al. 2001, 1152).

But can we make such definitions? Is there a real spot where Africa ends and Non-Africa begins? Just where is the defining line, not only now, but when our ancestors supposedly left Africa? Where can we place that point of exit? As Pam Willoughby (2007, 94) explains, “The first modern humans outside of Africa are those found at Mugharet es Skhül and Jebel Qafzeh, and they date to MIS stage 5e (Bar Yosef 1989a, 1989b; Tchernov 1988). Whether or not this represents the start of the Out of Africa II migration can be disputed, since all proxy indicators show that at this time the Levant was biogeographically part of Africa.” If we begin to think of the world as biogeographically analogue, rather than binary, how might things differ with a world conceptualized as being composed of Africa and Non-Africa? Keita (2004, 2) reminds us that not only should it “be obvi-

ous that members of hominid groups that migrated during the Paleolithic era had absolutely no idea whether they were migrating to other parts of Africa or leaving the continent altogether,” but that migrations were occurring within Africa as well. The world, then, is more accurately conceived of as “ecological and environmental zones” defined by “measurable differences in climate and ecology” than continents or geo-political landmasses defined only by imposed conceptual borders.

If the binary continues to persist in scientific discourse—with a likely influence on political and sociocultural discourses—perhaps of most concern is how Africa has been and will be portrayed: as Homeland, Crucible, or Cage. In some cases, Africa has been portrayed as that place we left to become modern—to become fully human—and it wasn’t until we left Africa that we could become who we are. The Human Revolution model, for instance, suggests this view, as does the Hybrid Vigor hypothesis. In other texts, Africa has been portrayed as a crucible—that chamber in which various forces came together to create us as we are, or us as we needed to be in order to become who we are. Still in others, Africa is portrayed as homeland—that ancestral place to which we might always look with affection and awe. Svante Pääbo, in a TED Talk in July 2011 in Edinburgh, Scotland, said, “What I often like to say is that from a genomic perspective, then, we are all Africans. We either live inside Africa today or in quite recent exile.” Within the language of Pääbo’s narrative, although we are all Africans, there still exists a dichotomy between Africa and the rest of the planet. He says, “You find a certain amount of genetic variation in Africa, and if you look outside Africa, you actually find less genetic variation.” Pääbo’s presentation is politically liberal and yet the African/Non-African divide is propagated. The reason I reference Pääbo’s TED Talk rather than one of his articles is because of his audience. TED Talks are watched by hundreds of thousands of

people across all demographics. The broadcasting of these binaries, as well as ideas depicting Africa as homeland, crucible, or cage, are likely to reach a wide audience through various multimedia. How will they synthesize these terminologies and ideas into their personal narratives? What ideas will they incorporate into their lived identities? While the language used by these researchers does not intentionally create divisions, it does construct conceptual dichotomies. While seemingly benign, the conceptualization of the world as African and Non-African or Africa and Non-Africa is a potentially worrisome categorization.

TIME-SPACE AND TIME-PLACES:

THE WHERE AND WHEN OF SELF AND OTHER

One concept important in the theoretical developments of humankind since the nineteenth century is that of time-space associations. Fabian (2002, 12) writes, “relationships between parts of the world (in the widest sense of both natural and sociocultural entities) can be understood as temporal relations. Dispersal in space reflects directly, which is not to say simply or in obvious ways, sequence in Time.” This time-space association is also important to discourses in human development. In 1800, Joseph-Marie Degérando wrote in his *Considerations on the Various Methods to Follow in the Observation of Savage Peoples*, “The philosophical traveler, sailing to the ends of the earth, is in fact travelling in time; he is exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age” (quoted in Robben and Sluka 2007, 34). To those early explorers and observers of unfamiliar human societies, whether they were naturalists or colonialists, distant lands were conceived of as distant times. One might argue that this perception continues in discourse regarding humanity’s African origins. Whether we say, “Once we left Africa we became modern” or “Once we became modern we left Africa,” we are agreeing on two dichotomies: Non-Modern and Modern and Africa and Non-Africa. These two temporal and geographic

dichotomies become intertextually associated and integrated as a single dichotomy of time-spaces or time-places: Non-Modern Africa and Modern Non-Africa. Politically and socially, caution is necessary:

The genetic evidence that modern humans emerged from Africa, leaving behind them ‘homeland’ representatives whose descendants still live in Africa and are self-evidently ‘fully modern’ in every way, has disturbing implications for continuing Western perceptions of modern Africans. Although the danger of these views is obvious, the mindset of some European archaeologists has remained unchanged [Oppenheimer 2003: 89-90].

What we are talking about here is the distinction between Self and Other and what kind of policies, actions, or ideas such a distinction can motivate or allow within the sociopolitical sphere. As Fabian (2002, 1) reminds us, “there is no knowledge of the Other which is not also a temporal, historical, a political act.” When we begin to conceive of groups of people as Other, a dangerous liberty begins to grow, often materializing in a license for discrimination. But how do we make these distinctions? Where do we draw the lines between Self and Other, temporally, spatially, or politically? This line was first drawn, perhaps, between *Human* and *Animal*; *Civilization* and *Wild*; *Man* and *Beast*. Wiktor Stoczkowski (2002, 42-43) writes:

The idea of the animal—we should rather say bestial—condition of our ancestors is part of the classic legacy of conjectural anthropology.... The tendency to compare the earliest humans with animals has existed from Antiquity, and it is easy, starting from a few texts chosen at random, to draw up a list of the main attributes ascribed by conjectural history to that ‘bestial’ state: absence of religion, absence of government, absence of laws, absence of language, absence of individual property, absence of clothing,

Here we have a definition by negatives, in which every item expresses the non-existence of 'typical' manifestations of culture. So the bearers of those attributes find themselves again confined to the state of nature, represented in the image of animals and, like them, lacking everything believed to be specific to humans. Such a view of animality comes from a simple inversion of the image we have of humans, that is, of ourselves.

Since Antiquity, there has been a perceived point at which we ceased to be the Other and became Us (Stoczkowski 2002, 60). Whether this point refers to the transition of the Ancients into the Moderns, animals into humans, natural man into social man, or the savage into the civilized, a dichotomy between Self and Other seems to have long preoccupied scholars of religion, philosophy, and science—indeed, scholars of the human condition. It is not surprising, then, that in the recent scientific explorations of human evolution, the dichotomy of Self and Other has also been on the forefront. How else are we to know who we are than knowing who we are not? The Non-Modern Africa and Modern Non-Africa time-place dichotomy is, essentially, a reworking of the Self and Other or Human and Non-Human binaries. We know that we are Modern, so the Other is Non-Modern. And, if we know that we reached modernity outside of Africa, then Africa is the place of the Other, or at least the place where the Other became the Self. As Willoughby (2007, 5) explains:

Over the last two to three decades, archaeologists and palaeoanthropologists have written about early modern Africans in the same way that Europeans initially wrote about non-Western people. Both are treated as distinct, as 'others,' outside the range of what it means to be cultured or civilized. Early European explorers were fascinated by the cultural and biological diversity of people they encountered worldwide. But there was

little attempt to link non-Western history and culture with Western technology and achievements. Just as indigenous groups became people without history (Wolf 1982, 1997), early modern Africans and their Neanderthal cousins in Eurasia have become people without behavior or true culture (Willoughby 2000; Speth 2004).

In conceiving of the Other, we must place the Other somewhere in time, somewhere in history, somewhere in space, and somewhere in place. We are left, then, with an intertextual conception that looks like this: Non-Modern Africa as Other and Modern Non-Africa as Self.

Our new scientific definitions are meant to inform the age-old question vital to self-conceived identity. But, at their core, have our new definitions of humanity differed much from our old definitions? In a meta-study of 24 texts examining the question of human origins published between 1820 and 1986, Wiktor Stoczkowski (1994, 38-39) writes,

How did humans appear? It would be difficult to understand the methods and structures of the scenarios that attempt to answer this question without first explaining what their authors understand by 'humans'. 'Humans' are defined by a conglomeration of characteristics that are given the status of distinguishing features of our biological family. Consequently, to explain anthropogenesis means to explain the origins of these human characteristics.... If we standardize the terminology which designates 'human' characteristics in our twenty-four texts, their profusion can be reduced to a list of thirty-eight properties.... It is striking that the core of this list, consisting of the most frequently mentioned characteristics, has changed very little over 150 years. The leading roles are constantly played by attributes such as tools, bipedalism, free hands, language, social life and cooperation.

If, as Stoczkowski suggests, very little has

changed in our definitions of the Self and Other—or the Human and Non-human—over the last 150 years, what might we predict of the next 150 years?

AND AWAY WE GO...

How will these time-place dichotomies continue to shape our understanding of human evolution—of our story—and vice versa? We have already seen in the last couple of decades how the discourse has been unfolding, but how will it continue to influence our daily world, our lived experience? Will the Africa and Non-Africa dichotomy enter political or economic discourse? Many may argue that it already has—that the idea of Africa-and-the-Rest-of-the-World has been present in the Western mind since the time of Aristotle. In the years to come, how will we identify the Other, and where will we place the Other in space and time? What places have we left, and where are we going? And, most importantly, who are ‘We’? As Landau (1991, 178) reminds us, “the fossil record may appear to support the notion that we are truly heroes to have survived. Or it can tell a different story: we are merely the remnants of a golden age.” In the end, it will be up to us to decide who we are, where we came from, and where we are going; not necessarily by the data we discover, but by the way we tell our story.

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SPRECHEN WIR DEUTSCH?

THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY IN AUSTRIA AND SOUTH TYROL

Barbara L. Hilden

This paper examines some of the linguistic tools, techniques, means, and methods by which the populations of Austria and South Tyrol construct identity. In order to better situate these two communities, this paper begins with an overview of the conditions which led to the creation of each state. It then explains some of the ways in which language can be used as a tool of identity construction. Positioning theory details ways both these groups create categories of separation and belonging. Citing the use of Austrian German, dialect in literature, differing pronunciation, and lexical development, this paper examines how the population of Austria constructs a linguistic identity distancing itself from Germany. This paper also examines how, using similar linguistic tools such as pronoun use and naming techniques, the population of South Tyrol constructs its identity. In contrast to Austria, the South Tyroleans align themselves with Germany, creating closer ties with Germanic neighbours while distancing themselves from Italy. Each population positions itself in relation to Germany, either with or against, using linguistic tools to create a group identity.

Two German-speaking communities occupy the Dolomite mountains of central Europe. One is an independent monolingual nation, the second a marginalized segment of population. Though related culturally, historically, and linguistically, these groups today use their common language to create very different identities. This paper will examine some of the linguistic tools, techniques, means, and methods by which populations of Austria and South Tyrol construct identity.

HISTORY

Austria

The Austrian Empire has its roots in the Hapsburg Monarchy, dating back to 1278 AD. It was succeeded by the Austrian Empire (1804-1867) and then by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918), the latter of which united the kingdoms of Hungary and Austria. Following defeat in WWI, the empire was disbanded and *Die Erste Republik* was founded (initially named *Deutsch-Öster-*

reich). Austria was annexed to Nazi Germany at the beginning of WWII (*Anschluss*), subsequently occupied by the four allied powers (1945-1955), and finally granted independence (commonly referred to as *Freiheit*) on May 12, 1955 (Steininger 1997).

South Tyrol

Castle Tyrol (seat of the counts of Tyrol) was built outside present-day Meran, Italy, sometime around 1100 AD in territory controlled by the reigning Hapsburg Monarchy. Following defeat by Napoleon in 1805, the Austrian Empire ceded the area to the Kingdom of Bavaria. The territory was returned to Austria by the Congress of Vienna in 1814. The Italian reunification movement (*il Risorgimento*) was strong during the first half of the 19th century, and the patchwork of independent Italian states lobbied hard against the Austro-Hungarian empire for the unification of the Italian peninsula. South Tyrol, however, remained under Austrian rule (Steininger 1997).

Undergraduate student; Departments of Anthropology and Modern Languages & Cultural Studies,
University of Alberta

Author contact: bhilden@ualberta.ca

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Italy was brought reluctantly into World War I at the behest of the Triple Entente and largely because of the promise of several territorial concessions in Austria-Hungary (including the Tyrol)—all home to Italian minorities. Following Austria-Hungary's surrender in 1918 and despite strong opposition from the citizens of South Tyrol, the area was returned to Italian hands. South Tyrol endured Italianization under the rule of Ettore Tolomei during the Fascist years (1922-1943). It experienced brief occupation during the Second World War but afterwards was returned to Italy. Italy and Austria negotiated the creation of the Trentino-Alto Adige/Tiroler Etschland region following WW II, and both German and Italian were made official languages. What is today called the Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Bozen became an independent province of Northern Italy in 1972 (Steininger 1997).

LANGUAGE AS A TOOL FOR IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

“Language,” writes François Grosjean (1982, 117), “is not just an instrument of communication. It is also a symbol of social or group identity, an emblem of group membership and solidarity.” As such, language is a powerful tool for the construction of identity. The use of certain linguistic forms marks one as either a member or an outsider. These same principles apply not only to individuals but also to groups, with whole segments of a population marking linguistic identity through conscious or unconscious language choices.

Positioning is one such method. Positioning describes a relation, denotes a placement relative to something or someone else. Linguistically, positioning can be understood as “the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person's actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts” (Harré and Van Langenhove 1991, 395). It is “a process by which interactants make their orientations toward social categories relevant” (Liebscher et. al 2010, 380). Individu-

als can position, both themselves and others, in a variety of means: in conversations, in the storylines of conversations, and in the actions of the storylines (Harré and Van Langenhove 1991, 396).

Groups, such as the Austrians and Tyroleans, can also position. These two different groups situate themselves culturally and linguistically apart from the dominant powers in their respective regions: Austrians by separating (positioning) themselves apart from German ideology and creating a uniquely Austrian space; South Tyroleans by positioning themselves apart from Italian ideology while simultaneously allying with their Germanic neighbours.

CONSTRUCTION OF AUSTRIAN GERMAN SEPARATE FROM *STANDARDDEUTSCH*

The language of Austria is German. Whether a dialect, a variety, or even “second-class German” (as it is occasionally still viewed)—German is the national language (Rusch 1989, 1). But Austrians are adamant about a national identity separate and apart from German(y). Rusch (1989, 2) writes that “‘Austrian’ is linguistically very far from being a language on its own or an independent linguistic concept.” It is rather a regional variety of the German language, and there is great internal variation within the national variety as well. However, “attempts at establishing Austrian as a national variety of German are common and generally accepted,” and function to ideologically separate the country from its large and influential neighbour (Rusch 1989, 11).

Rusch (1989, 13), however, argues against the desirability of a codified national variety of Austrian, believing that it would “have a damaging effect on the image of the ‘smaller Germans’ abroad,” and that establishing this national norm would unfairly privilege the Viennese variety of Austrian-German and “its most influential classes.” He advocates instead for national varieties of German, reinforcing the idea of satellite German-speaking communities and “Ger-

man as a pluricentric language.” “National identity,” he writes, “has to be sought and found elsewhere.”

The Austrians themselves seem to disagree. Through a variety of linguistic techniques, they position their national variety as a distinct alternative to *Standarddeutsch* and, both directly and indirectly, themselves as separate from Germany. A few of these means will be discussed below.

Conscientious objection

Following *Anschluss*, the term *Österreich* was “abolished and forbidden” (Rusch 1989, 3). Place names were changed: *Österreich* became *Ostmark-Deutsche*; Ober- and Nieder-*Österreich* (provinces) became Ober- and Niederdonau. Austrian resistance forces adopted the forbidden term and turned it into a subversive rallying cry. They coded it “05” (*Österreich* = Ö = Oe; e is the fifth letter of the alphabet) and plastered it on buildings and pamphlets. The country also endured the Germanization of many words, replacing Austrian vocabulary with German, which was met with decidedly cool reception.

Literature in dialect

Austrian writers make particular use of dialect in their literature. Referring to Austrian German and *Standarddeutsch*, Rusch (1989, 6) writes, “many writers use the various levels of style and the switching between them as a means of stylistic expression and characterization.” This then serves both literary and linguistic functions. As is common for Upper German dialects, the present perfect verb tense (*Perfekt*) is used in place of the simple past (*Präteritum*): “*Am Montagmorgen ist Melzer zur Arbeit gekommen, ziemlich spät, ... er hat die Siebenuhrsirene der in der Nähe liegenden Textilfabrik gehört und ist eilig in die Latzhose gefahren*” (on Monday morning Melzer had come to work fairly late... he had not heard the seven a.m. siren from the nearby textile factory and had dressed swiftly in overalls) (Wolfgruber 1984, 104).

Another element often considered es-

pecially Austrian is the positioning of the verb as main clause following *weil* (because) “...*Wunder ist es ja eigentlich eh keins, weil wir will denn schon für das Geld...*” (no one really wondered anyway, because we already wanted the money) (Wolfgruber 1984, 271). These both are examples of the creation of specific Austrian versions of German, even in the face of grammatical conventions which would, strictly speaking and by *Standarddeutsch* prescription, classify them as grammatically incorrect (Rusch 1989).

Lexicon

The lexicon of Austrian German differs in some very specific forms. It is perhaps no wonder that terminology for Austrian government differs from German (for example, *Bundesbeer* and *Bundeswehr*). Traditional Austrian/Hungarian dishes such as *Kaiserschmarrn*, *Palatschinken*, and *Powidl* have, naturally, no *Standarddeutsch* equivalent. But other food names vary as well. An Austrian apricot is an *Aprikose* instead of a *Marille*; one will be offered *Obers* for coffee instead of *Sabne*; and *Erdapfel* is heard in place of *Kartoffel*. The latter, admittedly, is standard throughout Bavaria and in other German-speaking realms, but was declared—to the specific exclusion of other options—Standard Austrian in the 1979 *Österreichisches Wörterbuch* (Austrian Dictionary) (Rusch 1989, 9).

Pronunciation

Pronunciation is also a tool for language differentiation. What may seem like a mild difference can, upon closer examination, reveal layers of meaning. The Viennese pronunciation of the word *Kaffee* (coffee) is one such example. The *Standarddeutsch* variant /‘kafe/ is spurned in favour of a uniquely Austrian form /ka’fe/. Though this may seem at first glance unremarkable, when considered in light of Austria’s rich *Kaffeehaus-Kultur*, the expression *‘kafe schmeckt mir nicht* (coffee doesn’t taste good to me) takes on new layers of meaning. In this way, the expression is not only (one may ar-

gue, is not at all) a statement of epicureal preference, but rather a dislike of German encroachment on an area of Austrian identity. Scheuringer (1987, 113) argues that it “*ist nicht nur Ausdruck der Bevorzugung eines stärkeren Kaffees... sondern offensichtlich auch Ausdruck einer sprachnationalistischen Denkungsweise*” (it is not an expression of preference for strong coffee... but rather an expression of national linguistic mindset).

CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN LANGUAGE IDENTITY IN ALIGNMENT WITH GERMANY

Large centres of German speaking populations (Austria, Switzerland) are widely acknowledged to have their own national varieties of German and are generally perceived to be part of the larger Germanic realm. Smaller pockets of German-speaking populations are less recognized. Small populations, such as those in South Tyrol, lack the infrastructure and institutions—language authorities, a unique linguistic codex—necessary to support the development of a separate linguistic community. Minor linguistic variations are either overlooked or non-existent, both by outsiders who are unaware of local differences and by the population itself. Thus, the population of South Tyrol is generally perceived to speak the Austrian variety of German (Ammon 1997, 163).

