

Nationalism and Fertility in Francophone Montreal: The Majority as Minority

Jon Ansen

Spitzer Department of Social Work
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Israel

and

Interface Demography (SOCO)
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Belgium

Abstract

Forty years ago, on the eve of the *Revolution Tranquille*, *Québécois* fertility was among the highest in North America. Today it is among the lowest. This paper analyses fertility in Quebec in terms of the minority group hypotheses, interpreting its low level as the class action of a minority group struggling to define its national, Francophone identity, within an Anglophone ambience. *Québécois* nationalism specifies Quebec as a unique reality in an Anglophone North America, and looks to the Province to create and maintain the conditions for this uniqueness to express itself. Nonetheless, the Francophone population, and in particular the middle class of entrepreneurs and government officials, remains in the classic position of a disadvantaged minority, which expresses itself in lowered *Québécois* fertility. The analysis focuses on fertility in census enumeration districts in Montreal, as recorded at the 1991 census, contrasting Francophone with Anglophone and other areas, at various levels of education and income.

Résumé

Il y a quarante années, à la veille de Révolution tranquille, la fertilité Québécoise était au nombre des plus hauts en Amérique du Nord. Aujourd'hui, c'est au nombre des plus bas. Cet article étudie la fertilité en ce qui concerne les hypothèses du group minoritaire en interprétant son niveau bas comme l'action d'une lutte de classe d'un group minoritaire qui lutte de définir son identité nationale et francophone dans les limites d'une ambiance anglophone. La politique Québécoise définit le Québec comme une société distincte en Amérique du Nord qui compte sur la Province de créer et maintenir les conditions de son caractère distinct pour s'exprimer. Quand même, la population, en particulier la classe moyenne des entrepreneurs et des fonctionnaires de l'administration, reste dans la position bien connue d'un groupe minoritaire, qui s'exprime en la fertilité Québécoise diminuée. L'étude concentre sur la fertilité en utilisant le recensement de la population fait en 1991, en particulier les circonscriptions électorales de Montréal dont on fait contraste avec celles des anglophones et des francophones et celles-ci avec d'autres circonscriptions qui inclurent des niveaux divers de l'éducation et du revenu.

Key Words: fertility, minority group, Quebec, nationalism

Introduction

Québécois fertility has moved, within little more than a generation, from being among the highest, to the lowest in North America. The *revanche des berceaux*, whereby the French-Catholic majority in Quebec was to be assured by out-reproducing the English, has been replace by a *renvoi des berceaux*, as the struggle for French hegemony has moved from the bedrooms to the boardrooms and the parliamentary chambers. But how is fertility related to this social, political and economic struggle over linguistic preeminence?

The minority group fertility hypothesis (Goldscheider & Uhlenberg, 1969; Ritchey, 1976) has long argued that group fertility should be analysed in terms of a group's relations with other groups with which it interacts. Fertility is a social fact (Halbwachs, 1939), (consciously or unconsciously) a part of the group's survival strategy. Lopez and Sabagh (1978), for instance, showed that among the Chicanos in Los Angeles (a group with pro-natalist norms), those with strong cultural and personal ties to the ethnic group had lower fertility than those without these ties (controlling, of course, for education and income). Fertility was higher, therefore, amongst those who did not benefit from the enhanced security of the integrated ethnic and social group. In North America

and in Europe, Jews are a civil minority, for the most part seeking full social integration. As a group they are well educated, with good financial resources, but subtle and pervasive discrimination restricts their ability to translate these class attributes, of standing in the labour market, into status attributes of group prestige (Weber, [1923]). The response is, and has been for many generations, a reduced fertility, even after allowing for Jews' urban or metropolitan residence, their level of education, occupational distribution, their income and other socio-economic variables (Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, 1969). In Israel, by contrast, the Jewish population is not a minority within the country, but certainly is one when viewed within the broader context of the Middle East. The particular nature of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours, as one over the establishment and maintenance of a specifically Jewish State, with its continual risk of war and of nationally motivated violence, brings about the opposite response, of an enhanced level of fertility, particularly among those groups in the population voting for parties with an emotional appeal to nationalist group sentiments (Anson & Meir, 1996). Francophone Quebec is another example of an enclave majority, but in a very different relationship with its neighbours. How are these relations be reflected, if at all, in the level of fertility?

