A Reevaluation of the Impact of the Hundred Years War On The Rural Economy and Society of England

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Most scholars have argued that the Hundred Years War negatively impacted the economy and society of England. They have focused primarily on four aspects of the war: the burden of taxation on the English populace, the effects of purveyance on rural society, the effect of recruitment on the labour force of England and the costs of supporting military expeditions. However, in each case the actual degree of impact can be called into question or offset by appealing to other scholarship, or by drawing attention to related positive benefits that are too often overlooked. Beyond this, one must also consider the benefits of war in the form of new industry and the influx of money from high wages, rewards, ransoms, and the spoils of war. This paper seeks to examine both the positive and negative impacts of the Hundred Years War on the rural society and economy of England and to demonstrate that the overall impact of the war was not as negative as the majority of historians have previously maintained.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in English history were shaped by the recurrence of war.[1] However, the precise impact of these events on the rural society and economy of England has been the subject of much discussion. Of particular interest is the exchange between British historians M. Postan and K. McFarlane.[2] While Postan has argued that this lengthy conflict had only negative impact on the society and economy of Late Medieval England, McFarlane has asserted that the war was a very successful venture for the crown, with positive impacts for the economy.

A number of other scholars have entered this debate, with the majority supporting Postan. They have focused on three important

1 I would like to thank John Langdon for his help with this article and my studies. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable feedback offered by C. Neville, L. Cornack, and J. Kitchen. Finally, I would like to thank Elizabeth Loeffler for reviewing this article and helping to make the words flow.

2 Postan's argument is presented in "Some Social Consequences of the Hundred Years War", originally published in the *English Historical Review*, 12 (1942), and "The Costs of the Hundred Years War", originally published in *Past and Present*, 27 (1964), both reprinted in M. Postan, *Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). McFarlane's argument is presented in "War, The Economy and Social Change" originally published in *Past and Present*, 22 (1962) and reprinted in K. McFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century* (London: Hambledon Press, 1981).

aspects of the war: the taxation of English subjects, the effects of purveyance on agriculture, the impact of recruitment, and the subsequent costs of supporting soldiers.[3] However, in focusing on these negative impacts, historians have tended to overlook the benefits of war, particularly those linked to the growth of local industry, such as cloth-making and armaments, and an increase in local wealth that resulted from rewards, ransoms, and wages. By carefully analyzing both sides of this debate, this article will demonstrate that the Hundred Years War should be seen as having, on balance, a positive impact on the rural society and economy of England.[4]

In order to examine the impact of the Hundred Years War in perspective, it is essential to consider the condition of the peasantry at the outset of this period. M. Bailey has suggested that "commercial changes tended to increase the vulnerability of the majority of the English peasantry to economic disruption" such as warfare, plagues, or bad harvests.[5] His argument is based on the belief that there were insurmountable obstacles to improved standards of living for the peasantry during this period. These included fiscal demands on an overburdened populace and the general instability of the economy.[6]

Bailey acknowledges that there are three main schools of thought regarding the economic situation of England in the early fourteenth century. The first school believes that England faced a crisis of subsistence, where the level of welfare deteriorated due to a growing imbalance between resources and population. The second

3 All three are called forms of taxation by J. R. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown, 1294 - 1341" from *Landlords, Peasants, and Politics in Medieval England*, ed. T.H. Aston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 290.

4 As A. R. Bridbury has observed, there is something paradoxical about this interpretation of war. To think only in terms of costs and effects is to ignore the fact that war was an integral part of the Middle Ages, as religion was. We must see warfare during this period as an inevitable part of society of that time period and, in doing so, we can hope to demonstrate its influence on the rest of society and the economy. "To call the money spent on (war) a waste is merely to confuse ends with means." See A. R. Bridbury, "The Hundred Years War: Costs and Profits", in *Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England*, ed. D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp. 81-2.

5 Though he is obviously pessimistic about the level of peasant welfare during this period, Bailey provides a very workable model within which to examine the impact of war on the rural economy and society. He also provides perhaps the best introduction to the issues of the general level of peasant welfare during this period, though not all scholars agree with his arguments. M. Bailey, "Peasant Welfare in England, 1290-1348", *Economic History Review*, 11, 2 (1998), p. 247.

6 The fiscal demands included such things as taxation and purveyance while the instability included a high cost of living, low landholding size, volatile grain prices, and inadequate money markets. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

school believes that England faced a crisis of feudalism, where the level of welfare deteriorated due to the increased burdens placed on the products and labour of the peasantry by landlords. A third school believes that the level of welfare actually improved in the transition to a more efficient, commercialized and monetarized economy. This third school downplays the possibility of a subsistence crisis in the early fourteenth century and suggests that the Black Death played a far greater role in economic change.[7] Bailey notes that the period immediately preceding the Black Death witnessed decreased instability as the pressures on peasant welfare became less prevalent.[8] Though Bailey does not examine the effect of warfare in detail, his work makes it possible to understand the greater context within which the role of the Hundred Years War should be examined.

According to Postan, the costs or profits of the Hundred Years War can only be realized in two ways: the economic and the financial. The former encompasses society's experience as a whole, while the latter confines the discussion to receipts and disbursements of the crown, which Postan believes can be dismissed as a useless enterprise for determining the impact on the rural economy.[9] These both, however, seem to rely on an arbitrary balance sheet that depends on what various scholars decide to emphasize. Postan states: "In real terms England's net balance of loss and gain in the Hundred Years War was bound to be in the red."[10]

Taxation

An example of the real costs Postan refers to is the taxation levied by the English crown on its subjects during the Hundred Years War period. In fact, it has been argued that "taxes had a sharp and immediate economic impact" on England.[11] There were two types of

7 *Ibid.*, p. 224.
8 *Ibid.*, p. 247.
9 'Real' terms refer to the various aspects of the economy that play a role in the overall experiences of society, such as taxation, purveyance, the demand for labour, industrial growth, and commercial development.
10 Postan, "Costs of the Hundred Years War", p. 34.
11 E. Miller, "War, taxation and the English economy in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries", from *War and Economic Development*, ed. J. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Miller focuses primarily on the reigns of Edward I and II but his arguments relate easily into the Hundred Year War period, and are cited by other scholars in that manner.

taxation that the crown utilized: direct and indirect. The former was raised by an assessment of the sources of wealth (called a levy on movables)[12] throughout the country, and included both the secular and ecclesiastical estates. The latter was raised through loans to the crown, as well as taxes levied on the export of wool and other customs fees.[13] McFarlane has estimated the total amount of taxes raised by the English crown during the Hundred Years War period (1336-1453) at around £8.25 million. He further divided this estimate into £3.25 million raised through direct taxation from the laity and clergy, and £5 million raised through indirect taxation from loans and subsidies.[14] W. Ormrod claims that these figures are low, arguing that the actual levels of taxation in England during the Hundred Years War period was closer to £9.5 million.[15] These numbers appear impressive, but should be examined separately in order to determine their true impact on the English population.

