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Extractivism: The Harper Government's Energy and Environment Policy

by Trevor McPherson

This work focuses on the Harper government's energy and environmental policy. Specifically, how environmental policy was designed primarily with the goal of facilitating their energy policy objective of maximizing resource extraction. I outline the evolution of the Harper government's environmental policy throughout their tenure, which includes the use of ineffective and deceptively communicated legislation designed to give the impression of action, and the systematic dismantling of environmental regulation. Also, I explain the Harper government's relationship with the resource extraction industry. Industry was given exceptional access to government, as they had substantial influence over policy and collaborated on communications strategy. The government also marginalized science, scientists, and environmentalists through defunding, muzzling, destruction of scientific records, and more. Finally, I examine the ideological underpinnings that inform these relationships and the rationality they construct. I will demonstrate that the Harper government's neoliberal populist orientation characterized their dichotomous conception of economy and environment, and therefore their environmental and energy policies, and their relationship with perceived allies and adversaries. Ultimately, the Harper government's efforts to maximize resource extraction through dismantling environmental regulation not only failed, but also obstructed their goal.

The Harper government adopted an energy policy that aimed to maximize the amount of resource extraction in Canada, and viewed environmental regulation as an impediment to that goal. The political difficulty of dismantling environmental regulation with the explicit goal of facilitating industry expansion necessitated the use of communicative strategies that frame the government's environmental policy as practical and responsible, the expansion of the energy sector as of national importance and 'common sense' – a common sense informed by a neoliberal populist disposition – and those who oppose their policies as dangerous and irrational. Despite their regressive environmental policy and efforts to obscure these policies, their goal of maximizing the amount of resource extraction in Canada has been unsuccessful, and in part because of these policies.

Environmental Policy

From 2006 to 2011 the Harper minority governments were required to take a balanced approach on the environment, or at least give the appearance one. Often co-opting the language of the environmental movement, various ministers in the highly scripted government discussed the need to take immediate action to prevent "consequences of potentially devastating proportions" due to climate change (Young 97). One of the government's first environmental policies, The Clean Air Act 2006, set emissions targets far less stringent than the Kyoto Protocol, which, at the time, the government had unofficially withdrawn from in favour of a "made in Canada" solution (Young 99, 101). The deceptive, nationalistic title a clear attempt to legitimize their policy. It was also around this time that Harper and his ministers began claiming the Harper government would build Canada into an "emerging energy superpower" (Cleland). The Clean Air Act 2006 changed the base year from 1990 to 2006, which enabled the government to announce a reduction target of 20% (Young 101). This is deceptive as the relative reduction of these new targets is half of what was pledged under Kyoto, and focused on emissions intensity rather than total emissions, allowing total emissions to grow with the economy (Young 99, 101). Regardless, the government still claimed total emissions would fall (Young 101). In 2007 the Harper government replaced the Clean Air Act 2006 with the non-legislative Turning the Corner Plan, which included plans for carbon pricing, and a zero emissions oil sands (Leach). The most ambitious parts of the plan were later abandoned, and it was revised in 2010 with lower emissions reduction targets (Leach, Young 102). Various policies and plans provided announcement opportunities and created the appearance of action, which demonstrates the government's communications focus. Canada is currently not on track to meet any of these targets (Leach). Eventually, the Harper Government abandoned these strategies and stated Canada's emissions reductions would be tied to the Obama Administration's yet-to-exist targets (Leach). Curiously abandoning the nationalistic "made in Canada" solution for a deferential one (Young 99).

A majority victory in 2011 meant the pretense of balance was no longer necessary, and the Harper Government implemented its most controversial and significant changes to environmental regulations. C-38 and C-45 were omnibus bills that included an enormous amount of legislation, with each being over 400 pages long and effecting more than 60 federal acts with little discernable connection (Krichoff, Tsuji 108). The bills included changes to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA), the Fisheries Act, the Species at Risk Act (SARA), the Navigable Water Protection Act (NWPA), and the Indian Act (Krichoff, Tsuji 109).

In the CEAA, the definition of 'environment' was restricted in scope from its already limited definition, as well the definition of 'environmental effects', which no longer considers effects on climate (Krichoff, Tsuji 109, Toner 113-114). Now, instead of projects automatically requiring an environmental assessment (EA) unless otherwise stated, projects will only need an assessment unless specifically stated (Krichoff, Tsuji 110). This has reduced the number of projects requiring an EA by 95% from approximately 6000 to 29 (Krichoff, Tsuji 110). The scope of the assessments, as well as opportunities for public and Indigenous participation, have been greatly restricted, and the Minister of Environment's discretionary power increased (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). Also considering the fact that the new EA regulations are contrary to international literature on best practices, the likelihood of litigation has also increased (Krichoff, Tsuji 111).

In the Fisheries Act, the scope of protection for fish habitats has been greatly reduced. It no longer protects fish from "serious harm", but only from "death". Within a fishery, enough harm to cause the death of fish could potentially mean ecological disaster (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). The act now also allows Cabinet discretionary powers to exempt fisheries, despite the already narrow definition of what constitutes a protected fishery (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). Also, the Navigable Waters Protection Act was changed to the Navigation Protection Act, a tactic that shifts focus from protecting the environment to protecting people's ability to make use of the environment (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). The waters being protected were reduced from 40,000 lakes and more than 2 million rivers to 3 oceans, 94 lakes, and 62 rivers, meaning that 99% of the countries waterways are no longer protected (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). In Ontario, two major rivers were excluded from those being protected; both of which are close to the controversial Ring of Fire mining development (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). Despite both rivers being important to nearby Indigenous communities, none were consulted about the changes (Krichoff, Tsuji 111). Projects on waterways will now be assessed by the National Energy Board (NEB), but they only assess feasibility not environmental effects (Toner 114). C-38 also exempts the NEB from considering SARA when reviewing pipeline projects, and since the NEB is the only agency responsible for reviewing pipeline projects at the federal level, all pipeline projects are federally exempt from SARA (Krichoff, Tsuji 112). The Harper government also changed the Indian Act so a band council only requires a simple majority, instead of a community majority, to surrender lands for lease, and again, Indigenous peoples were not consulted (Krichoff, Tsuji 112).

Relationship with Industry

Industry lobbyists had in fact asked for changes to these specific pieces of legislation that were ultimately changed by the Harper Government. A letter was sent to then Minister of Environment, Peter Kent, and then Minister of Natural Resources, Joe Oliver, by a group made up of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA), the Canadian Fuels Association (CFA), and the Canadian Gas Association (CGA) that expressed "shared views on...reform for major energy industries in Canada." The group suggested the laws were "outdated" and that the fact the "at the heart of most of the existing legislation is a philosophy of prohibiting harm" which they believed to be "adversarial" (Paris). The letter also said ideal reform would include timely licensing and permitting, reduce duplication, and address issues with Aboriginal consultation. The language used in the letter was the same used in C-38, as the act included four themes: making the review process more predictable and timely, reducing duplication in the review process, strengthening environmental protection, and enhancing consultation with Aboriginal peoples (Krichoff, Tsuji 112). Interestingly, the amendments achieved the opposite of their stated intention. The new discretionary ministerial powers, which have vague guidelines for when they can be used, could potentially incite litigation, making the process less predictable and less timely. Duplication had been address in legislation prior to C-38 and C-45, as Environment Canada officials told the Minister of Environment. Clearly, environmental protection was not strengthened, and Aboriginal consultation was not enhanced by reducing opportunities for both.

This legislation, and the communicative strategies accompanying it are part of a larger policy called Responsible Resource Development (RRD) (Toner, McKee 110). The strategy and terminology were used by industry in Alberta where a similar approach is taken to privilege industry over the

environment (Toner, McKee 110). Industry and government clearly understand the power of discourse. It is not surprising then that industry and government collaborated on policy as well communications. In 2009 the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources Canada said to CAPP, "we need to meet an active, organized anti-oil sands campaign with equal sophistication." (Stewart). In 2010 that same Deputy Minister said that CAPP and the Harper government had been working together for some time and need to "up their game" (Stewart). The RRD joint advertising campaign began in 2012 following these meetings (Toner, McKee 111). RRD was included in the Economic Action Plan advertising spots, which were followed by spots from CAPP and CEPA (Toner, McKee 111). There was also a separate $9 million advertising campaign run by Natural Resource Canada that portrayed the oil and gas industry as environmentally friendly job creators (Cheadle). Additionally, there was a $24 million international ad campaign promoting the oil sands specifically (Panetta).

The Harper government went beyond just promoting a favoured industry. The confidential Oil Sands Advocacy Strategy created by the Department of Foreign Affairs included a list of what the government considered "allies" and "adversaries" (Stewart). Oil companies, the NEB, the Privy Council Office, Natural Resources Canada, CAPP and other industry associations were listed as allies, while Aboriginal groups, environmental NGOs, European NGOs, competing industries, and media were deemed adversaries (Stewart, Fitzpatrick).

