


Moral Intuition, Rational Disagreement, and Psychological Influence



Cody K. Shiatis

cshiatis@student.ubc.ca

University of British Columbia

This paper defends moral intuitionism against a handful of the most common objections ushered against it. After detailing some of the options available to the moral epistemologist, I extract a motivation for accepting intuitionism by contrasting the view with some other alternatives such as perceptualism and inferentialism. I then turn to address the objections that supposedly render moral intuitionism untenable. I argue that the objections from moral disagreement and the psychological effects of framing cannot be mutually defended by the objector and individually fail to undercut the justification we enjoy when we accept moral truths based on intuition. Thus, I conclude that we are rational in accepting moral intuitionism despite the objections launched against it.

Keywords: *disagreement; framing; inferentialism; intuition; morality; perceptualism; rationality*

Moral Intuitionism has been of central concern in many recent discussions around moral epistemology. While it has received its fair share of advocates in the space, it has also been met with a handful of detractors. Gaining prominence first in W.D. Ross,¹ it has also received treatments from both Robert Audi² and Michael Huemer.³ However, they have not promulgated this theory without considerable opposition. Many concerns have been raised concerning moral

¹ W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).

² Robert Audi, "Intuition and Its Place in Ethics," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 1, no.1 (2015): 57–77.

³ Michael Huemer, "Revisionary Intuitionism," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 25, no.1 (2008): 368–392

disagreement and its ramifications on the status of intuition and the effects of framing on its reliability. I contend that moral intuitionism stands shoulders above some of its closest epistemological competitors and argue that these objections fail to deal the death blow to the theory.

Comparing moral intuitionism with both inferentialism and perceptualism, I will argue that intuitionism has the advantage over the two because both views lack explanatory power. Inferentialism is the view that moral beliefs are justified through rational inference. If this view were true, it would beg the question when we consider epistemic normative duties, like that of believing a conclusion which is a logical consequence of the premises. What motivates us to accept the conclusion of a sound argument? Arguably we are not coerced to do so, but we have a normative duty to be rational in such circumstances. What accounts for this normative duty? If inferentialism is true, then we must have an inference that justifies our normative duty to accept logically sound argumentation, but then why accept that inference? Thus, this view begs the question when we consider epistemic duties. Perceptualism fares no better. According to this theory, moral beliefs are ultimately justified by our perceptual faculties. We need only show an example of some plausibly justified moral proposition which is not justified by virtue of perceiving the non-moral facts involved. I point out that the view struggles to account for modal propositions that contain ethical content, since perceiving the relevant non-moral facts tells us nothing about what is necessarily true.

I will then turn to some of the objections launched at moral intuitionism and show how they fail to spell trouble for the theory. Moral disagreement often makes use of the assumption of epistemic parity. Two people who disagree and are on epistemic par with one another show that intuitions are unreliable, since the same faculty of intuition leads to contradictory results. Following Audi, I will challenge the notion that we are ever justified in believing we are on complete epistemic par with one another in the event of disagreement. Furthermore, consider the framing effects that figure so prominently in the second objection. Framing is the result of altering ethical thought experiments in a morally irrelevant way and it is deployed to show that our intuitions are inconsistent. However, these psychological effects also undermine the thesis that we are justified in believing we are on epistemic par. So, the objector can plausibly only defend one or the other; they cannot claim that disagreement and the psychological effects of framing both reduce the likelihood of intuitionism, since these claims are mutually exclusive. I will also reject the claim that framing effects undermine our moral intuitions, because the more general the scope of an intuition the less susceptible it is to framing. We would expect to see framing effects have some force when it comes to specific and difficult philosophical problems (i.e. trolley problems) but less so on more clear and uncontroversial examples. I conclude that due to the initial merits of moral intuitionism and the impotence of the objections, one is rational in accepting moral intuitionism.

WHAT MOTIVATES MORAL INTUITIONISM?

