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Article

Hermeneutics as Embodied Existence

Marja Schuster, RN, PhD
Senior Lecturer
Red Cross University College
Stockholm, Sweden
marja.schuster@rkh.se

Abstract

This article explores the possibilities and limits of a hermeneutic way of being in the world, more specifically being a researcher as a part of human, embodied existence. Understanding existence as embodied highlights the subjectivity of a researcher. For a hermeneutic researcher this subjectivity is both a precondition for interpretation and something that might endanger the scientific endeavour. In this article, I examine the possibilities of combining Hans-Georg Gadamer's empathetic hermeneutics with Paul Ricoeur's critical hermeneutics as a means of both recognizing and, to some extent, controlling my subjectivity in the research process. With Gabriel Marcel I also argue for hermeneutics as an embodied experience. This is exemplified by my study with a focus on the existential dimensions of the nursing profession. The first part of the article introduces Marcel and his philosophical anthropology concerning our bodily existence as essential for shared lives with others. In the second part, this understanding of self and others is further developed by means of the hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur. In the third part, I present a way of applying hermeneutics in procedures for interviews, transcription, and analysis of data.

Keywords: embodied existence, hermeneutics, Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer, poetic transcription

What has the body to do with science? We have a long tradition in the western world of seeing the body as separated from scientific thinking. The image of an objective scientist has influenced researchers from different paradigms since Descartes (1596-1650). For this 17th- century philosopher the fact that we think was the only thing you could be sure of. As such, he laid the foundation for the primacy of rational thinking in science, reducing the body to an object. This reduction of human existence had an impact on what was understood by science and what questions were possible to examine with scientific, objective methods. Science was equivalent to the natural sciences. At the beginning of the 20th century, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) started to criticize the natural sciences and saw a risk in their objectifying tendencies and the resulting loss of norms and values that make us human. He introduced the concept of lifeworld for the examination of phenomena in our everyday life. His phenomenology made it possible to ask questions about the subjective, intentional human experience and understanding of the world. Others have followed Husserl and developed phenomenological thinking, which also involves the idea of existence as embodied. The most famous of these is probably Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the following, however, I will introduce Gabriel Marcel and his idea of embodied existence. I find his exploration of the role of feelings in encounters between human beings fruitful for my own study.

Embodied Existence

To Feel and To Think

As soon as we leave the domain of the natural sciences and start asking questions about human experience and understanding, we must acknowledge the human body as primarily existential. Our experiencing is always manifested bodily as emotional responses and feelings when confronted with different phenomena in our lives. Understanding always starts with experiencing. Otherwise there would be nothing to understand. Our lives are also intertwined with the lives of others. This idea of shared lives means that we depend on each other, which makes communication something essential for human lives. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1997) developed Husserl's philosophical thinking on human intentionality of the mind to embrace even the body. For Merleau-Ponty, communication is an act of intentional body. Experiencing precedes analysis and understanding.

Gabriel Marcel (2002) described this experiencing as the mystery of feelings (p. 24). We can never merely "think feeling" without reducing it. To think what we feel is to objectify a bodily sensation, or as Marcel suggests, to build defences around myself and raise walls between me and the other (p. 33). For Marcel, this means a loss of communication and consequently a loss of living relation between human beings. The immediacy of feelings creates reciprocity in the encounter with the other and opens us to ourselves and to the world. This exposure to feelings has the power of breaking down walls, bringing us together in co-presence. For Marcel, being-in-the-world is primarily construed as participation. From this immediate understanding, we can then go further and interpret; in other words, we distance ourselves from the immediacy of our feelings. It is not until then that we move on from participation to communication and being in relation with the other.

Is there not a paradox here? What is this distancing if not the same as objectification? If not, does the strong emphasis on subjective feelings make Marcel an agent of an extreme, subjective philosophy? Marcel (2002) solves this by introducing the concepts of body-subject and body-object (p. 26). The immediacy of feelings constitutes the understanding of human existence as being a body-subject. I would describe this understanding as being pre-reflective. With the concept of body-object, Marcel integrates distancing from the immediacy of feelings with an

understanding of human existence. It is not until then that we think feeling and strive for a more reflected understanding. But thinking feelings does not refer to objective thinking. I understand this thinking feeling as compassionate thinking, integrating being as both a body-subject and a body-object. What Marcel argued is that feelings are crucial for our understanding of ourselves and others. Feelings mediate interpretation. To reduce understanding to rational thinking means to neglect feeling as a messenger with something important to tell us. But what about subjective philosophy, which is so problematic for a researcher? The idea of the body-object saves Marcel's philosophy from solipsism, which is the world constructed solely as a subjective representation. It refers to our common, shared world in communication and in relation to each other.

