1. **INTRODUCTION**

I was delighted when my friend, former Premier Peter Lougheed, called me and asked that I give the Merv Leitch Memorial Lecture in 1992.

My relationship with Merv Leitch was as a colleague dealing with a number of inter-provincial and federal-provincial issues in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The government of Premier Lougheed and our government in Saskatchewan had an interesting relationship. We had philosophical differences and acted in our own provinces in accordance with the principles upon which we were elected. We recognized, however, that we shared many common objectives. We had a shared desire to further the interests of Western Canada in the Canadian federation. Cooperation in this area took many forms. I think of my work with the Alberta government in sponsoring the Western Economic Opportunities Conference conceived and carried forward — brilliantly so — by Premier Lougheed and his ministers.

There was close cooperation to see that our two provinces did not engage in destructive competition to attract industry. We found ways of sharing the economic benefits of a particular industry. And, we were close allies in battling what we believed were ill conceived and unfair interventions by the federal government in the production and taxation of oil and gas resources in Western Canada, an issue of great interest to Merv Leitch.

Merv Leitch was, of course, a son of Saskatchewan and of drought. He reflected the almost super-human determination of many in that province to surmount the huge obstacles to success created by the depression and drought of the 1930s and its aftermath. If any writers were looking for a model for a Canadian Horatio Alger story they could do no better than the story of Merv Leitch. It is a story of which legends are made. And, in his case, are being made.

There is no better way to honour the sense of determination, the outstanding success achieved and the modesty which so unfailingly characterized Merv than to associate his name with scholarships which offer to young people opportunities to contribute to the life of Alberta and Canada. So, I am pleased and honoured to join you in paying tribute to the memory of Merv Leitch.

I felt I would offer you some remarks about how Canadians view our constitution, how these views differ in different parts of Canada, and how these views and differences in views seem to impede the rational discussion of some key issues in Canadian constitutional life. We may have ceased to discuss constitutional issues for the next few months (I suspect most of us hope this is the case) but these issues will not go away and sooner than we may think the issues will emerge once again.

In broad terms our difficulties flow from a singular fact: Canadians do not agree, even in the most basic way, on the nature of the Canadian federation. Let me elaborate. There are three abiding themes running through Canadian constitutional history. Most Canadians acknowledge two very differing themes. The first theme concerns relations between Canada and the United States. This theme is widely acknowledged by Canadians everywhere. The second theme concerns relations between English
speakers and French speakers in Canada. For many people, particularly in Ontario and Quebec, this is regarded as the basic reality of Canadian life; the matter that our constitution must address.

The third theme concerns relations between the economic heartland and the economic hinterland, between central Canada and outer Canada. In this view, that was what 1867 was all about — the gathering — in by Ontario and Quebec of the quasi-colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and thereafter all the other provinces. It is the changing of this colonial status of outer Canada to which constitutional change should be directed.

You will note that by theme two — the French-English theme — the "oppressors" (and I use that overblown word to give a flavour of the sense of grievance felt or at least expressed) are the eight or nine largely English-speaking provinces and the "oppressed" is Quebec.

But by theme three — the central-Canada outer-Canada theme — the "oppressors" are Quebec and Ontario and the "oppressed" are the remaining eight provinces. Ontario is the common "oppressor" in both themes. All other provinces change sides depending upon the lens through which one chooses to view the constitutional landscape.

This partly explains why successive Ontario governments play the role of benign honest brokers in, as Ontarians would phrase it, a true pan-Canadian spirit, while all other governments are pressing parochial issues in their struggles to remedy perceived injustices.

Quebec seeks some additional law-making powers and other means to preserve and promote the Francophone reality or, to put it another way, Quebec's distinct society. Other Canadians, particularly Western Canadians, wonder why we can't all be equal as citizens and equal as provinces, with no distinctions.

Western Canadians seek some way to curb the central provinces using their political power to the economic disadvantage of the West and Atlantic Canada. québécois wonder why they should not use such political power as they have to balance the disadvantages they suffer at the hands of the Anglophone majority, including Anglophones in the West and Atlantic Canada.

That is the Canada for which we are trying to shape a constitution.