Direct taxation may be divided into various different levies made throughout the Hundred Years War period. These were the taxes on the laity, which raised somewhat more than £2 million; and the taxes on the clergy, which raised around £1 million. Each of the levies were granted, either by Parliament or by the Church, with regularity to various kings for use, not only in war, but to "save the king's estates and honor."[16] This encompassed the defense of continental possessions, and constituted recognition of the general obligation of the country to pay for its own defense in years of peace. It has been further argued that "the approval of taxation in assemblies, local or national, was increasingly regarded as an entire community giving agreement, through its representatives, to the levying of financial

12 Movables included such things as livestock, stores of grains, and equipment (like ploughs) which could be given a monetary value.

13 These descriptions are given by C. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). This is a standard division that is used by most scholars on the subject.

14 K. B. McFarlane, "War, The Economy and Social Change", pp. 142-3, taken from enrolled accounts in *History of the Revenues of the Kings of England*, Vol. ii, Oxford (1925). These numbers are supported by Postan in his article "Costs of the Hundred Years War", p. 40.

15 W. Ormrod, "The Domestic Response", *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, A. Curry and M. Hughes (ed). (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1994), p. 87.

16 This is from C. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War*, p. 106, but is referring more specifically to the taxes granted during the years of peace and truce in the 1360's.

support in time of war."[17] Examples of direct taxation during the Hundred Years War are the ninths, tenths, fifteenths, or thirtieths levied on movables by Edward III during the early years of the outbreak of violence in France. As well, a fairly standard tax on the clergy was a tenth on ecclesiastical revenue. There were occasionally other attempts at hearth taxes and poll taxes that differed from these standard taxes on the laity.[18]

So what do these numbers mean in relation to the rural economy of England? In that these scholars use numbers that are largely the same, differences among them appear to be interpretive. Miller concludes that taxation's "impact upon the subsistence standards of medieval men could be direct and even severe," even though he acknowledged earlier that, at most, the peasants had only grumbled about taxation. There is no evidence of complaints that taxes were levied too frequently or too harshly, instead the complaints that did occur referred to extortion by the tax collectors.[19] J. Maddicott argues that, even though taxation was just one part of the whole picture and that the levy on movables was rarely a crushing burden, the crown's taxation did have a great social impact. He also argues that "the oppressiveness of taxation was much aggravated by the corruption and extortion which accompanied its levying."[20] Postan concludes even more strongly that "the Hundred Years War witnessed the victimization of England by its ruling classes," and that war was "a vast diversion of resources from *better* uses."[21]

C. Dyer offers a somewhat different interpretation, arguing that, even though only 40% of the peasant class actually contributed to direct taxation, there are still reasons for regarding the burden of war as significant to the rural economy, because the

17 C. Allmand, "War and the Non-Combatant in the Middle Ages", in *Medieval Warfare*, ed. M. Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 261.

18 These taxes refer to the amount that was owed by the people being assessed. A 'tenth' means that a person owed money equal to the value of one tenth of his movables. Hearth taxes were a set amount charged per hearth, and poll taxes were set amounts owed per person as determined by a poll of each community.

19 E. Miller, "War, taxation and the English economy...", pp. 17-18 and 27.

20 J. R. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 287.

21 Summation by A. R. Bridbury, "The Hundred Years War: Costs and Profits", p. 81 (italics added).

> incidence of taxes rose at a time when economic growth was ending ... The taxes were also combined with levies of local troops, and of purveyance (requisitioning of goods for which inadequate payment was made). There were complaints that the taxes were assessed and levied unfairly, and that bribes had to be paid. The poor were not exempt from the indirect effects of the taxes. Villages were economic communities, and the removal of a quantity of cash from the better-off peasants must have left them with less to spend on services and goods provided by their poorer neighbors.[22]

McFarlane, however, offers a different interpretation, arguing that the bulk of taxation, raised through indirect loans and wool subsidies, was financed through foreign pockets. Downplaying the burden of direct taxation, he emphasizes instead the importance of indirect taxes paid by foreign merchants and by the "systematic exploitation of the occupied provinces of France."[23] Newhall also makes an attempt to qualify the effects of direct taxation on the rural economy.[24] He argues that at the end of the fourteenth century the population of England was approximately 2.5 million people. The average amount of direct taxation, for the years 1416-1422, was £27,365. This averaged out to 2 2/3 d. per head per year during a period when the average carpenter's wage was about 4 1/2 to 6 d. per day, and the average labourer's wage was at least between 2 to 3 d. per day. In even the heaviest tax years of 1416-1417, the average amount assessed per head came to 1 s. 6 d., or 3 days work for a carpenter at 6 d. per day.[25] Newhall acknowledges that the uncertainty of population figures at this time make his numbers

22 C. Dyer, *Standards of Living in the later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 138-9.

23 McFarlane, "War, the Economy and Social Change", p. 147. In particular McFarlane points to the post 1421 period , when parliamentary grants fell off and French taxpayers paid for the war.

24 Newhall estimates the total amount of taxation, combining both direct and indirect, that would have been paid. In the years of Henry V's conquest of Normandy, which experienced at least seven years of continuous warfare, the taxation resulted in the average of 13 d. per head, which was not an unreasonable burden. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*, pp. 184-5.

25 A carpenter is estimated to have enjoyed 230 days of work per annum at this time. I am using the standard abbreviations used in most scholarly sources for money. The abbreviation £ refers to the English pound sterling, s. refers to shilling, and d. refers to pence. The standard exchange is £1 = 20 s., 1s. = 12 d., and 1 mark = 13 s. 4 d. or 2/3 £ Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*, pp. 184-9.

tentative, but suggests that these numbers do give a good indication of per capita direct taxation figures. A. Bridbury also concludes that for the 1370's, "it is clear that the king's taxes took no more than two or three days' earnings from the ordinary farm-labourer."[26] He argues that these figures were easily within the population's ability to pay, and that "we have only to compare taxes of 7 d. or 9 d., levied in the 1370s, with the fines and amercements of 3 d., 6 d., and even 12 d., which were commonplace in the earliest manorial courts ... to appreciate how very much more thirteenth century manorial authorities were able to wring from ordinary villagers than Parliament allowed the king to take from their descendants.[27]

Indirect taxation also played an essential role in the crown's finances, the most important aspect of which was the continued levy of a subsidy on wool exports. This subsidy helped to raise the £5 million attributed to indirect taxation by McFarlane. It was begun by Edward I during his years of heavy taxation in the 1290's, and continued to be granted by Parliament throughout the Hundred Years War. The crown increased the export duties, from a low custom of half a mark, on raw wool shipped to the continent. As well, they may have entered the wool trade with stocks acquired through taxation or compulsory crown purchases.[28] The impact on international trade, and wool producers in particular, was significant. Postan argues that:

> ... had the taxes been as high, and only as high, as the foreigners were prepared to pay, the total exports of wool would have stayed at the same level as before the taxes were imposed. The fact that wool exports slumped sharply and eventually fell to less than one-third of their pre-tax level means that the charges were higher than the traffic would bear.[29]

26 These figures are for the levies on movables as well as the poll taxes (famous during the 1370's) and parish taxes that peasants would also have to pay. A. R. Bridbury, *The English Economy from Bede to the Reformation*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge (1992), p. 37.
27 *Ibid.*, pp. 35-6.
28 R. Kaueper, *War, Justice, and Public Order* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
29 Postan, "Costs of the Hundred Years War", pp. 40-1.