The way simple intuitionism is usually cashed out is that to have the intuition that p , for some proposition p , is to be in a mental state ϕ whereby p seems to be true. The non-inferential nature of comprehending p is either due⁴ to a sui generis and unique seeming state or derived from an adequate understanding of the

⁴ Matthew S. Bedke, "Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 45, no.3 (2008) 253–269. Bedke describes the difference between these views as a question of where to locate the seemingness attitude. It can be found in the content under consideration (as in Audi) or in an initial and qualitatively unique seeming state (as in Huemer).

self-evidence of p . Moral intuition is what you get when the content of ϕ is a normative proposition, something like ‘it is wrong to torture innocent people for fun’. The camp of ethicists who claim that at the foundation of our moral beliefs lie intuitions about moral propositions are called moral intuitionists. It is not required that all our ethical beliefs are known through intuition, but at least some must be. Rossian intuitionists, for example, believe that a handful of moral duties articulated by W.D. Ross⁵ are self-evident and constitute a prima facie duty to perform them. Philosophers have developed this view in a couple of different ways. Robert Audi has a view in which intuitively known moral propositions are self-evident, and we are justified in believing them based on adequately understanding them.⁶ Michael Huemer suggests instead that we are prima facie justified in believing anything that seems to be the case, in the absence of defeaters.⁷ On this view, the intuitions come from a sui generis seeming state. I wish to remain neutral on these views in the foregoing, although much of what I say will not be about the intuitional state itself but more focused on the products of such a state.

So, how do we come to know moral propositions? Consider a proposition like:

1. It is wrong to torture innocent people for fun

(1) seems to be true to most individuals who contemplate it carefully. The proposition carries with it its own verisimilitude. The natural question that arises with respect to (1) is: how do we know (1) is true? Before we look at the available options consider a modalized version of (1) for reasons that will become important later:

1*) There is no possible world in which ‘it is wrong to torture innocent people for fun’ is false.

In other words, (1*) suggests that (1) is necessarily true. Is (1*) as intuitive as (1)? It seems equally inconceivable that (1*) should be false as it is for (1) to be false in the actual world. Contrast this with a different pair of propositions:

2. The moon is not spatially contiguous with the earth

2*) There is no possible world in which ‘the moon is not spatially contiguous with the earth’ is false.

(2) is true of course, and it may just be justified by a simple perceptual experience. We hardly need to appeal to any inference that demonstrates the spatial distinctness of the moon and the earth. (2*), on the other hand, is not true at all, let alone intuitive. It is possible that there exists a world in which the earth is connected to the moon by means of a kind of shaft, perhaps resembling a barbell. I contrast these two

⁵ Ross’s duties are as follows: fidelity, veracity, non-injury, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, reparation and gratitude. This list may strike some as arbitrary, perhaps additions or omissions need to be made. Alternatively, some principles may be reducible to others. Clearly, these principles were not meant to exhaust the possibilities of prima facie duties. Audi also adds liberty and respectfulness. Robert Audi, “Intuition, Inference and Rational Disagreement in Ethics,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11, no.5 (2008): 476.

⁶ Audi, *Intuition, Inference and Rational Disagreement in Ethics*, 478.

⁷ Huemer, “Revisionary Intuitionism,” 370.

examples to emphasize how little difference there appears to be between (1) and (1*); they enjoy a phenomenological resemblance which other propositions (even intuitive ones⁸) do not share with their modalized counterpart. So, we can confidently say that (1*) is intuitive if (1) is.

Revisiting our initial question with this in mind: how do we know a moral proposition like (1*) is true?⁹ Three live epistemological options present themselves. For a moral belief with the content of (1*) it could be justified by an inference from a set of premises to a conclusion that (1*); it could be perceived by a kind of perceptual process where the content of (1*) supervenes on some non-moral facts; or it could be a basic belief, which is a belief that is not formed on the basis of any inference. On a foundationalist epistemology, those basic beliefs which are warranted or justified are termed properly basic.¹⁰ These are in effect regress-stoppers: they are warranted beliefs which we hold in a non-inferential way and which we are licensed to do so in the absence of any overriding defeaters of equal or greater epistemic weight.

First consider whether we are justified in believing (1*) based on some inference. Those who endorse this view may claim that we infer (1*) from (1). Two issues with this assertion: first is that it would be logically invalid to infer (1*) from (1),¹¹ and second is that we only move the problem over to (1). What gives us the ability to infer (1) at all? Perhaps, we infer (1) from more general moral principles such as 'it is wrong to ϕ if ϕ results in less overall well-being and flourishing of the human species'. Again, we only kick the question upstairs to these general principles. Besides that, a more devastating objection to inferentialism exists. Consider epistemic normative duties; those duties that govern what we ought to believe or assent to. Why accept the conclusion of a sound logical argument? Perhaps, it is virtuous to follow the evidence where it leads and to love the truth, however, nothing constrains us inescapably to assent to the conclusion of a good argument. Even after seeing the logical or probabilistic connections between a set of propositions and what they entail, we may still resist implementing the belief into our noetic structure. This could be for several reasons such as stubbornness, incompatibility with cherished beliefs, incompetence, and so on. Nevertheless, it should be agreed that something like the following principle is true:

3. We have a prima facie duty to be rational.

Inferentialism would suggest that for (3) to be justified, it must be inferred from other propositions. The problem is that (3) contains the moral reason for why we ought to abide by valid reasoning in the first place. By providing an inference to justify (3), we assume the truth of (3) and thus beg the question. Therefore, on pain of circularity, we must not consider (3) as inferentially justified. If the inferentialist wants to assert that all moral knowledge is inferential at bottom, then they run squarely into this difficulty.

We are not yet in a place where we can claim (1*) (or for that matter (3)) as intuitive. There exists another epistemological option which may account for our moral knowledge: perceptualism. This view suggests

⁸ I am assuming that there is a fact of the matter with respect to (1). In other words, moral realism, in some shape or form, is assumed true.

⁹ My argument here does not hinge entirely on (2) being intuitive or not. All that I aim to show is that the truth of (2) is assessed differently than the truth of (or lack thereof) of (2*), whereas the same is not true of (1) and (1*).

¹⁰ Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹¹ Similarly, inferring (2*) from (2) would be plainly invalid.

that our moral beliefs are ultimately derived from perceptual experience. We first have a perceptual experience of some state of affairs, like that of a person plunging a knife into the back of someone else, and then we have the concomitant experience of the moral properties which supervene on those states, like the wrongness of such an action. Preston Werner, for example, argues that a moral property like ‘badness’ can be represented in the content of a perceptual experience.¹² For our purposes in assessing the motivation behind moral intuitionism, we need not refute the thesis that perception of moral properties is possible. All that needs to be shown is an instance of a justified moral belief which we do not (or cannot) form based on perceptual experience. I believe that (1*) serves as a prime example of this. There does not seem to be any perceptual experience which could serve to bridge the gap between an ordinary claim like (1) and a modal claim like (1*). Perceptual experience does not tell us anything about what is necessarily true or false, at most it can confirm what we already know to be possible.¹³ Thus, if we know a proposition like (1*) we do not know it via perceptual experience.

So, by a process of elimination, we may conclude that a proposition like (1*) is known through moral intuition. But there remains one more escape for those who are partial to skepticism. The skeptic might suggest that we do not know (1*) at all. Perhaps moral truths about possible worlds are not knowable by agents in a cognitive position such as we find ourselves. Why think this? Consider whether (1) would hold in a possible world that had no moral agents whatsoever. Suddenly, it becomes less clear that (1) is necessary when we factor in worlds constituted by no moral actors at all. It must be said that this retort is special pleading in the case of moral propositions. Typically, we are not skeptical of the claim that ‘all bachelors are unmarried,’ which is a necessary truth and holds even in worlds where no bachelors exist. We do not have any special reason to handle a moral proposition like (1*) differently than we would any other necessary truth. An explanation is owed to those of us who accept this proposition as necessary. Indeed, whatever reason the skeptic might have must be of such epistemological significance that it is more plausible to accept that reason than it is for us to accept that ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ has the same modal status as (1*). For now, it is sufficient to point out that the objector does not give us good reasons to handle modal moral propositions any differently than non-moral modal propositions.

Returning to moral intuitionism, it appears that this view is an inevitable result of epistemological foundationalism coupled with the belief that moral knowledge is possible. The significance of foundationalism is key in this regard. We have seen that a moral proposition like (1*) is not justified by inference nor by perceptual experience. If we want to say that we are justified in accepting some moral beliefs as basic, then we are committed to the existence of a faculty which confers non-inferential, *prima facie* justification on those beliefs. This is the explanatory role that positing the faculty of intuition plays. A way to cache this out in externalist terms¹⁴ would be to suggest that an organism whose cognitive

¹² Preston Werner, “Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13, no.3 (2016): 294–317.

¹³ Example: it is possible that my height be 5 foot 11 inches because I can see that my height is indeed 5 foot 11 inches in the actual world. Based on this perceptual experience, I can also form the belief that it is possible for me to be any height which is not actually my height (i.e., 6-foot, 4-foot, etc.).