Relationship with Science, Scientists, and the Environmental Movement

The adversarial mindset of the Harper government illustrates their dichotomous conception of environment and economy, and rationalizes their marginalization and destruction of contradictory views and information. It is also a continuation of earlier discursive tactics, although there has been a shift from legitimizing their own actions to delegitimizing others. For example, the open letter from then Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver in which he stated "environmental and other radical groups...threaten to hijack our regulatory system to achieve they're radical ideological agenda...They use funding from foreign special interest groups to undermine Canada's national economic interest." He claims these radicals delay projects until they become economically unfeasible by exploiting a broken regulatory system. Addressing regulatory deficiencies, according to Oliver, is "an urgent matter of Canada's national interest." (Paris). Oliver also appeared on television to discuss the issue saying foreign interests funding the oil sands benefits Canada, but that environmental groups oppose projects that create jobs, bring in revenue, and investment (Payton). Only days previous PM Harper also stated publicly that he was concerned that foreign money was enabling consultation and regulatory processes to be "hijacked", like Oliver, adopting the discourse of terrorism.

Oliver's letter and television appearance, as well as Harper's comments, came approximately one month after the letter from industry lobbyists requesting regulatory reform, and approximately three months before C-38 and C-45 were tabled (Paris, Parliament of Canada, Parliament of Canada). Their timing and coordination indicates agenda setting. We also see a return of nationalist rhetoric, although no longer in asserting Canada's right to protect the environment, but in asserting Canada's right to extract resources, and in claiming it's in Canada's interest to maximize extraction. According to Oliver, industry expansion is "Canada's national interest" and ensures the "financial security of Canadian families," therefore those opposed are enemies of Canada who cause Canadian families hardship (The

Globe and Mail). Oliver and TransCanada CEO Russ Girling appealed to ordinary 'Canadian families' when they compared the Energy East pipeline project to the Canadian Pacific Railway and the St. Lawrence Seaway, portraying the project as a nation building exercise (Toner, McKee 117). The implication being that those opposed are bad Canadians (Toner, McKee 117).

The Harper Government has also garnered attention for defunding or eliminating agencies that produce scientific knowledge, especially environmental, as well as their marginalization of dissenting views, and destruction of information. Bill C-38 included the elimination of the National Round Table on the Economy and the Environment (NRTEE), which was created to promote sustainable development and frequently reported on Canada's emissions, and locked down its website and reports before doing so (Krichoff, Tsuji 109, Turner 90). Environment Canada's Environmental Emergency Program was cut so severely it was forced to close all its regional offices, and in 2013 announced it no longer had the capacity to deal with a serious oil spill (Turner 102). The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) capacity to monitor aquatic ecosystems was dramatically reduced, and it was forced to close all eleven of its libraries with reports of much of the information being destroyed (Peyton, Franks 11, Turner 104).

Another tactic is to restrict federal scientists from speaking publicly about their work. According to a survey, the vast majority of federal scientists believe their work has been compromised by political interference, and that the public sharing of scientific findings has become too restricted (Chung). This has led to self-censorship in the scientific community (Chung). For example, Dr. John Wilmhurst, the Resource Conservation Manager for Jasper National Park, was fired without a publicly stated reason (Pratt). Many suspect it was because he commented on the melting Athabasca Glacier, and in response, 118 former Parks Canada employees accused the government of using the threat of dismissal to instil a culture of fear (Stuart, Pratt). Intimidation tactics extend to environmentalists as well. Revenue Canada was given $8 million to audit the allegedly foreign funded racial environmental groups (Turner 101). The audit only uncovered an anti-nuclear organization run by doctors, and Ducks Unlimited (Turner 101). Like environmentalists, scientists are demonized as well. There were plans to close the Polar Environment Atmospheric Research Laboratory and the Experimental Lakes Area (ELA), thought to be invaluable tool for scientific research. (Peyton, Frank 11, Turner 103). Greg Rickford, then Science and Technology Minister, used the public criticism he received over the closing of the ELA as a fundraising opportunity, asking for help fighting "radical ideologue" scientists (Peyton, Frank 13).

The Extractivist 'Common Sense'

The Harper Government's relationship with science, scientists, and environmentalists is informed by their belief in the illegitimacy of the knowledge created and espoused by these groups. This is due to an epistemological populist orientation to knowledge. Ramp and Harrison define epistemological populism as:

> "...an orientation to knowledge which privileges the reliability of ordinary individuals' direct opinions and personal experiences (the lessons of which can be generalized unproblematically) over the perceived abstractions generated by social science research...In such a theory...the more numerical, general, and statistical the analysis, the less trustworthy it is. Thus, emphasizing the objective evidentiary value of the

[mandatory long form census] could actually feed a sentiment in favour of its elimination...or, to broaden the point, statistical evidence of global warming....In a thoroughgoing epistemological populism, one begins and ends with one's own experience and with taken-for-granted generalizations which frame the world in a narcissistic and moralized way not open to critical dialogue, qualification, or self-reflection, insulated instead by association with like-minded sovereign individuals, united by suspicion of professional or institutional knowledge production." (279)

Emphasizing of the overwhelming and conclusive evidence of climate change, or other types of environmental science, would then reinforce its illegitimacy in the eyes of the epistemological populist (Ramp, Harrison 279). This orientation to knowledge explains the Harper Government's treatment of science, scientists, and environmentalists, as in their view they are acting to marginalize and eliminate illegitimate knowledge, its creators, and its effectuators.

There is also some interchange between epistemological populism and neoliberalism that informs the Harper Government's construction of "what interests, rights, and social goods citizens hold in common" (Ramp, Harrison 281). The Harper Government's dichotomous conception of environment and economy, their exaltation of the resource extraction industry, and the marginalization "radical ideologue" scientists, is useful in demonstrating their interpretation of common interests, rights, and social goods. According to the extractivist, the social goods we have in common are our natural resources. It is then in our interest to extract these resources, maximizing our utility, growth and progress (Peyton, Franks 5). This in turn allows individuals' to accumulate wealth for the purpose of purchasing consumer goods, their fundamental right (Ramp, Harrison 283). To shift of our economy away from fossil fuels would be a refusal to utilize our common social goods. This is not in our interests as it obstructs progress, and preventing us from doing so is a violation of our rights as individuals. It would defy 'common sense'. (Peyton, Frank 5)

The Harper government's epistemological orientation to knowledge is useful for understanding their marginalization of science and scientists, and their forceful efforts to facilitate industry growth demonstrates a neoliberal rationalization. Although, it's the interplay between the two that explains the marginalization and demonization of the environmentalist movement, as they fight the 'common good' with illegitimate knowledge.

The Harper government's tireless efforts encouraging President Obama to approve the Keystone XL pipeline included PM Harper himself referring to the project as a "no brainer", and stating that logic dictates its approval is "inevitable" (Toner, McKee 115, Baker). Harper also offered to address emissions to provide President Obama with the "political cover" needed to approve the project, as if industry expansion is 'common sense', and only politics, not conviction, would impede it (Hall).

The Failure of Extractivism

Blowback from the Harper Government's environment policy is evidenced by numerous stalled or rejected projects. For example, the Northern Gateway pipeline was stalled by intense opposition from environmentalists and First Nations groups. The government's consultations with First Nations Chiefs in B.C. were viewed as rushed, and done to "fabricate" a record of consultation should court proceedings be needed (Pemberton). Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, head of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, said the Harper Government has "...in a provocative way, pitted the economy against the environment and it will prove incredibly divisive to Canadians...We will carry this fight through the courts and on the land if necessary." (Pemberton). A consequence predicted by Alberta's former Progressive Conservative Minister of Environment, Jim Prentice:

> "...the constitutional obligation to consult with First Nations is not a corporate obligation. It is the federal government's responsibility.... these issues cannot be resolved by regulatory fiat, they require negotiation. The real risk is not regulatory rejection. It is actually regulatory approval, undermined by subsequent legal challenge and the absence of 'social license'." (Toner, McKee III)

Social license, though ill defined, is essentially the community acceptance of a project, which a company acquires by following through on the social obligations it has to a community. Northern Gateway required local and regional acceptance, but this can also extend nationally, or internationally. Due to the growing threat of climate change, the Energy East pipeline is facing growing opposition in Quebec (Tomesco). Previously, now PM Trudeau has said he cannot support the project until it acquires social license (Poitras). The TransMountain pipeline expansion faces opposition for reasons similar to both Northern Gateway and Energy East (Cattaneo). President Obama rejected Keystone XL stating it would undercut his administrations environmental goals, and referred to Alberta's oil as "dirty" (Koring, Bellefontaine). Experts have stated the Harper government's abysmal environmental record has increased opposition to industry expansion, and that PM Trudeau and Premier Notley's willingness to take action on environmental issues will improve the industry's image and facilitate expansion (Leach). When Premier Notley, who has spoken of the need to acquire social license previously, announced Alberta's new carbon tax, she stated that the province received a "wake-up call" when Keystone XL was rejected (Giovannetti, Johnson).