Naming

Becoming nominally Italian was only one identity crisis moment for South Tyrol. The strict program of Italianization after the First World War helped ensure vestiges of German were forcibly removed from the region. As early as 1906, Italian senator Ettore Tolomei was demanding the assimilation of South Tyrol. He refused even to acknowledge the name “South Tyrol,” arguing that “*Für uns gibt es ein Tirol weder geographisch noch historisch. Es gibt ein historisches Trentino und es gibt ein Alto Adige*” (For us there is a Tyrol neither geographically nor historically. There are historic Trento and Alto Adige regions) (quoted in Freiberg 1989, 126). Understanding the

potential names had to galvanize a people behind an identity, Tolomei went further to say, “*Der Name war ein Banner; die ganze Welt würde begreifen, daß ein Gebiet dieses Namens, das oberste Becken des großen italienischen Flusses, Italien gehörte*” (The name was a banner; the whole world should understand that this region, the uppermost basin at the reaches of Italian influence, is indeed Italian) (quoted in Freiberg 1989, 126). In 1921, Tolomei demanded the Italianization (termed the *Wiederherstellung*, the “restoration”) of all family and place names in South Tyrol. Thus, a Schulze from Bozen became a Sculdasci from Bolanzo almost overnight.

Pümpel-Mader (2000) explains the ties between physical territory and naming. Settlers are frequently named for the area they occupy: Tirol and Tiroler, Schweiz and Schweizer. One creates a collective social identity by “*die Übertragung der Erfahrungen der sozialen Gemeinschaft*” (the transference of characteristics to the social community) (Pümpel-Mader 2000, 124). Collective identity arises, she argues, in large part through the role of *Herkunft* (a German term which includes and brings together notions of origin, ancestry, family, and land), the naming thereof, and the social characteristics ascribed to these names which members of the society adopt (Pümpel-Mader 2000, 124). In the Tyrol regions, these include a great many physical landscape characteristics: *diese Bergbewohner* (these mountain dwellers), *dieses Bergvolk* (these mountain people), *die tirolischen Gebirgsleute* (the Tyrolean mountain people), and *die Eingebornen der rauheren Thaeler* (the natives of the rough valley) are all names by which the Tyroleans have been known (some since as early as 1796) and through which, Pümpel-Mader (2000, 125) argues, the Tyroleans understand not only their land and home, but also themselves.

Pronouns

Pümpel-Mader (2000, 122) examines the social role of collective identity construction. She writes of the “*gesellschaftlicher Proze-*

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es” (social process) and the role of *wir* (we) in the creation of a group. She argues that the collective is a symbolic version of the group and a collective cannot be created out of relationships of interaction. It is rather an imagined and theoretical entity. Individual relationships are based in daily interaction, but a collective—a group—is not. Because of this, the group and group membership (what she terms the *Wir-Gefühl*) are constructed not from interactions, but rather in a cognitive and emotional self-reference (Pümpel-Mader 2000, 123). The *Wir-Gefühl* is the construction of identity that is lived and experienced in social groups.

Use of the *wir* pronoun thereby creates a group membership out of these individual interactions. This is evident in South Tyrol in the alternative name to the *Tiroler Volkspartei*: “*Wir Tiroler*,” (Tyrolean People’s Party: “We Tyroleans”) as well as in the name of the local paper, *Die Wir Tiroler Zeitung*, (The We Tyroleans Paper), and its email addresses, @wir-tiroler.com.at (Pümpel-Mader 2000, 123).

Characteristics

Cognitive and emotional collective identity is also suggested through the use of Tirol and its adjectival derivatives in everyday language. Group belonging is subtly demonstrated through the use, repetition, and subsequent linguistic entrenching of these words in everyday vocabulary. “*Nominationsarbeiten*,” (nominal identifiers) as Pümpel-Mader (2000, 126) terms them, stand symbolically for the creation and consolidation of group coherence. They bind characteristics of the everyday Tyrolean world to the sense of identity constructed by those who inhabit it. She cites numerous examples of this phenomenon, including “*Wir haben heute SAISON TIROL erhalten*” (Tyrolean weather), “*Tanzabend «Tirolerisch»*” (Tyrolean dance style), and an abstract characterization of Tyrolean style in general: “*Ein Haus mit typisch tirolerischem Charakter*” (Pümpel-Mader 2000, 126).

Austria

The Austrian-German variety continues to be widely used throughout the region. Though in many ways similar to other varieties of German, Austria has the population, means, and—perhaps most crucially—inclination to support a fully codified linguistic identity separate from its German neighbour. Dialectal literature continues to be produced, published, and consumed. Lexical differences are becoming increasingly codified—since 1951, Austria has produced a dictionary of Austrian. Duden now produces a *Wörterbuch des österreichischen Deutsch* (dictionary of Austrian German). And both are growing: the 1951 *Österreiches Wörterbuch* contained 118 entries; the 1990 edition contained 219 (Ammon 1997, 172). “The specific traits of the Austrian national variety have,” as per dictionary evidence Ammon (1997, 174) collected, “rather increased than decreased.” The evidence would seem to suggest not only a static but, in fact, growing awareness of a distinctly separate national variety.

South Tyrol

According to the 2010 South Tyrol census, 69.4% of residents declare themselves members of the German language group; 26.3% declare Italian membership (Autonomous Province of South Tyrol [APST] 2010, 15). These numbers remain fairly consistent throughout recent history: in the 2001 census, 64.0% of the population identified as German; 24.5% Italian. In 1991, it was 65.3% German and 26.5% Italian (APST 2010, 19). Figures as far back as 1961 fall within 10% of the 2010 results—this would seem to indicate relative stability in the population. A shift towards or away from either linguistic group is not evident. Thus, the linguistic situation in South Tyrol can be perceived as relatively stable.

CONCLUSIONS

Through a variety of linguistic features, both of these populations create and maintain a linguistic identity separate from their neighbours. In Austria, this is achieved through a national language variety that is not German: the Austrians create an oppositional identity. They define themselves and their language by what it is not and position themselves as separate. The South Tyroleans, in contrast, create a linguistic identity by aligning themselves with the German language. Through the conscious use of place and personal names, adjectival use which links the land, language, and people, as well as through the use of group-inclusive pronouns, the South Tyroleans construct a group membership and identity which position them with Austria and Germany, while simultaneously distancing themselves from Italy.

Each of these populations use similar linguistic tools to construct an identity that binds the group together while/by dissociating from a larger hegemonic power. Geographically, historically, and linguistically related, both Austria and South Tyrol construct identities by positioning themselves in relation to German(y), albeit in very different fashions. Their relations to German(y) serve to unite their peoples and create a powerful group membership.

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**PLACE AND CONTESTED IDENTITY:
PORTRAYING THE ROLE OF THE PLACE IN SHAPING COMMON
SOCIOPOLITICAL IDENTITY IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH**

H.M. Ashraf Ali

This research is about how a collective socio-political identity, the 'Pahari' (the hill people), is constructed by the ethnoculturally diversified groups of indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. While conducting my PhD dissertation fieldwork in the CHT, I experienced that most of the non-Bengali ethnicities use a common term 'Pahari' in their everyday conversations. This term derives from the Bengali word 'pahar', which means "hill"; and the term 'Pahari' is the term used by 'the inhabitants of hills' or 'the hill people' to introduce them to visitors, tourists, or in their everyday conversations. Of course, they have their own distinctive and individual ethnic identity marked by language, religion, kinship, and marriage system (e.g., Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya). Thus, they have two different identities: the ethnic identity and the common socio-political identity. The influence of hills, land, forest, Kaptai Lake, and above all, the ecological system of this region on the economy and the lives of the people who live here is immense. In this research paper, I will reflect on how a particular place, a different geographical setting, is used to bring group members of diverse ethnicities together in order to construct a common socio-political identity. Although the 'place' is central to the construction of this Pahari identity, social, economic, and political relations with the Bengalis appear as determining factors in adopting such collective identity by the culturally differentiating ethnicities in the CHT. Finally, I will describe how and why the Pahari identity is contested and contradictory in broader socio-political context in Bangladesh.

The historical development, strategic geographical position, ethnocultural diversity, and economic-political significance of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) has marked it as a unique place within South Asia. The CHT is situated in the southeast corner of Bangladesh and is bordered by the Indian state of Tripura in the north and Mizoram in the east. The country of Myanmar borders in the southeastern part. In Bangladesh, this mountainous region of the CHT is comprised of three districts—Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari. The CHT has been the home of the following 12 ethnic groups for hundreds of years: Chakma, Tanchangya, Marma, Tripura, Reang, Mro, Lushai, Khumi, Chak, Khyang, Bawm, and Pankhua. These ethnic groups of people are distinct from the majority Bengali population of Bangladesh with respect to race/ethnicity, language, culture, religion and other social systems. For example, most of these ethnic groups speak in a mixed language of Bengali,

Pali, Burmese, and Assamese dialect whereas all the Bengalis of the plain speak in one language—Bengali. From religious point of view, a majority of these ethnic groups such as the Chakma, the Marma, and the Tanchangya are Buddhists and the rest of them are either followers of Hinduism or Christianity. Conversely, the majority of the Bengalis are followers of the religion of Islam.