Hermeneutic Existence

Marcel's philosophical underpinnings of existential body, subjectivity, and shared existence lead us to the hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur. I am now going to relate to each other their somewhat different ways of discussing hermeneutics. In the following, I thematize hermeneutics as different kinds of interpretative movements. This way of understanding hermeneutics emphasizes the dynamic character of our existence, involving encounters with others in time. In our actual lives we are embraced by history and challenged by the future.

Self and the Other

A hermeneutic way of being in the world is about making meaning of our lives. It is about trying to understand one's self and others in a common world. What do we do when we try to understand something? Understanding is not about solving a problem, but it helps us see possible problems with the phenomenon we are dealing with. In this way, it is a prerequisite for how we orient ourselves in the world in relation to one another. Our will and need to understand are initiated by situations we do not understand, by the unfamiliar ways of thinking and acting. In this "otherness" lies a threat, something that questions how I understand my existence. This happened to me at the very beginning of the process of interpreting the empirical material from a study referred to later in this article. Parts of the texts affected me in a way I was not prepared for. Over a period of time the impact of my negative, judgemental feelings made it hard to go further in the process. The threat of different ways of thinking and acting can be powerful in its denial of the other, thereby inhibiting human growth and learning. Gadamer (2003) calls for openness to this otherness and how other people make meaning of their lives (pp. 268–269).

But to focus on otherness is not enough. For Ricoeur (1992), this otherness is impossible to understand without an insight into shared lives and our dependency on one another (p. 317). Openness understood in this way points to its dialectical character, consisting of not merely being open to others but also being open to myself and my way of understanding. The otherness of the other could be seen as an invitation to togetherness in reciprocity, where I risk myself and my arbitrary, taken-for-granted understanding. What I am describing here is the hermeneutic movement between sameness and otherness, where understanding is mediated by interpretive activity actualized as reflection consisting of questions and answers (Gadamer, 2003, p. 299). It takes place in an encounter with a genuine wish to understand a phenomenon and how it affects both self and the other. In dealing with the data, it was not until I started questioning my emotional responses to the texts that I could move on to another level of interpretation.

Fore-Meanings and Understanding

Confronting my judgemental feelings was like opening a door to a hidden room. I am referring here to another hermeneutic movement that exists in time between past, present, and future. We

inherit structures of thinking, which affect our actions in encounters with others (Ricoeur, 2005, pp. 244–245, 255). Gadamer (2003) calls these structures "fore-meanings," "fore-understanding," or "prejudices" (pp. 269–270). They can be both destructive and constructive, and we are not aware of them in our everyday lives. This is also true in research. My fore-meanings are imbedded in conceptions and notions I have of others and of myself. Ricoeur (2005) defines these conceptions and notions as representations, or re-representations, of the past in the present (pp. 245, 255). In this way, the absent past becomes visible because it is present in my thoughts, affecting my self-understanding and understanding of others, as well as how I act and how I am directed to my future.

When doing research, in my case when interpreting texts, the hidden fore-meanings might lead to superficial interpretations based on unreflected conceptions. I see what I want to see and ignore the possibilities offered to me by the text. Gadamer (2003) calls these kinds of interpretations "arbitrary fancies" (p. 266). As a researcher I risk violating the text, that is, interpreting meanings of the phenomenon I am investigating without actually encountering the text. The interpretation is merely a projection of myself through the text. The subjectivity of the researcher, however, is also a precondition which points out the direction of the interpretation. Without it we are lost in emptiness. Gadamer (2003) struggles with this paradox when he states that the text needs to be protected against misunderstandings based on the arbitrariness of the interpreter (pp. 268–269). It is crucial never to forget that the text represents its own meanings. As an interpreter I must strive for openness to possible meanings of the text and be sensitive to myself at the same time. The text seduces me with its familiarity and provokes me with its otherness. My fore-meanings are imbedded in my responses to the text. They are brought to light and as such their impact on my understanding of the text can be questioned. In my case this meant having access to the eyes and ears of other researchers, including nursing researchers. Once unveiled by constructive questioning of my interpretations, I was able to evolve in the critical thinking so central in research.

