

The Subsidiarity Arrangement of Global Governance: Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa

by Grace Li

Introduction

Among the principal purposes of the United Nations outlined in Chapter One of the United Nations Charter is to be a harmonizing centre for the achievement of “international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” (UN). A central manifestation of this is in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which to build on the Millennium Development Goals, outlines 17 broad goals and 169 targets to “wipe out poverty, fight inequality, and tackle climate change,” by 2030 (UN). Specifically, SDG One aims to “end poverty in all its forms,” and has developed and worked with several bodies in the UN system, such as the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, UNICEF, the International Monetary Fund, amongst others, to reach this (UN). However, the UN system provides just one institutional channel to stimulate international poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since poverty is both a widespread and multidimensional issue, the United Nations must share responsibility through a subsidiarity arrangement of global governance in partnership with regional agencies to sufficiently address all aspects. In this paper, I will argue that regional agencies help ease the burden on the United Nations in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and specifically Goal One because a global division of labour in partnership with regional agencies of varying objectives and scopes allows for greater consideration of regional and national contexts on the ground level, and for the international community to target specific dimensions of poverty reduction (PR).

First, I will define key terms that provide a framework for my thesis. The *United Nations system* refers to conceptual and structural characterizations of the United Nations, both of which are underpinned by the constitutional document of the organization: The United Nations Charter (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 225). The UN system constitutes a “loose collection” of United Nations history and policy, including the “emergence, process, activity, and inherent difficulties” of the UN system, which requires active application by sovereign governments (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 223-224). Another understanding refers to the UN’s explicit structural organization into principal organs, subsidiary organs, commissions, specialized agencies, funds, departments, and other entities.

Global governance includes international organizations amongst a variety of public and private actors labelled “global governors.” Global governors can be any authorities who “exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy,” by creating issues, setting agendas, establishing and implementing rules or programs, and evaluating outcomes (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 81). This can include NGOs, civil society campaigns, experts, intergovernmental organizations, states, regulators,

judges, lobbyists, business firms, and hybrid networks blending multiple types of actors. These actors coordinate on global, regional, national, and local levels, which characterizes the contemporary global governance system as multilayered and multisectoral (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 68). However, to move away from defining global governance as all kinds of governance, everywhere, one must recognize the embedded preference for subsidiarity (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 33).

Subsidiarity asserts that “collective problems are best solved at the lowest level at which they can be solved” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 33). The demands placed on the UN system in the post-Cold War order requires progression towards a global governance structure based on “rule of all, by all, for all” through a global division of labour between the UN and other global governors (Peou 1998, 439). The principle assumes that a central authority should assume a subsidiary function, performing tasks that cannot be performed effectively at an immediate or local level, in a top-down or bottom-up fashion. Top-down subsidiarity allows central authorities, such as the United Nations, to exercise political power in a non-centralized way, while bottom-up subsidiarity places central authorities into an auxiliary role. The assumption is that the prior works when regional agencies are technically and financially competent, and politically capable of achieving collective action, while the latter can succeed when regional and international organizations embrace internationalism and let regional agencies take part in decision-making processes and policy execution (Peou 1998, 439). In the context of PR, this means beginning at the level of the impoverished to avoid alienation of those who are greatest affected through overextension of the central governance system (Knight 2000, 177).

Regions refer to the areas of the world where several countries are “economically and politically interdependent,” and its governance, much like global governance, is facilitated through multilevel and multisectoral state and non-state actors, known as *regional agencies*, that operate within these specific regions (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 251).

The subsidiarity model is best explained through a critical lens, rooted in understandings of the UN’s developmental history, and criticism of the contemporary world order. However, what is key to understanding the relationship between critical theory and subsidiarity is the notion of improving what is being criticized, namely, the UN system. Critical theory entails the “transformation of ... existing reality,” reform, and even revolution (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 158). Subsidiarity and decentralization of global governance to include multilevel actors is an inherent challenge to existing power relations evident in the UN system, which emphasizes the innate authority of euro-dominant institutions and ideological positioning. The push to renegotiate relative levels of power between central and auxiliary actors in the international community may stem from necessity, but nonetheless presents a compelling challenge to the existing world order to reach a more beneficial result for the international community at this point.