Conclusion

The Harper government was a strong ally for the resource extraction industry, allowing them unprecedented access to government, and collaborating to expand the industry. This entailed a dismissive attitude toward climate change, aggressively dismantling environmental protections, and marginalizing science, scientists, and the environmental movement. Ultimately, this clashed with growing concern about climate change and environmental issues globally, and has been detrimental to the resource extraction industry. The Harper government's ideological foundation of neoliberal populism informs their actions, as they viewed environmental science, government scientists, and environmentalists as attempting to violate individuals' right to exploit common social goods in pursuit of their interests, informed by illegitimate knowledge. These ideological foundations were the product of

western alienation, which reached its pinnacle following the implementation of the National Energy Program. Stephen Harper was determined to ensure westerns never again felt the indignation they did when told how to utilize their resources, although he has only forced them into a situation where they have no choice. Ironically, this has created a situation where leaders of left-of-centre governments – the second Trudeau PM and the first NDP Premier of Alberta – are addressing environmental concerns, hoping to acquire a social license and facilitate industry expansion.

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Parliamentary Reform in Canada: The Significance of Senate Reform

By Navneet Gidda

In this paper, I will argue that the Canadian Parliamentary system has become significantly less democratic over time and therefore requires reform. Specifically, I will focus on the Senate and the ways in which the institution has had a negative impact on the state of Canadian democracy. Through an analysis of how Senators are selected, the make up of the Senate, and the institution's role in Canadian governance, I come to the conclusion that Canadians must demand reform if they are to maintain a strong, healthy democracy that serves their interests. Mainly, I support a Triple E Senatorial system since it gets at the root of the problem by decentralizing federal power and giving it to the provinces and Canadian people. I also include a brief discussion of Justin Trudeau's plan for the Senate which proposes more immediate reform and does not require constitutional revision. Rather than demanding abolition or tolerating the status quo, taking these steps towards reform will ensure that Canadian interests are the government's top priority. Through reform, Canadians would have more effective "sober second thought" and a democracy that works for the people, not the party in power.

In Canada, our parliamentary system of government is often seen as the epitome of democracy but the extent to which it remains true to democratic values (such as accountability, representation, citizen engagement, transparency, etc.) is often in question. The decisions made at the federal level of government have significant effects on the individual interests of each region of Canada which means engagement in federal issues on the part of individuals and provincial or territorial governments is incredibly important. To ensure the unique needs of each part of the country are being heard and met, parliamentary composition and proceedings must be scrutinized. As our democratic system matures, there are bound to be institutional changes and it is up to Canadians to push for changes that do not take away from the democratic nature of the country.

In this investigation I will argue that the federal parliamentary system in Canada requires reform because it has deviated from the participatory and representative aspects of democratic governance. The system is increasingly cutting Canadians out of the parliamentary process and is, as a result, producing a

more centralized, undemocratic federal government. To establish a system that is more aligned with the democratic values of Canadians, we must focus on reforming the organization and make-up of the Senate. Much of the debate around Senate reform in Canada stems from the democratic values of electoral participation and maintenance of a decentralized system that accounts for provincial interests.[1] From these values, "three main issues arise: the Senatorial selection process, the number and distribution of Senate seats, and the role and powers of the Senate as a whole, specifically its relationship to the House of Commons."[2] In this investigation, I will discuss the problems these issues bring to the Senate in order to support the argument that Canada ought to transition towards a Tripe E Senate or at least consider Justin Trudeau's proposals to reduce partisanship within the Senate.

It is immensely important to consider the Senate when evaluating our parliamentary system since the institution has numerous roles and responsibilities when it comes to policy and legislature. It is the major parliamentary body responsible for providing a "sober second thought" to issues at the federal level. During the bill-to-law process, Senators go over proposals made by those in the House of Commons and provide their input on how the bill ought to be amended. Essentially, they are responsible for questioning, improving, and delaying legislation to make sure mistakes are avoided. Since the appointed Senate has this large degree of influence on the outcome of legislation, "it represents a major, unrealized opportunity to address the democratic deficit in Canada's central policy-making institutions."[3]

First of all, the selection of Senators is in the hands of the Prime Minister as he or she is the one who appoints them. This partisan influence on the Senate sparks debate over whether appointment by the party leader in power is truly a democratic practice. If the Prime Minister is selecting Senators, it is highly unlikely that he or she will appoint individuals who do not favour the party. In the past, there have been several attempts to address this issue and one that is worth considering is the Meech Lake Accord brought forward by Brian Mulroney in 1987. Meech Lake suggested a type of Senate reform aimed at making the institution less partisan and more representative of provincial interests. The selection process suggested by the accord would give provincial Premiers the power to recommend Senators. Each province would produce a list of Senatorial candidates and the Prime Minister would be required to appoint Senators from those lists.[4] This method of appointment clearly allows provinces to have a say in the Senate and as a result a say in parliamentary legislation. It is a clear example of movement towards decentralization of federalism because each province is able to indirectly appoint Senators who would look out for their province's specific interests and issues that affect them. By doing this, Canadians in their respective provinces would be better represented in the Senate and would as a result have a greater, meaningful impact on federal legislation.

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[1] Michael Burton and Steve Patten, "A Time for Boldness? Exploring the Space for Senate Reform," *Constitutional Forum* 24, no. 2 (2015): 1, accessed November 10, 2015,
http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=10 8331942&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[2] Burton and Patten, "A Time for Boldness?" 3.

[3] Michael M. Atkinson and David C. Docherty, "Parliament and Political Success in Canada," in *Canadian Politics in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Wittington et al. (Toronto: Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited, 2008), 10.

[4] Rand Dyck and Christopher Cochrane, *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches* (Toronto: Nelson Education Ltd., 2014, 2011), 108, 416-18.

Although the Meech Lake Accord was unsuccessful, the idea of having a less centralized appointment process came out of it and its democratic value started being more widely considered. Eventually, the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 also touched on Senate Reform and brought about the popularization of a Triple E System of Senatorial appointment. The Triple E System has three main goals when it comes to the Senate: elections, equality, and effectiveness. Under this system, each province would elect six senators via proportional representation for nine year terms. This means every province, regardless of size, receives an equal number of Senators and therefore equal representation. And finally, Senators would be more effective since they would have considerably more power to oppose the House of Commons and serve the interests of the people. For example, Senators would have the ability to stop legislature in provincial areas of jurisdiction and therefore be more effective in converting the peoples' demands into real, observable change. The Triple E method aims to give Canadians an opportunity to participate in federal governance, be more equally represented at the federal level, and basically gets rid of appointment to make the Senate a house of the provinces – evidently forcing the parliamentary system to be more true to democratic standards.

Adopting an electoral approach to the Senate is a clear example of citizen participation in federal affairs and thus the Triple E system provides a fix to the lack of citizen engagement in parliamentary issues. Along with this election portion of Triple E, the equality of provinces aspect is also significant contributor to the establishment of a more representative system. The need for an equal number of Senator seats for each province comes out of the issue of the House of Commons being dominated by individuals who advocate for the interests of Ontario and Quebec, where most of the Canadian population resides. Canadians outside of these two provinces do not receive representation to the same extent so the Senate must fill the void.[5] By giving each province the ability to a) elect their own and b) have an equal number of Senators, we allow the system to be more democratic. Furthermore, population density is already addressed in our House of Commons. It makes sense for the Senate to give the provinces equal representation in order to avoid ignoring valid provincial concerns amidst the centrally focused House.[6] Canadians, no matter where they live, would have access to a group of individuals in direct engagement with federal legislative procedures and decisions – this ease of access to parliamentary proceedings is a crucial element of maintaining a legitimate democracy.

One former Conservative MP, Howard McConnell argues for a Triple E Senate by referring to the success of the United States' equally elected Senate. McConnell states that, in America, giving each state an equal number of Senators means "the lower house represents the people and the upper house the states. Either principle without the other would result in a perversion of federalism, since in a legislative body organized according to population alone there would be no assurance that regional or state interests would be adequately taken into account."[7] According to McConnell's argument, the whole point of an upper house is to represent all of the states and value equality of representation over strengthening centralized federal power.

[5] Howard McConnell, "The Case for a "Triple E" Senate," *Queen's Quarterly* 95, no. 3 (1988): 683, accessed November 10, 2015,
http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/docview/1296887594?accountid=14474.
[6] McConnell, "The Case for a "Triple E" Senate," 687.
[7] McConnell, "The Case for a "Triple E" Senate," 684.

