Unity Deferred: The "Roman Question" in Italian History, 1861-82

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ABSTRACT: Following the *Risorgimento* (the unification of the kingdom of Italy) in 1861, the major dilemma facing the new nation was that the city of Rome continued to be ruled by the pope as an independent state. The Vatican's rule ended in 1870 when the Italian army captured the city and it became the new capital of Italy. This paper will examine the domestic and international problems that were the consequences of this dispute. It will also review the circumstances that led Italy to join Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance in 1882.

In the early morning of 20 September 1870, field guns of the Italian army breached the ancient city wall of Rome near the Porta Pia. Army units advanced to engage elements of the papal militia in a series of random skirmishes, and by late afternoon the army was in control of the city. Thus concluded a decade of controversy over who should govern Rome. In a few hours, eleven centuries of papal rule had come to an end.[1]

The capture of Rome marked the first time that the Italian government had felt free to act against the explicit wishes of the recently deposed French emperor, Napoleon III. Its action was in sharp contrast to its conduct in the previous decade. During that time, the Italians had routinely deferred to Napoleon with respect to the sanctity of Pope Pius IX's rule over Rome. Yet while its capture in 1870 revealed a new sense of Italian independence, it did not solve the nation's dilemma with the Roman question. This article will examine how this problem adversely influenced Italy's foreign relations, undermined its search for national unity, and led to an uneasy alliance in 1882.

The remarkable influence exerted by Napoleon over the Kingdom of Italy from 1861 to 1870 reflected his personal

involvement in the founding of the modern nation. Many reasons have been cited for Napoleon's remarkably altruistic support of Italian unification: his "ties of family and youth with Italy," his perception of himself as a "European statesman and French patriot," his "sympathy with the ideals of liberalism," and his desire to see France as the moral leader of a regenerated Europe.[2] Moreover, the attempt by the Italian patriot, Felice Orsini, to assassinate Napoleon in January 1858 was a shocking reminder to the emperor and to Europe of the harsh and arbitrary conditions under which the Italian people still lived. For Orsini was no back-alley assassin. A follower of the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, a member of the short-lived 1849 republican government in Rome, and an author whose writings on Italian nationalism were popular in Great Britain,[3] Orsini seemed to have been cast in the same mould as Napoleon in his youth. Thus his attempt to kill the emperor, once also a revolutionary, was a measure of his despair for his country. Consequently, Orsini's call to Napoleon from his death cell, "to render to Italy the independence which her children lost in 1849 through the fault of the French themselves"[4] had a uniquely compelling quality.

Within months of Orsini's attack, the emperor had acted. In July 1858 he invited Camillo Cavour, prime minister of Piedmont, to a secret meeting at which the two leaders devised a cynical plan to expel Austria by force from the Italian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. These would then be annexed to Piedmont, along with the province of Romagna, to form a new Kingdom of Northern Italy. Tuscany and the Papal States (to be freed from Vatican rule) would form a central kingdom, while the Kingdom of Naples in the south would remain unchanged. The pope, left only with Rome and its environs, would be invited to accept the presidency of this new Italian confederation as a form of compensation for his temporal losses.[5] There was one problem, however. This plan did not consider the level of influence already gained by the Italian National Society's unification campaigns throughout the peninsula. Although unification had the active support of only a minority of the

population, the Society had been successful in rallying many diverse, influential supporters to its cause.[6]

In 1859 a war pitting France and Piedmont against Austria was fought to a stalemate. At the bloody battle of Solferino in June 1859, Napoleon realized that his French soldiers had alreadt paid too high a price for Italian freedom. Without reference to Cavour, he quickly came to terms with the Austrians, having won only Lombardy for Piedmont. His decision to withdraw from the war was influenced by news of popular uprisings in Tuscany, by the realization that the Austrians were far from beaten, and by reports that the Prussians had mobilized their army on the Rhine.[7] He had little choice but to extricate himself.

But if Napoleon had hoped to stifle the unrest in Italy merely by ending the war, he was too late. Once the war in Lombardy had removed political restraints in the other provinces, the unification campaign of the political activists in the National Society developed its own momentum.[8] Napoleon's plans for regional consolidation were swept away on waves of popular revolts guided by the National Society's local committees. Plebiscites in the central states authorized their annexation to Piedmont in March 1860, and a further plebiscite in the Papal States sanctioned their annexation in September. This brought the Piedmontese army into the field against the papal forces to uphold the people's decision. In the south, between May and October, the island of Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples fell to the irregular forces of Giuseppe Garibaldi.[9]

Throughout the rapid collapse of the independent Italian states and their coalescence around Piedmont, Cavour had skilfully maintained Napoleon's support. The emperor had also given his tacit consent before the Piedmontese army drove the pope's forces out of the Papal States and captured them for Italy.[10] By the end of 1860, Napoleon faced a united although still incomplete Italy. Yet he had two consolations: the Italians continued to look to France for guidance and support, and the new kingdom had ceded the provinces of Savoy and Nice to France as payment for its assistance. However, this payment was likely insufficient;

his patronage of Italy had cost Napoleon the significant conservative support of the Catholic *notables* at home.[11]

With respect to the new Italy, both Napoleon and the pope were anxious to ensure that its success in 1860 did not extend to the Catholic Church's remaining foothold on the Italian peninsula, the city of Rome and its environs.[12] The challenge they faced was clear. Following unification, Cavour, the new prime minister of Italy, made the exaggerated claim that the acquisition of Rome as the nation's new capital was the most important task facing the government. This goal was also endorsed by the new parliament. But Napoleon had to oppose any such action for his relations with other Catholic rulers and the demands of his Catholic supporters at home required him to maintain a garrison of French troops in Rome to protect what was left of Pius IX's temporal rule.[13] Events were to prove that Pius IX was prepared to defend his remaining patrimony to the bitter end.

