



My Face is Thine Eye, Thine in Mine Appears: The Look of Parenting and Pedagogy¹

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“My face is thine eye, thine in mine appears.” With this double image John Donne portrayed the complete and perfect intersubjectivity of lovers. Contained within each other’s look, they share one world, constituted in the utter reciprocity of their feeling and attention, sustained by a shared perception:

Let sea-discoverers to new worlds have gone,
Let Maps to other, worlds on worlds have showne,
Let us possesse one world, each hath one, and is one.
(John Donne, “The Good-Morrow”)

The poet condenses the ego, the other, and the world into an economy of imagery that represents experience before it is numbered and named, neatly sliced and sectioned for analysis. As the poet places the world within the orbit of the lovers’ looks, so may one explore the looks that pass between parent and child and teacher and student to discover the worlds they contain as well as the worlds they deny.

By locating the world within the look, I am positing its intersubjective origins and status as an intentional object of consciousness of all who live and act within it. That is not to say that our minds create the world but that the world we know is the one we share with others. Conversely, our capacity to know others depends on this world we share, for as Merleau-Ponty has argued, we know others through their actions in the world:

At first the child imitates not persons but conducts. . . . My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things, it is above all a relation to the world. The other’s consciousness as well is chiefly a certain way of comporting himself toward the world. Thus it is in his conduct, in the manner in which the other deals with the world, that I will be able to discover his consciousness. (1964, pp. 116-7)

We come to know another through the world and the world through another. Strasser (1969) describes the first moment of intentionality, of turning-to, as a primordial association of infant and mother. Here the turning to things is collapsed into the “you” as world, things, and mother are all sought by the life energy drawn to love, knowledge, and finally survival.

There is style and form to the nurturance, the intimacy, the control, the expression and dialogue of both parenting and pedagogy. That is not to say that the forms of these two phases of care are isomorphic or that they exist in a cause-and-effect relationship. It is to say that each configuration influences the other and is in turn affected by the relations of reproduction and production.

The look provides an index to the complex relations that prevail in both parenting and pedagogy. The direct passage between persons, the look, has been celebrated by Confucius: "Look into a person's pupils; he cannot hide himself"; by Plato: "They set the face in front . . . and constructed light-bearing eyes and caused pure fire to flow through the eyes"; by daVinci: "The eye sees many things without seizing hold of them, but suddenly turns thither the central beam which . . . seizes on the images and confines such as it pleases it within the person the memory" (G. Grumet, 1982).

The look, fusing nature and culture, both provides our information about the world and expresses our understanding of it. The look that Donne's lovers share is distinguished by its reciprocity. Mutually initiated, received, and held, its symmetry is such that it shuts out the world that surrounds them. The perfect and complete mutuality of lovers is an ideal of romantic love that is sometimes echoed in sentimentalized portraits of pedagogy and parenting. We sentimentalize the powers, Ann Douglas tells us, that we have already surrendered (Douglas, 1978). As industrialization pushed women to the edges of the economy and exiled them to domesticity that substituted consumerism for productivity, educators extolled the maternal glance, praising its tenderness, modesty, self-abnegation, and moral clarity. As industrialization and urbanization prolonged childhood, requiring the exclusion of children from productive labor, the impotence of childhood was aggrandized as the innocent and pure look of truth was imputed to children. While I am not willing to adopt Sartre's phenomenology of the look that identifies the glance of the other as an inevitable and unavoidable assault of my freedom, I do share his recognition of its essential asymmetry. The structure of the look is essentially dialogical. Like speech, the look can be given and received, returned or refused, but only in those fleeting moments of fusion, those instants in the lives of lovers, parents and children, teachers and students can the look contain the complete reciprocity of which the poet dreams. Balance is static, as Grotowski's actors know (1968), for only in asymmetry is there movement. As the glance moves between parent and child, between teacher and student, it picks up pieces of the world and so enlarges our collective consciousness.