The Québécois Identity

The relations between the linguistic groups in Quebec are the outcome of historical developments over the past 250 years (See, 1986). Following the British conquest of New France in 1759 there grew two parallel colonial settlements, French in Lower Canada and English in Upper Canada. Despite the differences in language, religion, customs, and the power differences between the two settlements, there was little struggle between them. The common threat of expansion by the United States, and the availability of the open frontier for further settlement led to accommodation between two groups rather than conflict and competition (though the *Patriote* uprising in 1837, and Francophone opposition to conscription in the First and Second World Wars, indicate that tensions were controlled rather than non-existent). Within Quebec there was a complementary relationship between the English, who had mainly commercial interests, and the French, who were mainly agricultural. English political control was mediated by the Catholic Church which served as the major institution serving the Francophone population, not only as representative, but also as provider of schooling, social, and medical services.

Until World War II, Quebec remained predominantly rural, while Montreal, located at the headway of the St. Lawrence River, became Canada's commercial and financial centre. Industrialisation was slow, and was based on foreign (British and US) capital, but here too the Church sought to obfuscate class divisions by organising Francophone unions emphasising conciliation, as an alternative to links with the more confrontational US industrial unions. The division between Federal and Provincial politics enabled the growth of class

based politics at the Federal level, and ethnic (language group) politics at the Provincial level, particularly as Quebec became the only Province where French speakers could speak and live their lives in French.

Changes following the Second World War made the old élite, and the ideology of conservation and accommodation, increasingly anachronistic. The rapid growth in the world economy, particularly in the three decades 1945-1975, led to a rapid growth in production and in the standard of living. At the same time, there was a move from an agricultural-industrial economy to a service economy. While industrial employment has never been more than a third of the labour force, and by 1990 had dropped to just a quarter, the service industries by 1990 accounted for almost three-quarters of the labour force, leaving just a residue in agriculture (Fréchette, 1992). At the same time, the population became more urban (80 percent by 1990) and then suburban (the Montreal region, for example, was 57 percent of the total population in 1971, and remained the same in 1991, but the central city declined by 5 percent, and in 1991 was 26 percent of the metropolitan total, compared with 32 percent 20 years previously); there was a movement of women into the labour force (by 1990, 44 percent of all employees were women); and unemployment increased dramatically, especially from the 1970's to the mid 1980's, when the baby-boom generation born in the 1950's and early 1960's was entering the labour market – just as economic growth was slowing down.

At the same time, the shift in outside economic control from Britain to the United States, and within the United States from the old industrial centres of New England to the Mid-West led in turn to a move in Canada's economic centre from Montreal to Toronto, and with it a growing migratory movement of Anglophones from Quebec to Ontario (Terimote, 1992). The old cultural antagonisms between the French and the English speakers now became more clearly a comprehensive issue, not just one of language and religious belief. In particular, the conflict came to focus on access to the (Provincial) state, and the use of this state apparatus to counter Anglophone control of the economy and to break down the cultural division of labour – if necessary by gaining independence from, or at least renegotiating the degree of autonomy within, the Canadian Federation (Fréchette, 1992). In 1960 the electoral victory of the Liberal party heralded the start of the *Revolution Tranquille*, the Quiet Revolution, a revolution from above in which the provincial state took over from the church responsibility for the provision of schools, hospitals, health, social services, and income guarantees. This Quiet Revolution, coupled with the movement of Anglophone entrepreneurs to Toronto, has opened the door to Francophone entrepreneurship, and state sponsored infra-structural initiatives have created a market in which it can grow. There has thus been a growing local, and particularly Francophone, control of the local economy. However, this has been coupled with a decline in the economic position of Quebec, relative to Ontario and Canada in general. Furthermore, as Moreau (1992) notes, Francophone control of Quebec's economy has mainly been concentrated

in smaller enterprises. Large enterprises, and the major financial organisations have remained Anglophone or foreign. The growing appearance of an indigenous Francophone economy thus conceals the heavy indebtedness to Anglophone finance, and the movement of major financial and other organisations to Toronto suggests that Francophone enterprise may have largely filled vacant slots in the Quebec economy rather than created new markets.