Moreover, the pope's appreciation for Napoleon's efforts on his behalf was far from unqualified. For while the emperor supported the pope in Rome, he did not support his claims to recover the lost Papal States.[14] Indeed by 1860, the pope considered Napoleon a "traitor and a liar," although he did not believe that France would desert his cause.[15] Nevertheless, the pope could not have failed to realize how little religious conviction and how much political realism were reflected in Napoleon's support of papal rule in Rome. The reality was that while the French troops had restored Pius IX to power in 1849, once Italy was united, the only purpose they served was to protect the pope from his own people.[16] This left Napoleon in the ironic position of incurring the wrath of Catholics the world over for the loss of the Papal States and that of Italian nationalists for not allowing them to finish the job.[17]

As awkward as his position was, the emperor had little choice but to maintain it, even though Italy's king, Victor Emmanuel II, had already agreed to respect the independence of the pope's remaining territory.[18] Yet there is evidence that Napoleon would gladly have removed his forces, had

he had the justification to do so. In April 1861 the emperor's outspoken cousin, Prince Napoleon, implored Cavour to find an arrangement "that the Emperor can accept for the Pope" to get the troops out, "then you can do as you wish with the Pope." However, he warned that a French withdrawal must not have the appearance of a retreat in the face of Italian unity.[19] Finally in July 1861, Napoleon summed up the problem: if he had an honourable way out, he would leave the Italians to accept the responsibility of acting according to their own interests.[20] But his best chance had been missed. Cavour died suddenly on 6 June 1861 leaving the Roman question unresolved.

Cavour's enormous prestige in the eyes of the French meant that, upon his death, there was no one else in the Italian administration who could find the appropriate compromise or provide an adequate guarantee to settle the Roman question.[21] Thus an agreement that likely could have been signed with Cavour in the summer of 1861 was not settled until 15 September 1864, as the September Convention. Yet after three years of negotiations and the exchange of hundreds of messages, the Convention's main terms are remarkably simple. Italy agreed not to attack, or to permit an attack, on papal territory; and in return, France agreed to withdraw its troops from Rome as soon as the pope could organize an army, but definitely within two years.[22] Problems of interpretation arose, however, and seven additional clauses were added to clarify the original articles. One of these was an undertaking by Italy that "Rome would not be annexed or become Italy's capital without the consent of France."[23]

This, France believed, secured the pope's future. But no provision was made for the unthinkable—a situation in which France would be powerless to act. Pius IX, however, did act within his limited range of options. In December 1864, three months after the Convention was signed, he issued the *Syllabus of Errors*. Purportedly a circular letter to Catholic priests, it was also a specific condemnation of democratic progress and, as such, could not be ignored by the world at large. Typical of this letter is Proposition 80.

This defines as an error the belief that "The Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile and harmonize himself with progress, with liberalism, and with recent civilization."[24] The *Syllabus* marked another step in the Church's long crusade against the forces of liberalism and democracy in Italy and Europe. And as far as the Convention was concerned, the pope's position was never in doubt: since it had been settled without his knowledge or consent, he was not "in any way bound by [it]."[25]

To comply fully with the terms of the Convention, Italy also had to undertake some delicate internal manoeuvring. This agreement included a secret protocol that required Italy to move its capital from Turin to Florence. Napoleon adopted this measure to sooth French public opinion, and it gave the Italians an opportunity to feign disinterest in Rome. Nevertheless, Emilio Visconti-Venosta, Italy's capable foreign minister, was adamant that there be no suggestion that outside pressure forced Italy to adopt Florence as its capital.[26] While the French obviously saw the transfer of the capital as a means of diverting Italian attention away from Rome, for the Italians, Florence was nothing but a convenient stop on the road to the Eternal City.[27]

Italy's preoccupation with Rome was, however, diverted briefly in 1866. The strong current of Italian nationalism (still promoted by the National Society in the 1860s) and the constant provocations of the irredentists maintained pressure on the government to free Italian Venetia from Austrian rule. When direct negotiations with Austria failed, however, in April 1866 Italy accepted a Prussian military alliance against Austria. A key article in this agreement stated that no armistice would be concluded without the signatories' mutual consent and that Austria must agree to cede Venetia to Italy. Austria countered with an offer to France: in return for French and Italian neutrality, Austria would cede Venetia to Italy via France. Napoleon recommended the offer to the Italians as an opportunity to gain Venetia at no cost or risk of bloodshed. But the Italian cabinet realized that if Prussia won, they would be unable to justify not having taken advantage of the opportunity

offered by the Prussian alliance. Nor were they convinced that a victorious Austria would necessarily meet its obligation.[28]

Ultimately Italy met its obligation to Prussia, citing the virtues of "loyalty and keeping one's word." But on a less noble level, the politicians believed that the people needed a popular war "to cement unity and strengthen the still fragile state." They also hoped to extend Italy's borders beyond Venetia by conquering other disputed territories. Despite this optimism, the brief war in June and July 1866 proved a disaster for Italy. It suffered embarrassing defeats on land at Custozza and at sea off the island of Lissa, while the Prussians swept to victory at Sadowa. Worse still, Prussia displayed such disregard for Italy's contribution and loyalty that its chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, authorized an armistice with Austria without reference to its ally and without regard for the transfer of Venetia. This was accomplished instead by Napoleon who had received Venetia from Austria and ceded it to Italy.[29] Thus Italy was forced to accept Venetia, not in recognition of its sacrifices in the war, but as a gift from Napoleon. Despite this humiliation, once Venetia was in the fold Italian thoughts turned again to Rome.