The twelve ethnic groups largely depend on shifting cultivation, forest, and hills for their livelihoods whereas the Bengalis of the plain depend on a homogenous form of agriculture: plough-cultivation (Ahsan and Chakma 1989; Ali and Shafie 2005; Chakma 2010; Schendel 1992). Thus, the CHT is a very important region in Bangladesh for strategic geographic position and security reasons (e.g., the border with India and Myanmar), the location of hydroelectric power resources (e.g., Kaptai Hydroelectric Project), natural resources (e.g., forests and Kaptai Lake), and possible economic and tourism

Graduate student; Department of Anthropology, University of Alberta

Author contact: haali@ualberta.ca

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development. Sociocultural differences and cultural diversity are prevalent throughout this region, primarily due to the diversity of indigenous peoples.

However, there are different discourses, confusions, and debates about the actual identity of these ethnic groups in CHT. The people of the CHT have so far been represented as the *Tribal* or the *Upzati* in government documents from the British colonial government to independent Bangladesh. The *Jummas*, the *Adivashi*, and the *indigenous people* are also the parallel collective identity for the twelve ethnic groups in the CHT, which are mainly represented by the indigenous political groups, academic and independent researchers, and international human rights organizations (Ahamed 2006, 376; Ali and Shafe 2005, 68; UNDP 2009, 1). As this study observed, most of the indigenous people in the study locality use the term *Pahari* in their day to day conversations or to introduce themselves to others (i.e., visitors or tourists).

Sometimes they also use the term *Adivashi*, meaning ‘the original people/inhabitants’, and sometimes they use the term *Jumma*, a term deriving from the practice of *jhum chash* (shifting cultivation). The term *Jumma* was romanticized and popularized by the indigenous political leadership to mobilize the diverse ethnic groups from the CHT for the resistance movement against the Bangladesh army and the immigrant Bengalis in the mid-1970s. Though various international human rights organizations including the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identify these 12 ethnic groups collectively as “indigenous people” based on cultural traditions and way of life, the government of Bangladesh has recently enlisted them as “small ethnic groups” in the Bangladesh Constitution (for a more detailed discussion of this, see The Daily Star 2011).

In response, the people in the CHT differ with this government decision. Rather, they claim that they are the original inhab-

itants. They emphasize four key criteria, namely the ‘place’ and ‘time’, the ‘nature and sources of their livelihoods’; and the ‘tradition and pattern of lifestyle’ that markedly differs from the Bengalis of the plain. These *Pahari* people argue that they are the original inhabitants of the CHT, as they have been living in the hills for generations, at least since before the arrival of any Bengali here.

In this paper, I examine how and why the CHT people from ethnoculturally diverse groups use the term *Pahari*. Some anthropologists have recently used the term *Pahari* in their research in the CHT (e.g., Ahamed 2006; Ali and Shafe 2005; Uddin 2008), but none of them contextualizes and elaborates upon it in relation to place, recent sociocultural change, and unequal power relations within the *Pahari* community. Considering the scope and objective of this paper, I will not elaborate about the other parallel terms such as the *Jummas*, *Adivashi*, and stereotyped identity such as *Upzati* or *Tribal*. Throughout this paper I will use both terms *Pahari* and *indigenous* to indicate all non-Bengali ethnic groups in the CHT. Sometimes, I also use the phrase ‘CHT people’ to denote all the non-Bengali people in the CHT. However, I have observed that two common words, namely *Pahari* and *Adivashi*, are mostly used by research participants and other local people in this study area. Although *Pahari* and *Adivashi* are used as the collective socio-political identity and they have intimate relationship to a ‘place’ and ‘time’, I would rather confine my focus on the *Pahari* and its background and significance in relation to their economic and sociopolitical life and how it is used to differentiate the *Pahari* from the Bengalis of the plains.

This paper is divided into three major sections. The first section describes methodology, study locality and the ethnocultural features of the research participants and the historical/political context of the CHT. It highlights how the indigenous people attempt to bring aspects of social, economic

and political relations with the Bengalis and the Bangladesh state together to form this sociopolitical identity. The second section explains the term Pahari and how it is used by the study community in their everyday life. It also concentrates on how the indigenous people link a place to the construction of the collective Pahari identity. Finally, it demonstrates how and why the Pahari identity is contested and contradictory in broader sociopolitical context in Bangladesh.

METHODOLOGY

My PhD dissertation fieldwork on microcredit, power, and poverty at Rangamati in CHT was conducted in two phases between May 2009 and July 2011. I used standard anthropological data collection techniques, including participant observation, unstructured interviews with key informants, and semi-structured focus group interviews following purposive and snowball sampling. I talked to key informants, particularly to elders and community leaders. I also used relevant secondary data such as published research works, books, and articles on the CHT people. A digital voice recorder was used to record interviews and informed consent was taken with each informant. I used ATLAS.ti 6.2, a qualitative data analysis tool, to code and thematically analyze the data (Bernard 2010; Fetterman 2010; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007).

Who lives in the study locality?

This study was conducted at Rangamati in CHT of Bangladesh. One of the significant aspects of the research area is the ethno- and sociocultural diversity present. Both indigenous and Bengali peoples reside in the CHT and practice many forms of religion. The indigenous people, collectively known as Pahari, include the Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya, Tripura, Lushai, Ahamiya, and Gurkha. Bengalis are for the most part Muslim, with a Hindu minority. The Chakma are the largest of the indigenous groups of people. The Chakma, Marma, and Tanchangya peo-

ples are Buddhist. Although the Tripura followed Hinduism, most of them in this study locality are converts to the religion of Christianity. The Lushais are Christians (Chakma 2010). Assamese (locally called Ahamiya) and Nepalese or Gurkha are Hindu. Both the ancestors of the contemporary Ahamiya and Gurkha people living in the study locality migrated from Assam in India and Nepal, respectively, during British colonial rule in the 19th century. The social and cultural differences between the indigenous and Bengali population are marked by different ethnic origins, social organizations, and cultural systems (e.g., marriage, social customs, kinship, religion, and language). The Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, and Lushai people lived in Rangamati long before the Bengali people migrated to this region. It can be assumed from different historical sources and narratives of the local indigenous people that they are the original inhabitants of the CHT and are of Sino-Tibetan descent, belonging to the Mongoloid group (Chakma 2010, 283). Linguistically, the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and Tanchangyas are associated with Sino-Tibetan. It appears that both the major group of people might have migrated from the Chin Hills and Arakan in Myanmar (e.g., the Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya and Lushai) and Tripura in India (UNDP 2009; Uddin 2008). Therefore, most of the indigenous people in this region are of Sino-Tibetan descent and have distinct Mongoloid racial characteristics that mark a significant ethnic and cultural difference from the Bengalis, an Indo-Aryan language group.

CONSTRUCTING COMMON SOCIOPOLITICAL IDENTITY: POLITICAL-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of economic exploitation, suffering, and antagonistic relationships between the Bengali and indigenous people in the CHT is linked to the discriminatory economic and political policies of both the Pakistani government (1947-1971) and the government of independent Bangladesh

that formed in the early 1970s (Nasrin and Togawa 2002; Uddin 2008). In 1947, the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent led to the rise of two nation-states: India and Pakistan. This division of British India was based on the “two nation theory” that independence activists devised to recognize the two major religious identities in the Indian subcontinent: Hinduism in India and Islam in Pakistan (Schendel 1992, 116; Uddin 2008, 42). Today’s Bangladesh and the CHT were included in the state of Pakistan because the majority of the populace was Muslim. However, the majority of indigenous populations in the CHT were non-Muslims. The Pakistani government abolished the semi-autonomous status, known as the CHT Regulation Act 1900, of the CHT indigenous peoples in 1963. At the same time, this government imposed development projects, including the Kaptai Hydroelectric Project, which brought devastating social, economic, ecological, and humanitarian consequences (Uddin 2008, 43). The influx of Bengali people into the CHT region from the plains followed. The establishment of the Karnaphuli paper mill and rayon, timber, and plywood industries in the 1950s, financed by the World Bank, brought immense suffering for the local indigenous peoples as they lost their lands and sources of livelihoods as forests were destroyed (Nasreen and Togawa 2002, 103). The construction of the Kaptai Hydroelectric Project (1959–1962), locally known as Kaptai Dam, appeared as a curse for the people who were living here. The construction of the Kaptai Dam was financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank (Nasreen and Togawa 2002). It is the largest dam in South Asia and created a vast reservoir of some 885 km (550 square miles). It was constructed without any impact assessment or any consultation with representatives of the local indigenous community. It submerged at least 40% of the total arable land of the CHT and displaced more than 100,000 in-

igenous people, particularly Chakma, who were mainly sedentary rice farmers (Bhikkhu 2007, 2; Nasreen and Togawa 2002). The suffering caused by this displacement and loss of land continues to affect people today because they have not yet been able to restore this crucial economic base.

Consequently, the indigenous people began to mobilize the diverse ethnic groups in order to form a collective sociopolitical platform to protect their economy, land, and cultural identity. The first collective use of the term ‘Pahari’ appeared in the formation of the “Pahari Chhatro Samity” (Hill Students’ Association) to protest against the discriminatory economic and political policies of the government of Pakistan in the 1960s (e.g., the Kaptai hydroelectric project and abolition of the semi-autonomous status of the CHT) (Schendel 1992, 120). The suffering, exploitation, and discrimination of the CHT people continued after the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971. Politically motivated migration into the CHT by Bengali people occurred on a massive scale beginning in the late 1970s, backed by the military might of the state. However, a delegation of indigenous political leaders led by the Member of Parliament Manobendra Narayan Larma Chakma called on Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and submitted a four-point memorandum on February 15, 1972. The major aspects highlighted in this memorandum were: 1) recognition of the diverse ethnic groups of the CHT as ‘indigenous people’ in the Constitution of Bangladesh and the endorsement of the CHT as an autonomous region and setting up its own legislative assembly; 2) retention of the CHT Regulation Act 1900 in the Constitution; 3) retention of the offices of tribal chiefs such as the Chakma Circle Chief; and 4) imposition of constitutional restriction on the influx of the Bengalis in the CHT from the plains. Instead, this proposal was refused categorically by the Bangladeshi head of state. The Prime Minister instigated the indigenous

people's delegation team to become Bengali by renouncing 'the idea of separate identity' (Mohsin 2004, 46; Uddin 2008, 45; UNDP 2009, 4). In addition to the refusal of this proposal, the Government of Bangladesh amended rule 34 (1) of the CHT Manual in 1979 allowing the resettlement of Bengali landless people (Nasreen and Togawa 2002, 105). Through this amendment, the Government of Bangladesh legalized the settlement of outsiders in the CHT that had previously been restricted by the British colonial administration in the 1900s (i.e., CHT Regulation 1900). It was estimated that more than 400,000 Bengalis had been uplifted from the plain districts to transmigrate to the CHT by the successive governments of Bangladesh from 1979 to the mid-1980s (UNDP 2009, 5).