Quebec Nationalism

Quebec nationalism has thus grown over the past four decades, and taken on a form of its own. It is specifically *Québécois*, identifying with Quebec, not just with being French. The French language is its expression, not its essence, and the identity is specifically North American, not European (Basham, 1978). Popular culture, such as the major sports played (ice hockey and baseball) and the popular music heard on the radio, is clearly North American. This is not to deny the uniqueness of the *Québécois* sentiment, merely to place it in focus, in relation to the negatives against which it is to be judged. It is a nationalism which specifies Quebec as a unique reality in an Anglophone North America, and which looks to the Quebec Province-as-State to create and maintain the conditions for this uniqueness to express itself. Before the Quiet Revolution, to be French-Canadian meant to speak French and, in most cases, to belong to and support the Catholic Church. The role of language in the state and in public life was therefore not an issue, nor was it even necessary (in principle) to live in Quebec, even though, in practice, most French-Canadians who left Quebec for other parts of Canada, or for the United States, moved into a totally Anglophone environment, and lost their command of the French language.

The Quiet Revolution, and Lesage's rallying call of "*maîtres chez nous*" signalled the change. The issue was no longer one of being a French-Canadian, but rather of being *Québécois*, that is, belonging to a particular region of Canada, a region noted for its special language, French. By this definition of self, non-Francophones within Quebec, whether Anglophones or Allophones, are anomalous, for they contravene the natural congruity between place and population. Small wonder, then, that the major thrust of this movement has been to make French the official language of all public discourse in the Province: in schools, in offices and other workplaces, and in public notices, such as advertisements and names of businesses. To attain this end, the provincial government has taken on an activist, almost corporatist approach, and in the process created the new middle class of government officials who have come to identify with the (provincial) state. In sum, following a script that might have been written by Benedict Anderson (1992), *Québécois* nationalism is movement which has grown out of the frustrations of a local, secular, Francophone middle class. Rejecting and rejected by the Catholic Church, yet denied access to, and advancement in the Anglophone centres of power, it has sought to replace these

with Francophone centres from which Anglophones are excluded, or admitted only as outsiders.

Quebec Fertility

Perhaps the most notable aspect of Quebec fertility, and of Francophone fertility in particular, is its tendency to extremes. After the First World War, Quebec's Total Fertility (TF), at over 5 children per woman, was more than 50% higher than Ontario's, and even in 1961, at the start of the Quiet Revolution, TF was 3.70, one child per woman more than in Ontario. Within 10 years, however, by 1971, it had declined to 1.88, almost half a child less than Ontario, and it has remained consistently low since then (Henripin, 1991, p.46; Caldwell et al., 1993). In 1987 TF was 1.35, the lowest of any Canadian Province (Jones, 1997) and in the early 1990's, at 1.61, only the Maritime Provinces of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were lower (Jones, 1996). Quebec thus has one of, if not the lowest fertility of any large scale population in North America, and on a par with the lowest levels of fertility in North and South Europe. This decline has been accompanied by a destabilisation of family life, as reflected in the growing number of cohabiting unions, particularly among the Francophone population; the decline in marriage rates, far more than in the rest of Canada (Pollard and Wu, 1998), and the growing rates of divorce. According to Jones (1987), four out of five couples entering a first union in Quebec are cohabitants, compared with only one in two in the rest of Canada, and the fertility of cohabiting couples (1.58) is on a par with that of the Province as a whole. In the rest of Canada, at 1.30, it is considerably lower than the population total. Evelynne LaPierre, of the Université de Montréal, (personal communication) has estimated that of all births, 45% are to unmarried women, a majority of whom are cohabiting, but cohabiting unions are less stable, so there is a growing potential for single-parent households. The population has largely disassociated itself from the Catholic Church, once the standard bearer of the call for a *revanche des berceaux*, and papal encyclicals rejecting contraception have been almost totally ignored by the population. It is commonly stated, among Quebecers, that the rest of Canada is conservative, and Quebec the *avant garde* of family life.