The French troops, withdrawn under the September Convention in December 1866, were not long away. Within months they returned to defend Rome when the Italian government had unwisely been slow to react to Garibaldi's last armed attempt to unseat the pope. The French action had been sanctioned by an exchange of notes in 1866 which gave both parties freedom of action under the Convention in the face of "exceptional circumstances." The pope had been saved, but at the cost of Italo-French relations, which reached their lowest point since 1860.[30] It now appeared that only a major catastrophe could ever again dislodge the French from Rome. That catastrophe came on 19 July 1870 with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.[31]

Throughout 1869 Napoleon had vainly sought a triple alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary, but they were wary of any agreement with France that could be seen as the

prelude to war with Prussia. Moreover, the Italians were generally opposed to any further military adventures. This opposition was supported by a violent anti-French campaign conducted by nationalist and anticlerical groups whose spokesmen were Giuseppe Mazzini and the redoubtable Garibaldi.[32] The cabinet was split, but tended towards neutrality. For Victor Emmanuel, however, support for France was both a matter of honour and a means to gain control over Rome after a French victory. Yet the king's support had a price, the evacuation of the French troops from Rome. This was the one thing that Napoleon was unable to grant. On the brink of war, he could not afford to alienate his conservative and Catholic subjects, just as Victor Emmanuel could not accept anything less than a French withdrawal for his people. Eventually the Italian cabinet prevailed, and Italy declared a state of neutrality on 25 July 1870.[33]

While Napoleon's proposed alliances came to naught, he still tried to secure Victor Emmanuel's personal commitment to respect the terms of the September Convention. When he advised the king on 16 July that he was withdrawing his troops from Rome, he assumed that this "would clinch the alliance with Italy."[34] But the king's price had gone up; simple withdrawal was no longer enough. In order to keep peace with the French Catholics, Napoleon then asked for the king's confirmation that he would continue to honour the Convention. The king, however, sent a vague response which noted that Italy "has never denounced the Convention" and surely Napoleon "therefore could not doubt that she would continue to fulfil the commitments."[35] Victor Emmanuel had deliberately avoided an unequivocal answer, hoping to gain greater Italian freedom of action with respect to Rome.[36] In mid-August, a month into the war, Napoleon made a desperate bid for an Italian contingent by offering the king a free hand in Rome. A similar offer made earlier might have succeeded, but now even the king could see no merit in joining the losing side.[37] Yet it is hard to believe that Italy, given its limited resources, could ever have provided any significant assistance to France against

the Prussians. Furthermore, the unresolved Roman question ensured that it had no incentive to do so.

With the war going badly for France and with Rome only defended by papal forces, each successive French defeat increased the pressure on the Italian government to move against the city. Through August 1870 the government held to the principle of finding a non-violent solution to the Roman question. But Napoleon's capture on 2 September and the proclamation of the French Third Republic two days later made continued loyalty to the Convention impossible for even the most conservative of Italy's politicians.[38] A decade of tension was suddenly released; the years of being kept on a short leash by Napoleon were over. For those in government the developments in France made any concerns about the sanctity of the September Convention or Italy's international reputation irrelevant. The opportunity was there and it had to be seized. The proclamation of the French republic ended discussions about the Convention. It was simply declared dead, a bilateral contract with Napoleon that did not survive the fall of his regime.[39] By raising the spectre of a possible republican insurrection in Rome, with all the memories that would engender of the expulsion of Pius IX by revolutionaries in 1848, the Italian government provided a semi-legal justification for taking control of the city.[40] Nor would the other European monarchs have been inclined to check rumours of an insurrection too closely.

Once a basis for action was established, timing became critical. The government clearly understood the need to act promptly, but two preliminary steps were essential. The first was to make a final attempt to reach an understanding with Pius IX, and the second was to canvass the European capitals for support, or at the very least, a position of neutrality with respect to the planned occupation of Rome. Negotiations with the Vatican on 9 and 10 September and an exchange of letters between Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX confirmed that no understanding was possible. The pope was determined not to yield any of his temporal rights over Rome. This was confirmed publicly in the Vatican's

newspaper, the *Osservatore romano*, on 13 September.[41] The pope also made "desperate last-minute attempts" to find support from various European states, but Catholic Austria, France, Bavaria, and Spain merely expressed their regrets, and only Protestant Britain showed any sympathy.[42]

Meanwhile, Italy's foreign minister was garnering the support that had been denied the pope. In contrast to the active support sought by Pius IX, all Visconti-Venosta needed was an agreement to do nothing. On 7 September, he gave notice to other governments of Italy's intention to occupy portions of the papal territory in order "to safeguard the interests of the Holy See as well as those of Italy."[43] Obviously, Visconti-Venosta's primary concern was with France, but the French foreign minister, Jules Favre, confirmed that it would follow a policy of non-interference and would let Italy act with France's sympathy.[44] This cautious approval set the tone for the other replies. Spain left Italy free "to act according to its own interests in its own country." Austria declined to take any action, and the North German Confederation avoided a specific response in order not to upset its Catholic population, although Bismarck added that he considered Rome to be "a purely Italian affair." And Britain, ever on the fence, hoped that an arrangement could be made with the Vatican, but had no objection to Italy entering Rome.[45]

Still the government moved with caution. To give Pius IX time to reconsider, the Italian army assigned to capture Rome advanced with agonizing slowness, crossing the frontier of the papal territory on 11 September and not reaching the city until eight days later. And an overwhelming force of 50,000 Italian troops had been assembled so as to discourage any thought of serious resistance by the 15,000-strong papal militia. The pope recognized this reality and ordered his troops to give only enough resistance to establish the fact that he was the victim of force exerted by the Italian state.[46]

The capture of Rome took but a few hours and, except for those unfortunates killed or wounded, it was done at little cost.[47] As battles go, it was not much; but it had the

quality of a truly momentous event. That day also established the definitive *terminus post quem* for modern Italian history. The Italian government wisely reported the event in a laconic style that made it all seem so very routine. At 11:20 PM on 20 September, Visconti-Venosta despatched a terse one-sentence message to the world: "Today royal troops entered Rome after a short resistance by foreign militia which ceased fire on the orders of the Pope."[48] This message was obviously meant to be all things to all people. The reference to "royal" and not "Italian" troops gave a sense of solidarity with the other kingdoms of Europe. Moreover, these troops had merely "entered" Rome, with no suggestion of capture or occupation; and they had been met by "foreign" forces who by implication had no right to be there. And finally, the pope was given credit for ending the fighting. All in all, it was exactly the right tone in which to advise the governments of Europe that the *Risorgimento* was complete.