An Overburdened UN System

According to a statement by the World Bank, while global poverty rates have declined in all regions, the progress has been uneven. While East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia have reduced extreme poverty to below 3%, more than half of the world’s extreme poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of poor people has increased by 9 million (World Bank 2019). If the trend continues, nearly nine out of ten of the world’s extreme poor will be in Sub-Saharan Africa. These figures indicate that the

United Nations PR agenda must adapt to address these asymmetrical figures of poverty, as the current approach will not meet the UN's targets by 2030. As it becomes increasingly difficult to reach the populations that have been left behind, the UN system is overburdened in its ability to extend to reach the full breadth of affected populations.

Upon formation, the United Nations featured 51 member-states, growing significantly over the years to the current size of 193 member-states (UN). This expansion of membership has massively expanded the scope of UN operations, especially with the inclusion of more developing nations, where the impoverished predominantly reside. In the 1990s, the "Washington Consensus" which featured a series of macroeconomic policy recommendations anchored around the mantra "stabilize, privatize, and liberalize," influenced a wave of reforms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Rodrik 2006, 973). However, despite significant policy reform, improvements in the political and external environments, and continued foreign aid, Sub-Saharan Africa failed to take off, apart from the few cases of Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique (Rodrik 2006, 975). What we learned is that this narrow field of market-oriented reforms could not uniformly solve issues of development across the world, as "different contexts require different solutions" to solving common problems (Rodrik 2006, 976). Attempts to copy-paste policy reforms from one country often failed, and precisely this observation necessitates the application of subsidiarity. Sustainable development and more specifically PR requires a nuanced approach contextualized within a specific country or region.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can be interpreted through the lens of subsidiarity, as articles 52 and 53 explicitly state that nothing "precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies" when dealing with matters relating to international peace and security, so long as the arrangements or agencies are consistent with UN purposes and principles (United Nations, Chapter VIII). This provides a pathway to a global division of labour between the United Nations, as the central governing body, and regional agencies and arrangements as subsidiaries. While there is some ambiguity concerning what constitutes a regional arrangement or agency, it is reasonable to extend the scope to include "state and non-state actors operating at sub-state, national, transnational, regional, transregional and international levels," as actors of all these varieties participate in global governance (Knight 2000, 171). While Chapter VIII intends its usage for issues concerning global peace and security, it will be my objective to illustrate how the subsidiarity principle can be applied to international sustainable development efforts, specifically through the thematic study of PR efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To evaluate the weaknesses of subsidiarity we can look to the European Union's application, in which subsidiarity has been compared to a "marketing gimmick" (Rayle 2015). Critics have argued that despite the aspirational nature of subsidiarity, it has been quickly discarded when inconvenient in the EU context. This illuminates a central weakness of subsidiarity: in the case of a weak application, subsidiarity can remain relatively inconsequential because it "provides too much leeway for state-actors to employ their own criteria" in determining how to most effectively handle an issue" (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 2016, 18). The decentralizing effects of subsidiarity, which would help to reduce the burden on the UN agenda, depends largely on both the institutional interpretation of what subsidiarity entails and the decision-making of predominantly state actors, which may be reticent to authorize a global division of labour if they see a benefit in maintaining central power (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 2016, 16).

However, this does not squander the redeeming strengths of the subsidiarity model, as using regional agencies to supplement UN activity in a global division of labour allows those people and agencies “living in the specific region and most directly affected to contribute to the resolution” (Knight 2000, 175). Those who suffer the immediate consequences of extreme poverty have a direct stake in the outcome and are therefore in a position to address PR with the most comprehensive and urgent consideration, compared to global forums that have “broader agendas, competing priorities, and numerous distractions” (Knight 2000, 175-176). By including regional agencies into the global PR conversation, the international community could establish greater consensus on the nature of poverty and the necessary measures to address it, while also allowing these agencies to evaluate the validity of a regional effort.

My paper will qualitatively evaluate the role that subsidiarity can play in poverty eradication efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through a framework of analysis that begins by looking at what constitutes poverty and what historical developments have led to high levels of poverty in SSA. Then I will draw on examples from SSA to outline what a global division of labour can look like in the region, tying this to the ability for regional agencies to better cater poverty reduction efforts to local contexts, and focus their activities on varying, but specific dimensions of PR. I will be consulting primary documents including the UN Charter, as well as secondary scholarship to empirically support my argumentation.

Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa

The United Nations defines poverty as “more than the lack of income and productive resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods,” extending to include “hunger and malnutrition, limited access to education and other basic services, social discrimination and exclusion, as well as the lack of participation in decision-making” (“Ending Poverty” UN 2019). However, there have been many understandings of what poverty entails. Dominant western definitions post-WWII have defined poverty in monetary terms, through indicators such as levels of income or consumption to gauge the number of people who have fallen below a given level, coined the *poverty line* (Handley et al. 2009, 1). While the United Nations recognizes various dimensions of poverty, they use a poverty line of \$1.90 a day to substantively measure poverty levels. The OECD’s definition of poverty, like the United Nations, recognizes how “economic, human, political, socio-cultural, and protective (security)” dimensions of poverty are interlinked, but explicitly includes “gender equity and environmental sustainability” which cut across all dimensions (“DAC Guidelines and Reference Series” 2007, 18). The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) also offers a unique insight into the “powerlessness and voice-lessness” of impoverished populations, which they consider a key aspect of poverty. Therefore, while operational definitions of absolute poverty indicated by economic thresholds are useful, it is important to recognize the various dimensions of PR.

The United Nations reports that the majority of people living on less than \$1.90 a day live in sub-Saharan Africa; therefore, a large proportion of international poverty reduction efforts are focused on this region. Various studies recognize income inequality, the lack of basic social services, access to safe drinking water and health care, persistence of conflict, and the lack of economic resilience as significant factors contributing to poverty levels in SSA (Moser and Ichida 2001, 29). These factors present a multidimensional picture of poverty in SSA and entail a historical approach to explore early connections to the imperial Scramble for Africa. The surprisingly high levels of inequality in Africa can be traced to “[processes] of class formation linked to” early colonial state-building, which has translated to social

stratification at independence (Walle 2009, 324). European colonial administrations were concerned with maintaining European hegemony over the continent through “harsh extractive practices” and strict law enforcement, rather than stimulating economic development. European subjugation left Africa with no historical processes of social contracting upon independence to maintain state legitimacy. This illustrates how legacies from early European colonial institutions, in conjunction with modern factors such as high population growth, the poverty financing gap, structural impediments, including infrastructure gaps and gender inequality, reliance on natural resources, and the inability to efficiently convert GDP growth into household income growth, has allowed high rates of poverty in SSA to persist (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019, 1, 6).

SDG One highlights several targets for eradicating poverty in all forms, but I would specifically point to the language in targets 1.A and 1.B which propose “significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation” and “sound policy frameworks at the national, regional, and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies” (“Goal 1” UN 2019). These targets denote a global division of labour which includes a “variety of sources” on many levels, and also calls for “pro-poor” development strategies, which are defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “enabling a pace and pattern of growth that enhances the ability of poor women and men to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth” (“Promoting Pro-Poor Growth” 2019). This entails a grassroots approach to include those most affected by persistent poverty in the conversation about PR. I will begin on a grassroots level, with the impoverished, and work my way up to lay out how subsidiarity can ease the burdens of the UN regarding their PR efforts.

Subsidiarity in “Pro-Poor” Poverty Reduction

There is substantial evidence that points to how while economic growth and increased productivity are necessary for widespread and sustainable PR, it is far from sufficient (Handley et al. 2009, 14). Author Hennie Lötter points to the issues that arise when high authorities or foreign entities “give aid to poor people” (2013, 129). Primarily, the aid giver’s “assessment of either the causes or effects” of poor people’s poverty can be wrong, which may lead to ineffective solutions to address causes or effects (Lötter 2013, 130). Therefore, as outlined by the subsidiarity principle, it is imperative to empower the “collective action and self-organization” of poor people, because their involvement provides contextual insight for what is causing their poverty, and what should be done (Brock 2016, 311). To provide an example of what direct consultation of marginalized people can look like, we can point to a study done by Charles Lwanga-Ntale and Kimberly McClean which examines the factors influencing chronic poverty in Uganda from the perspective of the poor (2007, 177). Uganda is a country in SSA that has named the poverty eradication as the vision of the country, implementing the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) to offer a comprehensive framework to address the causes and dimensions of poverty in Uganda. Researchers collected qualitative information about chronic poverty through direct discussion with community members and the chronically poor during site visits, analysis of chronically poor households, and case studies of chronically poor individuals, from which they identified drivers and maintainers of sustained poverty in the country (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 179). Consulting the perspective of poor communities allowed researchers to identify who the poor are and why they stay poor, which provides contextual solutions that influence effectual policy recommendation, rather than broad, blanket solutions.