The Charlottetown Accord attempted to deal with both the heartland-hinterland and English-French themes. It approached the heartland-hinterland problem with, as I will later note, the standard federal remedy of a second chamber, with equal representation from each province. It is uncertain whether the Triple-E Senate would have proved to be an effective shield for outer Canada — this would have depended upon whether the new Senate developed a party hue or a regional hue and whether regional objectives clearly articulated by elected representatives in the Senate would have inhibited the unrestrained use by central Canada of its House of Commons majorities.

The English-French problem was dealt with by using several approaches. The legislative jurisdiction of Quebec (and of other provinces) was confirmed as exclusive in a number of areas — tourism, forestry, housing, and others. The use of the federal spending power — the power to spend money in areas of provincial legislative jurisdiction — was to be curtailed. It can be argued that these changes would have in some ways responded to both English-French and heartland-hinterland issues by increasing the role of all provincial governments.

Dealing more directly with the English-French issue, Quebec was to be recognized as a distinct society and the Charter of Rights was to be interpreted accordingly. Quebec was to be guaranteed a minimum of 25 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons. Laws dealing with French language and culture would have had to be approved by a majority of the Senate and by a majority of the Francophone members of the Senate. A decision on these matters could not have been overridden by any combined vote of the House of Commons and the Senate.

This was the Accord's attempt to establish limited forms of geographic federalism of the conventional kind and a kind of ethnic federalism of which there are few examples in the world. But the Charlottetown Accord was not accepted by Canadians. The debate revealed that many Canadians (even those among, what my academic friends call, the chattering classes) disagree on the meaning of some basic concepts which are the foundation of our political life and understanding — the concepts of federalism and democracy. I want to turn now to these concepts.
II. **American Federalism**

Federalism in its modern sense effectively arose with the formation of the United States of America in 1789. We will recall that the British colonies along the eastern seaboard of the United States rebelled and fought a war of independence. The colonists organized an effective common army but did not organize an effective common government in order to pursue the war. The Second Continental Congress, which had, in effect, been acting as the national government, chose to form a loose confederal union under a document entitled the Articles of Confederation which was not ratified by all the states until 1781. However, this weak confederal arrangement was soon found to be wholly unsatisfactory and a new federal constitutional arrangement was devised by the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

I think this event is best regarded as the coming together of former colonies, now independent and sovereign, who recognized that they needed a union to assure their mutual defence and protection and to encourage trade and economic growth. But, in the words of A.V. Dicey, these colonies desired union but not unity — union for limited purposes and continued individual independence for other purposes. That is the essence of federalism.

Federalism is a system of government whereby the public have dual loyalties and choose two governments, one national and one local, as a focus for their split allegiances. Or, as the late Eugene Forsey stated it, the federal idea is this: federalism means a state that brings together a number of different communities with a common government for common purposes, and separate local governments for the particular purposes of each community.

It is instructive to look at how the American colonists set about to create what was in many ways a new form of governance. Let us look at what bricks they used to create this new kind of structure.

**Written Constitution**

The first brick was a written constitution.

Federalism is a legal structure of some complexity. Since this form of government was to be a new one, not relying on well understood practices, it was next-to impossible that it could be achieved by any means other than a written constitution. The written constitution was necessary in order to clearly delineate and define which powers of government were to be exercised by each of the two orders of government. The American constitution accomplished this by spelling out the powers to be exercised by the federal government of the United States and, by exclusion, those to be exercised by the governments of the new states of the union. All residual powers remained with the states.

**Supreme Court**

If some laws were to operate throughout the whole federation and if some state laws might collide with federal laws, there was a need for a judicial system capped by a court which had the power to deal with federal and inter-state issues — the Supreme Court of the United States. It soon became clear that the same body would have to arbitrate when federal and state powers came into seeming conflict. The Supreme Court became the arbiter.

A supreme court provided for in a written constitution was another brick in the federal edifice.

**Amending Procedure**

The federating states appreciated that their new constitution might need to be changed over the years, so they provided a formula by which it could be amended.

It was clear that the formula could not allow the new federal government to change the constitution as it saw fit — this would provide no security for the states in the exercise of their exclusive power. Similarly the formula could not allow the states to change the constitution at will — this would mean that the people of the United States, the supposed root of sovereignty, would have no vehicle to express their will as an entity. Clearly, the people of the United States or the federal Congress which they elected and the legislatures of the states should be involved in amending the constitution. So, the constitution included several elaborate provisions for amendment. I believe the only one that has been used for the twenty-six amendments to date requires that an amendment obtain a two-thirds vote by both houses of Congress — the Senate and the House of Representatives — and then be ratified by three quarters of the state legislatures.
This third brick was a constitutional amending formula which required that amendments gain the approval of Congress and three quarters of the states.