Consequences of these political decisions of the Government of Bangladesh were widespread and devastating. An indigenous political party, the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samity (PCJSS), which formed in 1972, was involved in a resistance movement against the Bangladeshi army and immigrant armed groups. This indigenous armed group was locally known as 'Shanti Bahini' (Peace Troops). The PCJSS created the notion of 'Jumma', a collective identity of all the indigenous people in the CHT, to mobilize its people to participate in this resistance movement. Consequently, an approximately two-decade indigenous resistance movement continued from 1975 to the late 1990s which cost thousands of lives and brought enormous suffering (Arens and Chakma 2002; Levene 1999; Mohsin 2004). At long last, the CHT Peace Accord between the Government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS was signed on December 2, 1997. There is still resentment among the indigenous people as the peace accord is yet to be completely implemented by the Government of Bangladesh (Chowdhury and Rafi 2001).

The influx of the Bengali people from the plains to lands that were previously oc-

cupied by the different indigenous communities was a main cause of antagonism between the Bengali settlers and the indigenous communities. The relationship between the indigenous and Bengali people had broken down because the indigenous people had to leave their ancestral lands as a result of this forced resettlement by the Bangladeshi government. In order to protect their ancestral lands and distinct cultural identity, the indigenous political leaders stimulated the common people from diverse ethnicities to participate in resistance movements against the discriminatory political stance of the Bangladeshi government. The indigenous political leaders utilized some common grounds of identity formation such as habitat, place, method of cultivation, and lifestyles of indigenous people to separate all the non-Bengali ethnic groups from the Bengalis in the plains and hence the political authority of Bangladesh. Consequently, the terms 'Adivashi', 'Jumma' and 'Pahari' appeared in the discourse of the identity construction of the indigenous people in the CHT in recent decades. The notion of Jumma was developed in relation to jum agriculture or shifting cultivation and land rights in the CHT. The indigenous political party—the PCJSS—symbolized this notion of Jumma in order to revitalize the movement of regional autonomy, distinct cultural identity, and land rights. As described by Ahamed (2006, 375):

The symbolic use of traditional agricultural practices (jum) as collective ethnic marker is a process of displaying a shared history of common past and present, in which all ethnic groups are intimately related and attached to CHT land. The use of Jumma is, in fact, an effort to uphold a common cultural identity. In the construction of Jumma identity, the historical past is shaped by present political realities in the CHT. Therefore, in practical terms, Pahari and Jumma supplement each other in the form of collective mobilization in the CHT.

Although the notion of Jumma was influential in the form of collective ethnic mobilization in the mid-1970s under the regional political leadership of the PCJSS, it is mainly limited to the political discourse in the post-Peace Accord situation in the CHT. The common indigenous people often use the term Pahari in everyday conversations in relation to place rather than Jumma in relation to the method of agriculture. Even the indigenous political leaders use the word Pahari in their political speeches, seminars, press conferences, and in other public discourse. This is because most of these people have left their traditional shifting cultivation and are now adopting new forms of farming in the hills. For example, instead of shifting cultivation, they are practising mixed crop or mixed fruit gardening in the hills. They are relying on plough-cultivation in the well-suited low and levelled land. Thus, in changing situations and contexts, these groups of people tend to choose the term Pahari to construct their shared identity in relation to a place, sources of livelihood, and lifestyle. Place has now become the key criterion for the indigenous people in determining difference from the Bengalis; it has become a powerful symbol to create a sociopolitical platform, as this study observes.

WHAT DOES THE PAHARI STAND FOR?

As described above, the people who live in the hills are the Pahari. But the question which arises is, are all the people who live in the CHT in Bangladesh Pahari? While conducting my dissertation fieldwork in Rangamati, I have experienced that most of the indigenous people use the common term Pahari to introduce themselves to visitors and tourists. It is also used while interacting with each other in various public domains. They are also identified as the Pahari by the Bengali population. This is not their actual ethnic identity; they are ethnically Chakma,

Marma, Tanchangya, Tripura, Lushai, Gurkha, or Ahamiya. People from each of these ethnic groups also use and identify with their individual ethnic identity, such as Chakma, Marma, and Tanchangya. One Pahari informant said, "Pahari is our common identity but Chakma, Tanchagya or Gurkha is our individual ethnic identity."² It seems that the term Pahari is constructed based on territorial, ecological, regional, and geographical significance and its relations to the various aspects of life of people in the CHT.

Obviously, this Pahari identity has broader social, cultural and political implications, especially when it is used to mark differences from the Bengalis and to connect it to their struggle for social, economic, and political freedom (Ahamed 2006; Sen 1999). In the following section, I will examine how the place is brought into a focal point to the construction of the collective Pahari identity.

HOW IS THE PAHARI IDENTITY LINKED TO A PLACE, THE CHT?

Geographically, the CHT is a part of Hill Tripura and Arakan Yoma, branching off from the Himalayan range and continuing to the south through Assam and Hill Tripura of India to Arakan of Myanmar. The Karnaphuli is the largest of the rivers in the region. Due to the construction of a hydroelectric project known as Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli in 1962, a major portion of the river has turned into Kaptai Lake (Chakma 2010; Chowdhury and Rafi 2001; Schendel 1992). The hilly topography of the CHT makes a difference in economic, social, and cultural systems and lifestyles between Pahari and the people of the plains in Bangladesh. Although it is not known who first used the term Pahari, it is assumed that the indigenous people in the hills coined it from the Bengali word *pahar* 'hill' and emphasizing the suffix *-i*; together it means 'inhabitants of the hill', in reference to their dwelling or living place,

¹ Sazib Bahadur, interview by Ashraf Ali. Rangamati, March 27, 2011, Interview #27.

reliance on hill, land, forest, and ecological system for their livelihood and subsistence economy (Ahamed 2006; Ali and Shafie 2005; Bhattacharya et al. 2005). The hill is central to the construction of cultural and sociopolitical identity of the indigenous people in the CHT. It is central because the hill is an integral part of their social, cultural and economic lives. The relationship between the hill, ecological system, environment and the people who live here is inseparable. The hills, forests, rivers, well-suited low and leveled land between the hills, lake, and hundreds of canals are major sources of farming, fishing, and other direct and indirect sources of livelihoods for the people who live here. The indigenous hill people traditionally depend on subsistence agriculture and they are predominantly involved in shifting cultivation, which is locally called *jhum chash*; they also practice plough cultivation at the fringe lands or in the well-suited low and leveled land which is situated between uplands or mountains (Ali and Shafie 2005, 81). This pattern of subsistence economy of the indigenous people in the CHT significantly differs from the semi-capitalistic agricultural economy of the plains in Bangladesh.

Thus, cultural and economic influence of the hill, forest, and biodiversity or ecological system on the life of the Pahari is immense. The attachment of the Pahari people to this natural environment and land is inseparable. The place is reflected on every aspect of the Paharis' economic system, living pattern, housing type, food practices, rituals, belief systems, and gendered division of labor, which is markedly different from the way of life of the Bengalis of the plains. Accordingly, the local indigenous people emphasize four key criteria: place, time, nature and sources of livelihoods, and the tradition and the distinct pattern of lifestyles as the rationale for connecting place to their collective Pahari identity. In other words, social, cultural, and political construction of the Pahari identity is directly linked to the possession or protec-

tion of a territory, a *Pahari homeland*, the CHT (Schendel 1992). In fact, the construction of the Pahari identity is a recent sociopolitical phenomenon in the CHT (Ahamed 2006). The Pahari, a common identity for all diverse non-Bengali ethnic groups, is emerging in response to the cultural, economic, and political discrimination created by the government and Bengalis in the recent past (e.g., the Kaptai hydroelectric project in the 1960s and the resettlement policy in the late 1970s) as well as the current social and economic relations with the Bengalis. Establishing land and territorial rights is the central issue for why the Pahari people have been struggling for decades to form a distinct cultural and sociopolitical platform and a collective identity.

A question that arises is, why are the Pahari people so concerned for their territorial rights? My recent ethnographic fieldwork in the CHT provides possible explanations. One of the explanations is that the indigenous people are concerned about their economy, future generations and their possible adaptation and coping strategies in response to increasing population and loss of land and natural resources in the hills. The impact of a changing socioeconomic situation, domination of the Bengali business syndicate, and the penetration of the market economy has created a challenge for the traditional subsistence economy of the indigenous farmers. As discussed above, traditionally the Pahari people used to live solely on the hills, forest, land and river for their livelihood. They would enjoy a communal and collective land-ownership by giving revenues to the traditional sociopolitical authority. The Pahari people who live in the hills were the owners of the hills, land, forest, and natural resources, but when the idea of propriety claims and the conception of private ownership of land was developed and implemented in the CHT, the Pahari people began to encounter a serious economic problem. As Schendel (1992, 122-123) wrote:

The territorial thinking has developed

strongly in reaction to proprietary claims by the British crown and its successor governments, the introduction of private property rights in land, and exploitation of the region's resources. Among the inhabitants of the hills, whose precolonial forebears didn't feel any particular closeness to each other because they happened to occupy the same tract of the hill land, the possession of a homeland has now become a core element in the construction of a shared identity.