During the first day of life the eyes of the newborn are calm. The gaze of the nursing infant is disinterested, though strangely receptive to the inquiring gaze of the mother searching for signs of temperament or need. Perhaps it is the deep stillness of the infant's gaze that invites the mother's identification. "I remember the day following the birth of my daughter, my first child, when my skin, suffused with the hormones that supported labor and delivery felt and smelled like hers, when I reached for a mirror and was startled by my own reflection, for it was hers that I had expected to see there" (Grumet, 1981).

It is with some chagrin that I must admit that this infant whom I had become did not and may never know me. Her gaze was non-specific though it often rested on my face. She existed in an egocentrism of a

one which Merleau-Ponty describes as “unaware of itself, liv(ing) as easily in others as it does in itself—but which being unaware of others in their own separateness as well, in truth is no more consciousness of them than of itself” (1964, p. 119). Merleau-Ponty calls this phase pre-communication, in which individuals are undifferentiated and experience a group life. The symbiotic relation of mother-child is expressed in their gaze of mutual misunderstanding. The infant’s gaze embraces the mother in an all inclusive identification that does not recognize her. The mother sees herself in a child who lacks a self. Yet this misunderstanding hardly deserves the embarrassment that follows a false assumption of familiarity as when you call out across the street to someone whom you thought to be a friend but who turns toward you with the defensive hesitation of a stranger. The infant’s inclusiveness, the mother’s projection, the passerby’s recognition bespeak a transcendental knowledge that slides below and through the layers of identity that form through time, choice, circumstance, burdening the human spirit in the defenses that Reich (1949) called character-armour, draping it with the mantles of class, gender, and culture.

The look that passes between the newborn infant and its mother violates common courtesy. Too empty on one side, too full on the other, it is the primordial look, the first intimacy. The truth of its fusion and confusion is, like the glance of Donne’s lovers, an instant that is rarely replicated. The nursing infant sees a reflection of its own face in its mother’s, and the mother sees her own face reflected in the child’s. Fortunately, for both mother and child, the world intervenes. Yet there will be other moments as their histories are intertwined through time when they again exchange the look of generations that transfers and transforms the possibilities of personhood from one being to another.

Research reported by Bowlby (1969) indicates that neonates have better sensory discrimination soon after birth than the mythology of the infant had led us to believe. Fantz reports that as early as 48 hours after birth, there is a preference for pattern, probably related to contour rather than shape or color. A drawing of a face is preferred to that of concentric circles, and after two months solid objects are preferred to flat ones. In the early weeks of life an infant is able to focus clearly only on objects that are eight or nine inches from its eyes (Fantz, quoted by Bowlby, 1969) and is able to track an object once fixated on it (Wolff, quoted by Bowlby, 1969). The face of a mother nursing her baby is ideally situated to be so perceived. Nevertheless, it is not the appearance of the mother that the baby seems to acknowledge as quickly as it responds specifically to her voice and touch. A differential response to a mother’s voice precedes the specific response to her face, a response which does not develop until the infant is 14 weeks old. By the fourth feeding the infant demonstrates the clinging, sucking behavior as it anticipates nursing as a response to the tactile stimulus of being held close to the mother’s body and, as early as three weeks, will turn its head toward the mother at the sound of her voice.

I have offered a brief mention of some of the extensive research on neonatal development because it confirms my impression that for parent

and child the look trails behind the touch and the sound as a sensory link between mother and child. The infant is first felt, cradled against the chest, supported by hands and arms. The crawling baby clinging to the legs, the toddler present at the fingertips of an outstretched hand. For the first three years of a child's life, parents and child move through a choreography of touch with constant physical contact as a theme that joins their movements through time and space and memory.

Just as the "you," as Strasser (1969) maintains, is older than the I, so the touch is older than the look. The child under six months does not have a specular image of her own body. Whatever information she may have of her body may come from its physical sensations, from its movement, from the degree to which its movements replicate the behavior of those around her. Still, the infant may not perceive those who come and go as distinct persons. Her cries when her mother or father leaves the room bewail her own incompleteness rather than the particular absence. What Wallon has called social syncretism, that delightful fusion between self and other which we call confusion, never fully disappears. Its reappearances in adult life are tolerated in romance, in the parenting of our own children, in the experiencing of another's world through aesthetic and religious experience. We are ashamed of these perceptions when they are disclaimed by another, by the rebellious child or the distracted lover, reminding us that our expectation is an atavism from our infancy.