Equal and Effective Senate

It was recognized at the outset that the federal government would exercise great power (and this has proven to be true to an extent greater than anticipated by the founding fathers), and that the federal government must provide a forum where every citizen's voice had the same weight. It was also recognized that this would give enormous power to the more populous regions of the country. This power needed to be restrained by another body, providing a countervailing power to the people in the smaller states. The solution arrived at was a Congress with two chambers — a House of Representatives whose members were chosen on the basis of equality of citizens, and a Senate whose members were chosen on the basis of the equality of states.

So, the Senate of the United States has two Senators from each state, and effective powers to restrain and shape decisions of the House of Representatives.

These, then, are some of the basic building blocks of American federalism:

• a written constitution
• a supreme court as a constitutional referee
• an amending formula involving Congress and the state governments
• an equal, effective Senate

III. IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY

The new government of the United States was not the only government in North America based on some principle of sovereignty divided among orders of government.

The Iroquois Indians had an elaborate confederal form of government which united five nations (and later six) with a Great Binding Law which provided for a collective leadership, separate bodies for debating issues, and an arbitrator for resolving disputes.

Like most constitutions, it relied heavily on shared customs and traditions and is not easily transferable to other societies. But it did illustrate to the American colonists that separate nations which had previously warred with each other could join together to deal with common concerns of defence, trade and other like matters, while remaining independent for other purposes.

IV. OTHER FEDERATIONS

The framers of the American constitution could also look to Europe where the Swiss Confederation had evolved along lines similar to the Iroquois. Several ethnically and religiously diverse cantons had formed together in 1291 to defend their mountain ramparts against the Hapsburg armies which ranged over central Europe. In its various forms, it has been remarkably successful in preserving Swiss independence as aggressive military powers around them waxed and waned.

Since 1787, we have seen some variation of the federal model used many times in both homogeneous and heterogeneous states. Based on formal constitutional arrangements, as of January 1, 1993, there were fourteen federal states in the world. There would have been seventeen but, over the past year, three federations — the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia — have broken up.

Federalism is no panacea. The East Africa Federation, the Federations of Rhodesia, Nyassaland, and the West Indian Federation, each of which came and went, provide additional testimony to that. Many of these fourteen federations — such as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Mexico — while federal in the formal constitutional or institutional sense, are in the practical or political sense so highly centralized that it is difficult to describe them as truly federal.

However, there have been some very successful federations which were born after the formation of the United States. They have followed some or all of the criteria for federalism first set out by the United States — Canada in 1867, Australia in 1900, and the postwar Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Several other non-federal countries — Spain and the United Kingdom — also have recently been undergoing a federalizing process. Depending upon one's definition, Belgium may have become a federal state. And it is the stated objective of the European Economic Community to establish federative superstructures which will eventually lead to the creation of a United States of Europe based on federal principles.
V. CANADA

The Canadian federation came into being in 1867 with the passing of the British North America Act, since re-named the Constitution Act, 1867. The most striking thing about that constitution is that it is not the constitution of an independent country but, rather, one of a semi-independent colony of Great Britain.

It provided for a division of legislative powers between the new federal government and the old colonies — the new provinces — and defined the nature of the new central parliament. It did little more.

The framers of the new federation assumed that the institutions of a unitary state — the parliamentary system as it operated in Great Britain and, partially, in each of the federating colonies — could be incorporated into a federal state where a single sovereign authority would not operate but, rather, federal and provincial governments would operate side-by-side, each sovereign in its own field.

Should problems arise at the provincial level, these would be dealt with through the use of extensive powers given to the federal government to supervise provincial governments: the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors, powers of reservation and disallowance, the declaratory power under s. 92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the power to appoint judges of superior provincial courts, and others. If these did not suffice, the powers of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster could still be exercised in Canada.

Canada used few of the building blocks that the Americans had used eighty years before. Let us briefly compare the federal elements in our constitution of 1867 with those of the United States.