Thus, the fear of the dispossession of rights to land, hills, and natural resources is one of the main reasons for why such shared identity has been constructed despite ethno-cultural differences within these groups. If the Pahari don't have rights to the hills, it might create a great threat to their existence, to their livelihood and economy, culture and identity. Since the hill people are generationally dependent on the traditional knowledge of shifting cultivation and other modern forms of farming in the hills, it seems to be difficult for many of them to find alternative means of livelihood.

“COLLECTIVITY” AND “OTHERNESS”:
COMPARING THE PAHARI-BENGALI
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

Discussion clearly reflects that the social, cultural, and political construction of the Pahari is deeply connected to a specific place, the CHT. This Pahari identity has its local meaning and contexts, interpretations, and enormous implications for the lives of the people concerned. As Ahamed (2006, 372) observed:

The usage of the term Pahari bears its own inclusive mechanism of cultural and geographical boundary maintenance specific to CHT. Pahar symbolises the special distinction of territorial and cultural boundary between Pahari and Bengali people, highlights the only authentic home and place for the Pahari. Their unique lifestyle in CHT has become part

of their pride and sense of belonging, which as understood by them, necessarily refutes cultural diversity among them.

Nevertheless, this study identifies three key aspects—place, social life, and economic-political relations—between Bengali and non-Bengali ethnicities in the CHT. These factors are intertwined and inseparable to the collective Pahari identity construction process. It has already been discussed above how place and political-historical relationships with the Bangladeshi state and the Bengalis together influence the indigenous people in forming various shared identities (e.g., the Jumma, the Pahari). Now I will discuss how culturally differentiated ethnic groups of people converge to form a shared identity and how they separate other groups in context of social and cultural aspects of life and inter-ethnic relations.

Ethnic boundaries and convergence of diverse ethnicities

The place is not just a setting for social and economic actions or the reflections of a particular way of life of the people. The place can be used to represent the temporary grounding of ideas as well, as we experienced in the case of the CHT (Rodman 1992). Besides, the territorial and ethnic boundaries of the social relations among the Pahari play a critical role in creating an alliance within or alienating others (i.e., the Bengalis). As described above, different ethnic groups such as the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Lushai, Ahamiya, and Gurkha live in this study community. There is a certain ethnic boundary for each of these ethnic groups based on their distinctive cultural and social organizations (e.g., religion, language, marriage, kinship, sociopolitical leadership system). Despite their ethnic and cultural differences, all of these ethnic groups adopt a common sociopolitical identity, the Pahari. This dimension of the convergence of diverse ethnicities can be explained in relation to the conception of “ethnic boundary”:

The ethnic boundary canalize social

life—it entails a frequently quite complex organization of behaviour and social relations. The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally ‘playing the same game’, and this means that there is between them a potential for diversification and expansion of their social relationships to cover eventually all different sectors and domains of activity [Barth 1970, 15].

In this perspective, the construction of the Pahari identity within diverse ethnic groups in the CHT is based on the sharing criteria for *evaluation* and *judgement* (Barth 1970, 15). Of course, there are certain individual and group interests and other social and economic forces that act in motivating these diverse ethnic groups to form a shared identity. For instance, they live in the same place, and they have a common interest to protect their land and natural resources from the intrusion of the state and the Bengalis. They are also exploited and discriminated socially and economically by the Bengalis in their everyday life. In order to achieve relief from the domination and exploitation they face, the Pahari want to establish social, economic, and political freedoms. There is also a closeness of social life among these ethnic groups as they share some common rituals and cultural practices including Biju, Boishabi, etc. The Biju, the biggest social festival of the indigenous people of the CHT (for more information, see The Daily Star 2010), is celebrated for three consecutive days beginning from the second-last day of the past Bengali year to the first day of the new Bengali year—that is, from April 12 to April 14. The grand festival is to say goodbye to the past year’s sorrows and welcome the new year with hope for a prosperous future. The first day is marked by floating flowers on Kaptai Lake, rivers, or water fountains seeking divine blessings and prosperity. The following day is

passed by preparing and serving special items of foods such as cakes, sweetmeat, and *pachan* (mixed vegetables) to relatives and guests. Finally, the first day of the Bengali New Year is marked by inviting guests and visiting relatives and tasting food including liquor, and blessing the children and youth by the elders (Chakma 2006, 20-22). Thus, these common social life practices preformed by the people in the CHT aid in constructing the common sociopolitical identity: the Pahari.

Separating and constructing ‘Other’

The Pahari people use the demarcation of territorial and cultural boundaries as the main criteria in demonstrating their cultural distinctiveness from the Bengalis. Patterns of inter-ethnic relations are also a key aspect that mark differences between the Pahari and the Bengalis. In most cases, as this study observes, the Pahari people identify the Bengalis as the “settlers” and by other negative terms such as *Bangiya* (strangers/outside from the plains). From an ethno-cultural point of view, all of the indigenous people are non-Muslims and their mother tongue isn’t Bengali. In this regard, the identification of the Bengalis as outsiders or *Bangiya* implies that, as Barth (1970,15) describes, there is

a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest.

In other words, there is a negative relationship of “assumed common understanding and mutual interest” (Barth 1970, 15) regarding social, economic, and political issues between the Pahari and the Bengalis in the CHT. The relationship between the Pahari and the Bengali is conflictive because the immigrant Bengalis were settled in the lands of the CHT previously occupied by the Pahari. There is also an issue of lack of mutual trust and shared understanding, as these two rival groups are struggling with each other to se-

cure their supremacy in the CHT region in regard to land, economic and political rights.

The Bengali settlers began migrating after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Based on the narratives of key informants from Pahari communities, this study found that the social, economic, and political relationship between the Pahari and the Bengalis was positive before the liberation war in 1971, but the situation has changed. Bengalis are now perceived as “bad people,” “rapist,” “torturer,” and “killer” by the Pahari (Schendel 1992, 122). Since the Bengalis were allegedly involved in various misdeeds and criminal activities such as transgressing the lands and natural resources owned by the Pahari, kidnapping, rape, killing, and extortion, the Pahari began to change their previous positive perceptions (Halim et al. 2005; Karim 1998). Many indigenous people lost their land and homes and became refugees as a result of the social instability created by rehabilitation of the Bengali people in the CHT region. This resettlement policy was (and still is) considered a nuisance, unacceptable, and a discriminatory political decision which has been directly responsible for deteriorating inter-ethnic relationships between the Pahari and the Bengalis. Even the relationship between the Pahari and the Bengalis who have been living in the CHT since the British period (1760-1947) disintegrated. The Pahari people hardly made a distinction between Pahari and Bengali in the past. The Pahari were used to living together peacefully, they co-operated with each other, and they rarely participated in ethnic conflict and violence like murder and arson after the resettlement policy was established in the mid-1970s. Consequently, by identifying the Bengalis as *Bangiya*, the Pahari people are separating the Bengalis from the rights to live in the hills. A key Bengali informant said, “There are still some Pahari people who cannot accept the presence of Bengali settlers.

That day a Pahari was saying that it is our region we cannot accept the presence of Bengali settlers here.”² This statement implies that the Pahari are the authentic owners of the hills and lands in the CHT, and the Pahari still view the presence of the Bengali settlers as problematic, a barrier for their social and economic development.

CHANGE, ASYMMETRY OF POWER, AND CONTESTED IDENTITY

As manifested in the above discussion, the construction of the Pahari identity is not independent of prejudgements and contestation. It is more of the regional, territorial, economic, and sociopolitical than mere cultural similarities and differences between the Pahari and the Bengalis. Besides the recent Bengali immigrants, local Pahari often address them as settlers, *Bangiya* or sometimes outsiders, there are a large number of Bengali people who have been living in the CHT region since the British colonial period. Note, however, the British local administration settled some Bengali farmers from the nearby Chittagong district to teach the Pahari how to use the plough and other modern technologies and to increase agricultural production beyond that of the subsistence economy of *jum* cultivation. The Pahari people exclude the Bengalis from the Pahari categorization based on their cultural differences such as language, religion, economic activities, kinship, and political systems (Ahamed 2006, 371; Schendel 1992, 106).

The logic of cultural difference used in separating the Pahari from the Bengalis has weakened as the Pahari people are experiencing a significant cultural and sociopolitical change in the post-peace accord development era in the CHT. This study identified that the cultural differences between the Pahari and Bengali has been reduced in the domains of the style of dress, language, marriage, and sociopolitical leadership. Most Pahari men and

² Momen Ahamed, interview by Ashraf Ali. Rangamati, July 27, 2009, Interview #6.

women wear Bengali dress, speak in Bengali dialect, and have adopted cultural traits and rituals from the pattern of Bengali marriage. Religious transformation and interethnic marriage are notable examples of cultural change in the CHT. Pahari groups such as the Tripura and Ahamiya are converting to the religion of Christianity, abandoning their traditional religion of Hinduism. Change of religion together with ethnic identity is also a recent phenomenon in the CHT. For instance, women have to change their religious and ethnic identities and even their personal names if they are going to marry someone from other than their own ethnic group and religion. Pahari and non-Muslim Bengali women have to sacrifice their traditional religion of Buddhism or Hinduism whenever they wish to have husbands from other ethnicities such as Bengali Muslim. A total of 37 cases of interethnic marriages were identified in recent years in the study area: within the Pahari community, 25; between Pahari men and Bengali Hindu women, 6; and between Pahari women and Bengali men, 6. In the third category, all the Pahari women, including Marma, Tanchangya, Ahamiya, and Gurkha, had to change their traditional religion, ethnic identity, titles, and names. They had to adopt a new ethnic and religious identity in accordance with the religious and patriarchal tradition of their Bengali Muslim husbands. Interestingly, there is no instance where a Bengali Muslim woman married a non-Muslim man. Based on the narratives of the couples this study observed, interethnic marriages may happen because of passion, social and cultural proximity, and economic factors. Social, cultural, and religious resemblance is found as one of the dominant factors for the high incidence of inter-ethnic marriage between non-Muslim Bengali and non-Bengali people in the study area. The weak socioeconomic background of parents sometimes may have forced some young women to choose life partners from other ethnicities and religions.

