**Pasqua First Nation Economic Entitlements Final Report**

**Key Findings**

* The government viewed Treaty 4 as a way to seize and secure Indigenous lands for their nation building project. This view differed substantially from the perspective held by Indigenous peoples, as they saw treaties as sacred nation to nation agreements that solidified a mutual relationship shared between them and the Crown.
* Oral promises made in the negotiation of Treaty 4 were not accounted for in the final written document, which caused immense dissatisfaction among bands. In addition, it contributed to feelings of distrust.
* Harmful prejudices held by the government, and thus their employees, often negatively affected their judgement in regard to the concerns, anxieties and challenges brought forward by the Treaty 4 signatories.
* The inadequate quantity and quality of goods given to Pasquas band had negative impacts on their agricultural success.
* Blame was constantly cast onto bands for their perceived failures, although climate conditions, the delayed dispersal of seed, and insufficient assistance often contributed to their lack of success.
* The pictographs created by Pasqua are the only written form of records kept throughout this time period that display an Indigenous perspective, rather than a colonial mindset. These pictographs can be used as a method to ascertain whether Pasquas band received the necessary quantities of implements, provisions and livestock that were stipulated under treaty.
* Pasquas band received only a small portion of the implements promised to his band, which can be seen in his records.
* The government took every opportunity to cut down on the expenditures associated with bands. However, this often went against what had been promised in treaty, such as; limiting the allowed number of headmen, strict stipulations put into place for the distribution of goods and strategically delayed annuity payments.
* The ‘Home Farm Policy/Experiment’ failed substantially due to the overall ignorance of the government.
* Throughout the ‘Home Farm Policy’ era, the needs of bands were put on the ‘back burner’ while the government choose to supply farm instructors with the implements, provisions and livestock that were promised to bands through treaty.
* The records kept for the years spanning 1879-84 are very limited, as they report the location rather than bands that goods and services were distributed to. They do not indicate the quantities of implements, provisions or livestock provided to each of the bands under Treaty 4.
* Sickness was a growing challenge for bands on reserves, often being left without medical assistance. Mortality related due to consumption goes against the promise made in Treaty 4 that liquor would not be allowed on reserves.
* The private ownership of oxen, securing the necessary agricultural implements and receiving the needed assistance lead to agricultural success on Pasquas reserve.
* Growing fears of an uprising significantly influenced the livelihoods of bands, as it led to strict government stipulations and rules that limited their movement as well as their ability to participate in local economies.

**Introduction**

The Indigenous peoples in what is now known as Canada and the Crown signed treaties on a nation to nation basis. These negotiations were communicated in a manner that gave the illusion that all parties involved would benefit mutually.[[1]](#footnote-1) However, due to conflicting views held by the two ‘sides,’ the interpretations of treaty negotiations and what was promised through them are vastly different. The validity of written records created by the colonial government often outweigh the validity of oral interpretations on what was promised through treaties. Treaty 4 was entered into in 1874 with Plains First Nations, whose ‘initial settlement’ era and ‘home farm policy’ era spanned the years of 1874-79 and 1880-84 respectively.[[2]](#footnote-2) The items promised to and received by Chief Pasqua’s band, included within Treaty 4, will be examined further, arguing that his band did not receive an adequate quantity or quality of goods, nor did they obtain them in a punctual manner. In addition, many government reports excluded vital information needed to definitively ascertain whether Chief Pasquas band received the appropriate amount of provisions, implements and livestock stipulated in Treaty 4. All of these contributing factors had an influence in the overall success of Pasquas band, although the government often cast blame solely onto bands for their perceived failures.

**Historical Background**

The Dominion of Canada sought to expand their boundaries in 1870. The purchase of Rupert's Land and the Northwestern territory from the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) for £300,000 was done without prior consultation with Indigenous tribes. The dismissal of Metis and Indigenous rights to their territories led to the Red River rebellion in which Louis Riel led an uprising in the Red River Colony, leading to the ‘creation’ of the small province of Manitoba. In the years approaching the signing of Treaty 4, fears increased due to the drastic decline in the ecological base Plains First Nations relied upon for both substance and economic stability.[[3]](#footnote-3) In the beginning of the 1870s, the government of John A Macdonald sought to obtain ‘Indian land title’ through legal surrenders, which led to the negotiations of treaties one, signed in 1871, through 8, signed in 1899. Initially, the Canadian government was not interested in negotiating treaties with Indigenous groups further west, as there was no pressure for settlement in those areas at that time. However, Treaty Commissioner and Lieut-Governor of the North-West Territories, Alexander Morris, was well aware of the anxieties that these groups had that was fueled by the depletion of resources, as well as worries of white settlement encroaching on their lands.[[4]](#footnote-4) These factors pushed Morris to act on behalf of the Plains First Nations, pressuring the government to extend treaty negotiations with Indigenous peoples in what is now known as Treaty 4 territory.[[5]](#footnote-5)

**The making of Treaty Four**

3,000 people met at Fort Qu’Appelle in September of 1874 and were present at the signing of Treaty 4.[[6]](#footnote-6) Among the attendees was Alexander Morris, David Laird, a Treaty 4 Commissioner, Indian Superintendent and Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories, along with William J. Christie, whose position was as an HBC Chief Factor as well as another Treaty 4 Commissioner.[[7]](#footnote-7) This treaty covers the area of what is now known as Saskatchewan, south of the South Saskatchewan River, and extends slightly into both Alberta and Manitoba.[[8]](#footnote-8) The void left by the HBC after the selling of Rupert’s Land to the Crown was filled by events surrounding the Red River Rebellion, lawless traders, alcohol, violence, and the last large-scale smallpox outbreak. In addition to these factors, growing fears of hunger caused by food shortages played a substantial role in the negotiations and signing of Treaty 4.[[9]](#footnote-9) Although initially reluctant, the government finally agreed to extend treaties west after raising tensions and anxiety from the Cypress Hills Massacre, along with the creation of the Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP).[[10]](#footnote-10) The Indigenous tribes of this area were fully aware of the shifts that would have to be made in their ways of living, transitioning from a higher reliance on hunting to agriculture. At this time, they acknowledged that they would require government assistance to successfully do so.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The negotiations of Treaty 4 differed from those of Treaty 3, as the former was created as a means of supporting settlement and peace, while the latter was created to secure the presence of the Canadian military and the safety of travelers.[[12]](#footnote-12) The chiefs of Treaty 4 requested that they be given the same treaty negotiated by the members of Treaty 3. However, Morris did not comply fully with this request, as he thought their population size was substantially smaller.[[13]](#footnote-13) Although many members and chiefs of the Plains bands were present, it has been estimated that nearly half of the Indigenous population either did not attend or refused to sign the treaty at that time. This led to a lack of awareness, on the government's side, of the population sizes of bands, which in turn led to issues in the dispersal of treaty annuities.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Throughout the negotiations, it is noted that there was tension between the Cree and Saulteaux Nations. However, much of these perceived tensions were actually directed towards the HBC. The Cree and Saulteaux were unsure whether they could trust the Canadian government to honor the treaty relationships that they sought.[[15]](#footnote-15) Chief Pasqua was one of the most prominent and informed chiefs that partook in the Treaty 4 negotiations, as he had prior experience with both agricultural and sedentary living.[[16]](#footnote-16) Pasqua is noted to have stated an issue that many chiefs viewed as substantial in the negotiation process. He questioned the manner in which their lands were sold to the Crown and the profit that the HBC made from this, as it was done without the surrender of Aboriginal title, and thus, without their consultation.[[17]](#footnote-17) In addition, throughout the treaty negotiations, the presence of the military was viewed as a “coercive threat” by the Cree and Saulteaux Nations.[[18]](#footnote-18)