Further evidence of a successful Triple E Senate can be seen in Australia where Senators' roles in legislation have been quite impactful. McConnell brings up an Australian incident where state Senators fought to have their state involved in a federal plan to use water from one of their rivers.[8] Clearly, a Triple E system has the ability to establish a Senate where Senators actually have the power to make a difference on behalf of the people they represent. Our Senatorial system has the wrong idea and ought to value equal, effective representation for the sake of protecting as well as advocating for provincial interests. The Senate is an effective way to get provincial opinions noticed as, again, Senators can influence many policy decisions.

In terms of the Senate's relationship to the House of Commons, some may argue that having an elected Senate would result in more deadlock between the two chambers. "If Senators were elected they would be more accountable to the province they represent and thus feel more justified in opposing ideas put forth by the House of Commons – and this could be problematic."[9] But this worry about political deadlock overlooks the extent to which the effectiveness of the Senate would be increased. Instead of only being able to delay legislation for a specific time period, Senators would be able to back up their claims with the support of the people and perhaps eventually have the power to reject certain legislation. By giving Senators more leverage to stress the significance of their opinions on legislation that affects their provincial area, we would be creating a more democratic system. As well, ensuring each part of Canada is entitled to have its interests heard and acted upon at the federal level is in fact a democratic value. Discussion, debate, and compromise on different perspectives in parliament is a step towards better democracy.

Recently, the Harper Conservatives tried to push for Senate Reform but the Supreme Court deemed an elected Senate to be unconstitutional. To reform the Senate, or even abolish it, we would have to amend the constitution and have provincial and territorial support. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, Harper decided to simply give up on continuing to advance his long promised Senate Reform ideas.[10] In response, even Senators have been commenting on Harper's refusal to acknowledge that there are other ways to begin reforming the Senate while building up democracy. For example, Senator Jim Cowan gives his perspective by stating that "there are ways the Senate could become more effective, without any need for constitutional amendment."[11] If Senators themselves are pushing for reform and realize that there are issues with the institution, it is worth looking into. As well, although the purpose of the constitution is to maintain concrete governing principles, when it isn't working for Canadian democratic values its amendment should be considered. Simply saying that it is too difficult to make amendments and therefore eliminating that as a solution is unacceptable. Linda Trimble, a political science professor at the University of Alberta, agrees with Cowan and says that "it is petulant and

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[8] McConnell, "The Case for a "Triple E" Senate," 685.

[9] Dyck and Cochrane, *Canadian Politics*, 619.

[10] Linda Trimble, "Status Quo Unacceptable; Senate Reform Possible; Abolition by Stealth Anti-Democratic," *Constitutional Forum* 24, no. 2 (2015): 33, accessed November 13, 2015, http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=10 8331945&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[11] Senator Jim Cowan, "Notes from an Insider: Some Bold Ideas on Senate Reform," *Constitutional Forum* 24, no. 2 (2015): 55-56, accessed November 13, 2015, http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=10 8331948&site=eds-live&scope=site.

negligent of the current government to simply throw up its hands in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision and to resist any form of democratic dialogue on Senate reform."[12]

Trimble weighs in on the situation further by suggesting that "without any immediate prospects for an elected Senate, maybe Canadians would indeed prefer a better, more representative, less partisan unelected Senate."[13] She mentions that an alternative to be considered for the time being is transferring the power of appointment from the Prime Minister to an independent council that is not influenced by partisanship. This idea is supported by Justin Trudeau's Liberals as they have proposed a transformation to independent appointments if they are elected. The Trudeau proposal entails a voluntary surrendering of executive power over a powerful governing institution – a bold step which reflects that the party's priority is a stronger democracy rather than the pursuit of power. If constitutional amendment is not feasible at the moment, taking this small step promised by the Liberals is better than doing nothing. It would be a large move towards democratization as Senators would no longer be conflicted between remaining true to their party's wishes and those of Canadians. According to Cowan, "in some committees, Conservative senators actually have scripts from which they read an assigned part."[14] The Harper government did not see the Senate as a body that would question them and ensured this by implementing party discipline within the Senate.[15] This is clearly an undemocratic, manipulative practice and therefore Trimble's mention of taking away the Prime Minister's power of Senatorial appointment puts Senators on the side of Canadians instead of the government – allowing the system to be more democratic.

Both Cowan and Trimble bring us to the conclusion that Canadians must be incorporated into the Senate Reform discussion. Trimble believes that most Canadians have no idea what the Senate does and engaging Canadians in the debate would give them insight into the functioning of Parliament.[16] This engagement would significantly increase the public's interest in federal politics in general as well and thus work to meet the participatory element of democracy. Informed people would be more inclined to keep an eye on the federal government and ensure they are not being left out of important federal decisions. As well, more citizen involvement in talk about the Senate could result in changes to other undemocratic aspects of Parliament.

Many people choose to go beyond reform and argue against the very existence of the Senate, fueled by the opinion that Canada would be more democratic without it. But abolishing the whole institution would bring about much more controversial problems than switching to a system such as Triple E or even keeping the status quo. One main issue that would arise is that there would be an overload of responsibilities on the judicial branch. The Senate's role of double checking government proceedings would get backlogged into the Supreme Court and result in overall inefficiency and more mistakes. As well, no Senators would mean fewer experienced parliamentarians. Compared to MPs, Senators serve much longer terms and thus are more acquainted with legislative issues – losing this would contribute to the increase in Parliamentary errors. As a result of all this inefficiency, Canadian

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[12] Trimble, "Status Quo Unacceptable," 36.
[13] Trimble, "Status Quo Unacceptable," 35.
[14] Cowan, "Notes from an Insider," 58.
[15] Cowan, "Notes from an Insider," 58.
[16] Trimble, "Status Quo Unacceptable," 35.

interests could be skewed and the democratic nature of our system would suffer. Furthermore, the loss of "sober second thought" would strengthen the party in power as they would no longer be hindered by Senatorial debate and delays. Cowan agrees with this point and states that "the government would...simply wait out the clock after introducing highly controversial legislation."[17] It would be significantly easier for the government to pass legislation as it would not have to pass through an interrogative institution. Plainly, we would end up with a less democratic system since the government could more easily pass legislation that goes against the interests of Canadians. The aforementioned issues would not lead to a more democratic Parliament – it would instead create a highly inefficient, centralized system.

Others may argue for simply accepting the status quo but there are clear problems with that as well, including the ongoing Senate scandal that has revealed another side of Senators. The scandal essentially involved a few Senators who wrongfully filed expense claims and used taxpayers' money to pay for personal expenditures.[18] A Senate that has lost the trust of Canadians cannot remain as it is within Parliament if we are to maintain a functioning democratic system. If individuals appointed by the federal government are stealing from citizens, how are we to trust them when it comes to advocating for our interests? Accountability is a huge aspect of democratic governance and the current Senate clearly does not feel accountable to the Canadian people and has instead pledged its allegiance to the party in power. The approach taken by the, now previous, Harper government to address all this has been to stop appointing Senators at all and hope the problem solved itself. Trimble calls this ignorance towards the Senate "abolition by stealth" and says it is extremely undemocratic as it is "designed to avoid talking about the future of the Senate."[19] By pretending the Senate is not there and refusing to build it up, the government deviates immensely from our democratic values. The approach completely refuses to acknowledge Canadians' opinions on the Senate, showing the extent to which our Parliament has forgotten about the people's role in democracy. It also prevents anyone from trying to increase the popularity of alternatives mentioned earlier in this investigation such as Meech Lake and Triple E. Keeping Canadians out of the Senate makes it incredibly difficult for any positive reform to occur and does not reflect a very democratic Parliamentary system.

From an analysis of past attempts at Senate reform, current problems, and future possibilities, I have established the argument that the Canadian Senate is highly undemocratic in several facets and does in fact require major reform. Over time, many ideas have been brought up for consideration including the Meech Lake Accord, Triple E System, and making non-partisan appointments. But most of these have either failed, been ignored, or simply deliberated. As well, any serious discussion or debate about the Senate has been within scholars or the government itself – there has not been very much serious talk about the issue amongst Canadians. It can thus be argued that Canadians have not adequately been able to participate in federal concerns and are consistently being cut out of the system. If the government does not take the various opinions of Canadians across the country into consideration, how can we claim to

[17] Cowan, "Notes from an Insider," 58.

[18] Ian Austen, "Dispute Over Canadian Senators' Expenses Balloons into Larger Political Scandal," *New York Times,* Oct 25, 2013, Late Edition (East Coast), accessed November 13, 2015, http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/docview/144484528?accountid=14474.

[19] Trimble, "Status Quo Unacceptable," 36.

have a representative, parliamentary democracy? Furthermore, from the examination of issues that arise from completely abolishing the Senate or accepting the status quo, it is very clear that those alternatives will not lead us towards a more democratic system – only reform can help us move forward.