What has intervened is the self, a concept of identity that is founded upon an understanding of how one looks to others. When the infant first recognizes herself in a mirror, she receives information about herself that she never had before, information that she may never have received at all without the presence of a reflecting agent outside her own body. The one that the infant discovers in a mirror, in her parents' eyes, is, as Lacan (1968) maintains, an identity that is alienated at the moment that it is claimed, for the visual image of the body is mediated through the other and radically undermines the earlier sense of connection to others. Secure in the awareness that was grounded in feeling, in the mimesis of touch, movement and a sense of self that did not distinguish one's self from others, the child confronts discontinuity between herself and others as well as the unsettling information that she is seen by others as she can never see herself. Although narcissistic character disorders described in individual pathology by Kohut (1971) and in cultural pathology by Lasch (1978) come to expression at this junction in development, they are caused much earlier by a disruption in the parent and child attachment that precedes the look that issues from a separate self. Only when the passage to the world and others is facilitated through touch and feeling, the movement and melody of the primordial choreography of early attachment, can the child tolerate the threat of the look. Only when the child is secure in his attachment to the looker can the rupture in that attachment that the look signifies be borne. Otherwise the child, and later, the adult, must strive to subsume the look and the looker, to take to herself the source of herself which is the image that the other has of her. Lacan's genetic history of the look has contributed to our

understanding of narcissism. The popular misunderstanding of narcissism as self-love, perpetuated by the myth of the Greek youth morbidly drawn to his own image, misconstrues the narcissist's preoccupation with the other's look as an excessive self-esteem. On the contrary, it is the child whose early dependencies and attachment needs have been thwarted or disrupted who is drawn to his image, not as a projection of himself but as that part of himself that he gets from others.

The hide and seek games, the refusal to be observed, all accompany the child's perception of the look. Her realization of her own separateness implies the autonomy of others, and she plays out her anxiety about their appearance and disappearance in hide and seek and peek-a-boo games.

In an attempt to capture the look that has captured her, the child is drawn to the objects of the parents' world with which she shares the look that constitutes her identity. Now the look of the parent is actively sought. "Look, look," the child implores, begging the glance that will ratify her activity. Now the child follows the parents' gaze when it is not directed toward her and is thus drawn into the world of her parents' attention. For the parent and the child, the touch, the voice, and the living space they share persist in tying them to each other like the crossed taut strings of a cat's cradle. Disapproval, encouragement, contact, and guidance are as likely to come through touch and sound as they are through sight. Home is mapped on coordinates of physical intimacy: the rhythm of feet on the stairs, the sound of breathing, the cough in the night. The jacket draped over the chair, the laughter, and the warm forehead are moments of a child's presence that displace the sight of her as the primordial sensation of the other. The child is lived before it is thought. To think the child is as difficult for the parent as it is for her to think herself.² This is not to say that the parent doesn't construct an image for her child that conforms to her memories or hopes, but that identity with all its imagery is perpetually undermined and corrected by the parent's grasp, however intuited and silent, of the latent possibilities within the child that circumstances have prohibited from achieving expression. Even though the look supersedes touch, as the child draws away from parents into the family that will be formed through her own touch, just as rational secondary processes evolve to dominate the primary thought and sensual apodicticity of infant experience, the parent-child relationship has the capacity to be the social relation where these archaic modes of relating to the world through others may be expressed. Because the parent-child relationship has the capacity to endure, it undergoes transformations that release the child from the trap of the parent's look. Every look emanates from a certain perspective. The look requires distance. The nursing child, nine inches from her mother's face is placed at a nearness that precludes the manipulation of distance, the nearness of attachment.

But as movement and space enlarge the child's world, as the child's capacity to symbolize, to hold the world in her head through imagery, develops, the perspectives that she takes on the world and that the world

takes on her grow more complex and rich. The world that only could be claimed by being grasped can now be pointed to. Desire, the search for the absent object, provokes the look that fills the empty eye with intentionality. The signs that the child learns to express her need are signs that evolve within the look of the other. There is no consequence in pointing to an object if no one is there to witness the gesture.³ The capacity to symbolize, to associate signs with the world and abstraction with gratification, rests on the ratification of the other's look and ultimately upon her response.