After the fulfilment of the dream, however, harsh reality followed. The culmination of the *Risorgimento* had not produced a truly united Italy. Great differences remained between the ruling class and the rest of society, between those who participated in elections and government and those who abstained, between the expanding industrial north and the poverty-stricken agricultural south, between the monarchists in power and the republican nationalists who no longer had a role to play in their own country. And now Italy had the burden of the Roman question recast in a new context. It was a unique situation. The "papacy presented the Italians with a problem faced by no other country."[49]

Internally, Church and State refought the Roman question in a form of civil war by decree. On the one hand, the government passed the Law of Guarantees, "Italy's truly great achievement in the field of legislation."[50] The Law recognized the pope's sovereignty over the Vatican and other Church enclaves, and it exempted the pope from Italian penal law while it made those who attacked the pope subject to the same penalties as those who attacked the king. It also provided the same recognition and services to the

Vatican that an independent state would enjoy, and it provided for a substantial annual payment to be made by the State to the Church.[51] But it did not restore any vestige of the pope's temporal rule. Nor was it a treaty between two sovereign states, but simply a law enacted by the Italian parliament. Consequently, Pius IX ignored the law, as did his successors, who did not recognize Italian authority.[52] On the other hand, the pope renewed his *non expedit* decree which forbade Catholics from participating in parliamentary elections. At the same time, Catholic laymen were organized in various religious societies to become "the frontline troops in the Catholic *reconquista* of civil society" and produced a "culture of opposition."[53] Thus the pope had chosen to maintain the negative policy he had followed since 1859. And despite his real affection for Italy, the combination of his advanced years and his wish to maintain a doctrinal position that would not restrict his successor, made it impossible for him to consider any compromise.[54] Thus Italian foreign policy after 1870 was based on this uncertain and divided domestic structure.

In spite of this handicap, Italian diplomacy initially proceeded in a very professional and successful manner. Visconti-Venosta's diplomatic objectives were to do everything possible to reduce friction between France and Germany, and to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe until Italy was strong enough to insist on an equal share when the disintegrating Ottoman Empire was broken up.[55] France was Italy's major concern. However, the residual tension between the countries was eased in March 1871 when France's foreign minister, Jules Favre, proposed a conciliatory policy. He accepted Italy's concept of the separation of Church and State, but he did not exclude some form of temporal rule for the pope. He emphasized, however, that France did not wish to challenge Italy's national rights, it only wanted to ensure that the pope and his spiritual rights were protected. This moderate stance was taken in the face of insistent demands from the Vatican for French support. In 1871 the French diplomats were anxious to avoid a dispute with the

pope, but they were even more concerned that they not "throw Italy into the arms of Prussia."[56] However, continuing Vatican protests and the influence of the French clericals always left this policy at some risk.

Despite the ongoing problems with Rome and the Vatican, following the *Risorgimento* Italy's financial woes were the "central preoccupation" of its politicians.[57] Serious disputes arose between Italy and France in the areas of finance and trade. Almost bankrupted by the costs of unification in the early 1860s, Italy had "to borrow lavishly," mostly from French financiers. Then in an 1863 commercial treaty Italy virtually opened its markets to French imports in a free trade environment. However, the fall of Napoleon's empire "also meant the fall of free trade," and this produced a series of shocks for the Italians. As part of its protectionist policy the French parliament rejected a new 1878 commercial treaty which had already been signed by Italy. Worse followed in 1879 when the French imposed high tariffs on imported Italian wine so as to protect the French growers whose vines had been damaged by disease. By 1880 diplomatic friction over Tunis caused the Paris banks to refuse to underwrite new Italian loans. A settlement of the rejected commercial treaty was finally reached in 1881 only after Italy had made so many concessions that some Italians believed that "the treaty had been signed at the expense of national interests."[58]

Concurrent with the trade setbacks, Italy also suffered foreign policy misfortunes. In 1880 increased agitation by the small but vigorous group of Italian irredentists almost precipitated an aggressive response from Austria-Hungary with Bismarck's full support.[59] Also the German chancellor's diplomatic schemes caused grave damage to Italo-French relations. The "War-in-sight"[60] crisis in May 1875 convinced Bismarck there were advantages to be gained by encouraging French expansion in North Africa, especially in the Italian-dominated, semi-independent state of Tunis.[61] Bismarck put his policy into practice at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, persuading France to expand its holdings in North Africa "as compensation for the British advance in Cyprus."

In this way Bismarck could also divert French energies and interests away from any thoughts of revenge against Germany.[62]

One the other hand, the Italians at the Congress of Berlin behaved in a curiously naive manner. They unsuccessfully tried to make gains in Europe and ignored suggestions about North African expansion. In keeping with the low-key approach they had followed since 1870, they came home from Berlin "with clean hands, which were also empty."[63] However, one Italian historian points out that the Italian delegation had received at the Congress "all the international legitimacy that could be conferred on Italy." But Italians at home needed more tangible proof of international prestige and consequently "Italian opinion reacted as if the country had been betrayed in its deepest expectations."[64]

Italian suspicions about deal-making at the Berlin Congress were confirmed by the French annexation of Tunis in April 1881. Yet the resultant outcry from Rome seems exaggerated because Italy had been warned. There had been cautions at the Congress of Berlin; in October 1878 the French had advised the Italians not to harbour any dreams about controlling Tunis, and in 1880 the Italian ambassador in Paris argued for an understanding with the Central Powers because of French plans for Tunis.[65] Nevertheless, with 9,000 Italians settlers in that country, compared with perhaps 200 French, Italy felt justified in its special interest. When its protests over the French annexation were ignored by the other European governments, however, Italy suddenly realized that it was isolated internationally. After a decade of carefully maintaining a diplomatic balance between the major powers, Visconti-Venosta's policy of "independent always, isolated never" had failed. There was no one to support Italy.[66] With its isolation, came a feeling of having been "defrauded of a legitimate possession" and of having its existence threatened, and its national identity and its survival as a nation questioned.[67]