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Picture That: Canada's 2015 Federal Campaign Through Instagram Images

by Elisa Carbonaro

Social media is changing the landscape of elections. It opens a new sphere for politicians and political parties to connect with citizens. Now more than ever before we are seeing our political leaders turning to social networking sites in order to campaign and disseminate information, and the Canadian 2015 federal election was a prime example of this. All three major party leaders took to social media as a campaign tactic, but how these leaders make use of social media images has gone relatively unexamined. In this research study I ask what are the common theme(s) evident in all three major party leaders' Instagram feeds during the 2015 election campaign? And a sub-question derived from this asks: what sorts of latent campaign tactics are suggested by these themes? In order to answer these questions I use a mixed-method approach, both a visual content analysis and discourse analysis are employed using a small sample extrapolated from Instagram. In summation, two major themes are apparent in all three leaders' Instagram pages: The Crowd Pleaser and The Family Man, both of which have underlining political agendas.

Introduction

Social media transcends all spheres of society: it is public, political, and personal. With its increasing popularity, there is no end in sight as to how ubiquitous and pervasive this medium of communication will become. Instead of consuming current events through evening broadcasts and morning newspaper deliveries, civil society is shifting to Internet news sources, including Twitter and Facebook trends. It is no surprise, then, that political campaigns have taken to social media more than ever before to raise support. This recent phenomenon has changed how we consume current political information and as a repercussion it has morphed the way politicians campaign. This shift towards social media campaigning has become quite apparent in the 2015 Canadian federal election, with all three of the main party leaders taking to Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter on a daily basis.

In particular, politicians are using more social media images to campaign than was the case previous elections. Perhaps due to how easily viewers absorb and interpret images, this trend is on the rise. Now that all the party leaders are on Instagram and Twitter, what themes are being conveyed in the images they express on social media outlets? Are these similar themes? And finally do these images reveal any underlining tactics? My official research question asks: <u>what are the common theme(s) evident in all three</u>

major party leaders' Instagram feeds during the 2015 election campaign? And a sub-question derived from this asks: what sorts of latent campaign tactics are suggested by these themes? In order to answer this question I will first review the relevant literature, followed by a description of my methodology, and subsequently report my results from my research.

Literature Review

There has been a growing body of literature on politicians social media use during and between elections, yet there remains a gap in the scholarship on how the strategic use of social media images frames and brands politicians. In general, the literature on political parties/officials social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) use has remained separate from the literature addressing strategic dissemination of visuals by political officials, (Marland, 2012: 217). Instagram is a new and rapid growing social networking service that allows users to share images and short videos, (Lee et al., 2015: 552). Launched in 2012, Instagram is still in its infancy (even with over 200 million users) and therefore has gone relatively unexamined; indeed, it is not formally recognized as a social media site in most of my literature. However, I am operationalizing Instagram as a social media site, as it was adopted by all three major leaders in the 2015 election and updated daily during the campaign. In this literature review I aim to achieve three outcomes: first, examine the importance of images in campaigns and how they are used to frame leaders; followed by a discussion of how politicians use social media, and finally I will operationalize the three major party leaders.

Images

Why are images important for campaigns? It is a simplistic question, in a sense, because we all have an understanding of the power and persuasion of images. Nevertheless, images appear to have a much stronger pull on voters than that of traditional candidate posters or radio ads– as one Tory noted, "visuals trump words," (Marland, 2012: 222). When examining campaign images of party leaders it is important to understand the power that these images have, how they resonate with viewers, and how this impacts votes. There perhaps is no better Canadian example demonstrating the power of images in a campaign than that of Robert Stanfield attempting to catch a football. In 1974 while on the federal campaign trail Stanfield partook in an unprompted game of catch, and he was photographed letting the ball awkwardly slip through his hands while knock-kneed and grimacing (Cheadle, 2008). Multiple national newspapers published the photo on their front cover with the large headline "Political Fumble?" and unfortunately for Stanfield this would become an iconic photo and the defining image of his political career (Cheadle, 2008). He lost the election to incumbent Pierre Trudeau, the young and "vital" Prime Minister who was already changing the image game through the use of televised commercials, (Flanagan, 2014: 102). Images have an incredible currency with the public and have the ability to make, or, in Stanfield's case, break a campaign.

Through the use of visuals, politicians tend to generate personality traits such as being relatable, intelligent, reliable, trustworthy, and competent– all qualities that voters consider important in leaders, (Hoegg, Joandrea, and Lewis, 2011: 896). Studies have shown that attractiveness and perceived competence (inferred through the visual) will have an effect on candidates' success at the polls, (Praino et al., 2014; Antonakis and Dalgas, 2009). These studies reinforce the notion that "image matters" during a

campaign; therefore, a logical conclusion is that voters do not vote for a candidate based solely on pragmatism. This helps solidified the concept that appearance, and hence photos of politicians, matter greatly in elections because they have a subtle influence on voters conceptions of competence and leadership.

It should be noted that the concept of appearance equating to competence (furthermore leadership) disproportionately affects certain bodies more than others. Gender, sexuality, and race have substantial power in constructing political authority. A Caucasian, male, heterosexual body is "the prototypical body of the political leader," (Trimble et al., 2015: 324). This has implications for my research, as all three party leaders in my study are the "prototypical body" of political authority, it could be expected that each candidate might reinforce this hegemonic narrative through the use of their visuals. Masculinity plays an important role in images, it has the ability to persuade voters of competence (Praino et al., 2014: 1100) and this is a tactic that citizens see repeatedly through images of politicians engaging in sports, labour (such as construction and handy-man work), and also 'paternal' photos help to reinforce this hegemonic masculine narrative of leadership.

Social Media

Social media allows for politicians to negotiate an identity that may differ, or even counter, what mainstream media and journalists have created. This provides an arena of agency for political figures to create their own image– unmediated, (Svensson, 2012:183). Svensson (2012) observes through his research that social media use during campaigns is less about engaging with citizens and more about "image-management," (186). In particular, Svensson found that social media was used strategically to create an image of both "competent politician and person," (189). Social media opens the door for the personalization of political figures, a peek into the private sphere that can be used to counter mainstream media narratives, (Carlson, Djupsund and Strandberg, 2013: 22). Constructing this "personal touch" for party leaders is not a new campaign tactic; previously television ads were used in Canada to "rub the sharp edges off [Harper's] personality" and create a softer, safer, and perhaps more of a paternal image of him, (Flanagan, 2014: 133). But with modern election campaigns incorporating social media this personalization can come "from the leader" rather than a political ad– helping to dismantle the barrier of 'politician' and 'citizen,' (Coleman and Moss, 2008). In addition to breaking this barrier, social media allows governments to reach large and diverse civil populations much quicker and even in real time, (Kavanaugh, 2012: 484). Taken together, these scholarly works help to outline *why* politicians are incorporating social media into their campaign tactics; however, it still highly contested whether or not social media is an effective campaign tactic or rather just a means of showing that politicians are "up-to-date," (Ross, 2015).

When discussing the effectiveness of social media campaigning, Obama's 2008 presidential campaign is the magnum opus. Obama's campaign was the first of its kind to mobilize popular social networking sites (Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube) in order to spread his political platform in combination with citizen engagement (Hanson et al., 2010: 585). As Hanson et al. (2010) outlines, Obama used these forms of social media to "provide a new form of mediated communication that [gave] the audience access to on-demand content and the ability to share and discuss it with others," (585). These are some of the key components to social media campaigning: the ability to produce content faster, direct communication to

citizens' computers and phones, and finally it allows citizens to spread and converse on the content. Obama's campaign changed the way that politicians use social media, what was once a supplementary medium of communication has now become an obligatory campaign tool, (Flanagan, 2014: 133). This literature helps support the rationale behind why leaders are using more social media than ever before, and even helps shed light on some of the ways in which it is used to frame or construct an image of a politician.

Party Leaders

For this project I have narrowed my research to Canada's three main party leaders: Justin Trudeau of the Liberal Party, Thomas Mulcair of the New Democratic Party (NDP), and Stephen Harper of the Conservative Party. Each party leader had an active presence on social media during the 2015 election campaign, a trend that spoke to the modern ubiquity of social media in politics. While this study is based on the three main party leaders, I am not giving any attention to their personality, platform, or political ideology in this literature review because I am primarily concerned with imagery themes and meaning of such in campaigns, not political standings.

Hypothesis

Based on of the above scholarly literature I predict that the leaders' Instagram feeds during the elections will fall into certain thematic categories, predominately personalization and masculinity. Reflecting work that addresses social media use by politicians, I would expect to see all three using personalization through family images or photos that peek into the private sphere such as home shots or what they had for dinner. These are the types of photos that mainstream media do not have access to; therefore, social media provides an arena of agency for personal photos. Another theme that I anticipate is an undertone or blatant image of masculinity. All three leaders fit the archetypal body of a leader, so I would expect each one to use this narrative in reinforcing their competence through masculinity. Such photos may include sports, construction, and outdoor activities.