And it is through signs or language that, Lacan maintains, the child masters the code that will release her from the look as she grasps the history and particularity of the perspective that shaped the look that shaped her. The reflection that transforms the child from the object of another's gaze into a subject requires understanding the image of oneself that is formed in the other's eye. Reflecting upon her own educational experience, Carolyn Proga, a William Smith College student, wrote this narrative a few years ago:

Saturdays, when I was younger, were always fun. I appreciated them, and looked forward to them with great eagerness. I remember one Saturday morning, in particular, in the fall of my sixth year.

My brother and I were very close. He is only a little more than a year older than me, so we were automatic companions for each other. He loved his "seniority"; a day didn't go by when I wasn't reminded of this by his saying "I'm older, you know." On that Saturday, we were playing outside together. At the time, my mother had a big thing about matching outfits. My two older sisters were dressed alike, as were Mark, my brother, and I. We were wearing similar blue jeans, T-shirts, and sweatshirt jackets, his red, mine blue. One of our favorite playthings was a silver and copper colored, peddle-powered car. There was room for only one to provide the energy, but the open space behind that seat allowed plenty of room for someone else to catch a free ride. Mark was giving me lessons on how to steer the car, everything about how to get to where you wanted to go, from both forward and backward directions. I remember how I ran over his toes, quite a few times, and smack into him, once, when the brakes proved to be a bit tricky to set into action. (Later, when I was learning how to drive a real car, Mark refused to have anything to do with the lessons.) During the course of the morning, I remember looking up at our house and seeing my father at the window of one of the upstairs bedrooms. He held his movie camera, and was recording my brother's and mine every movement.

I remember feeling very surprised. Perhaps that morning would not have remained so clear in my mind if seeing my father with a movie camera was a common thing. But it wasn't. He loved filming special occasions of my cousins or other more distant relatives, but almost never took movies of my sisters, my brother and me. The times he did take films of us were always seldom, and, also, of completely everyday actions, like summer days when we would all play in the stream of water from the garden hose in the back yard, or the games of my brother and me that fall morning.

I learned that turning a steering wheel right when moving backwards makes the front end swing left, that my brother's patience in instruction was really for his own benefit, for after that morning, he got far more free rides than me, and, from my dad, that maybe the special, unusual occasions of those people very close to you aren't always what's priceless to capture; to remember a few of the little things might be worth more.

After writing this narrative of educational experience, the student deconstructs the look that turned time into memory, that froze play into meaning:

It seems so strange, to remember how I felt when I saw my father at the upstairs window of our house, with his camera. My brother and I just didn't have as good of a time, after we realized that we were being watched and recorded. I wanted to show, just how unusual the entire event was. Yet I couldn't do it very clearly.

I never liked photographs; I always figured that if you needed a photograph of someone or something, to remember, then the person or event couldn't have been too important. John Berger, in his article "Understanding a Photograph", talks about the possibilities as to why photographs (I think that films, movies can really be considered close to the same thing) can seem so invading. The photographer chooses "... between photographing at x moment or at y moment" ("Understanding . . .", p. 180). The subject doesn't have that much of a choice. And to see the picture, later, "... always and by its nature refers to what is not seen" ("Understanding . . .", p. 180). When I see those home movies, I can remember the games; I can remember that little car so clearly, I can almost reach out and touch it. But I remember the feelings, towards my brother, towards my father, when I look at, and remember the situation, through my own mind's eye. No one else can feel that, when they see those movies.

I couldn't describe that feeling clearly at all. I made light of my "learning"; was it really so vital that I had learned how to steer that car? I think that it was more vivid, more painful, to realize that I didn't like my father watching so closely; invading. And to see those films now makes my remembrance too objective; how can I learn anything from that? ". . . nor can any such self-knowledge be properly characterized as objective knowledge" (*The Autobiographical Consciousness*, Earle, p. 9). It's aggravating—I don't like the feeling of confusion. "Know thyself", Earle stresses. But how can I, with someone—maybe even myself—looking over my shoulder?