Specifically citing the section “empowering the chronically poor”, poor people want to be consulted on “determining priorities for planning and resource allocations”, any government “programmes and initiatives that are designed to benefit them”, and given greater access to government and legal information (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 192). However, there are limits to what poor people can implement, which is why under the subsidiarity principle, this may require moving up the ladder to an agency with greater jurisdiction. The poor individuals consulted noted that empowering the chronically poor first includes requiring local councillors to ensure greater representation and participation of the chronic poor in decision-making processes. This shows that between the grassroots level and the United Nations system there are a variety of actors available to further ease the burden.

One avenue is through local and international non-governmental organizations, which depending on the scope of their operations, can focus on affecting change and offering expertise towards a specific aspect of PR rather than setting PR as a whole on their agenda. To illustrate this, we can look at how many of the chronic poor who were consulted cited education as a key interrupter of the cycle of intergenerational poverty (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 191). Access to education is a barrier for impoverished children, and while poor people and local communities may be unable to finance schooling, education NGOs can offer their services.

Promoting Equality in African Schools (PEAS) is an INGO based in the United Kingdom, which is dedicated to building, running, and increasing knowledge transfer about education in Uganda and Zambia (“Our Work” PEAS 2019). PEAS fund their operations through financial sponsorships and charitable donations and has built 28 schools in Uganda, and 3 in Zambia, amongst a variety of contributions in sustainability and gender equity. This example demonstrates how the scope of PEAS – which focuses on advancing secondary schooling in SSA – allows them to adopt a substantive direction towards alleviating one dimension of poverty, rather than overwhelming their operations by seeking to eradicate poverty as a whole. Whether it be increasing access to clean drinking water or health care in rural settings, partnerships with goal-oriented agencies can be beneficial for targeted change, while attempting to address the entire issue can prevent much substantive change from happening at all. Especially in a time where the United Nations faces uncertainty due to “budgeting shortfalls and a liquidity crisis,” which puts pressure on the General Assembly to streamline activities by reducing the number of meetings, we can look to non-state actors to take on specific burdens at a lower level (UN 2019).

While there is undoubtedly space for NGOs, civil society groups, and other non-state actors, “national governments remain the most important institution for reducing poverty” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 701). It is the governments in SSA which encourage conditions for economic growth and oversee the delivery of basic services, and when sub-national governments function well, this positively affects conditions for health and education provision. Poor people have indicated that despite pro-poor policies, there are concerns that it is the implementation of policies that fail the poor (Lwanga-Ntale 2007, 191). Specifically, “corruption and limited capacity” are major barriers to effective implementation at local levels. Findings from a study by Dr. Theodore Davis indicate that policies and efforts “aimed at improving government effectiveness and political stability and controlling corruption” would significantly improve human development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa (2016, 650). Empowering sub-Saharan African national and sub-national governments to strengthen institutional practices is imperative for both the effective

implementation of pro-poor policies and sustaining national development. This may require developing countries to look up towards a higher level for guidance on how to improve governance structures or hold their institutions accountable.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is a development agency of the African Union (AU), is mandated to strengthen the capacity of member-states and regional bodies through a comprehensive agenda for the realization of Agenda 2063 – coined Africa's vision and action plan (NEPAD). This 2063 agenda is tailored to the region, outlining several broader visions that contain further sub-goals to “reduce poverty, put Africa on a sustainable development path, halt the marginalization of Africa, and empower women” (NEPAD). Specifically, NEPAD outlines a pathway to “an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” through the affirmation of democratic values, human rights, and the law, as well as targeting the capacity and capability of national and local institutions and leadership (African Union Development Agency “Agenda 2063” 2019). This platform provides African nations with support for their efforts towards the institutionalization of good governance, through a localized lens. While there is debate over what achievement of the broader SDGs may look like in different parts of the world, the 2063 Agenda crafts a distinct action plan for African development, which it can then track the progress of individual nations, holding them accountable to identifiable targets. NEPAD's support of African governments in their pursuit of stronger good governance practices can strengthen the capacity and capability of individual national and sub-national governments to implement pro-poor policies, providing an excellent example of what an empowering partnership between a regional organization and national governments can look like.