Methodology

My research question is exploratory and aims to discover certain trends; therefore, I have chosen a nonprobability sampling method because a) it allows me to code and analyze a manageable amount of images and b) my sample size is small to begin with. I have set qualifications for my data in order to ensure that my results are answering my research question(s). First, all my data was extrapolated from Instagram on October 11th, exactly eight days prior to the election, and I collected the 15 most recent images from each leader's account. I chose Instagram because it is an image-only social media site that has gone relatively unexamined; therefore there is a literature gap in analyzing how these social media photos are being used in campaigns. So close to the election, these particular photos are important because they are the images that each leader has strategically chosen to use as a tactic to help with their campaign. Another qualification I have added is that the image must either be a landscape shot or have a human in the frame; therefore, it cannot be a 'text picture,' because my research is primarily focused on images and not text.

I am using a mixed-method approach, a visual content analysis in order to answer my main research question research about manifest content and a discourse analysis to answer my subsequent question regarding latent content. Content is defined as "any message that can be communicated, including words, meaning, symbols, or themes," and by applying a content analysis technique I will be able to better organize the images based on thematic content, (Archer & Berdahl, 2011: 371). My imagery /discourse analysis is guided by the methodology of Marcus Banks, who described researching visual images as moving beyond just the superficial level and examining more of the latent content of the image based off of cultural and historical context, (Banks, 2001: 15). I examined the 'latent campaign tactics' as defined by some of the major concepts that emerged from my literature review such as personalization and masculinity. Guided by Banks qualitative approach to visual analysis, once I had organized the images thematically I asked what narratives are being communicated through these pictures? What are some of the greater implications of these photos? This qualitative approach will allow me to best answer my second question.

Results

There were major motifs present throughout all three party leaders' Instagram feeds that paralleled portions of my hypothesis. Within my sample, there were two evident thematic categories that transcend Harper, Mulcair, and Trudeau's Instagram posts; I referred to them as the 'Crowd Pleaser' and 'Family Man.'

Image 1.a: Crowd Pleaser: Mulcair

The Crowd Pleaser was a very common image within my sample, accounting for roughly 20% of each leaders' Instagram feed. The Crowd Pleaser image is characterized by the party leader standing amidst a crowd of enthusiastic supporters, usually the leader is depicting speaking passionately or just smiling, surrounded by a sea of party colors.

I use image 1.a as an example of Mulcair as The Crowd Pleaser, encircled by supporter and orange, the official NDP color. The crowd is never stagnant in these shots, they are always riled up and galvanized while watching the leader, and I would argue that these images are a latent tactic used to instill

a sense of trust, credibility, and authority in the leader. Though it should be noted that not all Crowd Pleaser shots clearly depict the leader, as seen in image 1.b below; however, it is implied that Trudeau is there in the distance, lost in sea of supporters.

Image 1.b Crowd Pleaser: Trudeau

This theme initially contradicted my hypothesis that the leaders would use social media to break the barrier between politician and citizen, creating a sense of personalization seen in the Family Man motif. However, the Crowd Pleaser is akin to the literature on how appearance is used to convey competence (Praino et al., 2014). This becomes an alarming trend of images due to recent articles documenting the pervasiveness of " crowd-renting," (Schneider, 2015). Recently *The Atlantic* did an article on how politicians are using companies like Rent-A-Crowd to pad their rallies with bodies, creating the perception of a large group of supporters, (Schneider, 2015). The act of renting supporters or even staging a group of people to cheer for a photo has an undertone of propaganda to it, and at the least should raise questions about the ethics of these synthetic photo ops and media releases. Marland (2012) expands upon crowd manipulation for the use of a visual and posits that they are "so devoid of any substance that their newsworthiness is open to interpretation," (215). The carefully orchestrated Crowd Pleaser photos of Harper, Mulcair, and Trudeau are used to create a sense of legitimacy for each leader through visual solidarity (Mayo, 1978). But given the manipulation of these images it raised questions in my own research about the ethical nature of the Crowd Pleaser. What does this type of image mean for the democratic principle of popular sovereignty? Are these photos ethical? Does the virtue of the photo change because a partisan group disseminates it? And how, as citizens, can we begin to develop a critical vocabulary for assessing these staged social media images?

Image 1.c Crowd Pleaser Harper

Given my literature review, the Family Man was a predictable trope. This image occurred repeatedly in all three leaders' Instagram pages and illustrated both the concept of personalization and masculinity. I categorized this image as any photo where the party leader was seen with young kids, whether familial or not. These types of images also made up about 20% of my sample, most frequently occurring in Harper and Trudeau's feeds. When an image depicts the leader and their family, such as image 2.a of Trudeau, it reinforced the argument by Coleman and Moss (2008) who suggests social media is used to break the barrier between politician and citizen. Instagram allows the leaders to created this personalization through a mediated medium, exposing a private side to the public.


Image 2.a Family Man Trudeau

The Family Man theme also plays heavily into the concept of masculinity, and I would argue that it supports the work of Trimble et al. (2015) and the role of hetero-normative masculinity in campaigns. When the Family Man image occurs with a party leader and a child that is non-familial there is an undertone of paternalism. An example of this is image 2.b below, depicting Harper as the Family Man, and sitting down with a young girl while they both smile. Though there were no examples within my sample, the "kissing baby" photo is another common imagery theme during campaigns that ascribes to the paternalism of the Family Man. This form of masculinity is much more nuanced than the overt displays that I was expecting such as sports or handy-man photos, and instead is a sublet protectionist model of masculinity. Iris Young (2003) outlines the protectionist model of masculinity as one of virtue, chivalry, and fatherhood. By having this repetitive image of each leader with a baby, a toddler, and even pregnant women, I would argue that they are constructing the protectionist narrative that Young outlined, illustrating themselves as the indeed "father" of the nation. There is space for a much greater and in-depth analysis of gender and the Family Man theme during campaigns, one that is intersectional in scope and addresses the gendered implications of this imagery theme. Possible questions for further research should analyze how female politicians could cultivate this image, and if that is desirable? How are women portrayed, through visuals, as protectors of the nation? And finally, if these paternal photos are masculine, does that make them bad?

Image 2.b Family Man: Harper

Image 2.c Family Man: Mulcair

Even though these two themes flowed through all three leaders' feeds, each had motifs specific to their own Instagram. For example, Harper clearly had a 'Laureen' theme where his wife appeared in 40% of his sample photos. Mulcair had a distinct 'Youth' theme where images of youth in NDP clothing or barring NDP signs were photographed on their own. And finally Trudeau, taking a page from his father's book had a clear motif of 'Nature' and the Canadian land, often appearing active in images, further highlighting his vitality. All three of these themes deserve a more critical analysis, employing the method that Banks (2001) described as taking both a cultural and historical lens to the photo.

Conclusion

This study has answered my research question, providing me with two evident themes that transcend all three leaders' social media images. Throughout this paper it has become apparent that social media is used by politicians to cultivate a disparate image. This mostly occurs through portraying a sense of competence and equally personalization. However, when all three leaders are portraying the same 'disparate' image, it conflates the originality and personalization of their Instagram pages. Masculinity and protectionist models also underpinned numerous images during campaigns, and this is a section of my results that requires greater gendered analysis in the future.

They saying goes 'an image is worth a thousand words,' but when it comes to staged images of politicians I think the saying should change to 'a thousand sources.' There is so much more that could be analyzed and discussed with each of the 45 images I mined. That said, I believe that having a larger n study would only add to the validity of these reoccurring themes I discovered. Social media image analysis is an under-researched field that requires more attention, especially given the potency and power of a single image. For now, we need to yield caution when consuming multiple images on a daily basis of our political elites and begin asking questions about authenticity, gender, and purpose.

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Battling for Votes: The Ascent of the Permanent Campaign in Canada

by Helen Zhang

This paper describes a recent shift being seen in Canadian politics. By studying the concept of the permanent campaign, it can be seen that voters are involved in politics in a new way. The permanent campaign is characterized by how it increasingly uses recent and new technologies in a sophisticated manner. This includes what is known as Web 2.0, which is seen with the broader widespread usage of the internet as well as social media platforms. Web 2.0 makes practices of data collecting possible, such as microtargeting and narrowcasting. The permanent campaign is also evident in the changing landscape of news media. These various techniques of using technology in Canadian politics shapes the way that the electorate receives messages. There are differing opinions as to whether this shift is positive or negative for Canadian politics. Journalists tend to view the permanent campaign as harmful while some authors view things like social media as more participatory.

Introduction

Canada is currently experiencing the rise of what is known as the permanent campaign. The permanent campaign can be described as the "persistence of partisan electioneering by political parties and elected officials, even during governance periods between elections."[1] In this paper I will argue that the rise of the permanent campaign has created a Canadian political landscape in which various new technologies have opened up ways to shape how the electorate is involved in politics and more significantly, how messages are received by voters. In exploring some specific changes that have taken place during this modern era of political communication, various opinions on the topic can be found. Different authors argue on the effectiveness of new communication strategies and whether the general nature of this type of communication is good or bad for Canadians. This paper will describe the most widely used forms of political communication found in today's party system. This includes the news media which has shifted away from complex story reporting, raising great concern with journalists as it has created a more restricted and less democratic reporting landscape. The permanent campaign also adapts to the widespread use of the internet by what is known as Web 2.0, which encompasses things such as social media and related platforms. Web 2.0 and sophisticated databases make the practices of microtargeting and narrowcasting possible.