The hermeneutic movement in time, between fore-meanings and understanding, is a pathway back to the past, to structures imbedded in our traditions, which conduct our understanding of the present and what we strive for in the future. In this way, the hermeneutic project can be described as an understanding and renewal of tradition by making visible its fundamental prejudices. The unveiled, destructive fore-meanings are actually made fruitful in that we now see more clearly problems with our present lives. The insight of "belonging to history" also means that we are inevitably implicated in the interpretive situation (Gadamer, 2003, p. 276). I can never totally free myself from my fore-meanings, or put myself aside from the situation, and be an objective observer.

Understanding and Explanation

Hermeneutics is about involvement in human encounters. As a researcher I struggle for ways to deal with my subjectivity. This struggle is a dynamic, non-linear process of striving for understanding of what it means to be human. So far in this article I have explored the process of interpretation as movements between sameness and otherness and as movements in time between past, present, and future. A third way of understanding the complexity of hermeneutics is to explain it as a movement between proximity and distance.

Becoming aware of collective ideas from the past as components in our present self-understanding facilitates a critical approach to unreflected thinking and acting. In other words, it is not enough to be sensitive and open in the hermeneutic situation. Ricoeur (1993) suggests that interpretation based solely on empathy results in naïve understanding (p. 149). In more reflected

understanding we need a space between the other and ourselves and, in my case, between the text and myself. The hermeneutic movement between proximity and distance creates this space.

Proximity actualizes the subject's capacity to sense another person's feelings in trying to understand this person, but proximity also means to be aware of one's own feelings in the encounter, and to be near oneself. Proximity without awareness of one's own feelings is problematic, even destructive, because of the risk that arbitrary, projective interpretations violate the other. The hermeneutic being-in-the-world calls for a capacity to distance, but it is not the same as being objective. This is where explanation has its role as the saviour of hermeneutics. Ricoeur (1993) suggests that understanding needs explanation to sustain the integrity of the text against arbitrary interpretations (pp. 73–74).

The demand for explanations defends the text against the subjectivity of the researcher. Understanding must be mediated by explanation in a reflective movement between proximity and distance. This critical dimension of hermeneutics becomes apparent in the encounter between the reader and the text with a focus on language. The significance of language for self-understanding lies in the assumption that words are not only signs, but they also have a meaning (Ricoeur, 1993, p. 61). Understanding a text by means of explanation involves systematic analysis and argumentation where parts of the text are explained in relation to the whole text and vice versa. This means that words are set against other words, against whole sentences, and against the whole text (p. 50). Explaining the text is an aspect of hermeneutics in methodological thinking that develops understanding systematically and analytically.

Hermeneutics engages our past and inherited traditions, which have an impact on our present and future lives. Thus far, as a researcher, I have been engaged in understanding and explaining individual lives described in texts. To leave interpretations at this point might raise ethical questions concerning my responsibility as a researcher. It is my duty to dig deeper to make it possible for my informants to carry on with their lives. Ricoeur (1993) describes this digging deeper as "unfolding the world ahead of the text" (p. 77). The world he is referring to is our common, shared world. How we experience something remains private, but its possible meanings can be shared with others. This insight of shared lives makes it possible for us to transcend from the actual toward the possible. It means to recontextualize the text by means of a perspective different from the original context in which the text was born. In my case, this meant relating the professional context of nursing to philosophical thinking regarding the common conditions of human life. For me as a researcher, this offered a pathway from accusation to reconciliation in the deep understanding of the existential challenges in nursing.

The Hermeneutic Endeavour

I have outlined above the role of subjectivity in how we understand ourselves and others. I have also described how this subjectivity can be understood as embodied existence actualized as emotional responses and feelings in encounters with others. Further, I have illuminated the complicity of subjectivity when interpreting texts. In the following, I will describe an application of these philosophical underpinnings exemplified by my research concerning existential dimensions in the nursing profession (Schuster, 2006).