This student, like so many of us, will carry this question throughout her life, reclaiming through language the perspective that objectifies her.

The "look" of pedagogy, like the "look" of parenting, is also arranged in time and space. If the history of the parent's look is lodged in the biological moments in the history of the child's physical development, the history of the teacher's look is lodged in culture, in the social forms and institutions that exist at any given historical moment and through which society shapes the young.

It is at this juncture that I must confess that I have, as I understand it, described the look of pedagogy in describing the look of parenting. The moments of the parental look, from the initial misunderstanding to the asymmetry in attention, from the objectification of the look to the reclamation of subjectivity through mastery of sign and language, are essential phases in the dialogue between teacher and student that we call pedagogy. Within the intimacy of the family these moments are mediated through the material struggle to maintain life. The family is always preoccupied with material necessity. Procuring and preparing food, providing and maintaining shelter, sustaining each others' bodies is the work of the family. Buber (1965) points to the apprenticeship relationship, which placed the teacher and student in a similarly purposeful yet barely rationalized relation where the work literally *at hand* defined the dimensions of the task, to exemplify a pedagogical relationship that is, like parenting, engaged with the material world. The relation of teacher to student has evolved into one that, though less clearly instrumental, has become highly intentional as the press of material necessity seeps out of schooling. Teachers and students manipulate signs and symbols. The medium through which they communicate is knowledge, the codes and methods of the academic disciplines by now highly abstracted from the material necessity and politics that originally shaped them. Buber describes its purposeful character:

The world, that is the whole environment, nature and society, "educates" the human being; it draws out his powers and makes him grasp and penetrate its objections. What we term education, conscious and willed, means *a selection by many of the effective*

world: it means to give decisive effective power to a selection of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the educator. The relation in education is lifted out of the purposely streaming education by all things, and is marked off as purpose. In this way, through the educator the world for the first time becomes the true subject of its effect. (1965, p. 89)

Buber goes on to consider the problem of intersubjectivity when purpose is gathered only into eye of the teacher:

If education means to let a selection of the world affect a person through the medium of another person, then the one through whom this takes place, rather, who makes it take place through himself, is caught in a strange paradox. What is otherwise found only as grace, inlaid in the folds of life—the influencing of the lives of others with one’s own life—becomes here a function and a law. But since the educator has to such extent replaced the master, the danger has arisen that the new phenomenon, the will to educate, may degenerate into arbitrariness, and that the educator may carry out his selection and his influence from himself and his idea of the pupil, not from the pupil’s own reality. (1965, p. 100)

If the touch and the voice are the sensual passages between parent and child, those modes of contact are associated with an intimacy that we limit to erotic or familial relations. The look dominates the classroom. The increasingly collective quality of schooling as centralized and efficient urban schools draw large numbers of students together has the effect of diminishing intimacy as touch and even sound are muted in the corridors of the nation’s schools. The grip of the visual and the primacy of spectacle are problems of contemporary life that we may turn to later, but first we need to examine the postures and perspectives that have led to the look of pedagogy.

The child’s reality that Buber specifies as one which the educator must recognize is filled with her life in the family. One of the major functions that schooling plays in our experience is the repudiation of the family. The reasons for this aversion are manifold. In this country they are tied to the impulse to forge a community and a national character from a populace drifting off into a distracting wilderness. The “Olde Deluder Satan” laws threatened members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony with the intervention of the Church if families failed to teach their children to read scripture. In the late 19th Century the ethnicity of immigrant families was consciously undermined by schools and social agencies eager to shape a conventional work force which could support the norms of collective labor. In our culture and in pre-industrial cultures, as well, schooling has provided the context where the maternal influence over the child’s development, so pervasive in the domestic setting where mothers have provided so much of the primary nurturance, is denied. The gender analysis of schooling has led us to examine the