Written Constitution

In 1867 our constitution was only partly written. I say partly because it depended for much of its substance on continuing British parliamentary customs and conventions. Thus, the 1867 constitution made no mention of such matters as political parties, a prime minister, a government selected from the majority party in Parliament and other basic, albeit unwritten, parts of our constitution.

I mention this because it is important to remember that constitutional documents do not a constitution make. They help immensely, particularly if they acquire powerful symbolic value like the United States constitution has for Americans. But they must be supported by some shared values embodied in common customs and practices.

Supreme Court

The 1867 constitution made reference to the right of the federal government to set up a court of appeal, and one was set up in 1875 — the Supreme Court of Canada. It was neither the final court of appeal for ordinary legal disputes nor was it the arbiter of constitutional disputes. Both of these functions were performed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, as was the case for other British colonies.

Amending Formula

The 1867 constitution contained no amending formula. It was not thought to be necessary or desirable. The British North America Act was an ordinary statute of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster and could be amended by the Imperial Parliament at the request of Canadian authorities, or otherwise. The final decision-making authority was assumed to reside with the Imperial Parliament.

The Senate

The Senate of 1867 was not a federation-type Senate. It was appointed by the federal cabinet and was not regarded as the voice of the provinces or the regions in the central government. It was viewed more as the protector of propertyd interests — the sort of function performed by the House of Lords — and less as a representative of the smaller provinces or regions.

It is interesting to note that the Australian constitution passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1900, only thirty-three years after the British North America Act, did provide for a way to amend the constitution without reference to the Imperial Parliament. It also provided for a powerful Senate which was directly elected and had equal representation from each Australian state. There was no doubt that the Australian Senate was designed to represent the states, and particularly the smaller states, at the centre.
Colony to Nation

Canada moved from colony to nation sometime between 1867 and 1931. Milestone dates were the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and joining the League of Nations as a separate country in 1919, and then the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 by the Imperial Parliament formally declaring that, henceforth, laws passed by the Imperial Parliament would not apply to Canada. An exception to the general rule was that the Imperial Parliament could pass laws amending the British North America Act, an exception requested by Canada because Canadians had no other way to amend their constitution.

Canada evolved to nation status without its constitution accommodating that change. We were clearly an independent country with a federal form of government, but one whose constitution reflected this fact quite inadequately.

VI. FROM COLONY TO NATION: CONSTITUTIONAL FORM

One way to characterize Canada’s constitutional history during the last sixty years is as a story of the continuing efforts of Canadians to make our formal constitution reflect the realities of national life. These efforts have revealed surprising difficulties.

Written Constitution

We have set out to reflect in the constitution more of the way our governments operate. The major changes achieved were the amendments made in 1982 which added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending formula. If the Charlottetown Accord had been adopted, we would have added another fifty-odd pages of text to our constitution thereby achieving a constitution of world class proportions for bulk alone if not for lack of clarity or capacity to quicken the pulse.

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court became the final court for constitutional disputes in 1949. We thereby changed the constitutional referee from a court outside Canada with no perceived bias — the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council — to a court all of whose members are appointed by the federal cabinet.

The provinces frequently express the view that this puts them at a disadvantage. René Lévesque used to say: "the Supreme Court of Canada is like the leaning tower of Pisa, always leaning, and always leaning in the same direction." Proposals to involve provincial governments in the process of appointing the judges of the Supreme Court have abounded: the latest were part of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The situation remains one where the Court continues to be a creature of federal statute with one fleeting and somewhat incongruous reference to the Court contained in the constitutional changes adopted in 1982.

The position of the Supreme Court represents unfinished business in enacting a federal constitution for Canada.

Amending Formula

By providing for a way to amend the constitution of Canada, the 1982 changes patriated the constitution, since they removed our last constitutional link with the imperial parliament (if not the monarch).

This amending formula (or formulae if you will — there are several) recognizes the principle of the equality of provinces but contains a population threshold as well. The general formula requires that constitutional changes have the approval of the House of Commons and the legislatures of two-thirds of the provinces representing fifty per cent of the population of Canada. A further formula sets out a short list of the subjects that cannot be changed except with the consent of the House of Commons and all the provincial legislatures.

Successive governments of Quebec have not accepted the idea of the equality of provinces. In their eyes Canada is a pact between two founding peoples, each of which should have a veto over constitutional changes. Accordingly, the province of Quebec, as representative of the Francophone founding people in Canada, should have a veto over all significant constitutional change.