This, on the surface, seems to be a very reasonable argument. The amount of revenue raised by the wool subsidy was considerable. For example, Sherbourne finds that from 1362 to 1368, all years of relative peace, the gross yield of the wool subsidy totaled £289,700 or an average of £48,250 per annum. This number rose still further in the seven years that followed.[30] If, on top of the regular levy on movables, the local population had to pay for the total of this subsidy, the impact on the rural economy would indeed have been serious. However, McFarlane, building on the premise of T. Rogers, argues that this wool subsidy was largely paid for by foreign merchants who came to England from Flanders and elsewhere on the continent. He states that "the exporters of wool ... were competing among themselves to sell in markets which had no other adequate source of supply. Export had only to be interrupted to produce an industrial and political crisis in the Flemish towns."[31] In addition, Postan failed to consider that there may not have been an adequate supply of wool to export and that the great industrial surge in cloth-making also began to require large amounts of local wool.[32]

Both the logistical and administrative burden of these two kinds of taxation, direct and indirect, created an advanced administrative system that allowed the English crown to continue a prolonged military endeavor against a much wealthier and larger, but less politically unified French kingdom. Even if the war ended poorly for the English crown, this administrative system allowed England to become a major player in Europe in the final centuries of the Middle Ages. We should not, however, entirely discount the impact of medieval taxes upon all ranks of society. Some testimony to the resentment they aroused may be seen in the reluctance to pay and in strenuous efforts at evasion.[33] However, "no one seriously objected to paying for the campaigns that culminated in the capture of the king of France," and

30 Sherbourne, "The cost of English Warfare with France", *English Historical Review*, Vol. 50, No. 122, (Nov. 1977), p. 141.
31 McFarlane, "War, the Economy and Social Change", p. 145.
32 The cloth industry will be discussed more in depth later on.
33 Miller, "War, taxation and the English economy", p. 18.

> no one seriously objected to paying for the war that Agincourt vindicated and the colonization of Normandy crowned. It was the abject and irredeemable failure that the country would not stand for. ... The men who lost their nerve in England ... were much more likely to have done so because they found themselves paying more than they thought they should have done for military expeditions which always seemed to end in humiliation and disaster.[34]

Purveyance

Purveyance has usually been regarded as another of the burdens the Hundred Years War placed on the rural society and economy. The process of purveyance began when the king issued a writ demanding that a county or counties provide certain quantities of grain, flour, meat, or other items and deliver them at a designated port by a specific date.[35] Purveyors had the right to buy before other buyers or before the goods went to market and also had the right to obtain transportation (wagons, horses, boats) to move the acquired goods to the selected destination.[36] These arrangements do not seem to have been overly burdensome on the surface, but scholars, in particular Postan and Maddicott, have argued that there were serious problems with the practice of purveyance, which resulted in a severe burden being placed on the population. Maddicott argues that purveyance was inherently arbitrary.[37] Problems included late payment, inadequate payment, or no payment at all for the goods taken; goods being purchased under the going market rate and sometimes being sold for the profit of the purveyor; an uneven burden on the countryside; commandeering unfeasible amounts of victuals and other supplies and leaving the population in short supply; and sparing the rich while placing the burden on the poor.

Purveyance was very difficult to organize properly and

34 Bridbury, "The Hundred Years War: Costs and Profits", p. 89.

35 J. Langdon, "Inland Water Transport in Medieval England", *Journal of Historical Geography*, 19, 1 (1993), pp. 2-3.

36 Hewitt also gives a more detailed description of the types of items purveyed; they included beef, mutton, pork (usually salted), oats, beans, peas, cheese, fish (commonly dried), wheat, and ale. H. J. Hewitt, "The Organization of War", in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. K. Fowler (London: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 81. See also the very detailed table on what was purveyed in his book *The Organization of War under Edward III* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), p. 51.

37 Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 300.

efficiently. Purveyors did not carry large sums of money to make immediate payment for the goods they took. They gave wooden tallies that allowed the producer of the goods to collect payment at a later date, but the delays in payment may have caused hardship.[38] The crown requested what were arguably excessive amounts of supplies to be raised in a very short time frame, from a limited region, for expeditions to France, continental or coastal garrisons, and naval forces. An example of late payment occurred in the south-western counties in 1355, where large quantities of victuals were gathered for the army of the Black Prince waiting at Plymouth. The crown did not pay until the spring of 1357.[39] Maddicott argues further that, even though "the crown usually intended to pay for the goods which its servants took, ... much went unpaid for, both because of the government's inability to control its local officials and because those officials frequently did not have the ready cash to pay for what they took."[40] No records demonstrate that the villagers were ever fully repaid or that they expected repayment.[41] Of course, this argument could be reversed. Though sources do not claim that payments were made, this does not mean that they were not *actually* made. The absence of complaints, which he suggests were linked to the peasants' acceptance of the inevitable, could also be indicative of the receipt of payments at a later date. The common practice remained to give wooden tallies to the producers of the supplies and make them responsible for the collection of their own money. A popular poem written circa 1340 condemned the king "who ate off silver, and paid in wooden tallies; how much better to pay in silver and eat off wood."[42] The lack of payment was a complaint that reached the crown on several occasions and resulted in repeated declarations that the supplies collected were to be paid for promptly. In a period when royal funds were tight, as was the case during most of the fourteenth

38 Hewitt, "The Organization of War", p. 82.
39 *Ibid.*, p. 82, taken from the *Register of the Black Prince*, II, London (1930-3), p. 86.
40 Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 300.
41 *Ibid.*, p. 309.
42 This poem, taken from *Anglo-Norman Political Songs*, (ed) I. Aspin, Anglo-Norman text Society (1953), p. 186, is cited by M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 256-7.

and fifteenth centuries, this was not always a realistic expectation. However, the Statutes at Large state that by the 1350s "it was held that small purveyance should be paid for at the time of taking and large ones within a fixed period—in 1354, a quarter of a year, in 1360, within a month or six weeks."[43]