The AU is partnered with a variety of other regional organizations and countries to support its operations, such as the European Union (EU), the United States, and China, amongst others (AU). Financing for the AU stems from member-state contributions as well as external donors, of which the EU provides the most comprehensive aid package (Phratlhathe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). Foreign aid can have problematic implications, as the AU must follow “different planning, budgeting, and governance procedures for donor contributions” (Phratlhathe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). This is a small window into a greater issue that arises when regional bodies must rely on external actors, who can have vested interests in the region, contribute aid erratically, or place stipulations on their aid in a way that hinders the ability for SSA to act in their best interests. While foreign donors assert that by providing the bulk of the AU budget, they should have access to “regular dialogues in early stages on the main directions and managerial approaches” and be involved in future reviews of strategy and yearly action plans to play a more meaningful role, African partners push back by saying that “donor presence” at high-level events “reduces the space for inter-African dialogue (Phratlhathe and Vanheukelom 2019, 14). Developing countries, especially in SSA, have trouble maintaining levels of autonomy when engaging with financing partners who threaten to stem the flow of funding if AU strategies drift from donor ones, which in considering African ties to colonization is something we must actively prevent. On the flip side, there are also concerns of moral hazard, as if key AU stakeholders continue to provide external financial support, this may weaken incentives for the AU to generate alternative resources and pursue reforms needed to consolidate AU effectiveness. The African Union Commission's position (AUC), while recognizing the necessity of financial and political accountability to their donors, stands that while they “can benefit from discussions... partners cannot set priorities for the AU” (Phratlhathe and Vanheukelom 2019, 14).

This is the crux of the argument for employing subsidiarity, especially regarding poverty reduction efforts in SSA. Assistance from high-level actors such as foreign donors or the United Nations “cannot be transformative,” as fundamental change must be pushed and agreed upon by member states (Phratlhathe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). While there is room for high-level collaboration and foreign aid, such as through the United Nations Office to the African Union amongst other UN bodies, and annual review, advisory discussions, and follow-up of progress on the SDGs at the UN High Level Political Forum to coordinate collective efforts, the potential for transformative change begins on a grassroots level, and is implemented nationally and regionally. External bodies such as the UN and other regional bodies can only assess the problems in SSA from an arm’s length, while it is the actors on the lowest levels who can provide contextual insight into the root causes and appropriate solutions for eradicating poverty. Strong partnerships between communities and local state and non-state actors, which includes those who are most affected, eases the burden on high-level actors by putting them in a supportive, rather than dominant role. It is through empowerment, rather than foreign prescription, that the international community can best support PR in SSA, and this is best accomplished through a model of subsidiarity.

To assess the effectiveness of a subsidiarity model in facilitating poverty eradication it would be imperative to:

- Regularly review both economic indicators of poverty, as well as figures representing the non-economic dimensions of poverty, such as access to education and health care, adherence to good governance principles, amongst others in SSA. These figures must then be measured against the achievement of the UN 2030 agenda to see if progress is on track/exceeding/behind expectations.
- Track levels of low-level PR initiatives, such as the amount and prevalence of poverty-oriented NGOs or civil society groups with operations in SSA. It may be difficult to do this at the level of poor people, however empirical studies such as the one by Lwanga-Ntale and McClean can help gauge their levels of participation, and their satisfaction with the policies intended to support them.
- Follow up with UN bodies to qualitatively and quantitatively determine whether their operations have been streamlined to function more efficiently through subsidiarity.

Conclusion

Subsidiarity, in principle, would serve to empower low-level actors in PR efforts in SSA, however, there is a concern with whether subsidiarity is plausible in the contemporary international community. I am reticent to express too much confidence, as the main barrier I see to the realization of a subsidiarity model is pushback from dominant member-states to facilitate a global division of labour. Countries with prominent ties to the AU and SSA and benefit from their control may be hesitant to take a step back and affirm African autonomy. However, in a time where the UN system risks overheating, we can see the United Nations recognizing subsidiarity as necessary to prevent itself from becoming “unfit for purpose.” The UN has moved towards recognition of civil society groups and engaged in partnerships with the private sector, which is to say, member-states will, and have been, forced to embrace subsidiarity to some extent already (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 703). The international community is also not limited to the examples I provided in my analysis; Chapter VIII authorizes a proclivity of other private, non-state, and state actors to aid in poverty eradication efforts. The partnerships I outlined represent an effort to decentralize the UN agenda, however for subsidiarity to thrive, high-level agencies and organizations must be willing to further embrace decentralization by affirming regional and national autonomy, and the African continent must