The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords sought to deal with Quebec’s objection to the 1982 constitutional changes by adding many items to the list of changes that would require the consent of all provincial legislatures. This met, in part, the claim of Quebec to the right of veto but, by extending the right to each province, respected the idea of equality of
provinces. Both Meech and Charlottetown having failed, this item too represents unfinished business.

Senate

There are few constitutional issues upon which Canadians agree more completely than that the Senate as now constituted should be abolished or radically changed. Yet, when it comes to deciding what should replace the existing Senate, unanimity of view collapses.

The Meech Lake Accord promised future Senate reform. The Charlottetown Accord provided for an elected and equal Senate with significant powers. This was a clear attempt to respond to the feeling in outer Canada that people here are effectively shut out of the decision-making processes in party caucuses and parliaments dominated by representatives from Ontario and Quebec. The Charlottetown Accord sought to make Canada more of a classic federation with a second chamber representing the regional governments at the centre, as in the United States, Australia, Germany, and Switzerland.

With the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, this represents more unfinished business.

VII. THE TROUBLE WITH CANADA

A constitution is intended to embody the common beliefs held by the citizens of a country, at least to the extent of setting out the institutions by which the citizens agree to be governed. Why do Canadians have so much difficulty reducing to constitutional form the rules of governance upon which we agree?

I have already referred to the differences about what the basic subject matter of the constitution should be: the one view that the constitution should address as a first priority the relations between English and French in Canada and the other view that the first priority must be to address the relations between the heartland and the hinterland. This is a difference of long standing.

A further problem has emerged since 1982. Before 1982, Canadians were reasonably content to have their constitution provide for the institutions of government and the division of powers between federal and provincial governments. They did not look to the written constitution to protect their individual rights. This was done by the Canadian Bill of Rights, provincial bills of rights, and human rights codes — all statutes as opposed to constitutional enactments. They looked also to the principles of constitutional law and justice which have protected rights under our system for centuries.

Debate around the Charter gave rise to the remarkable proposition that if a right is not mentioned in the Charter it does not exist. The Charter has captured the imagination of groups whom perceived themselves to be disadvantaged, from whom came demands for recognition of more rights. Added to this were calls to set out in the constitution a statement of the values for which our country stands.

This is surely a dangerous course. As we attempted in the last decade to encapsule our communal soul in the constitution, we found that we had not one soul but two or perhaps more — one based on the values of individualism, another based on the values of collective rights. These gave rise to the Canada clause and the social charter included in the Charlottetown Accord, both of which generated opposition from one side or the other to damn and doom that document.

I sometimes envy the Americans for their Declaration of Independence. Canada needs such a document, where we can hold forth with ringing phrases of purple prose in the full knowledge that these phrases carry no legal meaning or consequences. To state, as the Americans did, that: “We hold these truths to be self-evident — that all men are created equal,” while chattel slavery existed throughout much of the land, represented a triumph of dreams over reality. Perhaps governments should hold forth dreams to their citizens. But, preferably, not in legally-binding constitutional documents.

VIII. DEMOCRACY

The Charlottetown Accord debate not only renewed familiar discussions about individual and collective rights and the wisdom of including in the constitution statements of national dreams and aspirations. It revealed some less well-known differences: differences over what we mean when we speak of federalism and democracy. Having spoken at length about federalism, I turn now to the concept of democracy.
I sometimes think that democracy as the term is used today means nothing more precise than "a form of government of which I approve." There is probably no harm done to the term democracy when using it to mean all that is right and proper in the eye of the speaker. The harm comes from giving the term "undemocratic" a highly pejorative overtone and then branding as undemocratic any system that fails to conform to a particular and narrow meaning of democracy. We witnessed this in the Charlottetown Accord debate. I recall letters and articles, some of them by professors of political science, which defined democracy as meaning government on the basis of one person, one vote. They went on to argue that any government which did not conform to that model was undemocratic and, therefore, undesirable.

I quote from a letter in the July 30, 1992 edition of the Globe and Mail. Referring to possible Triple-E Senate, the writer opined:

If the new Senate were to be powerful, and Canada to remain a democracy, people and not provinces must be the basic unit to be represented. There is no reason why the two thirds of Canadians who happen to reside in Ontario and Quebec should accept an egregiously undemocratic formula which gives the vote of a Prince Edward Islander eight times the weight of an Ontarian."