Dress, behavior, attitude, and pattern of interaction with Bengali people have changed significantly for these ethnicities over the last few years. One of the key indicators of changing inter-ethnic relationships is different social and cultural functions and food practices. Nowadays, most marriage and circumcision ceremonies, death or birth rituals, and other major sociocultural and religious festivals (e.g., Biju, Eid, Pujas) are visibly marked with the attendance of multiethnic groups of people with different types of foods. Bengali people participate in the social occasions of indigenous people (e.g., Biju, marriage ceremony) and indigenous people participate in the socioreligious events of Pujas and marriage ceremonies of the Hindus, and Eid of the Muslims. If a Muslim person organizes a ceremonial occasion, he invites guests from multiethnic religious groups including Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists, and including Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya people. In this case, the host will serve food that can be eaten by all the guests. For example, chicken or mutton will be served instead of beef. Similarly, a Hindu or Chakma person will serve food that is not taboo for any guest attending there. In other words, food taboos are seriously taken into consideration for inviting guests from different ethnicities. Such a trend of social and cultural behavior stands as a symbol of respect and tolerance for each other's social and cultural practices. The personal experience of eating together in a given place under certain circumstances may transform the event as a whole into a shared and collective experience of mutual trust and respect, equity, and pleasure. Thus, sharing foods and eating together can be a powerful symbol of social solidarity, friendship, and celebration (Korsmeyer 1999). Such changes in the lives of the Pahari and the Bengalis indicates that the antagonistic relationship between these two groups is diminishing, at least to some extent.

Change has also been observed in the pattern of dress used and worn by indige-

nous girls and women, particularly the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and Tanchnagya, who are traditionally used to wearing a slightly shorter dress than that of Bengali girls and women. They are now tending to leave their traditional dress for certain social and economic realities. In order to better adapt to changing social and cultural situations, and to participate in educational institutions or in other public domains, Pahari girls and women are adopting the style of dress from the cultural mainstream in Bangladesh. Educated girls seem to have a tendency to wear Bengali-style *shahwar kamiz*, a three-piece dress; indigenous women mostly wear the *saree* like the Bengali women, leaving their traditional *thamis* and *pinon* when they are out of the home. Of course, they still wear their traditional dresses in their own traditional social and cultural programs. Change has also been observed in the dress of the indigenous men. This change is largely influenced by the greater exposure of the Pahari people to the wider society in Bangladesh, the increasing rate of education, and the positive interaction with the Bengalis.

The Pahari people have also experienced an important change in terms of their traditional sociopolitical structure in the CHT. Unlike the other parts of Bangladesh, the CHT has local government administration with the traditional three administrative circles—the Chakma Circle, the Mong Circle, and the Bomong Circle—for three separate hill districts—Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban, respectively. Each circle is divided into a number of *Mouzas*, and each *Mouza*, a group of villages regarded as an administrative unit of government, particularly for revenue collection, is further divided into hamlets or villages (Zabarang Kalyan Samity 2012). The Circle Chief is mainly responsible for administrative functions including land and revenue and dispute resolution. Each *Mouza* has its own headman to collect revenue for the Circle Chief, and a *Karbari* assists the headman in resolving internal social

conflicts (e.g., marriage, divorce) or disputes over land under their jurisdiction. This political leadership is traditionally dominated by males. However, the effectiveness of this sociopolitical system has been reduced with the introduction of local government administration (e.g., Union Parishad, Municipality) in the CHT. For instance, the study locality is part of Bangladesh's Rangamati Municipality. This is also under the jurisdiction of the Chakma Circle Chief, a headman, and a *Karbari*. The local government representatives are elected both from the Bengali and the Pahari communities. The changing role of the traditional sociopolitical leadership brings a different experience for the Pahari people as they are exposed to more dynamic and democratic political systems instead of patriarchal, male dominated, hierarchical power structures. In practice, most disputes centering on land, marriage, and other social issues are now settled by the elected political representatives, police stations, or by the courts.

In this connection, the construction of collective Pahari identity based on cultural demarcation between the non-Bengali ethnicities in the CHT and the Bengalis of the plains involves overlapping and contestation. Moreover, there exists social and economic inequality and asymmetry of power relations within the diverse ethnic groups such as the Chakmas, which are perceived as the most advanced among all the ethnic minorities in terms of their social, economic, and political development in the CHT.

Internal power asymmetries, domination, and deprivation are some of the common predicaments which appear for the indigenous people, turning a shared identity (e.g., Jumma, Pahari) into a “political pipe-dream” (Schendel 1992, 124). Even if it is compared with that of the Bengalis, the Chakmas are almost in line with the Bengalis because they hold some important economic and political positions in Rangamati, including on the CHT Regional Council and Ran-

gamati Hill District Council, as well as the Chakma Circle Chief; they are also involved in different government and non-governmental organizations with the Bengalis. As Schendel (1992, 124) wrote:

Acceptance of the Jumma identity depends on the degree to which old inter-group perceptions can be neutralized. For example, some groups consider themselves more 'advanced' than others; this is especially clear in the traditional division between 'river-valley' groups (e.g., Marma and Chakma) and 'hill-top' groups (e.g., Bawm, Mru and Khumi).

From this perspective, the idea of a collective identity—the Pahari—is equivocal, especially because of internal dynamics of domination, hierarchies, ignorance, and exploitation. It seems that there exists a recognition of limitations on shared understandings and mutual interest within the diverse ethnicities (Barth 1970, 15). For example, the Chakmas are in better positions, both in the education and government sectors, because they can avail the special quota allotted for all the disadvantaged ethnic groups in the CHT. Small ethnic groups such as the Tanchangya, Pankhua, Khiang, Mro, Khumi, and Bawam are deprived of these social and economic opportunities because they are relatively marginal, both in terms of economic and political power (Ali and Ahsan 2005; Uddin 2008). The way of life of the most of these ethnic groups has meanwhile been influenced by the changing socialpolitical, cultural, and economic situations in recent years. Many of the Pahari have gradually been connected with the wider Bangladeshi society because of their increasing physical mobility. Increasing population growth, land loss, and limited or lack of sources of livelihoods in the CHT have forced both poor and non-poor Pahari to migrate to other towns and cities in Bangladesh. Pahari people often migrate to urban centers such as Chittagong and Dhaka to seek jobs, business and education opportunities, and for other purposes. This is inevitable

for a majority of the Pahari in the CHT, given current socioeconomic realities. In practical terms, both the internal and external dynamics of the social, political, economic lives of the CHT people appear as fundamental challenges to strengthening feelings of belonging to a community, to mobilizing the diverse ethnicities in order to bring all members together in one political platform—the Pahari.

CONCLUSIONS

The place—the CHT—is central to the construction of the collective Pahari identity. The Pahari, like Jumma, has appeared as a form of imagined community, promoting a sense of community-belonging among diverse ethnicities in the CHT despite the existence of inequality, asymmetry of power, and contradiction within (Anderson 2006). The collective Pahari identity has been represented as a symbol of protest against the discriminatory political policy of the state of Bangladesh and the intrusion of the Bengalis in the CHT. For the Pahari people, the CHT has a "unique reality" (Rodman 1992). It seems that there is a shared meaning when the Pahari separate them from the Bengalis of the plains. Certainly, there is a significant difference of cultural and historical experiences between the peoples who live in the hills and in the plains. Culturally, the Pahari set themselves apart from the Bengalis in terms of their non-Islamic religious outlook and different mother tongues. Historically, the Pahari people have shared a unique experience, as they have been repeatedly invaded by outsiders since before the colonial past (Schendel 1992). Of course, there is in actuality much ethnic mobilization based on cultural and historical background. For example, the indigenous political leadership has succeeded in mobilizing the diverse ethnic groups through the construction of such shared identities as the Jumma in the mid-1970s. The indigenous political movement under the leadership of the PCJSS from the 1970s to the 1990s contested the military force of Bangladesh, a protest against dis-

criminatory political policies, including the influx of the Bengalis from the plains into the CHT, led to the CHT Peace Accord in 1997. The government declared to protect social, economic, and political rights of indigenous people, though the major provision of this agreement has not been fully implemented yet. Nevertheless, the Pahari political leadership is encountering internal political rivalry from a new regional political party, the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), formed in 1998 by a group of the Pahari protesting the peace accord between the PCJSS and the Government of Bangladesh (Uddin 2010, 27). The UPDF demands regional autonomy for the CHT, which is not a provision in the peace accord. Both the PCJSS and the UPDF are currently involved in political dispute over this issue. Whereas the PCJSS seems liberal, the UPDF is very much conservative in maintaining political relations with Bengalis and the Bangladeshi state, especially in pursuing their political demands. Nevertheless, the political goal of both parties is the same: to relieve the Pahari from the economic and political domination of the Bengalis and the nation-state of Bangladesh.