The French diplomats were well aware of Italy's vulnerable position and its inability to protect its interests

in the Mediterranean, and they anticipated that the loss of Tunis could well drive Italy into a German alliance.[68] Unlike their reaction ten years earlier, by 1881 the French seemed resigned to this eventuality. In a despatch dated 7 September 1881, the French ambassador in Berlin described a possible rapprochement between Italy and Germany as a "great defeat for us." And he viewed the loss of Italian friendship as "one of the consequences of [the] follies and imprudences of our absurd interior policy, of our deplorable military power." The loss of Tunis also transformed Italy from a revolutionary state to a conservative one.[69]

Shortly after its disillusionment over Tunis, Italy suffered a second national humiliation that struck uncomfortably close to home. On the night 12-13 July 1881, the procession carrying the body of Pope Pius IX to its final resting place was attacked in Rome.[70] An eye-witness account described the running battle between a group of demonstrators and the mourners in the procession, which police and troops could not control. Stones were thrown, the riot act was read, and just as the procession reached its destination the affair degenerated into a tumultuous mêlée. In the aftermath, the question of ultimate responsibility was endlessly debated with no clear answer. The government, however, had failed to maintain order when it had a duty to do so, and deservedly paid the price in international embarrassment. It also gave the Vatican an opportunity to argue that the Law of Guarantees was meaningless: the pope was not free in Rome.[71]

This incident quickly escalated into a series of anticlerical disturbances. The radical press carried violent articles, there was a call to storm the Vatican, anticlerical clubs sprang up, street shrines were vandalized, and rallies were held demanding the repeal of the Law of Guarantees.[72] Fuelled by rumours that Leo XIII was planning to flee Rome in fear for his life, the Roman question had again become an international concern.[73] Now developments in Germany further undermined the Italian state's shaky foundation.

For a decade Bismarck had waged a *Kulturkampf* against the influence of the Catholic Church in German affairs, particularly as represented by the opposition Catholic Centre

party in the Reichstag. In its attempt to control Church activities, the German state enacted anti-clerical laws, expelled the Jesuits, imposed state control of the educational system, and severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican. But by the early 1880s Bismarck and Leo XIII were ready to find a mutually acceptable solution.[74] The Italians feared that in doing so, the chancellor would use Germany's influence to intervene in the Roman question on the Vatican's behalf.

This fear took tangible form in late 1881 when Bismarck criticized the Italian government's handling of the Roman crisis in a Reichstag speech and suggested that Italy was sliding into republicanism. This caused "no little excitement in Rome," and made the clericals "jubilant."[75] This was followed by a series of apparently officially-inspired articles published in the Berlin *Post* supporting the pope in his war with the Italian state. Because the *Post* was considered to be Bismarck's mouthpiece, there was speculation that this was meant to prepare the public for some future action by the chancellor. At the same time, the Italian newspaper, *L'Opinione*, lamented that the "continued incoherence in the conduct of the [Italian] Government frightens us." Ivanoe Bonomi interprets Bismarck's actions as a direct challenge to Italy, "either Italy and Germany will examine the Roman problem, or the problem will be resolved without Italy and therefore against her."[76]

Nor were the Italians' fears totally groundless. They could remember calls by Napoleon in the 1860s and by the British in the 1870s for international conferences to solve the Roman question, and the clamour raised by the German Catholics for Bismarck to intervene on the pope's behalf.[77] They also recalled how Bismarck, acting as an "honest broker" at the Congress of Berlin, had imposed a collective settlement of the Russo-Turkish War. Now with Italo-German relations at a low ebb, and with the pope insisting that temporal power in Rome was essential to guarantee his independence,[78] the possibility of foreign intervention led by a self-seeking Germany loomed as a uncomfortable possibility. By 1882 even experienced Italian politicians

were anxious to reach an understanding with Austria-Hungary (and thus with Germany) in order "to safeguard the monarchy and the existing *status quo*."[79] Thus the Italian government was under pressure to break out of its isolation and to seek outside support from Germany and Austria for its continued presence in its own capital city.

Yet even as Italy was being forced into an alliance in order to protect her internal order, the Roman question remained a stumbling block. Italy wanted the alliance to guarantee her possession of Rome, but the large Catholic populations in the Central Powers made this difficult for them to grant. This impasse might have ended negotiations, but a new conflict broke out in Rome. Pope Leo XIII declared that his situation in the city was "absolutely incompatible with the dignity of the Holy See," and he called for the restoration of his temporal power.[80] Faced with this direct public challenge, the dismayed Italians immediately advised the German and Austrian governments that they were ready to reach an understanding, apparently with no preconditions. Again, the Roman question caused Italy's potential allies to pause. This roadblock was only cleared by Bismarck's suddenly perceived need to protect Germany against a potential Franco-Russian alliance. While Bismarck considered that Italy's "liberal character and parliamentary structure" made it an unworthy ally, he feared that Italian domestic disorders could result in a republican government that would prove to be a natural ally for France.[81] Since the isolation of France was "the hinge of German foreign policy,"[82] the advantages of an Italian alliance that would further isolate France were too attractive to ignore. Once the treaty became a German priority and not an Italian one, negotiations were quickly concluded and the Triple Alliance was signed on 20 May 1882.[83]

The new alliance had two key objectives for the Central Powers. The military objective (apart from isolating France) was to prevent "an Italian stab in Austria's back" in the event of an Austro-Russian war. The political one was to maintain the status quo in all three kingdoms.[84] This view is supported by the Austrians' attempt to convince the pope

that "the Italian monarchy was a bulwark against ... revolution." Indeed Benedetto Croce suggests that Italy only just escaped from having to undertake "a conservative and reactionary program at home."[85] Other Italian historians have justified their country's participation in the alliance in similar terms: as "a necessary choice" in order to maintain Italy's gains since 1859, and as a reaction to the fear of outside interference in the Roman question, or the rise of republicanism.[86] Thus the Triple Alliance is portrayed as a buttress for the House of Savoy which also deferred the settlement of the Roman Question to another day.[87]