Victuals were also purchased at rates lower than market prices. This was a common complaint that reached the courts and Parliament. The rates at which the purveyors often purchased goods were set by the king in advance as fair amounts. There is evidence that purveyors either under-estimated the value of the victuals, or demanded heaped measures instead of razed measures, however this was not the primary complaint. What seemed to bother the peasantry most was the recurrence of men either illegally seizing supplies for certain rates, or seizing more than what the king had asked for, and then promptly selling the excess on the market for a large profit. The author of *De Speculo Regis* explains that:

> ... if the royal purveyors want hay ... they offer 3 d. a bushel for it, although it is worth 5 d.; they pay 3 d. for a bushel of barley, worth 8 d., and 3 d. for a bushel of beans, worth 1 s.. They take the hens which sustain old widows, poor women and orphans, for 1 d. each, although a hen is worth 2 d. Where is the justice in this? It is not justice, but rapine.[44]

C. Neville and C. Nederman, however, have questioned Maddicott's repeated use of this source, as they believe that William of Pagula was not commenting on contemporary events, but offering a warning to Edward III about problems which could arise in the future from excessive levels of purveyance.[45] Another example from 1330, states that the men of Somerset and Dorset complained that the sheriff levied five hundred quarters of wheat and three hundred bacon

43 *The Statutes at Large*, Vol. I, p. 487, and Vol. II, pp. 103, 136-7. Hewitt argues that there is no reason to believe that these statutes were not largely upheld, though there continued to be some complaints. *Organization of War Under Edward III*, p. 59.

44 William of Pagula, *De Speculo Regis Edwardi Tertii*, Paris (1891), pp. 97, 103. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 311.

45 C. Neville and C. Nederman, "The Origins of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III* of William of Pagula," *Studi Medievali*, 3rd Series, Vol. 38, 1 (1997), pp. 328-9.

pigs for the king. "For every twenty quarters taken ... he would allow them only sixteen, and for these he paid at the rate of 10 d. a bushel,[46] afterwards selling the wheat for 1 s. 3 d. a bushel." Corruption appears to have been common enough that, in 1362, changes were instituted by Edward III that required purveyors to show the writ that they received from the king, detailing the amount to be raised within each county.[47] Complaints continued to surface, however, throughout the period of the Hundred Years War.

What may have influenced the economy more with regards to purveyance, was its uneven geographical distribution throughout England. The sheriffs or other royal officials in charge of gathering the victuals had to finish gathering and transporting them to the disembarkation port within a set time frame. For this reason, purveyance fell most often, especially in regards to expeditions to France, on the southeastern areas of England. This was partially because these areas constituted the primary corn growing regions of England, but also because they had a well developed water transportation network that allowed for the quick movement of goods to the coast.[48] In his examination of water transport in England, using in particular the purveyance accounts of the fourteenth century, J. Langdon argues that:

> It was in this eastward-looking area, in fact, that water transport was most prominent, and the decision to purvey in a certain area must have dictated to some extent the effectiveness of the transportation network. That relatively land-locked counties such as Leicestershire and Warwickshire were purveyed lightly (3 times up to 1348) ... must be a reflection of this, as must be the fact that Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire were purveyed relatively often (14 times to 1348), thanks to the Trent water system.[49]

46 *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, (ed) J. Strachey et al, Vol. ii, London (1783-1832), p. 40. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 311.

47 Both Hewitt and Prestwich refer to the great outcry leading to the demand for changes in 1362. Hewitt, "The Organization of War", p. 82 and Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 257.

48 Maddicott refers to both of these factors as essential to understanding the extra burden placed on the rural areas of the southeast. "The English Peasantry and the Crown", pp. 301 - 2.

49 Langdon, "Inland Water Transport in Medieval England", p. 2, using Purveyance Records found in PRO E101/550-597 and PRO E358/2-4.

Hewitt supports this interpretation of the geographical distribution of purveyance. As well, he stresses the influence that the army's size had on this distribution. Hewitt argues that for smaller armies, the resources of only a few counties were required, while such large-scale operations as the years of 1346 - 1347 required a much more complete distribution of purveyance.[50] It is also possible that the number of times each county was purveyed may be indicative of their potential for grain surplus. However, in combination with the levy on movables and the wool subsidy, purveyance must have left its mark on most counties.

The rural economy of England also faced the burden of requests for potentially unreasonable and unfeasible quantities of supplies. Maddicott notes that during the years 1296 to 1297 the men of Lincolnshire provided the produce from 2700 acres (2741 quarters) of cereals, and the men of Kent provided 4900 acres of cereals (4884 quarters). In the years following this purveyance, there are records of thirteen sheriffs being reprimanded by the king for depriving some men of all their corn, so that there was nothing left for their own sustenance.[51] In cases such as this, there can be no doubt of the potentially devastating economic impact of purveyance. This, however, was not the norm, particularly during the Hundred Years War period. Hewitt provides us with two detailed breakdowns of purveyance which demonstrate that adequate levels of victuals were obtained without excessive hardship on the counties called upon to supply the crown. The first was a breakdown of purveyance, using the Exchequer accounts, for the expedition of 1346 through ten counties, totaling 2903 quarters of corn, 1059 quarters of oats, 750 salted porks, 399 carcasses of mutton, 134 sides of beef, 27 weys of cheese, and 331.25 quarters of peas and beans. All were purchased at the standard market discount (21 quarters for the price of 20), and the

50 Hewitt, "The Organization of War", pp. 81-2.
51 PRO E159/69/m. 77d. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the crown", p. 314-15. During the years 1296 and 1297, R. Kaueper estimates, based on the figures of Maddicott, that the crown obtained an impressive amount of 13,500 quarters of wheat and 13,000 quarters of oats in twelve southern counties. R. Kaueper, *War, Justice, and Public Order*, p. 110.

price for wheat was at a reasonable rate of 3 to 4 s per quarter. The second example was a similar breakdown of purveyance for the provisioning of Calais between 1347 - 1361. Over the fourteen years in question, 13,138 quarters of wheat, 3964 quarters of malt, 6726 quarters of oats, 2211 quarters of beans and peas, and 2814 carcasses of beef and bacon were purveyed during a time when the population of Calais was wholly dependent upon England for its food. During these years the country was also able to support several expedition forces on the continent without a large number of complaints, which one would expect to have accompanied hardship among the rural population.[52]

There is also the possibility that the supplies needed by England's military forces provided an outlet for the surplus produce of the agricultural industry. In fact, J. Masschaele, after further examining the arguments of Maddicott, suggested that purveyance was actually indicative of the ability of the English economy to produce an agricultural surplus. Masschaele demonstrates that Maddicott's examples of purveyance in Kent and Lincolnshire actually represent less than one percent of these counties' total acreage, or as much as five percent if lands in fallow or inhospitable lands are included.[53] Masschaele further demonstrates that those peasants contributing to purveyance were actually the upper peasantry rather than those living at or close to a subsistence level. Slightly more than half of the contributors in his examples held a virgate or more, while another third held between a half virgate and a virgate.[54] The amounts collected from these peasants were well within their ability to pay. Though it appears that purveyors could force England into a food crisis if they pushed too hard on the population, throughout the Hundred Years War period there was no single year in which starvation was reported on any scale. This may

52 PRO E101/25/16 and *Calendar of Close Rolls, 1354-60*, London (1892-), p. 223. Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III*, pp. 50-63.