It is said by Morris in the negotiations that “the company may have little more money than the white traders, or the Half-breeds, or the Indians, but they have no more right, they have no more privileges to trade than the Indians, or the Half-breeds, or the whites.”[[19]](#footnote-19) This passage highlights that mutual rights and privileges were orally promised and assured throughout the negotiations of Treaty 4. In the written form of Treaty 4 it stipulates that bands were to receive the following:

Reserves of one square mile [be given to] every five persons; annuities of $25 for a chief, plus coat and medal, a $15 annuity per headman, and a $5 annuity for each individual; a suit of clothing every three years per chief; blankets, calicoes and British flag (given once); $750 worth of powder, shot and twine annually; two hoes, a spade, scythe, axe and seed per family; a plough and two harrows per ten families; oxen, a bull, four cows, carpenter’s tools, five hand saws, five augers, a crosscut saw, a pit saw and a grindstone per chief; there was to be a school on the reserve; no liquor was to be allowed; and hunting, fishing and trapping rights would be respected.[[20]](#footnote-20)

It was and continues to be in the opinion of the government, that the written text was the most accurate interpretation of the treaty and as such they dismissed claims of oral promises. The crown was not obligated to “enforce a mutually acceptable interpretation” of their duties.[[21]](#footnote-21)

**Differing Interpretations of Treaty Four**

The different interpretations of Treaty 4 become evident in W.J. Christie and Secretary to Alexander Morris and Indian Agent, M.G. Dickiesons, 1875 letter.[[22]](#footnote-22) Through their letter, they discuss a conversation they had with “Indians” who perceived the initial treaty negotiations as a method to lay the groundwork for a final agreement.[[23]](#footnote-23) A number of Plains First Nations chiefs were not part of the negotiations in 1874, and since their voices and opinions were not heard, they believed that the treaty had not been concluded. However, Christie and Dickieson wrote that they refuted this claim by threatening to revoke the treaty agreement. They further stated that the Treaty 4 bands would only be given what was agreed upon and recorded in the written document.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Alexander Morris recorded an encounter that he had with Chief Pasqua in a meeting held in 1876. This letter highlights the different interpretations of what was promised and understood, pointing to oral promises that were made but not written down. This is argued by Pasqua as he “asserted that [the crown] had promised to feed the Indians for twenty years,” and that he did not hand over his land when he had signed the treaty. Morris declined Pasquas assertions as well as his request for food for his people, upon discovering that the band had already received cattle from Mr. Christie, although the amount is unclear in this letter. Morris also indicated that he was aware of the different interpretations of the treaties and the challenges that would be associated with this.[[25]](#footnote-25) To both Morris and the Crown, the signatures gathered on September 15th, 1874 signified the end of treaty negotiations. However, misunderstandings of Treaty 4 were not resolved and therefore Indigenous leaders believed that they would be reassessed in the future.[[26]](#footnote-26)

The many chiefs involved in the treaty making process went into negotiations with the assumption that their traditions and beliefs would be protected and respected. Additionally, it was important to them that not only their rights and livelihoods were protected, but those of future generations were as well.[[27]](#footnote-27) This was acknowledged by Morris as he stated in the negotiations that “[w]hat I have to talk about concerns you, your children and their children, who are yet unborn.”[[28]](#footnote-28) Another significant consideration that must be taken into account is the mistranslations of the desires shared by both sides. This can be seen in the miscommunication of literal and metaphorical interpretations, displayed in Treaty 6 talks between Alexander Morris and Cree Chief Big Bear in regard to the chief’s fears of having a rope around his neck.[[29]](#footnote-29)

The pictographs created by Pasqua can aid in the overall understanding of the opinions shared among the chiefs of Plains Nations.[[30]](#footnote-30) Chief Pasquas pictographs provide insight into the perspectives and understandings of Indigenous peoples in regard to the signing and negotiation of Treaty 4. He also used his pictographs as a method to record what his band had received from the Crown. As historian Bob Beal indicates, these pictographs are the only written representation of Indigenous understandings of the agreements and events in relation to Treaty 4 that had not been influenced by the colonial mindset.[[31]](#footnote-31) However, due to their personal nature, it is challenging to accurately interpret them.[[32]](#footnote-32) Beal has accomplished significant work in attempting to decipher exactly what these documents indicate. His interpretation of Pasquas pictorial accounting states that members of Pasquas band who were engaged in farming received a number of implements. However, the amounts received differ substantially from what was promised throughout Treaty 4, such as; receiving 12 out of the promised 70 of both spades and scythes, as well as being given only 24 hoes out of the promised 140.[[33]](#footnote-33) As interpreted by Beal, Pasqua received a coat, fancy pair of pants and a shirt in 1879 and 1881, along with a hat in 1877 and 1881. This information indicates that Pasqua received his uniform on time and in the appropriate quantity. Although the chief received the stipulated suit of clothing, the records kept through Pasquas pictographs ultimately indicate that his band did not receive adequate amounts of the supplies that were promised in Treaty 4.[[34]](#footnote-34)

As previously mentioned, treaties were seen as a way to secure land, appeasing Indigenous peoples until they fully assimilated, and thus, gained independence. In the government’s opinion, once this independence was gained, they would no longer have any responsibility over the Indigenous peoples.[[35]](#footnote-35) In Lieutenant Governor Edgar Dewdney’s 1881 report, he expressed that “there [was] a good deal of dissatisfaction with the treaties,” pointing to the differing interpretations of the promises made through treaty.[[36]](#footnote-36) He further noted that any promises not explicitly written in the treaty document did not carry any weight, showcasing the dangers of the ‘cut and paste’ method used by the government.[[37]](#footnote-37)

**‘Initial Settlement’ Era (1874-1879)**

The government sought to civilize the Plains First Nations as they were viewed as culturally inferior. However, this racial presumption contributed to the inaction and delay of goods and agricultural assistance promised through the treaty. The delay, denial and/or the distribution of ‘below par’ treaty benefits, such as wild cattle from Montana and broken carts, made it extremely challenging for the tribes who signed Treaty 4 to progress agriculturally.[[38]](#footnote-38) Prior to European control, agriculture played a significant role in the Indigenous peoples of the plains lives, as they combined hunting and gathering with agricultural practices to create a more stable, reliable, and flexible economy. In addition, it is noted by historian Sarah Carter, that the Indigenous peoples who inhabited the plains had the ability to adapt, borrow, and learn new skills regularly, showcasing their capacity and willingness to strengthen their abilities.[[39]](#footnote-39) However, these documented attributes are often contrasted by Euro Canadian perceptions that label the plains peoples as strictly hunters, gatherers, and warriors, who did not possess the necessary skills to partake/succeed in agricultural practices.[[40]](#footnote-40) These ideas stem from preconceived notions and myths that Indigenous groups could not adapt.