It must be noted, however, that Italy gained other benefits. The alliance with Germany immediately gave Italy (at least in Italian eyes) the prestige of great-power status, albeit of a second-hand nature. After its recent performance on the international stage, this was a distinction the Italians coveted. Secondly, the alliance with Austria gave Italy some hope that with their western border secure the Austrians would expand eastward, thus allowing Italy an opportunity to acquire the disputed territories as compensation for any Austrian gains in the east. Thirdly, the alliance opened up German financial markets to replace those of the French and so tied Italy even more firmly to its new allies.[88]

Nonetheless, whatever benefits Italy may have gained in the Triple Alliance, the reality was that in the domestic conflict between the king and the pope over Rome, the king had yielded first. Even though the presence of the pope in Rome served as a lightning rod for every radical movement in the country, given time and determination the government was capable of controlling the internal disorders. Neither Germany nor any other nation was about to send troops to the pope's aid, nor did he likely want them.[89] But the threat of an international conference on the Roman question was another matter altogether. It was a distinct possibility and represented an unknown but almost certainly adverse risk to Italy. It would likely be caught between the moral suasion of the international community and that of the pope. Had Italy been more successful in its own right in the first decades, it might well have developed the national

articles of faith needed to match the Vatican's and so ride out the storm in 1882. But years of deference to Napoleon, the humiliation of 1866, the country's economic and military weaknesses, the setback in Tunis, and the riots in Rome had eroded national confidence. Thus after centuries of foreigners arbitrating the internal affairs of Italy, the possibility that it could happen again was a risk that the Italian government lacked the courage to take.

NOTES

[1] S. William Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican at War: A Study of Their Relations from the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Death of Pius IX* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 [c. 1939]), Chapter 2, describes the capture of Rome.

[2] William Echard, *Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 2, 5-6; Lynn M. Case, *French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1954), 51; A.C. Jemolo, *Church and State in Italy 1850-1950* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), 33; Pierre Renouvin, *Histoire des Relations Internationales*, vol. 5 (Paris: Hachette, 1954), 315-30.

[3] The titles of Orsini's books, *Austrian Dungeons in Italy* and *Memoirs and Adventures* (both published in 1857, only months before his assassination attempt), clearly indicate Orsini's message to the British public.

[4] Mack Walker, *Plombieres: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Italy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 178. (Cites William R. Thayer, *Life and Times of Cavour*, vol. 1 [Boston: Houghton Mifflan, 1911]). Napoleon had used French troops to put down the 1848-49 revolution in Rome and restore Pope Pius IX in the Vatican. He did so, however, in the expectation that the pope would establish a more liberal government. This did not occur.

[5] Cavour to King Victor Emmanuel II, 24 July 1858, in Walker, *Plombieres*, 29.

[6] Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 66, 149, 463.

[7] Harry Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento 1790-1870* (London: Longman, 1983/1986), 225-6.

[8] Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 470; S.J. Woolf, [ed.] *The Italian Risorgimento* (London: Longmans, 1969), 105.

[9] Hearder, *Risorgimento*, Chapter 9; Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 470.

[10] Muriel Grindrod, *Italy* (London: F.A. Praeger, 1968), 54; Lynn Case, *Franco-Italian Relations 1860-1865: The Roman Question and the Convention of September* (New York: AMS Press, 1970 [c. 1932]), 4. Louis Girard, *Napoléon III* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 301, notes that many young Frenchmen in the pope's army were killed in battles with the Piedmontese, whose actions Napoleon had sanctioned.

[11] Girard, *Napoléon III*, 300-01; Stuart L. Campbell, *The Second Empire Revisited: A Study in French Historiography* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), 114, 156.

[12] The pope had been left with the temporal rule of Rome and a surrounding territory approximately 115 kilometres long by 35 wide, fronting on the Tyrrhenian Sea.

[13] Jemolo, *Church and State*, 22-3; J. Derek Holmes, *The Triumph of the Holy See: A Short History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Burns & Oates, 1978), 133.

[14] Case, *Franco-Italian Relations*, 5. At the beginning of 1859, the combined Papal States had been the third largest power on the peninsula. By the end of 1860, the pope had seen his temporal flock reduced from 3,000,000 citizens to 600,000. See Robert F. Harney, *The Last Crusade, France and the Papal Army of 1860* ([Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1966] Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1977), 12.

[15] Harney, *Last Crusade*, 32, 35.

[16] As early as May 1859, Odo Russell, Great Britain's unofficial representative at Rome, commented that "while everything is done [by the French] to ensure his neutrality and good will, the Pope, *de facto*, is a prisoner of the French." See Noel Blakiston, *The Roman Question: Extracts from the Despatches of Odo Russell from Rome 1858-1870* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1962), 20.

[17] Holmes, *Holy See*, 133-4.

[18] Vimercati to Ricasoli, 13 June 1861, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* [*DDI*], series 1, vol. 1 (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1952), No. 140.

[19] Case, *Franco-Italian Relations*, 75, 81.

[20] Ibid., 119.

[21] Echard, *Napoleon III*, 145.

[22] Case, *Franco-Italian Relations*, 299-300.

[23] Ibid., 322.

[24] Hearder, *Risorgimento*, 288-9; Jemolo, *Church and State*, 31; Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, xv; Girard, *Napoléon III*, 328.

[25] Blakiston, *Roman Question*, 291.

[26] Girard, *Napoléon III*, 327; Case, *Franco-Italian Relations*, 276, 293; Jemolo, *Church and State*, 30.

[27] This specific reaction was anticipated in the September Convention's clarifying agreements. Point 4 states that the move of the capital was "neither a provisional expedient nor a step towards Rome" See Case,

Franco-Italian Relations, 322 and Frank J. Coppa, *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence* (New York: Longman, 1992), 120-1.