I have argued here that the construction of the Pahari identity is part of the continuous political resistance against the recurrent discrimination, deprivation, and marginalization by the state of Bangladesh, manifested in part by a demarcation of identity between Pahari and Bengalis. The Pahari identity becomes more meaningful and significant when it is used as a voice against the discriminatory economic and political stance of the Government of Bangladesh; it is a powerful social, economic, and political symbol when people dedicate themselves to protecting their rights to land and livelihood. Instead of internal cultural differences, the Indigenous Pahari people bring place to the forefront in the construction of this identity shared by diverse ethnicities. They deliberately exclude Bengalis from the Pahari identity despite some signs of increasingly positive social and

cultural relations. In this regard, the dynamic construct of place—the CHT—represents the innovative conceptualization of the indigenous people (e.g., the Jumma, the Pahari). This is part of an endeavor to achieve social, economic, and political freedoms (Sen 1999). The idea of 'Pahari' has already been turned into a form of political identity and into a salient social and economic movement. Dispossession of land, changes in traditional patterns of livelihood, deprivations, and uncertainty about the economic future are key factors influencing the Pahari to form a shared sociopolitical identity in the CHT. Unlike the direct confrontation with the Bangladesh state that took place in the mid-1970s, the Pahari people are now engaged in devising new strategies to adapt better to changing times. Obviously, the construction of a shared sociopolitical Pahari identity is part of this maneuver. Thus, the invention of the Pahari identity itself is a response to contemporary societal changes, demonstrating the common goal of turning this collective identity into a form of political existence separate from the influence of the nation-state of Bangladesh.

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SPANISH SUPREMACY: WHEATEN BREAD AND PANADERÍAS IN COLONIAL POTOSÍ

Keltie Mechalski

Since 1493, when the Spanish first attempted to bring wheat to the New World with Columbus's second voyage, it was clear that it would be a struggle. Each of their numerous attempts to grow wheat locally in the humid and hot conditions of the Caribbean was a miserable failure. The grain was of poor and uneven quality or simply did not germinate. El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, a writer and historian from the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru, recalled that "the anxiety of the Spaniards to have the things of their own country transplanted to the Indies was so strong that no danger or trouble seemed great enough to prevent them from trying to realize their desires" (Figuerola 2010, 305). The importance of this grain was such that even though it had already failed multiple times, Columbus and his successors continued their endeavours until they discovered that wheat grew well on the same land as maize. From that point on, wheat and wheaten bread thrived in the Andes Mountains.

Though El Inca Garcilaso could recall a time without wheaten bread, Africans, mestizos, and indigenous peoples soon joined Spaniards in consuming it. At the same time, urban Indians and Africans advanced into the production and sale of bread, in both forced and voluntary labour. Thus, bread "created an important colonial enterprise and transformed the Andean marketplace" (Mangan 2005, 96). Although wheaten bread thrived and became a dietary staple in the colonial vicerealties of Peru and New Spain, its production, unlike other enterprises, remained dominated by Spaniards. This trend can be examined more closely by looking at the thriving marketplaces

of Potosí, a colonial mining town in the heart of the Andes range. Unlike the non-Spanish dominated *pulperías* (small grocery stores) and *chicherías* (taverns that sold *chicha*, a maize beer) of colonial Potosí, the majority of large and small-scale *panaderías* (bakeries) were owned and run by Spaniards. By looking closely at the religious, social, and traditional attributes of the diverse society that existed there, it is possible to understand why this was one of the only industries into which non-Spanish peoples could not break.

The Greek myth of the goddess Demeter, who taught men to gather, use, store, and sow wild wheat, introduced a cultural breakthrough for mankind. Men turned away from their lives as hunters and gatherers to embrace civilization only after Demeter shared her knowledge of cultivation and initiated the agrarian cycle (Baudy 1995). Early modern Europeans were acquainted with ancient perspectives on the natural world but also drew on Christian ideology when considering the importance of bread. "The 'Lord's Prayer' refers to (our daily) bread as the necessary nourishment of the body, and indeed according to the gospel of John, Jesus declared himself to be bread: 'I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever.' (John 6:51)" (Figuerola 2010, 303). This strong Catholic affiliation to bread makes it easy to understand why the Spanish felt such desire and urgency to acquire a secure crop and in turn to produce wheaten bread in the New World. Without the bread, Spaniards could not properly perform Mass, and therefore could not properly worship their god. The conquest of the

Undergraduate student; Department of Anthropology, University of Alberta

Author contact: @ualberta.ca

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New World was not solely motivated by profits, but by religion.

When Cristoforo Colombo went to the Spanish monarchs Fernando and Isabella, religion was his driving motivation. He was successful in his proposals because the monarchs had just successfully completed *La Reconquista* in 1492. The Spanish reclaimed Spain in the name of Christianity and banished all Islamic peoples from the country. After hundreds of years of religious turmoil, the monarchs were eager to express their gratitude to God and saw Colombo's proposal as a striking opportunity to do so. This gratitude was demonstrated in efforts to strengthen Christianity within the country as well as to evangelize the New World.

Upon arrival in the New World, Colombo wrote in a letter that the indigenous people "*allende d'esto se fazan cristianos, y se inclinen al amor é servicio d e Sus Altezas y de toda lanación castellana* – might become Christians and be inclined to the love and service of their highnesses and of the whole Castilian nation" (Jane 1988, 9). This positive recognition of a possible Christian civilization and of a Spanish Imperial state was the beginning of centuries of Spanish rule in Latin America. In this context, bread was not only a substance for nourishment, but also a defining symbol of Christianity and therefore a defining feature of Spanish identity and power.

Maize, a starchy, corn-like grain, played an equally defining and religious role in the lives of the Maya, the Nahua, and the Inca. In the lives of these people, maize had an important place in the historical and religious traditions as shown through the presence of maize gods, maize rituals, maize iconography, and maize stories. "The Maya oral tradition ... tells of gods experimenting with different materials to create human beings, until they finally created people out of maize dough, leaving no doubt about the central place of maize in Maya culture. Nahua babies were not given a name until they had eaten their first maize-based food, thereby receiving an individual and cul-

tural identity" (Figueroa 2010, 308). The direct relationship between the Sun, the life-giving god, and maize was never overlooked by the Incas. In the most sacred building complex in Cuzco, known as the Coricancha, it was said that there was a field of gold maize and this maize as well as *chicha* were offered to the sun. Although Spanish and Indigenous cultures shared a common cultural attribute, grain, neither was willing to accept the traditions of the other, and differences emerged.

Francisco López de Gómara, a widely read Spanish chronicler, wrote in 1553 that "they did not have wheat in all the Indies, which are another world, a huge lack given what we are used to here" (Figueroa 2010, 301). Europeans observed that maize, potatoes, and manioc (or cassava, or yucca) filled the "food role that wheat and other cereals played in the Old World" (Figueroa 2010, 306). Maize, the most widespread of the three, reminded Europeans most strongly of familiar grain-producing grasses (Figueroa 2010, 306). De Gómara wrote in his history of the Indies:

Maize is, to conclude, a very good thing, and the Indians will not leave it for wheat, from all I know. The reasons given are important, and they are: they are used to this bread, they feel well with it; maize serves them as bread and wine, maize multiplies more than wheat and grows with fewer problems than wheat, not only from water and sun but also from birds and beasts. Maize requires less work: one man alone sews and harvests more maize than one man and two beasts sew and harvest wheat [Figueroa 2010, 301].

Indigenous peoples were deeply rooted in their traditions as a means to survive in the harsh colonial world of Potosí, where Spanish colonialism contradicted, overlooked, and many times rejected their traditions.

At the mining metropolis of Potosí in the early seventeenth century, a noticeable shift from *chuño* (freeze-dried potatoes) and *chicha* to bread and wine occurred, and this shift came to connote social distinction

(Saignes 1999, 108). Due to an increasingly stratified society, each class developed a distinctive way of life, including a unique food culture. This food culture highlighted the preference for and symbolic value of wheat-en bread over 'Indian breads.' It is quite evident that the racial and class structure of colonial society was reflected in a hierarchy of breads. At the top was wheaten bread, which had the prestige of the dominant class and religion. Maize bread, in accordance with regional preferences, came in second place and was adopted by a large number of the Spanish Americans, but it could not rise to the level of wheat (Figueroa 2010).

This hierarchy was, needless to say, dominated by the Spaniards. This domination was due to two simple factors: race and financial stability. Bread was a symbolic representation of Spain in the colonies, and therefore showed that the Indigenous were situated at the bottom. Although it was possible to change one's status and climb up the hierarchy, one could not achieve this without great perseverance and know-how. It was also more difficult for non-Spanish bakers to access the substantial amount of capital required to purchase bulk flour, so these bakers usually opened small-scale operations. Small-scale operations typically catered to a smaller area and earned a smaller profit (Mangan 2005, 99). The bread hierarchy that existed in Potosí can be summarized by saying that Spaniards owned large- and small-scale *panaderías* and mainly sold their products to a variety of people, while non-Spanish people owned small-scale *panaderías* and sold their products mainly to the indigenous population in their *ranchería* (community).

Although the non-Spanish inhabitants of colonial Potosí played a crucial role in the *panadería* industry, they rarely became owners of *panaderías*. Where an established religion described maize, not wheat, as the "holy" grain, where to run a bakery you needed Spanish blood and a large sum of money, and where weathered traditions led the way

through new territory, it is no wonder that the adoption of wheat was resisted, and that the non-Spanish population came to such odds with the *panadería* industry. Whether it was because of religion or social standing or tradition, the majority of non-Spanish peoples served the paid help of their Spanish officials and owners. Inarguably, with or without the industrial domination of Spaniards, wheaten bread and *panaderías* became a thriving industry in the New World. The ability of the Spaniards to integrate wheaten bread into this and many other societies may be their greatest feat. Five hundred years after Columbus's first attempt to bring this grain to the New World, wheaten bread remains a staple of South American diets. It has transcended the boundaries of religion, class, and time. As long as there are lands to sow, rains to nurture, and hands to work, it will remain a thriving business for centuries.

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