Although many groups had the ability and desire to succeed agriculturally, failure was imminent for some bands as a number of reserve lands were not suitable for farming. In addition, other bands dealt with the constant envy of settlers, as the quality of land possessed by their band was superior to that of the newcomers. Blame was continuously cast onto Indigenous peoples for their setbacks. In turn, they were labelled as lazy, liars, and beggars.[[41]](#footnote-41) Clauses in Treaty 4 stipulated that implements and provisions would not be supplied until bands were cultivating the soil, a logistical ‘loophole’ created by the government to limit their expenditures. These stipulations negatively impacted many bands. In addition, it was not guaranteed to bands who did adhere to these rules that they would receive sufficient amounts and/or implements in adequate condition in a timely manner. Implements that were given to bands remained in the property of the government, as they were not allowed to become the property of bands or chiefs due to colonial and racist misconceptions.[[42]](#footnote-42) Pasqua’s band, although willing to farm, lacked the ability to do so as they were ill-equipped. Initially, they had no cattle, agricultural implements or provisions to support the breaking of land, which was necessary in order to adhere to the treaty stipulations, and thus, to be provided with the necessary provisions and implements needed to be successful.[[43]](#footnote-43) Government ‘oversights’ had negative implications for bands, as the quantities of implements, provisions and livestock promised under treaty were inadequate to meet their agricultural needs.

Annuities, Agricultural Implements, Provisions and Livestock

1) **1874-75.** In a letter written in 1874 by the private Secretary of the Minister of the Interior, M.G. Dickieson, he stated that some of the Treaty 4 bands had begun cultivating the land and had horses and cattle, listing Pasqua's band as one of them. He acknowledged that the provisions promised to them in the form of seed, grain, and potatoes would not get to them before planting season. Through his letter, one can presume that he was aware of what was promised to the bands of Treaty 4 and the deadlines that government workers were failing to keep.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Government officials were aware of the depleting supply of Buffalo and what this meant for the plain’s groups, including the anxiety that they were experiencing. In the Minister of the Interior David Mills’ 1875-76 report he called for “prompt measures [to] be taken in the meantime to prevent catastrophe.”[[45]](#footnote-45) W.J. Christie and M.G. Dickieson’s 1875 report documented their inability to provide Treaty 4 band members with the promised annuities, as there was a substantially larger number of people than expected. They noted that they would need an additional $21,000 to pay all of the members present. These government employees imposed a restriction in regard to the number of headmen that the Cree and Saulteaux tribes could have, limiting them to 2 instead of 4.[[46]](#footnote-46) This was done as a measure to decrease the amount of funds the government would have to supply each band with but went against what was promised in the treaty. In the years of 1874-75 Pasquas band received a total of $2,275 in annuity payments. This report states that in 1875 there were 49 families in Pasquas band, however, it is stated by historian Bob Beal that there were 70 families present.[[47]](#footnote-47) The 1875 report states that Pasquas band was the only one prepared to winter cattle, and thus they were given to them. However, this report does not indicate how many were given, nor where they were obtained from.[[48]](#footnote-48) In addition, this report does not address the number of agricultural implements given to the band. This lack of information leaves a significant gap in knowledge.

**2) 1876-77.** As reported by Indian Agent Angus McKay, Pasqua’s band had been supplied with 2 oxen and 4 cows in the summer of 1876.[[49]](#footnote-49) In the same year, surveyor William Wagner wrote to David Laird in regard to Chief Pasqua. He stated that the chief had received his share of cattle, but that he “demanded… his share of tools and implements.” Further, he noted Pasqua’s desire to sell one of his oxen, reporting that he was clearly unaware of the rules in place that restricted his economic abilities. With no other options, Pasqua decided to eat the oxen which was met with shock and disapproval from Wagner.[[50]](#footnote-50) This incident negatively influenced his opinion of the Treaty 4 band, which was then relayed to the government. This can be seen in his statement in which he expresses his fears of bands selling the promised implements. This fear leads to his refusal to distribute the necessary and promised provisions and implements to band members. Much of his letter points to the perpetuation of myths surrounding Indigenous peoples.[[51]](#footnote-51) Included in this is the belief that Indigenous peoples were incapable of agricultural practices, showcasing paternalistic attitudes and savior complexes.

A quantity of barley was given to the Qu’Appelle band in the autumn of 1876, which was too late for them to plant, meaning that they would have to wait until the following spring.[[52]](#footnote-52) The government's inability to supply bands with seed in a timely manner had damaging effects. As noted by a report from June of 1877, bands expected to receive seed in the spring, as this is when Mr. Christie had promised them. However, this was not done. Therefore, band members once again faced starvation due to neglected government promises, as they were without food.[[53]](#footnote-53)

It is acknowledged by McKay in his 1877 report that “grasshoppers had destroyed all of the crops sown by the Indians.”[[54]](#footnote-54) This passage further displays the agricultural struggles faced by bands who sought to participate in farming. McKay indicated that the government would have to take “prompt measures” in order to maintain peaceful relationships with the bands of Treaty 4. In addition, he states that provisions “should be taken in order to provide for the carrying out of the terms and conditions agreed to in the Treaty which remain yet to be fulfilled.”[[55]](#footnote-55) This statement shows that McKay, and thus the government, were well aware of the shortcomings on their side of adhering to the treaty agreements. McKay states in his report that there are 50 families in Pasquas band.[[56]](#footnote-56) This amount differs from previous reports. This difference could be interpreted as a flux in the band's population due to deaths caused by famine, ill health or malnutrition, and/or because of excursions related to hunting, trapping, gathering or visiting, as this band “live[d] on the chase.” At this point it is noted that Pasquas band “made several attempts at farming” and that they had success in their root crops.[[57]](#footnote-57) This recorded success contrasts the perpetuated narrative that bands were incapable of achievement. Pasquas band, when provided with nets, had a great success in catching fish as acknowledged by McKay. Pasqua provided McKay with rationalization for his killing of the bands cow. Pasqua stated that “he had not been supplied with scythes and snaithes,” meaning that no hay was gathered and due to this, he was unable to feed and care for the animals throughout the winter.[[58]](#footnote-58) It is also important to note that in 1877, no schools had been maintained or created by the government, however, several had been established by religious groups.[[59]](#footnote-59)