[28] Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 122-4. Prussia had no interest in helping Italian nationalism. It used Italy solely to establish a second front and so divide Austria's forces. Prussia's major objective was to defeat Austria militarily so as to exclude it from having any role in the reorganized German Confederation planned by Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian chancellor.

[29] Ibid., 125-7. See also Grinrod, *Italy*, 56; Edgar Holt, *Risorgimento: The Making of Italy 1815-1870* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 284; Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy 1871-1915*, trans. Cecilla Mary Ady (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1929), 107; Raffaele Romanelli, *L'Italia liberale 1861-1900* (Bologna: Il mulino, 1990), 108-09.

[30] S. William Halperin, *Diplomat Under Stress: Visconti-Venosta and the Crisis of July, 1870* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 62-3. D.W. Houston, *The Negotiations for a Triple Alliance between France, Austria and Italy, 1869-1870* ([Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1959] Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1977), 39, notes that in October 1867, "France was on the point of war with Italy over Rome." The argument of acting under "exceptional circumstances" could also be applied to Italy's seizure of Rome in 1870. See Lillian P. Wallace, *The Papacy and European Diplomacy 1869-1878* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 35.

[31] The war came as no surprise to the Italians. Halperin's book, *Diplomat Under Stress*, gives a detailed account of Visconti-Venosta's unceasing efforts in conjunction with British diplomats to defuse the Franco-Prussian crisis. This was one of Italy's most commendable diplomatic undertakings in the nineteenth century, despite its failure.

[32] It is likely that Garibaldi received financial support from Bismarck in order to keep Italy out of a French alliance. See Wallace, *Papacy*, 35.

[33] Girard, *Napoléon III*, 452-3; Halperin, *Diplomat Under Stress*, 65-9, 131, 148-69; Salvatore Saladino, "Parliamentary Politics in the Liberal Era 1861 to 1914," in *Modern Italy: A Topical History Since 1861*, E.R. Tannebaum and E.P. Noether, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1974), 30-1.

[34] Halperin, *Diplomat Under Stress*, 161.

[35] Napoleon to Victor Emmanuel, 16 July 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13 (Rome: 1963), No. 167; Victor Emmanuel to Napoleon, 21 July 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 219; Napoleon to Victor Emmanuel, 21 July 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 220. Another reason Napoleon was trying to get Italy's commitment to respect the Convention was to placate his wife. Empress Eugénie's view was, "Better the Prussians in Paris than the Italians in Rome." See Holt, *Making of Italy*, 293.

[36] Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, 4 ff. A long description of these negotiations, which cites the many contributing factors on both sides,

is found in Federico Chabod, *Storia della politica esteri dal 1870 al 1896* (Bari: Laterza, 1962), 6 ff.

[37] Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 139-40.

[38] Christopher Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925* (London: Methuen, 1967), 35.

[39] Jemolo, *Church and State*, 32-3; Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 140.

[40] Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, 42. The citizens of Rome had no intention of beginning an insurrection. Their ancestors had watched rulers come and go for 2,600 years, and they were content to wait for a few more weeks.

[41] Victor Emmanuel to Pius IX, 8 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 693; Pius IX to Victor Emmanuel, 11 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 741; Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, 47.

[42] Anthony Rhodes, *The Power of Rome in the Twentieth Century* (London: Sigwick & Jackson, 1983), 23-4.

[43] Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, 43.

[44] Nigra to Visconti-Venosta, 10 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 732. France's distraction with her own problems is reflected in Jules Favre's closing comment that "one must not ask him for anything else at the moment." See also Wallace, *Papacy*, 120-1.

[45] Cerruti to Visconti-Venosta, 9 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 721; Minghetti to Visconti-Venosta, 12 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 758; de Launay to Visconti-Venosta, 17 and 20 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, Nos. 815, 842; Cadorna to Visconti-Venosta, 13 Sept. 1870, *DDI*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 770. The distraction caused by the Franco-Prussian War also affected these responses. See Raymond Grew, "Catholicism and the Risorgimento", in *Studies in Modern Italian History: From the Risorgimento to the Republic*, Frank J. Coppa, ed. (New York: P. Lang, 1986), 42 and Wallace, *Papacy*, 133.

[46] *The Times*, 15 Sept. 1870, 8; Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 141; Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican*, 59. By way of comparison, the Piedmontese army that conquered the Papal States had 33,000 troops.

[47] The reported casualties were 20 killed and 50 wounded in the papal forces and 27 killed and 140 wounded in the Italian army. These figures are not comparable, however, since most of the army's casualties occurred on the march to Rome. See Rhodes, *Power of Rome*, 24. Mario Silvestri, *Cento anni di storia d'Italia: 1861-1961*, vol. 1, *Il primo cinquantennio (1861-1914)* (Milan: Editoriale Nuova, 1981), 45, gives slightly different figures: 20, 40, 40 and 150 respectively, and adds that an excessive 250 medals for bravery were awarded to Italian troops for that day's action.

[48] Visconti-Venosta to all European Legations, 20 Sept. 1870, *DDI.*, series 1, vol. 13, No. 834.

[49] Woolf, *Italian Risorgimento*, 6.

[50] Jemolo, *Church and State*, 48-9.