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[1] Alex Marland, "Political Communication in Canada." in *Canadian Politics*, ed. James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon. (Peterborough: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 309.

News Media and Communication Management

With the rise of the permanent campaign comes changes in the way that information is distributed. An explanation of how the permanent campaign came to be is due to years of minority governments and continuous campaigning. This resulted in federal politicians acting like they are "child soldiers in a war-torn African country: all they know how to do is to fire their AK-47s."[2] This paints a portrait of exacerbated competition. The permanent campaign features various newly advanced tactics, including intensified and urgent media coverage. The most significant change that news media has gone through is the decreased degree of control it now has. Alex Marland defines Canada as a mediated democracy. This means that information about elected representatives is learned through the media, "rather than through personal interactions."[3] The politically informative nature of media did not fully emerge until the 1970s. The rise of the television in the homes of Canadians eventually lead to the importance of "images, emotion, personalities, soundbites, symbols and "cues" in politics."[4] In turn, this increasingly resulted in shifts of how parties operated, notably in "connecting with potential voters and in determining and allocating political priorities."[5] Consequently, media outlets do not get the chance to discuss important, complex topics in depth. In a present-day environment of heightened competition to capture an audience's attention, media outlets are encouraged to "adopt an accelerated pace and offer easily intelligible content."[6] A problem arises from this as politics often cannot explained in a quick and snappy manner. Information on television tends to be quick and flashy, not giving the time for people to truly grasp what is being covered. Consequently, this affects the way in which the electorate interacts with politics on a daily basis. This style of reporting may influence voters' understanding of politics. In other words, this new way of communicating aims to "shape how citizens feel and think about political issues and leaders."[7] This is accomplished by increasing the use of strategies such as pseudo-events for the sole purpose of create image bites and new regulations in the press gallery.

The relationship between news media outlets and the government have changed. Newsrooms have to deal with the changes of more limited information and make use of information subsidies that are provided by political communication personnel, such as "news releases, opinion pieces, written quotes instead of interviews, and other free content, including postings on social media."[8] The people that have the biggest issue with this is understandably, journalists. Marland uses the Canadian Association of Journalists (CAJ) as an example. They claim that there is a deterioration of democracy, quoting their concern that "genuine transparency is replaced by slick propaganda and spin design to manipulate public opinion" which results in contempt and suspicion of government.[9] Jennifer Ditchburn discusses

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[2] Tom Flanagan. "Something Blue: The Harper Conservatives as Garrison Party." in *Conservatism In Canada*, ed. James Farney and David Rayside. *(*Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 89.

[3] Marland, "Political Communication in Canada," 313.

[4] Marland, "Political Communication in Canada," 316.

[5] Brad Walchuk. "A Whole New Ballgame: The Rise of Canada's Fifth Party System," *American Review Of Canadian Studies* 42, no. 3 (2012): 421.

[6] Richard Nadeau and Frédérick Bastien. "Political Campaigning." in *Canadian Political Parties in Transition. Recent Evolution and New Paths for Research,* ed. Alain-G Gangnon, and Brian Tanguay. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 16.

[7] Marland, "Political Communication in Canada," 309.

[8] Marland, "Political Communication in Canada," 310.

[9] Marland, "Political Communication in Canada," 311.

government news management, using the following definition, "a strategic variant of public information whereby political actors manage communication in order to influence public opinion by controlling the news media agenda." [10] As a result, politicians now "take intensive training in voice, hand gestures, and other body language."[11] This exemplifies the focus on the image more than ever, while restricting access to those can provide more substantial information to the public at the same time. The Harper government is seen as especially private and inaccessible as "the search for better control over "the message" resulted in considerable tension with journalists of the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa" through various changes to rules.[12] A concern among reporters is that the poor quality and quantity of information provided is harmful to both the reporter and audience. If a journalist is not given enough information to fully explain an issue in the first place, it is unlikely the audience will be able to understand it either.[13]

The internet and news media can certainly interact with each other in the era of the permanent campaign in a codependent relationship. Some journalists attempt to place their own agency into their stories. More precisely, a media outlet's agenda does not always align to a party's so "journalists can choose to substitute other frames to replace those selected by parties."[14] Parties begin to find ways to get around this. A party website can be an efficient and important tool for reaching voters but also the media. An author describes how "one of the primary audiences of campaign websites is the media."[15] A political party can choose what campaign news stories to feature and in result, hence, the website provides access to what journalists will end up focusing on. The internet is certainly notable for the role it has in "the co-operative relationship between parties and the media." [16] The permanent campaign creates this environment of never-ending competition of holding the top story of the day. This may influence the perception of politics as chaotic and aggressive. Similar to news media, there are many different viewpoints on the new role of the internet in political communication.

The Role of Web 2.0

The internet has offered many people quick and easy access to information, more than ever before. However, social media is not exactly the ideal platform to comprehensively discuss politics. Similar to the current nature of news media, Web 2.0 saw its beginnings during the fifth party system. Walchuk explains how the "participatory and democratic potential of Web 2.0" is relatively new, even just compared to the end of the fourth-party system.[17] Beginning in 2000 the use of internet was known as Web 1.0, though it was nowhere near as influential as it is now. During that time, most parties had

[10] Jennifer Ditchburn. "Journalistic Pathfinding: How the Parliamentary Press Gallery Adapted to News Management Under the Conservative Government of Stephen Harper." (Master's Thesis, Carleton University, 2014) 10.

[11] Shannon Sampert, et al. "Jumping the Shark." *Journalism Practice* 8, no. 3 (2014): 282.

[12] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning," 19.

[13] Ditchburn, "Journalistic Pathfinding." 117.

[14] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning." 16.

[15] Tamara A. Small. "Equal Access, Unequal Success – Major and Minor Canadian Parties on the Net," *Party Politics* 14, no. 1 (2008): 59.

[16] Tamara A. Small. "Canadian Cyberparties: Reflections on Internet-Based Campaigning and Party Systems," *Canadian Journal Of Political Science* 40, no. 3 (2000): 654.

[17] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 423.

their own website but they were "electronic brochures," rather than a real tool for interaction.[18] In 2004, sites began to play a larger role in party campaigns and attempts to engage online visitors were really made.[19] In this changing landscape, the Internet went "from web content as the outcome of large up-front investment to an ongoing and interactive process; and from content management systems to links based on 'tagging'."[20] Elmer and Langlois specifically discuss the rise of Web 2.0 in a study of "traffic tags." This describes the way that specific words are used in order to gain traffic on webpages. For instance, a party would use strategic words that would gain greater Google-visibility in the ranked results list.[21] More generally, under the leadership of Jack Layton, the NDP employed a permanent team that included fifteen people responsible for their Web campaign. [22]

What all the different social media platforms have in common is the reliance of users to "share and circulate [content] across friends' networks of like-minded individuals and groups."[23] Social media is known to be widely used among the youth population. This raises an interesting discussion as youth are generally disengaged from politics. Walchuk describes how in the 2011 election, all five party leaders used social media to interact with potential voters more than ever.[24] He measures their statistics through "likes" on Facebook and "followers" on Twitter. Perhaps it may seem inconsequential to study levels of political communication through these means but he reassures that they "allow parties and leaders to connect with supporters and potential supporters."[25] This still rings true today in 2015 as the party leaders have many more followers than they did a few years ago. In particular, Justin Trudeau has over one million Twitter followers as of November. However, with the proliferation of social media and the never-ending lists of followers, friends, etc., there are questions as to what weight these connections can really hold. Front page feeds or dashboards are overflowed with information and many people may scroll past things posted by parties and politicians like they would scroll past an advertisement. Some do not see these platforms as useful to politics at all. Solberg argues that social media users do not influence party and government issues and agenda as much as people think, nor do politicians and political parties influence the public via social media.[26] This view is ultimately about how involvement in social media will not result in an individual voting. Although people use the internet to communicate more than ever, the 2011 election featured one of the lowest voter turnouts in Canadian history and among youth (aged 18-24) 37.4 per cent voted.[27] There is a major distinction between mere communication and a real connection. Walchuk points out that Web 2.0 has the possibility of allowing politicians to connect with the millennial generation but again, they are those who are "the least likely to vote and participate in traditional forms of political activity."[28] As another author finds, not only do youth not participate in traditional forms of political activity (such as voting and joining parties), youth also do not "shift towards alternative avenues

[18] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 423.

[19] Small, "Canadian Cyberparties," 644.