53 J. Masschaele, *Peasants, Merchants, and Markets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 37.

54 PRO E101/552/26 and PRO E101/170/1 for the accounts of 1346 ad 1351 respectively. As well, *Rotulli Hundredorum*, (ed) W. Illinworth and J. Caley, Vol. 2, London (1812-18), pp. 591-687. Masschaele used the Hundred Rolls to track peasant names and totals of land holdings and compared them to existing purveyance records. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

be especially true in the years following the Black Death, when the population of the countryside and towns did not, in itself, provide a market for the surplus.[55]

The final aspect of purveyance that aroused the frustration and anger of the rural populace of England was the upper classes' apparent exemption from purveyance. This appears to have occurred on a consistent basis and, in turn, resulted in the peasantry absorbing most of the economic burden of purveyance. Though not experienced by all lords' demesnes, the crown continually gave the nobility exemptions, for their own estates as well as for those of their tenants, on the basis that they were currently serving overseas or were otherwise serving the crown in some capacity. They were also able to avoid the effects of purveyance, at times, by being a part of the crown's inner circle. If the manorial lords knew that purveyance would be coming to their area of England during the years they did not already have an exemption, they would often sell their extra cereals and meat in the markets at a good rate prior to the crown purveyor's assessments. This, indeed, had a negative economic impact on the rural population of England.[56] Purveyance will always be soured by such contemporary chroniclers as William of Pagula, who wrote that "purveyors were sent to act in this world as the devil acts in Hell."[57] Opposition to purveyance, however, "had reached its limits by about the middle years of the *fourteenth* century, and, thereafter, with royal agents acting more reasonably, [it] became much less of an issue between the crown and people."[58]

55 This hypothesis requires much more inquiry into the amount of food actually produced, in comparison to the amount consumed by the rural population of England, to see if, and how large, a surplus actually existed. As well, I must acknowledge that there was always a market for surplus in the towns and cities of England. There were also restrictions on grain export to the continent, other than Gascony and a few other English held lands, to allow the crown to continue purveyance for its armies. It is therefore impossible to argue this hypothesis further without more in depth research.

56 All of the scholars to whom I have been referring throughout the section on purveyance seem unanimous in their view that purveyance was negative for the peasant classes, with the exception of Masschaele. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown"; Hewitt, "The Organization of War"; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*; Kaueper, *War, Justice, and Public Order*; and Postan, "The Costs of the Hundred Years War"; Masschaele, *Peasants, Merchants, and Markets*.

57 *De Speculo Regis*, p. 94. J. Maddicott, "English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 315.

58 C. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War*, p. 98.

Recruitment and Equipment

The final area stressed as an important indicator of the negative impact of the Hundred Years War was the effect of recruitment, and the subsequent costs that the rural populace sustained in supporting those recruited. Postan argues that "the most obvious real cost (of the Hundred Years War) was that of manpower diverted to war-making and in the first place that of soldiers in the field and in garrisons."[59] This can be questioned on the basis that war was an integral part of the society of the Middle Ages, and that to call the use of manpower and resources for war-making a waste is to ignore its inherent place in medieval society. Postan calculates the total number of men involved in the campaigns of 1346-1347 at 60-80,000 men, including all those assigned to combatant and logistical tasks at home and overseas, while he puts Agincourt at around 40-50,000 men.[60] He argues, "considering in proportion to the population in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the employment of 50,000 men might approach ten or even fifteen percent of the total male population aged between eighteen and forty-five."[61] This comes at a time when England was suffering from a shortage of manpower and could not afford to divert such a large proportion of its population away from other industries.[62] The recruitment of troops did not affect the different counties equally. Maddicott points out that it was the counties of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and Lincolnshire that supplied the majority of troops for overseas expeditions.[63]

There was, moreover, an increased burden on the population of various villages to take on the arming and equipping of the foot soldiers and archers sent to war. The crown made no real attempt to provide soldiers with weapons and armor, instead this burden was passed to the soldier and his community. Maddicott states "although

59 Postan, "The Costs of the Hundred Years War", p. 34.
60 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
61 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
62 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
63 Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 321.

the commissioners of array were given general supervision of the raising of troops within each county, the selection and arming of men for service, and the levying of money for their wages and equipment, were normally left to the local communities."[64] Hobelars seem to have received £2 or £3 from their community to purchase equipment and a horse, and to pay for expenses until the king's pay began.[65] For the communities involved, this was the equivalent of four oxen or eleven quarters of wheat.[66] It was not uncommon for the community to pay £1 to equip and arm a single infantryman. In addition, as the English armies slowly came to rely on mounted archers, the cost for a horse would have to be added, usually totaling another £1.[67] Standard equipment for an archer was an aketon and bacinet, together with a sword, knife, bow and 1 sheaf of arrows, although not necessarily all of these items at all times.[68] Counties, towns and even villages, began to pay money for relief from having to provide soldiers. Examples include Kent, which in 1335 paid £200 for relief from 120 hobelars, and Berkshire which paid 200 marks for forty hobelars that same year.[69] Once a soldier was outside of his county, he was paid by the crown, and the crown was responsible for replacing broken or lost equipment and reimbursing the costs of any horses killed.

There was a drastic decrease in population as a result of several recurrences of the plague over the period of the Hundred Years War. The battles of Crecy and Calais, however, occurred before the population of England had been reduced, so there was not necessarily a shortage of men to fight in France as well as work in the various professions needed to support an army. By the time of the Battle of Agincourt, England definitely had a reduced population compared to the early fourteenth century, but the number of men actually taking part in expeditions reflected that fact. While the

64 *Ibid.*, p. 321.
65 Hobelars were lightly armed cavalrymen, usually raised from the peasant class.
66 *Ibid.*, p. 325.
67 Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, pp. 124 - 135.
68 Military expenses paid by a village averaged 36.5% of their tax assessment. *Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas*, 194-5 and PRO E401/1656. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", p. 324.
69 *Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1334-8*, pp. 131-2. Maddicott, "The English Peasantry and the Crown", pp. 324-5.

number of combatants arrayed by the English for the siege of Calais numbered 30,000 or more fighting men, the number at Agincourt was estimated to be as low as 10,000.[70] The initial labour force to put these expeditions together would likely have been substantially larger than the forces themselves, however they would not necessarily have been engaged in full-time work having to do with the military adventure. Many labourers, especially those involved in agriculture, would return to their own endeavors after a short period of service, giving little thought to the men in France, beyond the recognition that the expedition might require more supplies in the future.[71] Others, however, would have been employed full time in the growing English arms industry.