¹⁴ I remain neutral here on the dichotomy between internalism and externalism. I am persuaded, however, that foundationalism and externalism complement each other better than foundationalism and internalism.

faculties are functioning properly¹⁵ will naturally form the belief that (1*) is true or that (3) is true, without the need for an evidential basis supporting either.

I believe we can see from this short discussion the benefits of adopting intuitionism and extending it to the moral sphere. The other live alternatives were shown to be fatally flawed or have null explanatory power with respect to some of the general moral propositions we considered. Assuming we know those propositions, then we do so by means of another mechanism: namely, intuition.

TROUBLES FOR MORAL INTUITIONISM

The literature in this area has produced a handful of objections to the intuitionist thesis. Space permits us to discuss only a couple. The first is that frequent and widespread moral disagreement occurs between individuals who agree on the relevant non-moral facts.¹⁶ This observation serves to undercut the reliability of intuition, since the same faculty responsible for the belief in a certain moral proposition is also responsible for the contrary belief that an interlocutor might hold. A second objection concerns the psychological effects of framing various ethical thought experiments differently in ways that are, in fact, irrelevant. The claim is that because we often treat these alterations as morally relevant when they are not, our intuitions are unreliable.

Before addressing these objections, it is important to specify what standard of reply is required to deal with them adequately. From the foundationalist perspective, beliefs such as “it is wrong to torture innocent people for fun” (or, for that matter, (1*) and (3) as I have argued above) are properly basic. These moral beliefs join company with other properly basic beliefs, such as belief in the reality of the past or the existence of other minds distinct from my own. When you consider beliefs of this variety, it becomes clear that it would be futile to try to supply an inference to justify them¹⁷ in the event that they come under scrutiny. On the other hand, they carry a phenomenological conviction and degree of warrant that make them especially difficult to defeat. It is not the case that properly basic beliefs are indefeasible per se, but any proposed defeater must have at least an equal degree of warrant to that enjoyed by the targeted belief. From the outset, it might already be clear that none of the aforementioned objections to moral intuitionism have that level of warrant ascribed to them. Perhaps, when taken together, they form a strong enough cumulative case such that we should temper our confidence in moral intuitionism or even be motivated to prefer an alternative view. The question ahead of us is whether these objections succeed in what they set out to do. Let us take each in turn.

Disagreement

Consider two individuals reflecting on the justificatory status of a proposition like (1*). Both fully understand the content involved in the proposition, the scope to which it applies, and so on. Now imagine that they both disagree on the truth or falsity of (1*). Does this not show that our intuitions can lead to varied results and are hence unreliable? Even if we find much agreement on other intuitive propositions,

¹⁵ Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹⁶ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology,” in *Metaethics after Moore* 339–365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹⁷ It is unclear if this is even possible in the case of a belief like ‘the past is real.’ Suppose a skeptic challenges you to justify (via inference) that the past is real. Any inference you give them would make use of premises, which, unless occurrent with the stating of those premises, assumes you argued for those premises just moments before. Thus, the premises that comprise the inference leading to the conclusion that ‘the past is real’ assumes the past is real and is viciously circular.

the looming possibility of disagreement seems to call into question the veracity of any particular intuition we have. Furthermore, disagreement appears to be an empirical fact when it comes to evaluating ethical thought experiments such as the trolley problem.¹⁸ It is worth mentioning that disagreement seems to be less prevalent the more general the moral principle is. Judging individual cases, like that of the trolley problem, gives rise to far more opposing ethical judgments than we would expect (1*) to invoke. Nevertheless, the problem remains for intuitionists: how shall we account for the widespread and frequent disagreement among our intuitive judgments?

This objection makes use of an assumption that is controversial at best, namely that of epistemic parity. Epistemic parity is necessary for the objection to succeed because otherwise the apparent disagreement may not lie in our intuitive judgments but may instead be located in an altogether different cognitive input. So, what are the conditions under which we would be justified in believing that an epistemic peer was approaching a moral quandary on a level playing field? After a disagreement arises, what likelihood can we assign to the idea that they have both (1) considered the relevant proposition with equivalent conscientiousness, and (2) are not influenced by rationally irrelevant psychological factors or background beliefs? These are very difficult conditions to satisfy, especially when we consider the justification necessary to defeat a properly basic belief. The problem is compounded when we factor in the many other inputs that may create a differential epistemic background. Robert Audi lists three additional complications:

One is that someone else's disbelieving *p* is itself a reason, for a person who rationally believes *p*, to doubt that the other is a full-scale epistemic peer in the matter. The second is that we are better positioned to make critical appraisal of our own evidence and of our responses to it than of anyone else's evidence or responses to that evidence... Third, as we check and recheck our own grounds for a justified belief that *p* and our responses to them, we tend to increase our justification for believing *p*, at least where we retain that belief.¹⁹

These variables make the disagreement objection much less effective and place the idea of epistemic parity out of reach. To defeat a properly basic belief such as (1*), as I have argued, we must have at least as much warrant in accepting that our interlocutor is on epistemic par with us as we have warrant for accepting (1*) in the first place. But for the many reasons mentioned above, this cannot be achieved. Granted, the possibility of disagreement does not undermine justification for a belief in (1*), but perhaps it can undercut the reliability of intuition as a faculty. This would render any particular belief we form by means of intuition dubious, in the same way that an encyclopedia containing 30% factual errors would cast suspicion on any particular belief you formed by reading it. However, the disagreement objection arguably does not present a worry here either. Although disagreement is very common in ethical matters, we are in no position to say that these disagreements are largely due to the capriciousness of intuition as opposed to a multitude of background epistemic inputs. Intuition itself may be extremely reliable, for all

¹⁸ Sinnott-Armstrong, 349.

¹⁹ Audi, *Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics*, 490.

we know, while the other cognitions required to converge on agreement may be the true source of unreliability. Again, we are not given a strong enough reason to believe intuition is the culprit.

We also have some evidence that irrelevant psychological factors sometimes tamper with our intuitive judgments. The effects of framing moral scenarios can cause people to judge inconsistently. This itself is a problem for intuitionists to address, but it is important to note here that the effects of framing and disagreement cannot be defended together as objections to intuitionism. This is because framing effects undermine the assumption of epistemic parity as much as any other irrelevant psychological inputs or background beliefs. Thus, the overall cumulative case against intuition is weakened because these objections mutually exclude each other. I have tried to show that the prevalence of disagreement does not accomplish an adequate refutation of intuition. But what about framing? Next, I will evaluate whether framing is sufficient to undercut our intuitive justification.

Biases and Framing

There have been a healthy handful of empirical studies demonstrating that framing hypothetical moral cases in such a way that the moral content stays constant, but the wording or something else is altered, affects people's judgments of those cases. Judgments can vary depending on the order in which the cases are presented, whether the participant is the one acting or observing a third party, and the language used to frame the scenario. A classic example comes from the psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.²⁰ They showed that participants changed their assessments depending on whether a case was framed in terms of lives "saved" versus people "dying." It turns out that people are much more risk-averse when the "Asian disease"²¹ scenario is framed in terms of lives saved. This and other results present a problem for the intuitionist, since we often take our intuitions about specific cases to be decisive evidence for or against moral theories. Because intuitions seem to be arbitrarily manipulated by irrelevant factors like wording and ordering, we cannot fully depend on them as evidence. The question is: how severe and prominent are these framing effects? James Andow conducted a study where he found a small influence of framing on intuitions about moral relevance (i.e., what counts in favor of an act versus what counts against it). This study provides some reason to think that our intuitions are vulnerable to framing and thus not as stable as was presumed. However, Andow does not take these results to amount to a full-scale refutation of intuitionism. He writes, "the main take-home message of the current studies is that any such framing effects on intuitions about moral relevance are *minor*."²² A pattern emerges in these studies that although framing effects are present their impact is exaggerated. Horvath and Wiegmann investigate the impact that expertise has on immunizing oneself against the influence of biases.²³ They conclude that

²⁰ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science* 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458.

²¹ The 'Asian-disease' scenario is intended to show how framing the same hypothetical situation in different terms leads to variation in choice. Specifically, it uses the language of 'saving' lives versus 'lives lost.' The scenario is presented to participants asking them to choose between two options. They can choose the guarantee of saving 200 lives while 400 will perish, or they can take the risky option of having 1/3 chance that everyone is saved versus 2/3 chance no one will be saved. The same thought experiment is then presented in terms of lives lost (as opposed to lives saved) and the results are that people are more willing to gamble when the situation is framed in terms of lives lost and they are more risk averse when it is framed in terms of lives saved. This is irrational since the two are essentially equivalent other than mere wording.