**3) 1878-79.** About 20 bands in Treaty 4 had selected their reserves by 1878, some however, chose lands not compatible with farming but were not discouraged by government officials. Out of the 20 bands, 13 had settled on their reserves and commenced agricultural practices. In a following report, it is stated that there were a total of 24 bands. However, the number of bands engaged in agriculture shifted to 11.[[60]](#footnote-60) The late 1870s were marked by a period in which the government sought to alleviate the struggles plaguing bands. This was done through the implementation of the ‘Home Farm Experiment.’ Instructors were sent to establish farms that would act as ‘model farms’ for Indigenous peoples, while also supporting them with provisions.[[61]](#footnote-61) In 1878, 5 instructors were present to assist Pasquas band, which included 30 families, however, the crop in Qu’Appelle failed due to a lack of fences.[[62]](#footnote-62) In June of that year, almost 4 years after the signing of Treaty 4, Chief Pasqua complained that even though they had broken up their land, they received 4 ploughs with only 1 oxen which he stated “went directly lame and useless.”[[63]](#footnote-63) This complaint highlights the issues present in the distribution of wild Montana cattle rather than domesticated oxen, as they were not equipped to work.[[64]](#footnote-64) Pasqua made an additional complaint pertaining to the lack of provisions that the band received, stating that they had only “ever received but once but not again.”[[65]](#footnote-65) The implements given to Pasquas band in 1878, as dictated from David Lairds report, are as follows; 13 hoes, 12 spades, 10 axes, 1 plough, 4 trace chains, and 10 hoes (burnt). In addition, Pasquas band received provisions and seed which amounted to 85 sacks of flour, 112 units of pemmican, 7 bushels of barley and 80 of potatoes.[[66]](#footnote-66)

In a letter written in 1878 by a Red River Journalist, farmer and later farm instructor at Pasquas band, Frank L. Hunt, for Lieut Governor Joseph Cauchon, he relays information passed onto him by Chief Pasqua, most of which reflects the anxieties, frustrations and uneasiness felt by the chief.[[67]](#footnote-67) Pasqua seeks assurance and the reconfirmation of the relationship established by treaty. This letter showcases feelings of mistrust and questioning, and further specifies that only a small portion of the promised provisions had been received.[[68]](#footnote-68)

David Laird did not believe that Pasqua was a truthful chief, and therefore, labeled him as a liar and a beggar whose complaints should not be taken seriously. In his 1878 letter to the Minister of the Interior, he states that Pasquas band had previously been given all of the required cattle, also noting that he believed that a “sufficient [amount] of seed[s] to plant the land” had been received. Laird later argued that promises of the dispersal of provisions during seed times were never a part of Treaty 4 and that he never explicitly promised this. Laird saw this as a beneficial act but claims that he denied provisions until he had “received an affirmative answer from Ottawa.”[[69]](#footnote-69)

In the 1879 Indian Affairs Annual Report it is noted that the buffalo “ha[d] suddenly left the country.”[[70]](#footnote-70) Although this event occurred more rapidly than expected, it was previously a cause for major anxiety among Indigenous groups in the west and was a driving force behind the signing of the treaty.[[71]](#footnote-71) M.G. Dickieson relays that the bands “ha[d] expressed fears as to the coming winter, as they sa[id] they ha[d] nothing to rely upon.”[[72]](#footnote-72) This passage conveys that although the treaty was established, bands in Treaty 4 did not view their relationship with the crown as secure and mutually beneficial, as obligations and promises were not kept.

The ‘Home Farm Experiment’ failed substantially as the government employed ‘strangers’ who were unable to meaningfully communicate with band members. These chosen farmers had difficulty in caring for their own farms as well as balancing the duties they were paid to do, which was to assist in the upkeep of the reserve farms. Again, it was assumed that Indigenous peoples would inevitably fail, and thus, were blamed for the failure of the ‘experiment.’[[73]](#footnote-73) It should be noted that at this time Pasquas band had begun cultivating the soil on their lands, which could indicate that they were having some success. In terms of seed, in 1879 it had been reported that Pasquas band was given 93 bushels of potatoes, 5 of barely and 6 of corn, along with garden seeds.[[74]](#footnote-74) The agricultural implements received were; 2 hoes, 9? and 9 whetstones. One yoke of oxen was given to be used to plough their reserve that was home to in between 30-50 families at this time.[[75]](#footnote-75) The amount of supplies given to Pasquas band was insufficient compared to the amount of people present on his reserve. This report exemplifies the failures present in Treaty 4 due to the government's lack of consideration in regard to the differing population sizes of bands.[[76]](#footnote-76)

**‘Home Farm Policy’ Era (1879-1884)**

The latter part of the 1870s and early 1880s were marked by the creation and implementation of the ‘Home Farm Experiment.’ As previously stated, this experiment failed greatly due to the inadequate and ignorant implementation headed by the government. Historian Gretchen Albers highlights the government’s failure in reference to fulfilling treaty promises, noting that during this time “focus moved away from delivering agricultural implements and animals to bands and families as promised in the treaty to instead supplying the government farms with such items.”[[77]](#footnote-77) This is a significant factor to take into consideration when reviewing the accounts/reports that were recorded for the freighting and dispersal of agricultural implements, provisions and livestock spanning the years between 1879-1884. Although attention was paid to instructor farms over reserve farms, neither saw immense success. Failure in regard to farming and thus community building stemmed largely from the drastic weather conditions faced by those living in the plains. In addition, Indigenous peoples contended with strict stipulations enacted by the Indian Act, prohibiting them “from selling, exchanging, bartering, or giving away any produce grown on their reserves without the permission of department officials.” [[78]](#footnote-78) The seizing of control and independence, inflicted by the government, contradicted their ultimate desire to have bands become independent from them, and therefore, decrease their overall expenditures.

The visit from His Excellency was used as a method to sooth fears and alleviate the complaints and anger felt by the chiefs and members included in Treaty 4. This was done in a manner that made bands feel as though they had a say, much like in treaty negotiations. Bands saw this visit as an opportunity to have their challenges and dissatisfaction not only heard but mitigated as well. However, this visit was yet another way to deceive bands into feeling a sense of control, as His Excellency stated upon his arrival that he could do nothing to alter their treaties. Dewdney relays that His Excellency acknowledged the challenges that bands faced and understood that they were in dire need of more provisions, stating that he would bring the matters up with his council. Ultimately, the inadequacies of Treaty 4 were fully understood by the government, as they were aware that the numbers of cattle and implements promised under treaty were insufficient. The meeting with His Excellency only served as an act of ‘lip service,’ as the governing party made further promises that were most likely never kept. [[79]](#footnote-79) A. Macdonald stated in his report from December of 1882 that the visit from His Excellency worked as a method to reassure Treaty 4 members that their interests were aligned with and “identical” to the Crowns. However, this statement alludes to the continuous promises that were made and the differing interpretations that were still present among both of the ‘sides.’ In addition, Macdonald notes that in his opinion the visit worked to solidify the ‘unchangeable’ nature of their treaty. Government officials still viewed requests for what was promised through treaty as excuses.[[80]](#footnote-80)

During the final year of the ‘home farm policy’ era, fears of a possible uprising taking place across the west were prevailing. In R. Mckinnons 1884 letter he expresses growing fears of an uprising influenced by Chief Piapot.[[81]](#footnote-81) The government understood that dissatisfaction was prevalent among some bands and had fears of them communicating their struggles with one another and joining forces against the government and settlers. These fears ultimately led to strict government control over many aspects of Indigenous lives, which included the creation of the pass system which significantly limited the movement of band members.[[82]](#footnote-82) Edgar Dewdney introduced this restrictive system, as well as the ‘home farm policy.’ He played a significant role in mitigating the spread of dissatisfaction between bands throughout the 1885 rebellion and worked to manage settlers worries.[[83]](#footnote-83)