Clearly, if one describes democracy as a system in which both chambers of a parliament are chosen on the basis of one person, one vote, then Canada with a Triple-E Senate would indeed be undemocratic; as it is now, with an appointed Senate. Indeed, I can think of no country in the world that is federal and by this definition, democratic.

Every working federation in the Western world (except Canada) has a second chamber which in some sense represents the component states and not the population as a whole. If this is part of what constitutes a federation, then federalism is, by definition, undemocratic. The very reason why countries form themselves into federations is that for some purposes they do not wish a numerical majority to prevail.

It is singularly unhelpful to stand four-square for democracy and then give that word a definition which consigns to the undemocratic fringe every working federation in the world.

It is tenable to argue that Canada should not be a federation but a unitary state — although, in the present context, it is the height of unreality. It is tenable to argue that a federation can work simply based upon a division of law-making powers between a central and regional governments, without any effective regional voice in the central government. It is, however, useful to note that no other western federation attempts to operate without such a regional voice. Not coincidentally, in no other federation is there such a continuous demand for the transfer of legislative power from the central government to the regional governments. I believe it is no accident that Canada, with perhaps the most centralist formal federal constitution in the western world, is in fact one of the most decentralized federations. I attribute this to the lack of an effective regional voice at the centre, the consequent lack of acceptance of federal government decisions as representing all Canadians, and the attempt to deal with this lack of legitimacy by transferring law-making powers from the centre to the provincial governments. To those who wish for a Canada with a strong central government able to deal with national issues, I say that nothing would add more strength to Parliament than an effective regional voice expressed in a reformed Senate.

We must either suspend the use of the term democracy as the essence of all that is good in government, or else give it a broader meaning than the one person, one vote, in all cases definition.

Federalism is a noble experiment which has proved in many circumstances to be the best working model by which free people can govern themselves. The strengthening of the Canadian federation should not fall victim to a pedantic definition of democracy suitable, perhaps, for a unitary state but wholly inappropriate for a country as diverse as Canada.

Permit me to close on a larger theme. I suggest that we need a different and wider concept of democracy, combining some concept of a government representing all citizens with a concept of geographic representation with, very possibly, concepts of ethnic and religious representation. That is certainly not tidy, but it has the virtue of reflecting reality, since in many countries, including Canada, citizens do not think of themselves only as citizens of a nation. They think of themselves as citizens of their province, and as Francophones, or Aboriginal people, and they seek to have those realities reflected in their governments.
People who share the vision of a widening world government look to the possibility of a transformed United Nations, one with institutions that would:

1. represent each member state, as the General Assembly now does

2. represent the countries which are strong economically and militarily, but without any single state veto, as a reformed Security Council might do

3. represent all the people of the world, as a people’s parliament elected on the basis of one person, one vote might do. Such a parliament might start with an advisory role, much like the role the European Parliament now fills, and grow from there. One of the ways it might grow is by the formation of caucuses within the Parliament that represent people who group themselves on ethnic or religious or ideological lines as well as national ones.

We need to seek institutions through which people can feel that they are represented, no matter what basis of representation they feel is most important to them. It may not satisfy a narrow definition of democracy. But if we see the ideal government as one that gives the greatest opportunity for people everywhere to influence the decisions that affect their lives, then clearly one which has flexible models of representation is better than a sterile one-person, one-vote definition of democracy. For adherence to the latter will almost certainly freeze the world in a mould of hundreds of unitary states with no effective mechanism except absorption of one state by another to build towards some measure of world government.

We need to expand our ideas of how institutions resolve conflicts between states, and how peoples can be created and strengthened on a world scale. There are few models, but the world’s federations are perhaps the best place to start. And Canada, where we attempt to balance geographic diversity and ethnic diversity within a federation, is a model worth considering. Canada is a very successful federation, even if our formal attempts to redesign it do not inspire confidence. I do not commend to the world the way Canadians talk about constitutions. I do commend to the world our record of achievement. And people throughout the world, except perhaps Canadians, are aware of our measure of success.

My hope would be that young people, like the recipients of the Merv Leitch scholarship, play a role not only in addressing Canada’s unfinished business, but in helping Canada and other nations move along a path of broadening federations with the impossible dream of shaping some form of world government embracing all humanity.

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