connections between parenting and pedagogy as we investigate the meaning of the educational enterprise for the men and women whose most compelling and significant human relationships are those they have shared with their own parents and their own children. In "Conception, Contradiction and Curriculum" (Grumet, 1981) I suggested that the function of curriculum was to wrest from the overdetermination of biology and history the relation of the child to the parent, each parent hoping to contradict the necessary form of its first relation to the child, the inferential nature of the father's paternity, the symbiotic nature of the mother's maternity. Contemporary forms of curriculum were traced to the paternal project to claim and the maternal project to disclaim the child. Another study "Pedagogy for Patriarchy: The Feminization of Teaching" (Grumet, 1981a) explored the economic and social motives of the women who entered the teaching profession in the mid 1800's. There they disclaimed the power and intimacy of the mother-look, accompanied by touch and by sound, as they adopted the glance appropriate to the theatre of the classroom.

Exchanging the space and territorial markings of the home for the church, teachers adopted the classic association of knowing and seeing as well as the Christian conception of grace that is earned through the denial of the body, activity, sensuality, physical labor, and politics. Grace came from an all-seeing but unseen deity-confession was delivered to an invisible confessor. The pulpit that removed the pastor from his flock permitted the look to operate, but at a distance. Initiated by the church, with clerics as the first teachers, the look of pedagogy replicated the cleavage between actor and audience, those who gave the look and those who received it, that dominated religious ritual. Foucault traces the history of those forms through the evolution of the concept of discipline manifested in the developing institutions of medicine, the military, the penal system, and schooling. In *Discipline and Punish* (1979) he argues that the eighteenth century substituted a subtle and pervasive coercion through the training and supervision of human behavior for the terrifying spectacles of punishment and torture and the control of the other's body achieved through slavery or vassalage that had functioned as earlier forms of social control. No longer was discipline to be imposed only upon a particularly aberrant population; now it was diffused throughout the populace not as a corrective but as an essential theme constituting the education of the young:

The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formulation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. . . . In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an aptitude, a "capacity," which it seeks to increase; on the other, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns into a relation of strict subjection.

(Foucault, 1979)

Whereas the look of the parenting surpasses touch, totalizing it without obliterating it or the symbiosis it expresses, the look of pedagogy as it has evolved in schools repudiates touch. The teacher is untouchable, invulnerable. The gradual and orderly surrender of one's body is the project of the elementary school. It may only be reclaimed once habituated to the forms of athletics and dance. When Piaget posits a stage of motor operations as essential to cognition, educators are at a loss to discover the bodies schooling has hidden so carefully for centuries. This program of control was promoted by the science of supervision, an arrangement of persons in collective units that permitted constant surveillance of individuals. By arranging students in rows, all eyes facing front, directly confronting the back of a fellow's head, meeting the gaze only of the teacher, the discipline of the contemporary classroom deploys the look as a strategy of domination. Foucault maintains that the prototype for the surveillance of the classroom is the panopticon, a prison designed by Jeremy Bentham that permitted a single warden to scrutinize many. Foucault cites the Julius (1831) comparison of antiquity's spectacle and modernity's surveillance:

'To render accessible to a multitude of men the inspection of a small number of objects'; this was the problem to which the architecture of temples, theatres and circuses responded. With spectacle, there was a predominance of public life, the intensity of festivals, sensual proximity. In these rituals in which blood flowed, society found new vigor and formed for a moment a single great body. The modern age poses the opposite problem: 'To procure for a small number, or even for a single individual, the instantaneous view of a great multitude.' (Foucault, p. 216)

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The look that constitutes identity in schools is organized to undermine dialogue. The theatre of the classroom permits students to be seen but not to see. Foucault points to the analysis and categorization of students into ranks and hierarchies and to the examination as procedures which prescribe what is to be seen. This look does not search for the student's reality, as Buber suggests, for it does not receive images but only examines the student before it to note the resemblance between the child and the image established for its development. The exercise displaces the dialogue as social identity is formed, not through symbiosis and differentiation but by mimesis and convention. Peer culture reinforces this surveillance punishing non-conformity with exile and ridicule. Mystified and disclaimed, the perspective of pedagogy is withheld from the student. Rather than finding language to name and appropriate the interests and history that have named him, the student too often sees the perspective behind the look as impersonal, inevitable, and determining. Lifted from history, motives, and politics, the look of the teacher is endorsed with an authority that disclaims history, motives, and politics.