[51]Ibid., 48-50.
[52] Holt, *Making of Italy*, 298; Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 144. The pope refused to recognize Italy on the basis that its king had no legal authority except in Piedmont and in Lombardy which he had received by formal treaty. Jemolo, *Church and State*, 31.
[53] Martin Clark, *Modern Italy 1871-1982* (London: Longman, 1984/1987), 81-8; Grew, "Catholicism and the Risorgimento," 45-6. While the *non expedit* decree cost the government the support of many of the ruling class (Woolf, *Risorgimento*, 6), it also meant that there was no one in the government to speak for the pope.
[54] Jemolo, *Church and State*, 53. For the observation that there was justice on both sides in the conflict between Italy and the Vatican, see Denis Mack Smith, "A Prehistory of Fascism," in *Italy from the Risorgimento to Fascism: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Totalitarian State*, A. William Salomone, ed., (Newton Abbot, Devon: David and Charles, 1970), 113-5.
[55] Seton-Watson, *Liberalism to Fascism*, 99.
[56] Visconti-Venosta to Nigra, 24 March 1871, *DDI* (Rome: 1966), series 2, vol. 2, No. 289; Favre to d'Harcourt, *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1871-1914 (DDF)*, series 1, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929) No. 11; Thiers to de Choiseul, 28 June 1871, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 1, No. 13; William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890* (New York: Knopf, 1956), 32.
[57] Chabod, *Storia della politica estera*, 501.
[58] Seton-Watson, *Liberalism to Fascism*, 19-20, 64, 80; Frank J. Coppa, *Planning, Protectionism and Politics in Liberal Italy: Economics and Politics in the Giolottian Age* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1971), 50, 57; Romanelli, *Italia liberale*, 232.
[59] Croce, *History of Italy*, 109.
[60] This was an artificial war scare initiated by Bismarck against the French, which they managed to turn against him and forced the chancellor to back down.
[61] Bruce Waller, *Bismarck at the Crossroads: The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Congress of Berlin 1878-1880* (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 146.
[62] Ibid. Even then France delayed taking any action for three years, wishing to avoid a confrontation with Italy. See Pierre Renouvin, *Histoire des Relations Internationales*, vol. 6 (Paris: Hachette, 1955), 88.
[63] Langer, *European Alliances*, 219-220; Silvestri, *Cinquantennio*, 77.
[64] Sergio Romano, *Histoire de l'Italie du Risorgimento à nos jours* (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1977), 80.
[65] Waller, *Bismarck*, 146-7; Waddington to de Noailles, 13 Oct. 1878, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1930) No. 352; Langer, *European Alliances*, 222.

[66] Ivanoe Bonomi, *La politica italiana da Porta Pia a Vittorio Veneto 1870-1918* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1944/1946 [1966]), 65-6; Clark, *Modern Italy*, 46; Langer, *European Alliances*, 220-225; Romanelli, *Italia liberale*, 229.
[67] Romano, *Histoire de l'Italie*, 82-3.
[68] D'Aubigny to Saint-Hilaire, 29 July 1881, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 4 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1932), No. 85; de Saint-Vallier to de Courcel, 7 Sept. 1881, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 4, No. 116; de Reverseaux to Gambetta, 28 Nov. 1881, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 4, No. 197.
[69] De Saint-Vallier to de Courcel, 7 Sept. 1881, *DDF*, series 1, vol. 4, No. 116; Romano, *Histoire de l'Italie*, 83; Croce, *History of Italy*, 109.
[70] Victor Emmanuel II and Pius IX had both died in early 1878 and were succeeded by Humbert I and Leo XIII respectively. However, the body of Pius IX had remained in the Vatican until the incident in Rome in July 1881.
[71] *The Times*, 13 July 1881, 7; 14 July 1881, 5; 15 July 1881, 5. It was suggested that in this clash the Ultra-Clericals ("more Papal than the Pope himself") could not lose. If there was no disturbance, it would prove that Roman citizens were loyal to the pope; if there was a disturbance, it would prove there was no freedom for the Catholics in Rome. *The Times*, 19 July 1881, 4.
[72] *The Times*, 21 July 1881, 5; 27 July 1881, 5; 29 July 1881, 5; 5 Aug. 1881, 5; 8 Aug. 1881, 3.
[73] Langer, *European Alliances*, 232; C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1975), 25. Rhodes, *Power of Rome*, 43-6.
[74] W.N. Medlicott and D.K. Coveney, eds., *Bismarck and Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1971), 79; Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary*, vol. 2, *1871-1898*, trans. J.A. Underwood (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 12-19; Wallace, *Papacy*, chapters 6 and 7.
[75] *The Times*, 5 Dec. 1881, 5. *Il Diritto*, a semi-official Italian newspaper, gave a more balanced view, suggesting that Bismarck was "too well-informed to be serious."
[76] *The Times*, 5 Dec. 1881, 5; 22 Dec. 1881, 3; 24 Dec. 1881, 5; Bonomi, *La politica italiana*, 67.
[77] Coppa, *Wars of Independence*, 119, 144; Wallace, *Papacy*, 255.
[78] *The Times*, 3 Mar. 1882, 5; Jemolo, *Church and State*, 54; Waller, *Bismarck*, 26.
[79] John Whittam, "War Aims and Strategy: The Italian Government and High Command 1914-1918," in *War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War 1914-1918*, Barry Hunt and Adrian Preston, eds. (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 86.
[80] Langer, *European Alliances*, 232-7.
[81] Ibid., 237-245; Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy 1871-1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 41.

[82] Geiss, *Geman Foreign Policy*, 19.
[83] Langer, *European Alliances*, 237-45; Medlicott, *Bismarck*, 129.
[84] Medlicott, *Bismarck*, 111; Langer, *European Alliances*, 245; Geiss, *German Foreign Policy*, 42; Renouvin, *Relations Internationales*, vol. 6, 105; Romanelli, *Italia liberale*, 229.
[85] Seton-Watson, *Liberalism to Fascism*, 112, Croce, *History of Italy*, 110.
[86] Romano, *Histoire de l'Italie*, 83; Augusto Torre, *La politica estera dell'Italia dal 1870 al 1896* (Bologna: R. Patron, 1959), 238.
[87] The Roman question was finally settled by the Lateran Pacts signed on 11 February 1929 by Vatican authorities on behalf of Pope Pius XI and by Benito Mussolini as head of the Italian fascist government.
[88] Seton-Watson, *Liberalism to Fascism*, 143; Shepard B. Clough, *The Economic History of Modern Italy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 131.
[89] The Italian newspaper *La Reforma* noted a basic truth. The pope could not afford to accept an international guarantee. It would place him in the hands of the guaranteeing power: "the protected are clients." See *The Times*, 5 Jan. 1882, 5. Moreover, direct access to the Vatican from the sea ended with the fall of Rome.