How, then, should we theorise this dramatic fertility decline? The *Revolution Tranquille* has dramatically transformed the way Francophone Quebecers live, their relations with the rest of North America and the way in which they view themselves, and a full explanation must clearly take account both of the structural (economic) and the cultural elements of this process (Burch, 1996). On the one hand, there has been an abrupt and overwhelming process of secularisation (Lesthaeghe, 1977; Lesthaeghe & Wilson, 1986), coupled with an economic and political transformation of Quebec into a Francophone Province, controlled by and for the French speaking population. Not only have opportunities changed, but also the way, and in particular, the order in which

these are evaluated have changed too. In particular, the language border has created, in Quebec, a relatively dense network of interaction within which behavioural preferences can be renewed and regenerated (Bott, 1971; Pollak & Watkins, 1993). On the other hand, all this has not occurred in a vacuum. Indeed, as the slogan of *maîtres chez nous* makes clear, these changes have focussed around, and been fuelled by, the struggle to demarcate the enclave and to take control of it, a struggle which, as the results of the Referendum in 1995 made clear, is far from over. Nonetheless, although the fertility decline, and the change in household structures, suggests that the revolution is population wide, its Andersonian logic implies what Guindon (1988) argues explicitly: that French Canadian nationalism is largely a middle class movement, one which having gained political power is now seeking to enlist the power of the state to move it from political to industrial control.

Quebec as a province, and the Francophone middle class in particular, is thus in the classic position of a minority group in struggle against the Anglophone Centre, a struggle to crystallise its social position and create congruence between its political, social and economic standing. As elsewhere, this struggle expresses itself, *inter alia*, in a controlled and reduced fertility, particularly among the middle classes. We should therefore expect,

- i. that Francophone fertility will be lower than Anglophone fertility particularly in the middle class sections of the population, those with the highest level of education;
- ii. differences in income will not explain the lower fertility in Francophone areas, that is, differences will remain even when income differences are accounted for;
- iii. Francophone fertility will be more sensitive than Anglophone fertility to socio- economic attainment, so that for any level of education, the effect of an increase in income on fertility (the regression coefficient) will be greater for Francophones than for Anglophones.

Analysis

The Data

The analysis focussed on area level data from the 1991 Canadian Census for 4,673 enumeration areas (EAs) in the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area, from which were deleted sequentially EAs with incomplete data, as shown in Table 1. A total of 1,269 (27%) EAs could not be included, leaving a total of 3,404 EAs in the analysis. The population in these EAs is distributed by Census Division as shown in Table 2. Overall, 86% of the population of the Montreal

Metropolitan Area was included in the analysis, of which 54% lived in the Communauté Urbaine de Montréal. In all the EAs included in the analysis, at least 69% of the population lived in private households, and in only one percent of EAs did less than 90 percent of the population live in private households. The number of private households ranged from 90 to 595, with a median of 335. Given this broad range of population sizes, statistical analyses will be performed weighting by the number of households (households are preferred to total population size, as this number will be less directly affected by the level of fertility in the population).

Table 1
Enumeration Areas Removed from Analysis

Reason for Deletion	Number of EAs
No Population	99
Missing from 100% file	77
Non-response rate greater than 5%	523
No children aged 0-5	296
No women of childbearing age (20-49)	3
No private households	2
Missing from 20% sample file	3
No household income data	262
Mean household income greater than \$250,000	2
Income coefficient of variation greater than 100%	1
Fertility outlier (see below)	1
Total	1269

Method

Fertility In the absence of data concerning recent births by EA, the fertility of the population of each EA was estimated by dividing the number of children aged 0-4 by the number of women in the childbearing ages (20-49). These are children born, on average, 2.5 years previously, to women who were then aged 17.5-47.5. In order to account for varying age distribution of the women, and the possible effects this might have on the measure of fertility, the number of women in each age group was weighted by their relative fecundity in a natural fertility regime (Chernichovsky & Anson, 1996) using the following values (the weights were calculated from Wilson et al.'s (1988) data on natural fertility schedules):

Age	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Weight	1.00	0.95	0.86	0.72	0.41	0.08

The very low level of infant and child mortality means that the numbers of children are, to all intents and purposes, the numbers of infants born in the previous five years; and the weights are approximately proportional to those used in the calculation of I_f (Newell, 1994). This measure, labeled CWR_w , is thus a similar measure of births relative to the fertility potential of the population. The weighting of the women of childbearing age allows for the different age structures of the populations in the EAs (see, for instance, Renaud et al, 1996, who show that the EAs of Montreal can be ordered along the course of the life cycle), but purposely does not factor out the pace at which young couples set up their own home and start bearing children. For the 3404 statistical areas in the analysis, CWR_w ranges from 0.0426 to 0.872, (one value exceeding 1.0 was excluded as an outlier), approximately equivalent to a TF range of 0.2 to 3.5. Raising CWR_w to the power of $2/3$ gives an essentially symmetrical distribution ranging from 0.122 to 0.913, with a mean of 0.494 (median 0.487) and a standard deviation of 0.124.