²² James Andow, "Are Intuitions about Moral Relevance Subject to Framing Effects?" *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2017): 140. Emphasis added.

²³ Joachim Horvath and Alex Wiegmann, "Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgement," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 100, no. 2 (2022): 342–359.

experts²⁴ only perform slightly better when dealing with framing effects and that one cannot sensibly mount an ‘expertise defense’ when the trustworthiness of intuitions is challenged.

Two modest experiments have been mentioned, and although their respective results do not find excessive persuasion from biases and framing, the fact remains that such influences exist at a moderate level. Does this spell trouble for the intuitionist project? Two points are worth highlighting here. First, these studies typically present participants with specific philosophical cases (e.g., trolley problems) that require special heuristic reasoning when considered in isolation. It would be worth asking whether more generalized principles are more resistant to such effects. A proposition like (1*) or (3) appears to be more uncontroversial than trolley scenarios—similar to how the faculty of perception is generally more reliable when dealing with nearby medium-sized objects as opposed to the very distant or the microscopic. Second, these studies may contain an inherent duplicity that confuses participants. When presented with two or more alternatives, it is natural to assume that they differ in some relevant way, even if that difference is morally irrelevant. The “Asian disease” case study is an example of this. The study may be designed in such a way that it prompts people to judge inconsistently. A more transparent scenario would be something like “heads I win, tails you lose.” We may be able to initially trick people into choosing one option over the other, but because the equivalence of both outcomes is painfully obvious in this case, we would expect to see less inconsistency than in the “Asian disease” scenario.

Setting those two minor points aside, does the objection sweep away the justification that moral intuition enjoys? Recall that the standards are very high for an objection to be a successful defeater of intuition. The effects of framing and biases are not strong enough to warrant the belief that they have a higher positive epistemic status than the reliability of moral intuition. The evidence is not impressive enough to cast doubt on the outputs of that faculty in a general sense. The aforementioned studies bear out just how moderate the effects really are. Moreover, they do not raise skeptical concerns about accepting propositions like (1*) as properly basic. It seems to me that I have more warrant for my belief in (1*) than for the belief that (1*) is a mere product of bias. For this reason, it is difficult to defeat the warrant held by intuition unless the evidence of framing were overwhelming. Only then would we have sufficient reason to question (1) our justification for a particular belief like (1*), and (2) the overall reliability of moral intuition as a cognitive faculty.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we have seen several reasons to accept that moral intuition accounts for the justification of some of our moral beliefs. This is not to say that moral beliefs are never justified by inference or perception, only that not all are. When other epistemological alternatives fail, what remains is a non-inferential, non-perceptual, direct, intuitive justification. Moral intuition, however, comes with challenges. We examined both the objection from disagreement and the problem of framing effects and biases. The issue with disagreement is that it assumes we can disagree while maintaining complete epistemic parity. Yet a host of variables call into question whether we are ever truly on epistemic par, making it difficult for the objection to reach the strength needed to undermine moral intuitionism. The same difficulty afflicts the objection from the ubiquity of framing effects. Studies reveal that framing has some influence on how we evaluate ethical cases, but it is not true that we are so enveloped by these

²⁴ By experts they mean philosophically trained ethicists.

psychological factors that we must forfeit warrant in intuition altogether. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Another important point is that the detractor cannot employ both objections simultaneously, since the concept of epistemic parity is incompatible with the psychological framing experienced by some but not all. What motivates moral intuitionism remains epistemically stronger than the cumulative effort to cast doubt on its veracity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andow, James. "Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Subject to Framing Effects?" *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2017): 115–141.
- Audi, Robert. "Intuition and Its Place in Ethics." *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 1, no. 1 (2015): 57–77.
- . "Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11, no. 5 (2008): 475–492.
- Bedke, Matthew S. "Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2008): 253–269.
- Horvath, Joachim, and Alex Wiegmann. "Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 100, no. 2 (2022): 342–359.
- Huemer, Michael. "Revisionary Intuitionism." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 25, no. 1 (2008): 368–392.
- Plantinga, Alvin. *Warrant and Proper Function*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Plantinga, Alvin. *Warrant: The Current Debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Ross, W. D. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
- Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. "Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology." In *Metaethics After Moore*, 339–365. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." *Science* 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458.
- Werner, Preston J. "Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience." *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13, no. 3 (2016): 294–317.