Annuities, Agricultural Implements, Provisions and Livestock

**1) 1879-80.** In the summer of 1880 Macdonald noted that a number of Indians had camped around Qu’Appelle and continuously asked for assistance/relief as they feared death due to starvation without. He denied their requests, however, he did state that upon their settling on a reserve they would receive the assistance that they needed.[[84]](#footnote-84) Stated within this report are two contradictory views, one directly followed by the other. Macdonald relays his frustration with the Plains Cree, viewing them as ignorant to farming and relying far too heavily on their previous ways of life, such as hunting and fishing, causing the government to provide further assistance. However, directly preceding this statement, Macdonald acknowledged that bands were willing to work and learn. These contrasting opinions demonstrate the often-contradictory opinions held by the government.[[85]](#footnote-85)

Six years into the relationship and promises that were solidified by Treaty 4, bands were still forced to deal with challenges in respect to the late delivery and dispersal of provisions needed for planting, especially seed. Edwin Allen noted in a letter to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs that bands did not receive the correct provisions for the weather associated with their geographical locations, which impacted their ability to successfully grow healthy crops. In addition, during this time the health of bands was severely impacted by scarlet fever, leading to the deaths of many members. However, Allen’s report did not indicate whether any members from Pasquas band were affected at this time.[[86]](#footnote-86)

An additional point of interest in Allen’s 1880 report is the praise that he gives to Chief Piapot. This praise was in reference to the chief’s ability to interfere with a conflict that had occurred between two other Treaty 4 chiefs. Edwin stated that “were all the Indians of the same temperament of mind as he [appeared] to be, there would be very little difficulty managing them.”[[87]](#footnote-87) Chief Piapot demonstrated that he held an immense amount of power over the actions taken by other chiefs, which at this time was appreciated and encouraged by the government. However, this praise is ironic, as only 4 years later Chief Piapot would be considered a challenge, as well as a negative influence on other bands.[[88]](#footnote-88)

The 1880 treaty annuity payments indicate that 27 Chiefs, 88 headmen and 5,761 Indians that were a part of Treaty 4 were paid a total sum of £30, 800.[[89]](#footnote-89) £6, 500 is paid by the government to the whole of Treaty 4 for agricultural implements, provisions and livestock. However, this report does not indicate the quantities that are given to each of the bands and/or their farm instructors. Unknown quantitates of pemmican and potatoes, along with 150 sacks of flour and 13, 618 lbs of beef were distributed to the bands in the Qu’Appelle area during their seed time. Although this report includes a breakdown of the provisions provided to each area included in Treaty 4, it does not specify what quantities of the aforementioned provisions were given to each of the bands in the Qu’Appelle area.[[90]](#footnote-90) This lack of clarity makes it challenging to concretely ascertain whether Pasquas band received the appropriate amounts of provisions promised under treaty.

Highlighted in F.L Hunts report to Edgar Dewdney, in March of 1880, are the harsh weather conditions faced by bands in the Qu’Appelle area, as well as the overall scarcity of wild game that was available to them. These factors contributed to bands dire need for government assistance, which in turn, as reported by Hunt, led to the unanticipated depletion of government supplies. Hunt acknowledged that the dire state which these bands were in, along with the lack of government support supplied to them, may lead to frustration. Due to the predicted dissatisfaction, Hunt called for the immediate stationing of a strong police force to combat any possible uprising.[[91]](#footnote-91)

Blame was still continuously cast onto bands, as Hunt labeled them as idle and continued the paternalistic attitude favoured by the government, stating that bands “must learn to respect and obey the protecting hand.” Hunt suggested that by sending away individuals that the government viewed as struggling - those who were seen as a drain on their ideal society and created ‘communities’ - would be beneficial to the civilization of capable band members, leading to their independence. However, this independence would have only stemmed from necessity, as it would have provided the government with a way to rationalize the minimal provision of aid, and thus, less government spending would have been needed. Blame would have been placed on the ‘strong who remained’ if their farms continued to fail.[[92]](#footnote-92)

**2) 1881-82.** Macdonald’s report dated 26th January 1881, begins by stating that the chiefs were “determined to do what they [could].” However, this is followed by comments regarding their uncivilized ways of living. The government did not wish to assist those that they viewed as capable or as having been given ‘enough’ assistance. This attitude can be seen in Macdonald’s statement that “those who had blankets and clothing must expect nothing,” only offering to supply band members who were “considered [to] require something.”[[93]](#footnote-93) In Dewdney’s 1881 report it is noted that there were families on the reserves that were comfortable with and had taken to farming. This comment, although positive, does not acknowledge the fact that many of these peoples were successful agriculturally before colonial control. Actual growth and progress of farms, as stated by Dewdney, positively altered the overall view held by band members, as they began to view their reserves as dependable. Although the government wanted bands to live on reserve land, they often criticized the manner that the Indigenous peoples approached this, as methods and practices used by bands often incorporated their old/traditional ways of living. Dewdney stated that in order to deal with bands in effective ways the government must humor them, as it would lead to their full submission, and therefore assist in their assimilation.[[94]](#footnote-94)

The perpetuation of a saviour complex continues throughout many government reports, while still casting blame onto the bands due to their inability to succeed. This view is highlighted throughout Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs John A. Macdonald’s 1881 annual report. In discussing the role of farm instructors, Macdonald stated that the practice of having only farm instructors complete improvements was a bad system. Rather, he suggested that their role should be only to “show the Indians how to work, and to see that they do it.” Through his view, this practice would ensure that assistance would not be given to a degree that would promote idleness among band members, nor reward “those able but unwilling to work.” One of the many failures of the home farm policy was the insufficient staffing of farm instructors.[[95]](#footnote-95) Only one farm instructor was employed to assist the 3 bands included in the Qu’Appelle area. F.L Hunt was the initial farm instructor in Qu’Appelle but was succeeded by G. Newlove in 1881.[[96]](#footnote-96) Macdonald expressed concern in his 1881 report, not for band farmers, but rather for the crops belonging to the farm instructors. He relayed that there were challenges associated with obtaining freight to assistant Indian farm instructor Robert Johnson's farm, questioning how he could “get along at all.” However, Macdonald does not show the same amount of concern or empathy towards farms run by band members although they were facing considerably more challenges, instead he continued to blame them for their shortcomings.[[97]](#footnote-97)

The bands in the Qu’Appelle area received ¾ lbs of flour and ¼ lbs of bacon per day, however, they expressed that this was not enough. Although the specific bands involved are not listed, a few chiefs expressed to Macdonald that they needed an increase in the provisions distributed to them. The government had hoped that in 1881 they would not be required to provide as much assistance as they previously had to the bands, and as such, had intentions of decreasing the amount of provisions that would be given. However, upon Macdonald’s visit to the Qu’Appelle area, he was forced to reassess this, due to the dire and “miserable” state which he found bands in. Macdonald did not agree to an increase in the amount of provisions that were given, however, he did agree to continue the current amount that bands had been receiving, rather than decrease it as planned. He also stated that once the weather grew warmer, they would be supplied with ammunition so that they were able to secure their own food.[[98]](#footnote-98) This stipulation would work to cut down on government expenditures.