The Interview

The overall purpose of my study was to explore nurses' self-understanding and their understanding of the other, the patient. The empirical material consisted of 14 in-depth interviews with registered nurses who worked with severely ill patients. The choice of informants was based

on my own experiences of working with cancer patients. The openness of hermeneutic research when interviewing meant that I had only a few specified questions prepared in advance. This did not mean that I was not prepared for my task. My focus was on the main question of my study and I had a perspective on which I was concentrating (Van Manen, 1990). My focus was on understanding the experience of being a nurse when encountering severely ill patients. My perspective was the existential dimension of the profession evolving from nurses' self-understanding and their understanding of patients.

The interviews had a strong orientation toward the existential dimension. The strong orientation was gained by using words with existential connotations. Choosing these specific words was based on my experiences as a nurse, as well as my nursing education, and could be understood as a representation of my fore-meanings. The words could be seen as possible keys to past memories. These words included the following: difficult conversation, hope, comfort, suffering, death, love, encounter, and meaning. At the same time it was crucial to maintain an open attitude toward the phenomenon and the informants.

After initial questions of a general nature concerning their work, I asked the nurses to reflect on the specific words and even to narrate actual encounters with patients. Most commonly the nurses started with general descriptions of the words. It was not until they described actual encounters with patients that they could go deeper into their narration. My ambition was to give them time and space to narrate, while I remained silent most of the time. The focus was on the meaning-making of the informants (Tappan & Brown, 1989). I broke my silence when I needed more specific descriptions and reflections. I did this with three open-ended questions: What did you think in the encounter? What did you feel? How did you act?

Not asking precise questions was a way of finding a balance between the conversational nature of the interview and the focus on specific themes, that is, between openness and orientation during the interview. The purpose of using key words was also to encourage narration. Narratives as a starting point for my interpretations put the human voice in focus. The meaning-creating activity of narrating aims at understanding one's self and others, our relations, and our world. Focusing the nurses' thoughts, feelings, and actions was a way of actualizing their professional self-understanding and their understanding of the other, the patient. To encourage nurses to relate thinking and action with feelings was also a way to illuminate embodied existence in their narrations. Furthermore, these individual narrations could also be seen as stories of a profession. They created a link between the present unique situation and the knowledge base of nursing and caring inherited from the past.

Transcription: Text as Existence

To interpret texts is to enter into the world of language. In a hermeneutic study it is not only important to cover *what* the texts are about but also *how* this is described. It is this *how* that calls for interpretation. The question here is, What does it mean when informants describe a phenomenon in a specific way? The focus on language emphasizes the role of transcribing in hermeneutic studies. Things happen when spoken words become written words. My intention with the first transcription was to write down the interviews verbatim. In addition to words, it is possible to note pauses, laughter, crying, and so forth. Other types of nonverbal communication, such as gestures and facial and bodily expressions, were lost. The results of the first transcription looked like this (with the double points indicating pauses in the text):

> *So when it comes to work and .. patients and so .. it's often quite small things, because you can never promise the big things, and keep it, but .. you can hope .. for .. a turning*

> *point or an improvement or so, with help from the small changes. Because it is obvious*
> *that .. both patients and families are extremely dependent on the feeling of hope. When*
> *they don't feel it .. well then it gets really hard .. for them and then, it hits back on me as*
> *a nurse too, that I notice it and .. feel obliged to maybe, to have to try to find something*
> *for them to hope for in order for them to carry on.*

I found it difficult to explore the text. The form itself forced me into a reading that was much too fast. It compelled me to carry on and it did not encourage me to stop and reflect. Was there another way to transcribe the interview? How could I make it evolve more slowly? The idea of the slowness of the text is to give words time and space to communicate their significance. It was here that the idea was born to transcribe the interviews by doing the word-wrap following the pauses in the respondents' speech. The second transcription results looked like this:

> *So when it comes to work and*
> *patients and so*
> *it's often quite small things*
> *because you can never promise the big things*
> *and keep it*
> *but*
> *you can hope*
> *for*
> *a turning point or an improvement or so*
> *with help from the small changes*
> *because it is obvious that*
> *both patients and families are extremely dependent on the feeling of hope*
> *when they don't feel it*
> *well then it gets really hard*
> *for them and then*
> *it hits back on me as a nurse too*
> *that I notice it and*
> *feel obliged to maybe*
> *to have to try to find something for them to hope for in order for them to carry on*

The quotation took the form of a poem. Other researchers have used different kinds of poetic forms as a means of data representation (Carr, 2003; Furman, 2006; Gee, 1985; Glesne, 1997; Pointdexter, 2002; Willis, 2002). Speech transcribed like this illuminates the silences that sometimes speak louder than the words (Van Manen, 1990). These silences become important in anticipating the meaning beyond words. They can be expressions of things we find difficult to formulate or hard to talk about. When silence is understood as a way of existing from which our speech emanates and to which it returns, this makes silence in narrating as significant as the words spoken (Van Manen, 1990). The dialectic of speaking and being silent is an aspect of our narrative identity.