Table 2
Population in Selected Enumeration Areas

Census Division	Total Population	Selected Population	Percent Selected
Beauharnois-Salaberry	11,172	9,660	86
Champlain	312,734	280,385	90
Communauté urbaine de Montréal	1,775,971	1,462,153	82
Deux-Montagnes	71,218	65,645	92
La Vallée-du-Richelieu	97,794	88,620	91
Lajemmerais	74,990	68,076	91
L'Assomption	71,591	68,069	95
Laval	314,398	271,821	86
Les Moulins	91,156	89,459	98
Mirabel	17,971	17,668	98
Roussillon	118,355	113,162	96
Rouville	7,780	7,498	96
Thérèse-De-Blainville	104,693	101,145	97
Vaudreuil-Soulanges	57,519	55,536	97
Total	3,127,241	2,698,897	86




Social Characteristics Individuals may be characterised by the specific language they speak, their level of education, occupation, income, and other such characteristics. For a geographical area, there is no one such characteristic. Rather, social aggregates are characterised by a distribution over the various relevant possibilities. Having defined fertility as a quality of the EA, not as a mean of individual or couple-levels of childbearing, we now sought a way to characterise the EAs by their *distributions* of the various mother tongues and levels of education, not merely by the modal category within the distribution, or by the proportion belonging to one particular category. Areas within a city have a particular ambience which makes them Francophone, or Anglophone, or Mixed or neither (Allophone); well or poorly educated, etc. It thus makes sense to assign qualitative (or ordinal) characteristics, rather than try to order them along continua of 'Frenchness' or 'class'. The method used will be illustrated using the division among language groups.

1. We constructed a four-column matrix representing the number of people in each EA who identify their mother-tongue as English; French; Both English and French, or Neither (a non-official mother language).
2. The matrix was analysed by Correspondence Analysis (Greenacre, 1984; Weller & Romney, 1990). This maps all the EAs in terms of the similarity or differences of the distribution of language groups, and maps the languages along the same dimensions. EAs with a similar distribution of language groups are close together in the plot, those with very differing distributions are far apart; similarly the distances between the languages will reflect the extent to which they are spoken in the same or different EAs (see Figure 1a,b). The first two dimensions, in this case, account for 99% of the variation in the original matrix. This two dimensional solution closely matches the findings of LeBourdais and Beaudry (1988) that population origin in Montreal could be mapped along two dimensions or factors, the first distinguishing Anglo- from Franco-phone populations, the other distinguishing native born from immigrant populations.
3. The points (EAs) are clustered according to their location along the two dimensions, using the points of the language categories as seeds, and weighting by the total number of private households in each EA (Figure 1c). This results in the assignment of EAs and populations, as shown in Table 3.

Figure 1
**Correspondence Analysis of Montreal Enumeration Areas
by Language**

a: Languages

b: Enumeration Areas



c: Clusters

Table 3
Assignment of Enumeration Areas by Language Group




Cluster	Areas	Percent	Households	Percent
Anglophone	458	13	135,835	13
Francophone	1,888	55	609,995	57
Mixed	650	19	199,655	19
Allophone	408	12	113,410	11
Total	3,404	100	1,058,895	100

The population in the Anglophone and Allophone areas approximately reflects their proportion in the population, whereas the Francophone population is divided between the Francophone and the Mixed areas, though in the former they make up a far more homogeneous group. Figure 2 presents the percentage identifying each language as their mother-tongue, by language area. Although Francophones are a clear majority in the city (a median of over 65 percent across all EAs) and are over 80% of the population in most of the Francophone areas, they make up less than half that proportion in most of the Anglophone areas. A similar localisation can be seen for Anglophones. Only the Mixed areas can be said to be truly mixed, reflecting in their composition the overall proportion of each language group in the population.