In Dewdney’s 1882 report he noted that progress had been made on many reserves. He attributed this progress to a shift in the mindsets of chiefs, relaying that chiefs understood that their previous ways of living were threatened, and therefore, they would have to comply with the governments stipulations in order to maintain a stable livelihood for their bands. In a meeting with Treaty 4 bands held at Qu’Appelle lake, Dewdney stated that they were pleased with the assistance that had been given to them, only making what Dewdney labeled as a “reasonable request” for more tools. This request was accepted, however, Dewdney neglected to indicate the quantity of tools supplied, as well as the names of the bands that they were distributed to. This display of good faith was exploited by Dewdney as a means of coercion, control and contributed to a false perception of equality, as Dewdney stated that the “government [was] liberally assisting all who showed a disposition to work.”[[99]](#footnote-99) In his report Dewdney stated that although assisting band members, or in his words “uncivilized savages,” was necessary, he considered it to be lost time. To limit future government expenditures, Dewdney stated that the Indigenous peoples should be encouraged to continue hunting small game, as this would alleviate some of the costs associated with providing bands with food. If bands were equipped with the necessary implements for hunting it would put less of a strain on the government. Although at the time this practice was done as a means to assist the government through limiting their expenditures, it also works to assert the hunting rights of Treaty 4 members.[[100]](#footnote-100)

G. Newlove was the farm instructor stationed near Qu’Appelle in 1881, and thus, was assisting Pasquas band. For the year of 1881, Pasquas band had 70 acres broken, 60 acres under crop, 60 acres of land fenced, and 50 tons of hay cut, leading to 1800 bails cut. However, Pasquas band did not have any acres of wheat, oats, barely, potatoes, turnips, peas, or a garden plated this season. This could have been due to a lack of provisions given and/or could signify the late dispersal of seeds to the band. Pasquas band consisted of 218 members in 1881, 160 of which were present on the reserve while 58 were out hunting. In addition, the band had 2 yoke of oxen on loan, 20 houses and 8 stables.[[101]](#footnote-101) Indian Agent A. Macdonald did not supply a report roughly around June of 1881. It is unlikely that nothing significant had happened from the time of his last report in January, which makes this empty report questionable.[[102]](#footnote-102) £63, 776 is paid to the members of Treaty 4 in 1881 for annuity payments.[[103]](#footnote-103) Shot and ammunition were distributed to various points in the Qu’Appelle area. However, the names of the bands that received these provisions are not listed in the report.[[104]](#footnote-104) Although it was recorded in the Indian Affairs Annual Report for 1882 that implements were freighted to Qu'Appelle, Pasquas band is not explicitly listed in these transactions. The names of Pasqua and/or G. Newlove are not included throughout any of the accounting reports, which includes records in reference to the tools, cattle, oxen and ammunition that were freighted and distributed to the bands of Treaty 4.[[105]](#footnote-105)

Through a meeting held at Fort Qu’Appelle between General Lord Lorne and the Treaty 4 leaders the government was made blatantly aware of the dire state which many of the bands were in, as they faced starvation and were in need of more farming assistance. This meeting highlighted the struggles and challenges that they faced due to the inadequate provisions stipulated in their treaty. Chiefs wanted better for their people, including the supply of more provisions and clothing. This desire goes against the ‘savage’ and ‘lazy’ narrative that was continued by the government. The government continuously pushed bands to make their own living but did not provide them with the adequate tools or power to do so successfully. Expressed throughout this meeting was a desire to have the treaty rewritten to include what was initially promised, but not recorded in the final treaty document due to misinterpretations and ignorance on the part of the Crown. Repeatedly requested for in this meeting is that each family be given a yoke of oxen and a cow, as well as numerous other requests that call for guns, ammunition, needles and thread, along with food and other implements.[[106]](#footnote-106) It is stated by a chief that if bands did not receive all that was promised through the treaty making process, then they could no longer be part of the treaty.[[107]](#footnote-107) In Dewdney’s 1881 report he suggested that the dispersal of a plough to each family that an agent deemed as fit, would work as a method to coerce bands to settle down. In addition, it was briefly mentioned in Dewdney’s report that if bands were unable to have a school on their reserve, due to the difficulty of securing a teacher, then they should receive a fixed sum of money.[[108]](#footnote-108) In 1882, as reported by Dewdney, Pasquas band was unable to decide on a location which they desired to have a school built, indicating that this treaty promise was yet to be fulfilled.[[109]](#footnote-109)

It is stated in the Inspector of Indian Affairs T.P. Wadsworths 1882 report that the crop on Pasquas band had grown from 60 acres to 83. [[110]](#footnote-110) However, he expresses his disapproval in regard to the manner that they were farming, fearing that they would have nothing to show if they continued to eat the grain as they worked. The government's failures are once again ignored, as blame is cast onto the “Indians” in this respect. Further in his report Wadsworth shifts this narrative as he comments on the failure of the farm instructors, stating that he could not “say the Indians [were] to blame, for they appeared tractable and willing [to farm].” This is a vastly different view than what was held by the government at this time. Following this, Wadsworth notes that although many bands were doing well, they would continue to need “direct supervision,” stating that the government should retain the employment of “faithful instructors.”[[111]](#footnote-111) As previously stated, the government perpetrated a narrative that labeled agriculture as ‘foreign’ practice to Indigenous peoples. However, A. Macdonald contrasted this narrative in his 1882 report when he stated that bands had “a natural hent for agriculture.”[[112]](#footnote-112) Overtime, the skills held by band members increased and became recognized by government officials.[[113]](#footnote-113) Macdonald acknowledged that if bands were given the necessary implements needed to mill their own grain, they would put less of a strain on the government in the future, which would lead to a decrease in their overall yearly expenditures. Additionally, he noted that Pasquas band would be a little expense to the government in the future, as they had received relief in the amounts of 2,529 lbs of flour and 1,399 lbs of bacon.[[114]](#footnote-114)

In 1882 there were 218 members in Pasquas band, which reflects the same amount that was recorded in 1881. 75 members were hunting at the time of reporting.[[115]](#footnote-115) This indicates that the band(s) were still reliant on their previous ways of life to provide them with a stable food supply. In addition, there were 3 men employed on Pasquas reserve, still including only one farm instructor and an insufficient number of horses (2) and oxen (3).[[116]](#footnote-116) This number varies slightly from Macdonald’s report, as he noted that Pasquas band had 6 yoke of oxen at this time, including many that were able to plough.[[117]](#footnote-117) The amount of oxen, that were presumably loaned to Pasquas band, would not have been sufficient for farming, highlighting the inadequacy of treaty provisions.[[118]](#footnote-118) In addition, the quality of horses given to the bands was inadequate for agricultural purposes, as many were cart horses.[[119]](#footnote-119)