Transcription in poetic form became a part of the interpretation because this structuring affected the workup of texts in several ways. Not only did the silences emanate more clearly, but even words became more significant. Both silences and speech were impregnated with meaning. Transcription as a poem became an aesthetic experience due to its strength to communicate meaning to me, the reader. It released ". . . a rare feeling of reflective play in interpretation and language" (Glesne, 1997, p. 218). Text transcribed like this began to breathe; in other words, it became alive. This had consequences for my encounter with it. The existential breathing of the text reminded me of human vulnerability, and I often felt deeply moved. You could describe this

as an embodied experience of interpreting activity. Willis (2002) describes something similar when addressing the encounter with a text as a "contemplative engagement" (p. 4). Pointdexter (2002) talks about "a deeper sense of empathy" (p. 70) and Furman (2006) about "multisensory insights" (p. 565) gained through poetic transcription. The poetic form invited me as a reader into proximity, into Marcel's participation, based on shared existence in reciprocity. At the same time it created the distance necessary for interpretation because the form allowed parts of the text, separate words and sentences, to emanate more clearly.

Interpretation: Text and Existence

The interpretation of the texts evolved in a dialectical movement between different types of reading. A naïve reading of a text meant that, as a reader, I had an immediate, unreflected understanding of the text (Ricoeur, 1988). This could be described in terms of projection where reading only confirmed what I already knew (Gadamer, 2003). Still, this kind of contact with the text was crucial. With Marcel (2002) I argue that to read naïvely is to be near the text as an interpreting body-subject. To allow myself this kind of proximity was to enter into the world of the text. At the same time it was the key to my hidden fore-meanings as a reader. This unreflected approach could be described as affected reading based on the feelings aroused in me in the encounter with the text. To be sensitive in this way is a precondition for Gadamer's openness to the text. What about the otherness of the text so important for Gadamer? This otherness was imbedded in my feelings of unfamiliarity, surprise, and resentfulness. On the other hand, with Ricoeur and his thinking on reciprocity, I could focus on my feelings of sharing and identification. In doing hermeneutics, both the unfamiliar and the familiar should be questioned because the task is not merely to understand the other, the text, but also to understand one's self as an interpreting subject. This calls for a critical approach, or a reading from distance (Ricoeur, 1988).

Reading from distance is a form of reading aimed at creating a space between the researcher and the text. It is more systematic and analytical compared to the naïve, unreflected reading. Using Marcel (2002), this could be described as striving for being a body-object. However, my reading is still influenced by the naïve reading, and I am following the pathways created by the emotional encounter between me and the text. To leave proximity with the text and strive for distance is the critical aspect of the interpreting activity. This critical approach means allowing alternative interpretations to evolve and confront each other, but they must always be discussed and validated in relation to the actual text. To work with interpretation in this way consists of problematizing the use of words and phrases related to other words and phrases in the text, confronting parts of the text with the whole text, and vice versa. Consequently, the more reflective and critical understanding of the text is mediated by explaining the text.

The turn from the naïve reading to the critical reading also meant a turn toward myself as an interpreting subject. The turn from being a body-subject to being a body-object was actualized by questioning my initial emotional responses to the texts. It was then that my fore-meanings could be unveiled. The question I asked myself here was as follows: Why do I react as I do when confronted by the texts? Marcel's thinking feeling was the key to understanding how I constituted myself as a subject in the encounter with the texts from the perspective of my research topic. In my hermeneutic task this was the most difficult part. It meant leaving proximity and becoming an outsider, which was difficult because not only were my informants' understandings unveiled but also my own self-understanding. Heidegger (1971) described this venture, which can be painful, as "thinking against oneself" (p. 8). How does one think against oneself? My experience was that it was very difficult, and almost impossible. To accomplish this, I needed a critical co-reader who was able to point to interpretations based on unreflected fore-meanings. For me, it was essential

that my co-reader represented a totally different profession. She could unveil my taken-for-granted thinking about the nursing profession, which was totally hidden from me. Suddenly I saw my interpretations through her eyes.