Table 4
Households in Enumeration Areas,
Education Clusters by Language Cluster (Percentages)

Education Cluster	Language Cluster				Total Households	
	Anglo-phone	Franco-Phone	Mixed	Allo-phone	%	N
Elementary	14	43	41	61	41	433,055
Trade	21	45	30	16	35	380,090
University	65	12	29	23	23	245,750
Total (100%)	135,835	609,995	199,655	113,410	100	1,058,895

Figure 2
Percentage Language as Mother Tongue, by Cluster Groups



Using the same methodology, the EAs were further divided according to the level of education, distinguishing between areas typified by Basic education; secondary and/or technical (Trade) education; and University education (elementary education = less than 9 years education; secondary/trades = more than 9 years, with or without high school, trade or non-university certificate; university = university education, with or without a certificate or degree). Table 4, which presents this division of households, cross tabulated by language-group, clearly brings out the social distinctions between the various language groups. Households in the Anglophone areas are overwhelmingly typified by University education, with a fifth in the Trade education group, and less than a sixth in the Basic education cluster. By contrast, households in the Francophone areas are evenly split between the Basic and Trade education clusters, with only an eighth of households in areas typified by University education. The Mixed areas are similar to the Francophone areas in the proportion of households in the Basic education cluster, but the remainder are evenly split between the Trade and University education clusters, and the Allophone areas have an overwhelming majority of households (61 percent) in the Basic education cluster, but they also have almost a quarter in the University education cluster. Clearly, the mother tongue predominating in the different areas of Montreal to a very real extent reflects social class differences, as was to be expected from our previous review of the literature. The question to be examined now is, how do these differences of language and class, reflect themselves, separately and in their interaction, in the level of fertility of the various populations.


Results

Fertility by Language and Education


Figure 3 and Table 5 analyse the level of fertility in EAs, by Language and Education clusters. There are small, but significant, differences between the various groupings ($R^2 = 0.0857$) which clearly support our first hypothesis. Taken as a whole, Anglophone areas have the highest level of fertility, followed by Francophone, Mixed and Allophone areas. However, the specific ordering of the areas varies according to the level of education. At the Basic level of education, there are few differences in fertility between the language clusters, except for a slightly lower level in the Mixed group, and a positive skew in the Anglophone cluster. At the Trades level of education, fertility increases overall, and there is a clear gradient, declining from Anglo- through Franco- phone to Mixed, and lowest in Allophone EAs. At University level, the overall fertility drops again, but now the Francophone areas clearly have the lowest level of fertility. The area level of fertility thus varies quite clearly as both the education and the language group typical of the EA vary. In particular, whereas the

Figure 3
Fertility by Education and Language Clusters


a: Basic Education



b: Trades Education



c: University Education



relative level of fertility in the Anglophone areas *increases* as the level of education increases, that of the Francophone areas *decreases* as the level of education increases.

Table 5
Least Squares Additive Factors for Level of Fertility in Enumeration Areas,
by Language and Education

Education Cluster	Language Cluster			Allo-phone	Total
	Anglo-phone	Franco-phone	Mixed		
Basic	-0.0236	0.00327	-0.00482	0.0252	0.00806
Trades	-0.00404	0.0215	0.00995	-0.0274	0.02690
University	0.0277	-0.0248	-0.00513	0.00222	-0.0350
Total	0.0336	0.000474	-0.0161	-0.0180	0.490

Note: Values are least squares estimates from linear regression of the Transformed Weighted Child Women Ratios on Language and Education Cluster, weighting by the number of private households in EA. For definitions see text. Language, education and interaction are all significant at $p < 0.05$, $R^2 = 0.0857$.

For expected values, add factors, e.g.:


$$\text{English-Basic} = 0.490 + 0.00806 + 0.0336 - 0.0236 = 0.508$$

Fertility and Income


Language and Income One of the basic issues underlying all social relations in Quebec is the structured inequality between the two major language groups, reflecting itself not only in the different distributions of education and occupational prestige of the two groups, but also in the level of individual resources, as represented, for instance, by the level of pay at any given educational level. LeBourdais and Beaudry (1988) showed that occupation and income are two separate dimensions in the identification of geographical areas in Montreal, and their findings are echoed in Figure 4, which presents the distribution of log-median income for the EAs, by education and language cluster, and Table 5, which shows the multiplicative factors for the prediction of expected median income from the language and educational assignments of the areas. Perhaps the most notable finding here is the way the income differences between Anglo- and Francophone areas grow as the level of education increases. In the table margins, income rises with the level of education, but there is no marginal difference (i.e., net of education) between the Anglo- and Francophone clusters. Only the Allophone areas show a clearly reduced level of group