Of course, these numbers may be questioned. McFarlane argues:

> that only once—at Calais in 1347—did the number of soldiers taking part in a campaign reach something like *one per cent* of the population of England and Wales. Most of the pitched battles of the war ... were fought by as little as a half or a third of one per cent. Since a great many of the actual combatants were gentlemen by birth and their servants, men who had no other gainful employment than war ... and since the campaigning season ... was customarily short and did not begin until the harvest was in, it is unlikely that the raising of armies caused any great dislocation of the labour-market.[72]

Moreover, because the war was continuous over a long period, the men serving overseas were often the same in subsequent campaigns. Even when they were not, villages would not necessarily have to

70 These numbers are from D. Seward, *The Hundred Years War*, Atheneum Press, New York (1978), pp. 68, 157.
71 This point can be further demonstrated by the vast number of books put out by historians of late medieval England that ignore the impact of the Hundred Years War partially or even completely. See J. Hatcher, *Rural Economy and Society in the Duchy of Cornwall*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1970), C. Dyer, *Standards of Living in the later Middle Ages*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1989), and E. Miller and J. Hatcher, *Medieval England: Towns, Commerce and Crafts*, Longman Group Ltd., London (1995). All of these are thorough examinations of the economy and society of England yet make at most a passing mention of the Hundred Years War.
72 That "a great many" of those involved were gentlemen, during the 'age of the Infantry Revolution', is dubious, but generally McFarlane is correct in stating that the impact on the labour force of England would be negligible. McFarlane, "War, the Economy and Social Change", p. 141.

repurchase swords and armor each time someone from their community was sent on an expedition. This could decrease the burden imposed on a community to supply equipment and recruits. In addition, Postan only focuses on the male population of England and ignores the active role of the female population in agriculture and manufacturing. In that women were not recruited for military campaigns, the disruption was limited at the outset to only a portion of the total population.

War and Economic Development

So far, our discussion has focused on the three major reasons given by scholars as to why the Hundred Years War had a negative impact on the rural society and economy of England. However, the burden of taxation is open to interpretation and there is a lack of proof that purveyance remained unpaid, or that the amounts taken were excessive. As well, the number of men recruited to fight and the burden of supporting them can be seen as having a negligible impact on the agricultural labour capabilities of the rural community.

The negative impacts must also be balanced against a number of beneficial impact, including the increased development of industries that supported one hundred and seventeen years of warfare. One example was the cloth-producing industry. Prior to the Hundred Years War, most English wool was transported to Flanders or elsewhere on the continent. The wool subsidy granted first to Edward I, but more importantly to Edward III and his successors, caused the cost of this export to increase substantially. The cloth-producing industry in England, in terms of cloth produced beyond the needs of the local community, can be traced back to at least the twelfth century.[73] By the year 1334, however, "it was clear that something was wrong with the industry" because the widespread manufacture of cloth had almost disappeared.[74] With the imposition of a tax on the export of raw wool, many producers began to look to the cloth producing industry in England rather than the wool market in Flanders. The demand for wool in Flanders was bound to keep a

75 L. F. Salzman, *English Industries of the Middle Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923).
74 *Ibid.*, pp. 202-3.

market open for trade, as is evidenced by the revenue gathered by indirect taxation; however, because there were no extra dues charged on the export of cloth, it became cheaper to purchase English cloth rather than English wool on the continent.[75] Miller and Hatcher sum up the growth of the cloth industry as follows:

> Reflect[ing a] more decisive shift in some places and regions towards more specialized patterns of production both for some goods of general consumption and some of the materials used in their manufacture, allowing some economies of scale and favoring some development of skill. Secondly, so long as skilled labour was available or could be trained, there was no reason for these developing industrial centers to accept constraints of the local and limited markets which had been the context in which much of medieval urban manufacture had developed. Thirdly, *when scarce materials were readily to hand, or fiscal influences ... gave English producers a marked advantage, ... export as well as home markets were well within the range of English manufactures.*[76]

For these scholars, the scarcity of wool as well as the fiscal influences instituted by the crown resulted in the English cloth industry expanding its trade to the continent.

A final reason for the expansion of the local cloth industry was the growing trend in the military to furnish men with uniforms. There was not yet a national uniform used by all expedition forces and garrisons, but individual forces, based in a region or serving a particular leader, began to receive uniforms as part of their equipment. For example, the Cheshire archers serving under the Black Prince all wore green and white tabards over their armor.[77] The vast numbers of men leaving on expeditions, plus the supply of extra uniforms reserved for replacements, would have provided cloth-

75 *Ibid.*, pp. 204-5.

76 (My italics.) Miller and Hatcher, *Medieval England: Towns, Commerce and Crafts*, p. 411.

77 The reason for uniforms is interesting in itself. They were usually given out to add to the unity of the forces, allowing them to identify with one another, but they were also given out to prevent desertion, for it was harder to be inconspicuous in military uniform than ordinary clothes. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 128.

producers with much work, especially from 1346 to 1347, when there were 30,000 or more soldiers on expedition to the continent at a single time. There can be no doubt that the local cloth-producing industry flourished in this period.

A second and more important industry influenced by the Hundred Years War, was the manufacture of arms. The need for the provision of armor, swords, pikes, bows, arrows, cannons, and siege engines all increased dramatically because of the war. Of these, the provision of bows and arrows is easily traceable thanks to the abundance of written sources left behind in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Hewitt, Newhall, and Prestwich have each examined this aspect of the war in their respective works, but none has looked specifically at the economic impact this industry had on England. The proportion of archers in the expedition forces increased substantially over the Hundred Years War. In relation, the production of arrows and bows also increased. Hewitt summarizes the number of bows and arrows, as stated in the *Calendar of Close Rolls* and Rymer's *Foedera*, detailing the counties of England and the numbers of requests for each of the years 1341, 1346, 1356, and 1359. In 1341, there were requests for 7700 bows and 13,000 sheaves of arrows. In 1346, the numbers decreased to 2280 bows and 5550 sheaves of arrows. In 1356, they rose again to 4300 bows and 8700 sheaves of arrow. In 1359, they were 4100 bows and as many as 20,400 sheaves of arrows. Overall, the requests over these four years totaled 18,280 bows and 47,650 sheaves of arrows (or 1,143,600 individual arrows).[78] Prestwich points out that between 1353 and 1360, the Tower of London employed bowyers and fletchers to produce 4000 painted bows, 11,300 unpainted bows, 4000 bow-staves, and almost 24,000 sheaves of arrows. He further demonstrates that in 1371 there were another 16,500 sheaves gathered in a single year.[79] Newhall shows that, according to the Exchequer accounts, during the years 1418 and 1422, the expenditure from the exchequer for bows and arrows was £446 18 s. 3 d., £318 6 s. for bows alone,

78 Numbers taken from Rymer, *Foedera*, Records Commissioner, London (1816-19); *Calendar of Close Rolls, 1354-60*, pp. 224, 601-2; and PRO E372/191/m. 9; Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III*, p. 64.