The relation between these two ways of reading could be described as being intertwined. I not only go back and forth between parts of the text and the whole text, but I also alternate between proximity and distance, between being a body-subject and a body-object. In other words, an experience-based reading and a structured, analytical reading succeed each other. Though to leave the text here would mean to leave it, and myself, unveiled, even hurt. It is not enough to seek intertextual explanations to understand a phenomenon. Coming so far, you have only understood and explained an individual experience. The deep significance of meaning-making in hermeneutics calls for Ricoeur's (1993) unfolding the world ahead of the text (p. 77). For this unfolding to be successful, Ricoeur introduces a third kind of reading. The interpretations of individual texts describing individual experiences need further explanation for deeper understanding. Here the intertextual interpretations are confronted with explanations from outside the text. In my case, this meant developing and deepening the interpretations by using a philosophical, anthropological perspective from Ricoeur, Gadamer, Marcel, and even from other philosophers, for example Emmanuel Lévinas (1981, 1987). Past individual experiences of human beings are connected to our present common world and shared existence. This idea of shared lives in reciprocity does not deny the uniqueness of human beings. But, a world based solely on the individual makes it impossible for us to understand one another. For the world to be habitable we also need insight about the common conditions of human life. Understanding past and present as intertwined, in the light of the common conditions of human life, helps orient us toward the future. It is not until then that the fundamental task of hermeneutics is accomplished, that is, our life has changed in some respect.

Concluding Remarks

In this article, I have argued that collecting, transcribing, and interpreting data can be understood as an embodied activity. Initially, when I planned how to interview the nurses, this meant relying on my own experiences from encounters with severely ill patients. In other words, it meant recognizing and using my fore-meanings, and trusting my feelings for important themes in the encounters. Naturally, even my nursing education and its theoretical underpinnings contributed to these fore-meanings. The words I chose could therefore be understood as representations of a collective, educational tradition and the fore-meanings of what it means to be a nurse.

The poetic transcription of the interviews facilitated the rare play between intimacy and reflection in my encounters with the texts. Marcel's (2002) embodied existence, with a focus on feelings as mediating interpretation (p. 26), contributes to understanding the meaning of Ricoeur's (1988) naïve reading of a text (p. 175). It also makes sense of the openness to the other (the text) and self described by both Gadamer (2003, pp. 266–269) and Ricoeur (1992, p. 317). As such, recognizing the embodied existence of a researcher opens up the possibility of unveiling hidden fore-meanings, especially the destructive ones, affecting the research process. Taking the subjectivity of a researcher as a point of departure in the analysis of a text makes it possible to control it to some extent, and this contributes to more trustworthy interpretations. The subjectivity I am referring to here is not that of a self-sufficient ego. Who I am and become, even as a researcher, is dependent on others. To recognize the researcher as inescapably implicated in the research process challenges the dualistic approach to scientific work separating mind and body, self and others.

What about the dangers of poetic transcription? One risk, as I see it, is to be captivated by the text. The seduction of nearness makes it hard to distance from it. You might emotionally experience the meaning of the text as being "larger than life" and actually impossible to explain. This kind of deep empathetic understanding blocks a more critical approach to the meaning of the text. Naturally, as a researcher you can also be captivated by the text in a nearness that arouses strong feelings of resentfulness that prevent further questioning. In other words, the subjectivity of the researcher undermines the trustworthiness of the interpretation.

Hermeneutics is concerned with the will and need to understand phenomena confronting us in our human lives. With Marcel's embodied existence, hermeneutics becomes a way of existing in the world. It is not merely a question of method but something that permeates my whole existence. Gadamer (2003) implied this when he stated that understanding and interpretation belong to human experience of the world in general (p. 476). For Gadamer, reducing hermeneutics to method would be an arrogant enterprise, a technique based on a false sense of superiority of a researcher denying his or her historical and human affiliation. Combining Gadamer's and Ricoeur's hermeneutics with Marcel's philosophical anthropology, makes it possible to develop methodological thinking concerning interpretation in qualitative research, without giving up my human belonging.

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