

phenomenon that compels one to thoughtful action (Bevis, 1981). While the nurse's within Ferguson's cancer experience likely carried out many thoughtful actions, they were not of sufficient magnitude or importance *at the time* to be perceived as such by their patient. Thoughtful actions by physicians, on the other hand, may have been more apparent to Ferguson because of their integral connection with her cancer treatment. Caring physicians discussed treatments with her, sought her views, and provided information that would help her make treatment choices. This treatment was ultimately responsible for her cure. Would Ferguson's perception of caring physicians have been different if she had not been cured? Might the thoughtful actions of nurses be more perceptible to a person with cancer not so preoccupied with treatment decisions aimed at cure? As death comes closer and the treatment focus shifts from cure to comfort, might those with cancer be more sensitive to the caring actions of nurses?

The author closes her thesis by saying, "If good education is a series of new births, new understandings, then my reflective-interpretive journey has been good education, indeed" (p. 92). The reading of this study was "good education" too. It facilitated a new understanding about what it is like to have cancer, an increased awareness of the tendency toward failing to see patients as people first, and a greater willingness to learn from the day-to-day experience of people with cancer in order to improve nursing practice.

#### References

- Bevis, E. (1981). *Caring: A life force*. In M. Leininger (Ed.), *Caring: An essential human need*. Thorofare, NJ: Charles B. Slack.
- Degner, L., & Beaton, J. (1987). *Life-death decisions in health care*. New York: Hemisphere.
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Leininger, M. (1981). The phenomenon of caring: Importance, research questions and theoretical considerations. In M. Leininger (ed), *Caring: An essential human need*. Thorofare, NJ: Charles B. Slack.
- May, R. (1969). *Love and will*. New York: Dell.

Karin Olson  
University of Alberta

#### *The Experience of Love in Marriage* by Gerald Terlep, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Wayne State University, 1989

All phenomenological research begins with a moment of vision. Without this moment of vision, which is an experience of intuitive rather than inductive or deductive knowing, the phenomenological researcher has nothing to investigate. One cannot be assigned a problem to investigate, using phenomenological methods. Phenomenological inquiry demands that what is selected for investigation be radically and subjectively important to the investigator. The inquirer must first experience the problem in its subjective significance to self. Only then is phenomenological investigation used to understand the problem in its objective significance to culture. In this view, the phenomenological inquirer understands that human experience itself is a relationship between person and thing. Experience itself exists as experience only as we understand it. This is not to say that experience unites the human and the real, because experience itself is the reality of being human. Experience is, then, a returning, an event that occurs whenever

a person turns toward reality. Experience is, so to speak, the human turning back and forth between self and everything else.

Experience is in itself a circular happening through which what lies within the circle becomes exposed (*eröffnet*). This open (*offene*), however, is nothing other than the between (*zwischen*)—between us and the thing. (Heidegger, 1967, p. 242)

Hüserl invented phenomenology, as it were, but Heidegger revises it. Heidegger's phenomenological method is this return (*kehre*) method.

Heidegger applies this *kehre* method in his study of being and time, but at no point does he write at any length about this methodology as such. However, comments on this *kehre* method are found throughout *Being and Time*, and in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Heidegger tells his readers to find his method of inquiry by studying directly what he has written:

We cannot now enter any further into the essential and fundamental constituent parts of this method. In fact, we have applied it constantly. What we would have to do would be merely to go over the course already pursued but now with explicit reflection on it. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 328)

Taking Heidegger at his word, Terlep immerses himself in Heidegger's writings, emerging with this construct of the *kehre* method, which Terlep then applies in his phenomenological investigation of married love.

Citing Heidegger along the way, Terlep guides his reader through each step of this *kehre* method. In this journey, Terlep also calls on other writers to illuminate each step of the method. For example, at the moment-of-vision level, which follows the stages of stress reaction described by Selye, there is a crisis of personal creativity, an experience of situated instability that cannot be maintained. The crisis is either resolved, and growth takes place, or it is not resolved, and a "developmental lack" is produced. Besides his own moment-of-vision experience, which Terlep poignantly describes at the beginning of the study, he also draws on diverse writers (e.g., Descartes, Hume, James) who have all described at least one of their moments of vision to their readers.

Within this framework, the customary trip through the literature is conceptualized as an exercise in deconstruction, although Terlep is well aware that to destroy something is to disassemble without care, and that, according to Heidegger, anything done without care is not human. In any case, Terlep organizes his review of the literature into the three categories gleaned from Heidegger, that is, the content, criticism, and correction stages of the deconstruction level.

Terlep's review of the literature is easily faulted, even by his most sympathetic readers. For example, Terlep's discussion of humanistic philosophy is limited to a dense synthesis of Plato, C.S. Lewis, and Freud. Overall, however, there is so much compacted into this literature review that Terlep's discussion of Kierkegaard, Hüserl, Buber, and Heidegger more than makes up for the shortcomings. Terlep's 10-page synthesis of what Kierkegaard has to say about love and marriage could be expanded to book length as a service to marriage and family counselors, therapists, family practice nurses and physicians, and others in the helping professions.

In Kierkegaard's view, man is free only when he decides to set value for himself. Kierkegaard asks: "Does Man live by an aesthetic or an ethical value?" The question is answered by each man's choice to love or not to love. Kierkegaard uses marriage as one experience that tests his philosophy, because Man cannot avoid Woman. Our very nature creates this either/or. The fact of Woman's existence forces this choice. But Man's sexual nature is expressed in the particular, not in the universal, not in the abstract. A particular woman makes an absolute demand on a particular man. A particular man is not indifferent to a particular woman. "Our erotic nature demands this particular crisis," says Kierkegaard. Although it may seem to each married couple accidental that they found and fell in love with each other, the ontological fact is that attraction between Man and Woman is not accidental, but fundamental to being human. Terlep spells out Kierkegaard's three phases of erotic desire (i.e., dreaming, seeking, desiring). In the third stage, desiring, the man experiences dread because he now fully understands that his own meaning has by his own choice come to be dependent on another, an ontological as well as a psychic, social, and physical dependency.