commit to instituting reforms that encourage self-reliance. By doing so, regional agencies can help ease the burden on the United Nations system in achieving SDG One by providing greater insight into local, national, and regional contexts to bring effectual change, and provide targeted relief rather than attempting to tackle poverty as a whole, which is what the UN has been tasked with thus far.

References

- “About Us.” NEPAD. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.nepad.org/who-we-are/about-us>.
- “Amid Financial Crisis, General Assembly Should Reduce Number of Meetings, Streamline Activities to Better Meet Development Goals, Speakers Stress.” United Nations. United Nations, November 8, 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12213.doc.htm>.
- Beegle, Kathleen J., and Luc J. Christiaensen. *Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2019. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/323541>.
- Brock, Gillian. “How Should We Discharge Our Responsibilities to Eradicate Poverty?” *Res Publica* 22, no. 3 (2016): 301–15. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s1158-016-9328-z>.
- “Capable Institutions and Transformed Leadership in Place at All Levels.” Agenda 2063. African Union Development Agency. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.nepad.org/agenda-2063/goals/346>.
- “Chapter I.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>.
- “Chapter VIII.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html>.
- Davis, Theodore J. “Good Governance as a Foundation for Sustainable Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (July 25, 2016): 636–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1191340>.
- “Ending Poverty.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/poverty/>.
- “External Partnerships between the AU and Organisations, Regions or Countries.” African Union. African Union. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://au.int/en/partnerships>.
- “Goal 1: End Poverty in All Its Forms Everywhere - United Nations Sustainable Development.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/>.
- “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html>.

- Handley, Geoff, Kate Higgins, Bhavna Sharma, Kate Bird, and Diana Cammack. "Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues." Overseas Development Institute, January 2009. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/860.pdf>.
- Jachtenfuchs, Markus, and Nico Krisch. "Subsidiarity in Global Governance." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 79, no. 1 (2016): 1–26. <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4777&context=lcp>.
- Knight, W. Andy. *A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
- Lötter H. P. P. *Poverty, Ethics and Justice*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013.
- Lwanga-Ntale, Charles, and Kimberley McClean. "The Face of Chronic Poverty in Uganda from the Poor's Perspective: Constraints and Opportunities." *Journal of Human Development* 5, no. 2 (January 22, 2007): 177–94. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1464988042000225113>.
- Moser, Gary, and Toshihiro Ichida. "Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa." International Monetary Fund, August 2001. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0112.pdf>.
- "New Partnership for Africa's Development - NEPAD." United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/socialperspectiveondevelopment/issues/new-partnership-for-africas-development-nepad.html>.
- "Our Work." PEAS. Accessed December 13, 2019. <https://www.peas.org.uk/our-work>.
- "Overview." World Bank, October 2, 2019. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview>.
- Peou, Sorpong. 1998. "Global Governance The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN Context." *Global Governance* 4 (4): 439–60. <https://search-ebscohost-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.glogo4.35&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Pharathlathe, Kesa, and Jan Vanheukelom. "Financing the African Union: On Mindsets and Money." The European Center for Development Policy Management, February 2019. <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP240-Financing-the-African-Union-on-mindsets-and-money.pdf>.
- "Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Policy Guidance for Donors." *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, 2007. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264024786-en>.

Rayle, Rudolf. "What Happened to EU Subsidiarity?" World Economic Forum, December 11, 2015. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/what-happened-to-eu-subsidiarity/>.

Rodrik, Dani. "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform." *Journal of Economic Literature* 44, no. 4 (2006): 973–87. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.44.4.973>.

"Sustainable Development Goals Launch in 2016." United Nations. United Nations, December 30, 2015. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/sustainable-development-goals-kick-off-with-start-of-new-year/>.

Walle, Nicolas van de. "The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 307–27. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.063006.092318>.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson. *International Organization and Global Governance*. Second ed. New York, NY: Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.