Figure 4
Log Median Income by Education and Language Clusters

a. Basic Education



b. Trade Education



c. University Education




Table 6
Least Squares Multiplicative Factors for Median Level of Household
Income in Enumeration Areas

Education Cluster	Language Cluster			Allophone	Total
	Anglophone	Franco-phone	Mixed		
Basic	0.924	0.960	0.953	1.18	0.773
Trades	0.929	1.04	1.02	1.02	1.10
University	1.16	1.00	1.03	1.03	1.17
Total	1.07	1.07	1.01	0.865	35,481

Note: Values are least squares estimates from linear regression of $\log(\text{median household income})$ on Language and Education Cluster, weighting by the number of private households in EA. Language, education and interaction are all significant at $p < 0.05$, $R^2 = 0.309$. For expected values, multiply factors, e.g.:

English-Basic = $\$35,481 \times 1.07 \times 0.733 \times 0.924 = \$27,116$.

income. The values within the cells of Table 5, representing group-specific returns to education, show a very clear picture of group differentiation. For the Francophone and Mixed areas there is only a minor change in income as education rises, the main difference being between the Basic and Trades level of education. Indeed, in Francophone Trades education areas expected income hardly differs from that in University areas ($1.04 \times 1.10 = 1.14$; $1.00 \times 1.17 = 1.17$). For Anglophone areas, on the other hand, there is a very clear group-specific rise in income, particularly as we move from the Trades to the University level of education. For the Allophone areas, by contrast, there is a real *decline* in group-specific income levels as education increases, so much so that expected income differential at the Trades education level ($1.02 \times 1.1 = 1.12$) is actually higher than at the University education level ($0.829 \times 1.17 = 0.970$).

There is thus a clear interaction between the language and educational characteristics, and the median level of income per household in the EAs. Even though there is an overall tendency for area-level household income to rise with the level of education, there are very different returns to education for the different language groups at the different educational levels. In particular, Anglophone EAs are particularly *advantaged*, and Allophone EAs particularly *disadvantaged*, at the University level of education.

Fertility Effects

Table 7 presents the weighted least squares estimates (additive effects) for the change in area fertility as the median income changes. The log median income values are centred on the metropolitan median, 4.54 (€CAN\$35,000) enabling a comparison of the level of fertility at this median value, as well as the slope of

Table 7
Least Squares Additive Factors for Level of Fertility in Enumeration Areas
by Language, Education and Income

Education Cluster	Language Cluster			Allo-phone	Total
	Anglo-phone	Franco-phone	Mixed		
Basic	-0.0292 <i>-0.189</i>	0.0352 <i>0.224</i>	-0.00181 <i>0.0000270</i>	-0.00418 <i>-0.176</i>	0.0197
Trades	0.0124 <i>0.439</i>	0.00249 <i>0.489</i>	0.0112 <i>0.332</i>	-0.0261 <i>-0.123</i>	0.0247
University	0.0167 <i>0.315</i>	-0.0376 <i>0.450</i>	-0.00939 <i>0.366</i>	0.0303 <i>0.209</i>	-0.0443
Total	0.0205	-0.00300	-0.0144	-0.00305	0.474

Note: Values are least squares estimates from linear regression of the Transformed Weighted Child Women Ratios on Language and Education Cluster, together with slope estimates for the effect of log median income on fertility within Language and Education clusters. Plain type values are baseline, or intercept, elements, *italic values* are slope estimates for the nested effect of log median income was centred on the metropolitan mean value, 4.544 (€\$35,000). Language, education their interaction and log median income within language and education clusters, are all significant at $p < 0.05$, $R^2 = 0.277$. For expected values, add factors and multiply income coefficient by value, e.g.: English, Basic = $0.474 + 0.0205 + 0.0197 - 0.0292 - 0.189 \cdot \log(\text{median income})$, centred = **0.485** at centre income value.

change in fertility as income level changes in the different groups of EAs. The values in the margins are now the expected level of fertility, for language and education clusters, at the median level of income. Comparing these values with those in Table 4 indicates the same net effects, namely an enhanced fertility in Anglophone compared with the other areas, and a lower fertility particularly in areas typified by University level education. Within cells (the interaction effects) there are two striking patterns:

- i. for Anglophone areas, baseline fertility, at the conurbation-wide median level of income, *increases* as we move from Basic through Trades to University level education;
- ii. for Francophone areas baseline fertility *decreases* as we move up the educational scale, thus supporting our second hypothesis that fertility differences between Anglo- and Francophone populations cannot be explained by income differences between the two groups;
- iii. the Allophone population, which, as we saw, is worse off financially than the Francophones, nonetheless has a fertility pattern similar to the Anglophones, namely, as the level of education rises, so does the level of fertility. The Francophone pattern is thus very specific to this majority-as-minority group;
- iv. at all levels of education, the income coefficient is highest in the Francophone column, indicating that income has the greatest effect on this group. The Francophone groups are thus clearly responding more, in their fertility behaviour, to their immediate conditions, and in particular, the greater income coefficients indicate that they, more than any other group, are restricting their fertility unless and until conditions enable them to do otherwise;
- v. for Allophone populations, by contrast, the income coefficients are the lowest of any group, indicating that their fertility levels are the least responsive to their immediate material conditions.

Conclusions

What can we learn from this analysis? This study has shown that, taken overall, fertility in the Francophone areas is lower than in the Anglophone areas of Montreal, and that this reduction in fertility is particularly pronounced in the middle class areas, those typified by a University level of education. Furthermore, it shows that this lower fertility cannot be explained by reference to the lower income of Francophone areas, even though this reduced income is also particularly salient in the middle class areas. Finally, by showing that Francophone fertility, far more than fertility in other areas, rises as level of income rises, it has been argued that the lower Francophone fertility reflects a contingent reduction in fertility, a response to specific social conditions, and not a cultural commitment to lower fertility in and of itself.

The present study has focussed on fertility variations *within* Montreal, and as such cannot provide a total explanation of the generally low level of fertility in Quebec Province, nor even in the city of Montreal. At approximately 1.5

children per woman, even Anglophone fertility is remarkably low, when compared with many other populations in North America, suggesting that fertility levels in the city reflect far more than income, education and local relations between the different language groups. What I am suggesting is that the special relations between Quebec and the Anglophone majority in North America has the effect of *reducing* the fertility of all groups in the province, just as, for instance, the special position of Israel in the Middle East has the effect of *increasing* the fertility of all sub-populations in Israel, Jewish and Arab, religious and secular. The analysis presented here seeks to tease out the nature of this special effect by considering it, in microcosm, *within* Montreal, in the comparison between Anglophone and Francophone sections of the city. The pattern I have identified, though substantively small, is, I would suggest, theoretically significant, as it brings into focus the manner in which group situation and group relations are reflected in fertility levels, following a group logic or strategy which may even operate *against* a conscious group commitment to enhanced fertility.

To extend this analysis, we need to see the relations between Anglo- and Franco- phones in Quebec as a reflection of the broader relation between Franco-Quebec and Anglo-Canada, or even Anglo-North America as a whole. The inner imperative, *être maîtres chez nous*, drives both sets of relations: internally, to extend ever-further the reach and ubiquity of the French language; externally to test the reality of Quebec's borders, to test the strength of the ties that bind Quebec to Federal Canada. Fertility reduction, as foregone personal procreation, consistently appears wherever "less-central" or semi-peripheral states or social formations are struggling against the hegemony of the centre. It is occurring in Southern Europe, for instance, in the most dynamic foci of European economic growth; it is occurring in South and East Asia, in the (not-so) Little Tigers, and it is occurring in Quebec. In each case the struggle takes on its own form, but in all cases it appears to involve the substitution of the imagined, national, community for the personal, familial community; the identification of individual creativity less with biological *procreation*, more with social *creation*. The agenda is set at the national level, and it is a group, not an individual agenda. If, as Caldwell (1976) argued over 20 years ago, in societies with wealth flow from parents to children there is no rational imperative to have children, it is precisely in societies such as these that children appear as a personal whim, while the normative social pressure is for self-realisation in the public, not the private arena.

If fertility is, indeed, a social phenomenon, the outcome of social forces which impose themselves on individuals, and not just the sum of ostensibly rational individual decisions, then our task, in research, is to develop a macro-sociology of fertility. Such a sociology will place fertility, or rather, the social pressure to have, or not to have children, within the context of a social situation, internally and externally structured in its relations, in its distribution of resources, and in the continuous struggle to shape and reshape this structure of relationships. The

Montreal example is but one instance of this broader enterprise, but it is one that does, I believe, provide valuable insights.

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