In an attempt to disassociate themselves from an authority that disallows dialogue, many teachers have adopted the stance of humanistic psychology that would replace the look of domination with the reciprocity of egalitarianism.

"My face is thine eye, thine in mine appears." That mutuality, for all its romanticism, fails the pedagogical project in three respects. First, like the fascination of lovers, it is blind to the world, making the other's look the end rather than the means in the act of knowing. Secondly, this stance is dishonest, for it denies the asymmetry in the student-teacher relation. It disclaims the teacher's power, in the world and in the institution, and in so doing prohibits the student from deconstructing and appropriating the perspective of the teacher's look for his own vision. Thirdly, the ideal of equality fosters an eroticism that ensnares both teacher and student in their reciprocal gaze. Buber imputes the same objectification to eroticism that he locates in the will to power (1945, pp. 94-98). Both agendas undermine the dialogue he calls education: the former by appropriating the other to one's own subjectivity, the latter by distancing him by objectifying him.

Parenting permits the ultimate reciprocity that pedagogy denies because it evolves in time. The history of the parent-child relation is one of exchanged glances. The child will walk many miles and make many visits to understand the look under which he has stood. Even the adult who has grown beyond the frame of his parents' look will pursue them, imploring them to see again and alter their perspective. Finally, as old age reverses the original relations of dependency, the adult who was once the child is now the overseer within whose gaze the aged parent still sees his former power and possibility.

Denied duration, pedagogy precludes such reciprocity. Denied duration, pedagogy precludes the long dialogue through which the child reappropriates that which he gave up in order to be a person in his parents' eyes.⁴

The teacher looks out to the world and through the world to the student. It is this detour through the world that we call curriculum or that my colleague, Richard Heaton, calls the third thing. It is what engages us just as making dinner engages the family or making goblets engaged goldsmith Marcone and his apprentice Cellini. The look of pedagogy is the sideways glance that watches the student out of the corner of the eye. It is not easy to act like a teacher in the theatre of contemporary schools. It requires seeing others and being seen, without being reduced to our images.

Finally, the world we work with, the curriculum is itself an archive of the look as it is a collection and ordering for presentation of the signs of our collective experience. It is the teacher who responds to the curriculum as a living sign beckoning us to the world that moves beneath it and curls up upon its edges. Or it is the teacher who presents curriculum as a prohibition, NO TRESPASSING, a sign that denies access, enforces distance, and walls off the world. When curriculum is alive, it invites the student to reappropriate it as she reclaims her identity from its origin in her parent's look, grasping and dislodging and reclaiming its perspective. When the curriculum is a dead sign, all of us, teachers and students, stumble under its empty stare.

Notes

1. Presented to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New York, N.Y., March, 1982.
2. I can recall a few times when meeting the parent of a troubled child whom I taught, I was surprised with her way of describing the child when cool objectivity would take the place of blind and irrational support. I would consider the possibility that this posture was being assumed to match the professional stance that I as the teacher would be expected to take, but always I was left with the suspicion that the detachment that permitted this mother to describe her child as a liar or a spoiled brat was more a cause than a consequence of the problems the child faced.
3. In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty talks at length about the significance of pointing and grasping as actions which reveal the distinction of the objective from the phenomenal body. The phenomenal body is known to us through what it can do; a repertoire of behavior profoundly influenced by others. See the chapter "The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility".
4. My colleague, Professor Joan Stone, reports that while duration is absent from most pedagogical relations it is sustained in many schools where deaf children are taught. "Teachers may work with the same kids everyday, all day for four or five years—touch comes back and the look is different. Interesting—I've seen many gentle women in the past few weeks as I visited these schools. They seem more like mothers than teachers; they don't seem to have sold out to the patriarchal structure and, in the case of the Syracuse women, they fight it with impressive energy. Same is true of some of the men." Personal correspondence.

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