In 1882, 39 acres of land were broken, with 88 acres under crop and 135 tons of hay cut. The band previously had 50 acres under crop, which highlights their progress. In addition, it was recorded that 140 acres of their reserve was fenced. The band was successful in cultivating 64 acres of wheat, 1 acre of oats, 5 acres of barely, 10 acres of potatoes, 2 acres of turnips, 1 acre of carrots, 4 acres of corn and 5 acres that were dedicated to a garden. From these crops the band harvested 1000 bushels of wheat, 25 bushels of oats, 100 bushels of barley 700 bushels of potatoes and 60 bushels of turnips.[[120]](#footnote-120) Rains in the Qu’Appelle area lead to the destruction of the community's bridge, which indicates that transport, and thus the distribution of supplies, would have been affected. In addition, this weather could imply that there were challenges associated in the growth of crops.[[121]](#footnote-121)

**3) 1883-84.** In an 1883 report it was recorded that there were 290 members present on Pasquas reserve, along with 18 horses and 20 oxen.[[122]](#footnote-122) Wadsworth reported that there were 36 families on this reserve, each of which were growing crops and had between 2 to 10 acres of land. In addition, it was recorded that 160 acres were fenced. However, this information is contrasted by a report on Farming Agencies and Indian reservations for the same year, as it is stated that 200 acres were fenced. 155 acres had been broken, and 127 were under crop in 1882 and 88 in 1883. It was recorded that Pasquas band had purchased 1 mower and 1 rake and were putting them to good use by farming enough supply of hay to sustain themselves, as well as to sell for a profit.[[123]](#footnote-123) Out of their crops the band harvested 150 tons of hay, 700 bushels of wheat (from 64 acres), 50 bushels of oats (from 5 acres), 525 bushels of barely (from 35 acres), 800 bushels of potatoes (from 10 acres), 150 bushels of turnips (from 6 acres), 80 bushels of carrots- gained from source #9 (from 2 acres) and had 5 acres dedicated to a garden.[[124]](#footnote-124) There were 26 dwellings and 11 stables present on their reserve at this time, as well as 105 acres of old land.[[125]](#footnote-125) This report shows a slight increase in the amount of buildings present on Pasquas reserve than what was reported in 1881-2. 1883 was the first year that the Treaty 4 agency was thoroughly inspected. Instructors were still present on the reserves at this time to ensure that work was completed, and that assistance was given when needed.[[126]](#footnote-126)

In A. Macdonald’s annual report, dated July 6 1883, he expresses that there was a notable depletion of big game, namely moose, throughout the area of Treaty 4. He further stated that in certain seasons jack fish supplied bands with food. Macdonald acknowledged that the changes demanded by the government at the signing of Treaty 4 were sudden and contrasted bands previous ways of life. However, in his annual report he stated that many reserves had seen success in their crops and were willingly learning how to complete farming processes on their own. [[127]](#footnote-127) Although he acknowledged that a number of families in Pasquas band were doing well, having purchased their own yoke of oxen, he, and thus the government, viewed their chief as an unfit leader. Macdonald claimed that Chief Pasqua was “constantly asking for help” and that the members of his band had “become ashamed of him.”[[128]](#footnote-128) It is unclear whether these feelings were truly held among band members, or if it was just a method used by Macdonald to continue on the colonial narrative and devalue chiefs that were viewed as a threat/problem to the growth of the nation. The government constantly searched for ways to cut their expenditures in regard to treaty promises. Dewdney initiated strict stipulations for the distribution of tea, tobacco and ammunition, as he felt it was more economical for the government to give these supplies out in small quantities and only when work was completed.[[129]](#footnote-129) It was noted that the “tea and tobacco which was given to the Indians… made them very cheerful.” However, it was indicated that bands had anxieties in regard to a lack of moccasins and clothing at this time.[[130]](#footnote-130) In addition, the government strategically delayed the payments of annuities to drive up the sales of winter necessities. These delayed payments would have had negative effects on the lives of the bands, as they would have had to ration their funds and provisions. Members of Pasquas band were presented with ploughs and ox harnesses as a means of encouragement. [[131]](#footnote-131) The ‘gifting’ of these implements after work was done and success had been achieved, rather than receiving them as part of their treaty implements, further conveys the inadequacies of Treaty 4.

Although immense progress had been made and recorded in regard to reserve farms, Dewdney continued to view band members as “worthless and lazy Indians.” Dewdney believed that if bands were to be left without assistance they would either leave their reserves or become more dependent on the government in the future. He acknowledged that there was insufficient amounts of tools, implements and power received through treaty, however, he noted that at this time “the cry for rations [was] not so persistent” as it previously had been.[[132]](#footnote-132) The government still did not want to supply bands with help unless they helped themselves first. However, this logic was not beneficial, as for the most part assistance and provisions were needed before stability was achieved on reserves. As stated by Dewdney, Pasquas band was successful in raising crops and had broken a substantial amount of land.[[133]](#footnote-133) However, Pasquas band is recorded to have halted in their advancement due to the failure of a previous crop.[[134]](#footnote-134) Numerous government reports indicate that the harsh climate and weather conditions played a substantial role in crop deficiencies and therefore negatively affected the success of bands.[[135]](#footnote-135) John A. Macdonald relayed in his 1884 report that Pasquas band had “done remarkably well,” also noting that this was in part due to his perceived change in Pasquas behaviour and attitude. [[136]](#footnote-136) He stated that Chief Pasqua was progressing in a favourable manner, as it was acknowledged that the chief kept on his reserve for the most part, and therefore in his eyes was submitting to the control of the government.[[137]](#footnote-137) This ‘submission’ could have largely been due to the success and progress of his band, leading to less ‘complaints/demands’ or fears shared with government employees.

Several bands were believed to be ready and willing to have schools built on their reserves.[[138]](#footnote-138) Dewdney stated in his 1884 report that a schoolhouse was being built for Pasquas band but was still not fully completed. The schoolhouse required work to be done for it to be considered comfortable enough for a teacher. Due to this delay, there was no mention of securing a teacher for the school as of 1884. A. Macdonald noted that following the completion of the Industrial schools “there would be no difficultly in [employing] scholars.”[[139]](#footnote-139) However, it was noted in his previous report, from 1883, that there were problems in keeping teachers on reserves due to the little pay that they would receive.[[140]](#footnote-140) It is important to acknowledge that the education/schools that were promised in the Treaty 4 - signed 10 years prior to Dewdney’s report - were still not fully in place.[[141]](#footnote-141)

The records created for the time period spanning 1883-84 were quite limited in the information that they provided. In 1883 the department of Indian Affairs recorded the amount of money paid to companies and government employees as well as the types of provisions and implements given to members of Treaty 4. However, this report includes limited information as it does not specifically note the bands included or the quantities of specific provisions and implements that each of them received.[[142]](#footnote-142) A report from 1884 on the implements that were paid for by the government is again limited in the information it provides. Included in this report is evidence that implements, blacksmithing and repairs were paid for. However, it is unclear which bands these services were distributed to and what quantities were received.[[143]](#footnote-143) It is recorded that seeds for gardens, potatoes, barley and wheat were paid for and distributed to Treaty 4 members. Although again, the quantities and band names are excluded. These exclusions make it challenging to definitively state whether Pasquas band received adequate amounts of provisions and implements throughout this accounting period.[[144]](#footnote-144)