79 *Calendar of the Close Rolls, 1343-46*, p. 538; *Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1358-1361*, pp. 221-2; and Rymer, *Foedera*, III, ii, p. 911. Prestwich implies that these were all built at the Tower though some may easily have been transported there from elsewhere in the country. Regardless, they are still large numbers in either case. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 141.

£325 13 s. 4 d. for bow-staves, £755 1 s. 5 d. for arrows alone, £343 3 s. 2 d. for arrowheads, £2 for eight gross bowstrings, and £266 4 d. for the manufacture of bows and arrows, which totaled £2457 2 s. 6 d. spent on archery. In addition, there were two separate orders for the collection of 1,190,000 goose feathers (part of the declarations to take 6 feathers from every goose in England and send them to London) and two orders for 400,000 arrowheads. These requests totaled 150,000 arrows for 1418; 375,000 arrows for 1419; 400,000 arrows for 1420; and 425,000 arrows for 1421. Although Newhall argues that these numbers are only for expenditures on arrows alone, not including orders classified under *bows and arrows*. Arrows were also made during these years in Normandy under royal supervision.[80]

The investment made by the crown for all of these supplies was in addition to the original bow and sheaf of arrows with which men were supposed to be supplied from their own communities. The need for arrows and bows was such that ash, the ideal material for their construction, was forbidden for use in the manufacture of clogs and shoes, "lest the supply be consumed to the detriment of fletchers."[81] Estimates for the price of a sheaf of arrows range from 3 d. to 1 s. 4d., and the price of a bow could be as high 1 s. 3 d. during the Hundred Years War period. Since bows and sheaves of arrows were purchased in the tens of thousands, the result was a significant flow of money from the crown back to the rural economy. For example, in 1341 the crown would have paid £385 for the 7700 bows (at £1 each) and another £487.5 for the 13,000 sheaves of arrows (at 9 d. each) that were received. The payment of £872.5 in one year was a large investment during the fourteenth century. Supplying the demands of war must have required a large number of labourers working metal for arrowheads, carving bows and arrows from the ash, and so on. The investment by the crown in 1341, assuming bowyers and fletchers made approximately £5 per year, a good wage

80 Taken from *Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry V*, II, pp. 144, 178, 384, 391; PRO Issue Rolls 633, mm. 15, 18; 636, mm 5, 7, 8, 11, 15; 638, mm 1, 3, 10, 14, 15; 640, mm 2, 7, 10, 12, 13; 643, mm 3, 4,11, 21; 646, mm 3, 10; 649, mm 3, 9; 652, mm 1, 3, 12, 13, 21; 655, mm 4, 6, 9, 13; and PRO E271/m 16. Summarized in Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*, pp. 260-1.

81 This was a declaration made by the crown in October of 1416. *Ibid.*, p. 259 taken from *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, IV, p. 103.

for craftsmen at that time, would indicate that at least 175 man-years of full-time labour would have been employed by the archery industry.[82] A similar estimate may be made for the period of 1418 – 1422, which would indicate at least 100 man-years of full-time labour per annum employed by the archery industry. In addition, there would have been an impact on the local transportation network used to transport these supplies to the ports of embarkation or to London for storage in the Tower.

E. Hunt and J. Murray argue "one industry that flourished throughout this period irrespective of market loss and market disruption was that of meeting the needs of the military."[83] They state that "war had become not only endemic throughout this period, but more importantly for business, it was being waged by larger and larger polities that had the means to acquire more and more of what Cicero once described as war's sinews—money."[84] They also discuss the construction industry, especially shipbuilding, mining, and metal working as three examples of areas that grew as a result of the war. The argument could be made, however, that the archery industry was the one that developed the most over the years between 1336 and 1453, and in turn had one of the largest economic impacts on English rural society.

Another beneficial impact of the Hundred Years War was the increase of basic personal wealth. This took the form of high wages for soldiers, rewards for distinguished service (either in monetary sums or in property), and the profits of both booty and ransoms from the French countryside. Wages for soldiers were set at 4 s. per day for bannerets, 2 s. per day for knights, 1 s. per day for sergeants and men-at-arms, 6 d. for hobelars and mounted archers, 3 d. for foot archers, and 2 d. for regular infantry.[85] The Black Prince offered double wages for one of his campaigns in the years following the Black Death. Wages were not necessarily meant as rewards, for they were supposed to be used to support oneself while on campaign. However,

82 not any familial support, or external labourers that were also employed.
83 E. Hunt and J. Murray, *A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200 - 1550* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 170.
84 *Ibid.*, p. 170.
85 Taken from *The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell*, (ed) M. Lyon et al, Brussels (1983), p. 331 among other sources, and summarized in Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 84.

when serving overseas for extended periods of time these wages could add up quickly, especially for the nobility; but even archers and infantry could manage to return to England with a profit. This was more the case during the campaigns of Edward III and Richard II, for example, than those of Henry V, because Henry's primary goal, between 1416 and 1422, was the conquest of Normandy. During those campaigns he did not wish to antagonize the countryside by letting his men live off the land without paying for what they took. During earlier, and even some later, campaigns, the English had no compunctions about taking what they needed from rural France instead of using wages to purchase supplies.[86] Wages were not an entirely reliable source of profits as the crown was often in arrears on payments. There were many cases of men collecting wages owed to them several years after the campaigns on which they had served. However, wages did provide an opportunity for men to increase their basic wealth.[87]

The various rewards that soldiers could receive were also important. The most obvious rewards were the land grants given by kings to their followers; this was particularly the case with land grants given throughout Normandy and France by Henry V following his successful invasion of 1416 to 1422. This was arguably the only case that allowed for the wide scale distribution of land to soldiers serving overseas, because these grants were the best way to ensure the future defense of the Duchy.[88] After 1370, grants of land were added to the various indentures as a reward for service. Even in years of defeat, the hope for land was always a prominent reason to serve in the military.[89] There were cases when the grant of an office, such as the lieutenancy of Calais, might also provide profits. However, offices did not necessarily convey monetary rewards because the king

86 Throughout his work, Newhall discusses the need for Henry to appeal to the populace of France in order for him to be accepted as their king after the conquest was completed. There were in fact several declarations promising punishment if English soldiers took from the populace of France between 1416 and 1422. The indication that these were needed demonstrates that this was a new idea, which went away from the customs of the previous English expeditionary forces. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*.