A person creates self by one's own choices. One's choices reveal the self, not only to others, but also to self. To choose *is* the ethical, the absolute. In choice lies the finite "opening to create the eternal possibilities of relationship, of love," as Terlep puts it.

Terlep's distillations of Buber, Heidegger, Fromm, Frankl, May, and Moustakas, although easier reading than his treatment of Kierkegaard, are just as rich. For example, he quotes Moustakas, "Romantic love is honest, but it is not true. Love that undergoes the test of time, crisis and change and continues to exist is true love" (1972, p. 112).

Implicit in this notion of true love is that it exists in time. True love has not only the present of romantic love, but also a past and a future, which is why true love and marriage are associated with each other. "Marriage gives love time," as Terlep puts it. Whereas Heidegger lets us know that time means that our being is limited, so Death approaches only because we exist in time, Moustakas says that romantic love never dies because it only exists in the now. Romantic love never grows. It has no life of its own to aid us in living our life. When Moustakas talks of true love, he is saying that true love is the other side of existential loneliness. He sharply distinguishes between existential loneliness, which is an awareness of the reality of being human, and an anxiety-ridden loneliness that is a futile flight from the human condition. In this view, the only way to freedom is in achieving a balance between love and loneliness.

In the criticism stage of the *kehre* method, Terlep argues that the best critiques of the problem come from recent feminist thought, as well as classical and contemporary Marxist thought. To strengthen his argument, Terlep cites such writers as Daly, Fausto-Sterling, Horney, Gilligan, Massey, Stratton, all in the feminist tradition, and Marx, Engels, Fromm, and Zaretsky in the socialist tradition.

When Terlep comes to the correction stage of the *kehre* method, he presents four already fairly well-known world views which he tries to integrate into one grand world view. The four world views are (a) the systematic pluralism of Pepper, as expressed in his world hypothesis theory, (b) the world view implicit in the

American Indian medicine wheel, (c) the archetype theory of Jung, and (d) the general systems theory of Bertalanffy.

Although it is instructive to follow Terlep's argument in this correction stage, it is also clear that, even if he were completely successful in integrating several of these world views, Bertalanffy's general systems theory is excess baggage here, because, as many know, Bertalanffy's mechanical epistemology is already quaint. It has seen better days.

Terlep claims that Western philosophy has at best a very meager concept of love, no concept at all of marriage at the level of Care (*sorge*), and little regard for Woman. If Western philosophy is a study of the Beautiful, the Good and the True, it is sadly deficient in understanding Love as the experience of the One. Terlep believes, rightly I think, that Oneness and Unity are better developed as a philosophical category in the Native medicine wheel, and in several Eastern philosophies. Moreover, while Western philosophy proposes a human nature in which love is only an accidental trait, both Woman and some socialists find this view alien to their experience. Woman finds love necessary for family and the socialist finds Care necessary for community. Within this framework Terlep and his co-researchers launch their eidetic investigation of the phenomenon of married love.

Descriptions of the lived experience of happily married love gleaned from interviews with the co-researchers are many and rich. For example:

W. I feel better about myself. Even when we're separate, it's still there. There's an inner peace. It's like a continual inner peace. Inside of myself, there's an inner peace, even though I'm a separate being apart from him.

H. I feel exactly like that. Exactly like that. When we're together, I experience it there, but I depend on it in my work, or in dealing with the kids, or anything.

H. When I have those feelings of oneness, I have a real sense of my masculinity and your femininity, so we're even experiencing that differently, I think.

W. At times, it is a sexual thing, but at other times it's just like a total oneness. It's just a feeling.

Terlep reports that happily married couples are happy because they create their own happiness. They experience energy in what they do. They all agree that married life takes continuous work, because the individuals involved and their situations are continuously changing. But within the relationship of married love, one's very perception and experience of the world is changed by the fact of married love. Terlep lists eight items as a data summary of the reduction level of his reported research:

(a) sexuality becomes a value rather than a behavior when sexuality is an expression of love; (b) couples find their personalities merge into a togetherness and emerge into a separateness between each other; (c) each couple plays at sex, is happy in their love, and is creative in living their life; (d) couples find they share spiritual, social, physical, and psychic levels of care; (e) the two persons who have become a happily married couple value each other absolutely; (f) couples find that their role in the family is to help children emerge from the family and to help each other merge into a family; (g) a helpful counselor must

first determine if a married couple love each other before predicting behaviors, meaningfulness, and outcomes; and (h) married love grows through four identifiable stages: partnership, pair, couple, and what Terlep mechanistically calls "dyad."

At the construction level, Terlep moves back to Heidegger, integrating what the co-researchers have found to Heidegger's doctrine on Care. At the unconcealment stage, Terlep reports two conclusions: first, married lovers change and develop from two individual persons into one coupled personality, and second, married couples who love each other make each other happy.

This study has many implications for the tasks of constructing and reconstructing a philosophy of education, a philosophy of family medicine, and a philosophy of marriage and family counseling, which Terlep mentions, but does not discuss in great detail. Despite its many minor flaws, Terlep's phenomenological study of married love is a highly creative and distinctive piece of scholarship at the foundational level.

#### References

- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927)
- Heidegger, M. (1967). *What is a thing?* South Bend, IN: Regnery/Gateway.
- Heidegger, M. (1982). *The basic problems of phenomenology* (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Original work published 1975)
- Moustakas, C. (1972). *Loneliness and love*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

John J. Dewitt  
Wayne State University