The data collected for the 1884 annual report indicated that Pasquas band had a total of 335 (?) acres broken, 127 and 184 acres under crop in 1883 and 1884 respectively, and 275 (?) acres fenced. The band had 133 acres of wheat, 38 acres of barely, 17 acres of potatoes, 6.5 acres of turnips and 3 acres for a garden. Out of these crops, the band harvested 897 bushels of wheat, 216 bushels of barley, 1079 bushels of potatoes, 200 bushels of turnips. In addition, 200 tons of hay were cut. The amounts harvested by Pasquas band stand out amongst the reports of other Treaty 4 farms, indicating the success of his band.[[145]](#footnote-145) At this time S. Hockley was the farm instructor present in the Qu’Appelle Lake area. Pasquas band had 273 members living on the reserve with 22 houses and 13 stables, along with 13 horses and 4 oxen that were privately owned by band members. In addition, the band had 24 oxen that were given to them under treaty or were on loan to them. The private ownership of these animals indicates that the government was initially unwilling to provide adequate quantities of them to bands through the treaty.[[146]](#footnote-146) Out of the 72 families present on Pasquas reserve 33 had a mix of crops. These crops included potatoes, wheat and barley.[[147]](#footnote-147)

It is noted by Dewdney that Pasquas band was finding success in cultivation, as “a good deal of crop was in the ground.” This is corroborated in farm instructor S. Hockley’s letter, as he stated that “very good progress [had] been made” among the bands/reserves under his supervision. In addition, he highlighted the immense amount of effort displayed by Pasquas band, as they “[carried] the rails out on their backs.”[[148]](#footnote-148) Although progress was made, bands were still struggling due to sicknesses, which was acknowledged by government employees. Dewdney relayed that there was “an unusually large number of deaths.” In addition, he stated that bands were in dire need of fresh meat, as salty foods that were obtained from the government aggravated the diseases that they faced.[[149]](#footnote-149) Sickness among Pasquas band was also noted by S. Hockley, as he recorded that 4 deaths had occurred.[[150]](#footnote-150) In addition, sickness is noted in A. Macdonald’s 1884 letter to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, pointing to a lack of medical attention and/or a doctor. However, Macdonald claims that these mortalities were caused by consumption, which highlights the presence and impact of alcohol, which was supposed to be restricted on reserves as stipulated in Treaty 4.[[151]](#footnote-151)

**Conclusion**

Promises made by agents throughout the negotiation of Treaty 4 were used as a method to sooth the worries of band members and chiefs. These promises were deployed by the Crown in order to gain the possession of Indigenous lands in a peaceful manner. However, in most cases bands never received what was orally promised to them, as these terms were not explicitly mentioned in the written document. The different interpretations of the treaty had negative impacts on the bands of Treaty 4, as they surrendered their land for many empty promises.[[152]](#footnote-152) Chief Pasqua sought to gain recognition of the shortcomings of this treaty, but was instead initially painted as a liar, lazy and greedy. These depictions stemmed from harmful myths that Indigenous peoples of the Plains were incapable of farming and were using treaties as a way to continue their ‘idleness.’[[153]](#footnote-153) Pasqua, along with the many other chiefs included in Treaty 4, did not receive goods in adequate quantities or quality and were in a constant struggle to obtain the promised items in a punctual manner. Due to this, many attempts were made by treaty signatories to have their treaty renegotiated to incorporate not only what was excluded from oral promises, but also to account for the treaty’s inadequacies, such as the insufficient amount of oxen and farm instructors given to each band, the incorrect types of seed disbursed, as well as the lack of implements needed to farm successfully.[[154]](#footnote-154) The combined failure of all of these factors played a substantial role in the lack of stability, success and prosperity of Pasquas band.

During the ‘Initial Settlement’ era Pasquas band did not receive the correct amount of provisions, implements and livestock that was promised under treaty.[[155]](#footnote-155) This was highlighted through the information recorded in his pictographs, as he noted that his band received only 12 out of the promised 70 of both spades and scythes, as well as being given only 24 hoes out of the promised 140.[[156]](#footnote-156) The ‘Home Farm Policy’ era was a time marked by many contrasting views, as well as records limited in the information that they provided. Although government employees kept records for the freighting and payment of implements, provisions and livestock provided to Treaty 4 areas, it is challenging to conclusively ascertain through these documents/tables whether Pasquas band received the correct quantities of what was stipulated in the treaty. Throughout this era, Pasquas band faced many challenges, most of which point to an insufficient amount of supplies and assistance. In addition, the fulfillment of education for bands was yet to be accomplished at this time. Bands continued to show their dedication to not only the relationship established through Treaty 4, but also to the success of their own reserves. However, the government placed a higher emphasis on the success of their own farm instructors, supplying them with the necessary goods instead of the bands.[[157]](#footnote-157) All of these factors indicate that Pasquas band did not receive all that was promised during the negotiations of Treaty 4.

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134. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1883, Report of T.P. Wadsworth, 9 Oct., 1883, 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* 31 Dec., 1883, Annual Report of A. Macdonald 6 July, 1883 and A. Macdonald letter 31 Aug., 1883, 70-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Extract from the report of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs John A. Macdonald, 1 Jan. 1885, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Letter from A. Macdonald to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 16 Sept., 1884, 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* 31 Dec., 1883, Annual Report of A. Macdonald 6 July, 1883 and A. Macdonald letter 31 Aug., 1883, 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 31 Dec., 1884, A. Macdonald to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 16 Sept., 1884, 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* 31 Dec., 1883, Annual Report of A. Macdonald 6 July, 1883 and A. Macdonald letter 31 Aug., 1883, 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. LAC, RG 10, v. 3682, f. 12, 667, Edgar Dewdney 28 Apr., 1884. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1883, Table B Indians of Manitoba and the North-West, 127-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Table B Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Agricultural Implements, 143-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Table E Indians of Manitoba and the North-West- seed, 151-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Table of Farming Agencies, 192-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Table of Farming Agencies, 198-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Canada, *Sessional Papers,* Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31 Dec., 1884, Statement showing the number of families in each Band who raised crops, 1884, Treaty, 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. LAC, RG 10 v. 3687, f. 18362, S. Hockley to Indian Commissioner, 30 Apr., 1884. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. LAC, RG 10, v. 3682, f. 12, 667, Edgar Dewdney 28 Apr., 1884. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. LAC, RG 10 v. 3687, f. 18362, S. Hockley to Indian Commissioner, 30 Apr., 1884. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 31 Dec., 1884, A. Macdonald to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 16 Sept., 1884, 66-7; “The Qu’Appelle Treaty, Number Four,” Appendix Morris, *Treaties*, 330 – 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. LAC, RG 10, v. 3665, f. 10,094 Interpreter (F.L. Hunt?) to Joseph Cauchon, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Carter, “We Must Farm to Enable Us to Live,” 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Morin, "Perceptions of Implementation,” 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Albers, “Excerpt,” 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Beal, “An Indian Chief,” 140-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Albers, “Expert,” 9; Carter “We Must Farm to Enable Us to Live,” 341-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)