87 Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III*, p. 105 and C. T. Allmand, "War and Profit in the Late Middle Ages", *History Today*, 15 (1965).

88 Military commanders were always granted land first but others did receive land, including some very humble men-at-arms and other soldiers as in the case of Henry V's conquest of Normandy. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 100.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 100.

usually relied on the deep pockets of the appointee to supplement what the crown could afford. The holder of the office would often have to pay the balance out of the income he received from his estates in England.[90] The other possible reward for service in the military was a direct monetary payment. The most common circumstance for this type of reward was for outstanding feats on the battlefield, noted by the king or a captain. Examples of this were James Audley, a humble knight serving in the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, who received a pension of £400 per annum from the crown, or the yeoman Nicholas Bonde who received a pension of 50 marks per annum for service at the same battle.[91] These rewards were not common and were even rarer among archers and infantrymen.

Extra wealth was also obtained in France through booty. This was especially true during the phase of chevauchées, which dominated the reign of Edward III. It is difficult to place a monetary value on the goods taken from France because the booty was rarely recorded, though there are examples which allow us to see what valuables were plundered. Even when exaggeration is taken into consideration, the amount of goods brought back to England from France was substantial. The standard practice for the distribution of spoils was for the commander of the force to receive one-third of the booty. In turn, the king would receive one-third of the total made by all the commanders. This could vary, as was evidenced by the armies of the Black Prince which gave one half of the total to the prince.[92] In 1354, Robert Knollys collected a silver basin and ewer (weighing 7 pounds), 4 silver chargers, 18 silver saucers and other pieces of plate, 2 goatskins, and two new pairs of boots.[93] Another example of the potential for booty was a declaration made by Edward II in 1319, that each man was allowed to seize as much as he could carry, up to £100, from enemy lands.[94] In 1346, large quantities of goods,

90 *Ibid.*, p. 100 and see also J. Kirby, "The Financing of Calais", in *Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research* though he concentrates much more on the amounts of money required to keep Calais operating, based on the balance sheet, more than issue of offices.

91 *Register of the Black Prince*, IV, pp. 196-8, 291; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 101.

92 See D. Hay, "The Division of the Spoils of War in Fourteenth-Century England", in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, v. 4 (1954).

93 PRO E101/334/2; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p. 103.

including clothes, jewels, vessels of gold and silver, and prisoners, were recorded as possessions of returning soldiers.[95] This wealth was distributed throughout the country by 1348, as evidenced by a fourteenth century chronicle, which states:

> There were few women who did not possess something from Caen, Calais or other overseas towns, such as clothing, furs, cushions. Table cloths and linen were seen in everybody's houses. Married women were decked in trimmings of French matrons and if the latter sorrowed over the loss, the former rejoiced in their gain.[96]

Similarly, Froissart records that in 1356 the Black Prince's army brought back to Bordeaux much gold, silver and prisoners.

Ultimately, the ransoms received by the English for French prisoners were the main source of profit for soldiers serving overseas. The major expeditions of 1346-1347, 1356, and 1415 each resulted in a large number of French prisoners, and many less important expeditions also resulted in the capture of prisoners. Thomas Holland received £12,000 for the capture of the Count of Eu. The ransom of Charles of Blois stood at around £110,000, and the ransom of £500,000 was demanded for King John of France after Poitiers.[97] These were not received uniformly by men of all status groups, but there were many cases of smaller ransoms being demanded and received by infantrymen and archers for French prisoners. It is important to acknowledge that many of the ransoms demanded were not paid in full, such as Charles of Blois, who only paid £17,000 of his ransom already mentioned above.[98] Ransoms were also paid to France when they captured English nobles, but scholars agree that the balance rested significantly in favor of the English over the total period of the Hundred Years War. There is no doubt that ransoms, as

94 *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, (ed) Denholm-Young, London (1957), p. 94; Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III*, p. 108.
95 Froissart, *Chroniques*, (ed) Macaulay, V, London, 1924, pp. 346-7
96 T. Walsingham, *Chronica Monasterii S. Albani*, (ed) Riley, London (1863-4), p. 292 as cited in Hewitt, "The Organization of War Under Edward III", p. 110.
97 Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages*, p.104.
98 *Ibid.*, pp. 104-107 as cited from *Camden Miscellany*, Vol. xiv, Camden Society (1926) and *Register of the Black Prince*, IV, pp. 339, 379, 381.

well as other rewards, wages and spoils of war, provided strong motivation for service in the English armies that fought in France. Few men made a large fortune from war, but there was a very real possibility to further one's financial position.

Conclusions

The economic impact of war is difficult to quantify for the later Middle Ages. There were definitely aspects of the Hundred Years War that negatively impacted the English rural population. These impacts, emphasized by scholars such as Postan and Maddicott, include: high levels of direct and indirect taxation forced upon the populace of England; the effects of purveyance upon the agricultural market; and the effect of recruitment on the labour force, as well as the added burden placed on communities to support those serving in the military. However, in each case the actual degree of impact can be called into question or offset by appealing to other scholarship or drawing attention to related positive benefits that are too often overlooked. Thus, much of the burden of taxation was shouldered by foreign merchants (through indirect taxation), or consisted of minor payments that were insignificant to the populace (through direct taxation). The main complaint noted by historians regarding taxation was not the level of taxation but systemic abuse by those who assigned to gather taxes. There were also complaints during the years of English defeats because people did not desire to pay high taxes for campaigns that ended in humiliation and disaster. The primary concern expressed by both historians and contemporaries regarding purveyance is that the populace often did not receive payment for the goods that were taken, or if they did, it was received in inadequate sums. There has been no exhaustive study of the purveyance accounts and exchequer accounts to determine if payments were never made or only delayed, or if the goods purveyed were necessary for subsistence or the surplus agricultural production that the populace would normally have sold on the market. If either of these were the case, complaints may have been inspired by a lack

of profits rather than genuine deprivation. There were legitimate complaints about officials using their powers of purveyance to gather goods at low prices in order to sell them in the market for profit, but these were eventually curtailed by declarations from the crown. The impact of continuous military expeditions to France on the labour force does not seem to have been a factor. There always seem to have been enough men to service the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. The smaller expeditions of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries mirrored the drop in population following the Black Death. Beyond this, one must also consider the benefits of war in the form of new industry, in particular cloth-making and archery, but also mining, metalworking and shipbuilding, and the influx of money from wages, rewards, ransoms, and the spoils of war.