[20] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 423.

[21] Greg Elmer and Ganaele Langlois. "Networked campaigns: Traffic tags and cross platform analysis on the web," *Information Polity: The International Journal Of Government & Democracy In The Information Age* 18, no. 1 (2013): 46.

[22] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning," 20.

[23] Elmer and Langlois, "Networked campaigns," 48.

[24] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 423.

[25] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 425.

[26] Monte Solberg. "In Social Media: Content is Still King," *Canadian Parliamentary Review* 36, no. 2 (2013): 2.

[27] Solberg, "In Social Media," 3.

[28] Walchuk, "A Whole New Ballgame," 425.

of political action."[29] There are certainly issues get a lot of social media attention but Solberg states that users "either parrot a point of view on Twitter or sign a Facebook petition believing they are participating in democracy."[30] Nevertheless, this view denies any influence social media may have over a person and implies that things such as awareness and exposure to new issues have no significance to those that may not have had such information the first place.

There are concerns about the accessibility and actual degree of openness of the internet. Since the internet itself has little financial costs and is decentralized, cyber-optimists would argue that all parties have the same chances and opportunities to make use of the capabilities of web 2.0. On the contrary, others could argue that the internet does not offer a level playing field. Major parties dominate the online sphere similar to the other spheres of everyday media outlets, stating that politics within the cyber-sphere is "politics as usual."[31] The internet may appear to be easily accessible but it is not without financial costs. It requires money (and tech-savviness) to make a fancy looking website that users will be inclined to stay on and return to. Small discusses the 2004 election and parties' websites and finds that while all sites provide plenty of relevant information, minor parties use the technology for dialogue among supporters much more often, they are more stale and text-based.[32] The main disadvantage that minor parties face is how the internet requires users to somehow come in contact with content themselves. A major party is more likely to have a popular website than a minor party. The internet is a special advancement to political communication as other mass media outlets do not have the same ability of this type of direct interaction. Most notably, this information can be "transmitted in many directions."[33] Small makes an argument that many other have made as well, that the major Canadian parties use the Internet as "an instrument of power-seeking and controlled communications, not one of democracy."[34] While the internet provides a new form of political communication for parties and the electorate, many have doubts about the real effects it can have. A study finds that "only 23% of Canadian users agree or strongly agree that the Internet helps them have more political power."[35] In a more cyber-optimist view, Small argues that internet-based campaign communications is "more transparent and centralized," in response to an argument that believed these communications are "regionalized, targeted or private."[36] The internet is used to carry out functions that have always been necessary in campaigning but technological advancements have also been used for specific purposes related to target messaging.

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[29] L.S. Tossutti. "Voluntary Associations and the Political Engagement of Young Canadians," J*ournal Of Canadian Studies* no. 1 (2008): 103.
[30] Solberg, "In Social Media," 3.
[31] Small, "Equal Access," 52.
[32] Small, "Equal Access," 58-61.
[33] Small, "Equal Access," 60.
[34] Small, "Equal Access,"66.
[35] Charles Zamaria, et al. "Executive Summary" in *Canada Online! A Comparative Analysis of Internet Users and Non-users in Canada and the World: Behaviour, Attitudes and Trends 2004*. (Toronto: Ontario Media Development Corporation, 2005), 10.
[36] Small, "Canadian Cyberparties," 640-1.

Political Communications and Microtargeting

The era of the permanent campaign saw the rise of databases. Databases collect various tidbits of information about voters that can then be neatly gathered into groups. This information is used in a practice called microtargeting in which the purpose is "getting the right message to the right people."[37] These techniques of data collection are connected to how parties attempt to "focus the debate on issues for which they have a positive image, in order to convince voters to view these issues as being important."[38] In order to do this, parties must attract voters' attention to certain issues in which they can convince voters that the party is best equipped to deal with an issue, which can eventually result in a vote.[39] The Conservatives were the first party to use a national database. By 2011, NDPVote was created for party use and expressed "the culmination of the NDP's adoption of marketing practices."[40] The NDP employed a team that was responsible for "micro-targeting polling and communication activities aimed at demographic groups prevalent in specific neighbourhood."[41] To illustrate, the database was used by tracking the neighbourhoods where residents paid highest cellphone costs which revealed the homes that would be "most receptive to demands from Layton to bring down the cellphone charges."[42] Even more significant, in 2015, the NDP had dramatically sophisticated their system practices with the assistance of "270 Strategies Inc., a consultancy with ties to the Obama presidential campaigns."[43] Around the same time, the Liberals also developed their own database named "Liberalist." Liberalist was also created with the help of a system connected to the Obama campaign.[44] The open access online tool is presented as an "identification and relationship management system" that allows users (party personnel) to carry out "targeted communication and mobilization activities."[45] An author finds that the Liberal's use of their databases has "paid off in terms of the party's ability to marshal both funds and workers for a number of federal by-elections in 2013 and 2014."[46] All these advancements in database usage has made communication to specific voters very easy. It is argued that this leads to parties being "less responsive to the demands of citizens" as the electoral system allows them to "target a much smaller body of movable voters through increasingly sophisticated techniques."[47] The largest concern is that these divisions have led to politicians abandoning "the art of political persuasion and the hard work of building a broad consensus on a national vision."[48]

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[37] Steve Patten. "Databases, Microtargeting, and the Permanent Campaign: A Threat to Democracy?"ed. Anna Esselment et al. 3.

[38] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning," 2.

[39] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning," 5.

[40] Alex Marland and Thierry Giasson. "From brokerage to boutique politics: Political marketing and the changing nature of party politics in Canada." in *Canadian Parties in Transition: Recent Evolution and New Paths for Research*, ed. Alain-G Gangnon, and Brian Tanguay. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 15.

[41] Nadeau and Bastien, "Political Campaigning," 20.

[42] Marland and Giasson, "From brokerage to boutique," 15.

[43] Patten, "Databases, Microtargeting," 6.

[44] Marland and Giasson, "From brokerage to boutique," 14.

[45] Marland and Giasson, "From brokerage to boutique," 14.

[46] Jeffrey Brooke. "The Liberal Party of Canada: Fading or Resurgent?" In *Canadian Parties in Transition: Recent Evolution and New Paths for Research,* ed. Alain-G Gangnon, and Brian Tanguay. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 23.

[47] Richard Nimijean. "Elect Us™: Values politics, branding, and the 2015 federal election campaign," *Catholic University Law Review* (May 2015): 30.

[48] Patten, "Databases, Microtargeting," 13.

A technique related to micro-targeting is narrowcasting. Narrowcasting is known as "the practice of sending particular political messages to particular people and ensuring that supporters or constituents receive the campaign messages."[49] Through social media and the employment of permanent teams that specifically work with aspects of the permanent campaign, distinct opportunities are offered to parties to reach specific people in extremely particular ways.[50] This means that websites can focus on the general mass of internet users but also on individual users or particular groups. Audiences can be spoken to as regional and/or private ones. This is relatively new compared to the previous format of television which only allowed parties to speak to national audiences.[51] An author describes this technique in relation to the idea of "brand politics." That is, parties that emphasize values instead of ideas. Intense connections are played upon with the hopes that narrowcasting messages can result in "the same emotional relationship with a leader and party as they do their car, mobile phone... "[52]

Conclusion

Although there are many different views on what effects the permanent campaign has had in Canadian politics, a conclusion that can be made is that advancements have changed the political landscape. There are more methods for parties to communicate with the electorate, which includes the new ways that messages are delivered to voters. However, it is difficult to measure exactly how much influence the tactics of the permanent campaign has on the electorate. Although not the main focus of this paper, the 2015 election featured the use of the social media as a communication platform more than ever. Parties used social media platforms to get out a message via social media networks. A rather large question some authors pose is how much influence social media really has, especially when a large amount of social media users are a group who tend to not vote very often. It is worth questioning how influential these sites will be in the future, especially when the youth voters will be those who have never known a life without social media.

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[49] Philip N. Howard. "Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in
Political Campaign Strategy," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 597, (2005): 158.
[50] Elmer and Langlois, "Networked campaigns," 43.
[51] Small, "Canadian Cyberparties," 645.
[52] Nimijean, "Elect Us," 31.

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    Journal Of Canadian Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 100-125.

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    American Review Of Canadian Studies 42, no. 3 (2012): 418-434.

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    A Comparative Analysis of Internet Users and Non-users in Canada and the World: Behaviour, Attitudes and
    Trends 2004. 5-11.Toronto: Ontario Media Development Corporation, 2005.

Canada's Beef with Lipstick: Eat or Be Eaten

By Marina Banister

In the summer of 2015 the City of Edmonton Youth Council proposed a motion to City Council to adopt solely vegetarian or vegan food for all catered meetings for the purpose of environmental sustainability. The motion garnered national media attention, starting with a focus on the motion itself, however quickly transformed into a story about sexism when the online reader commentary started to attack the Youth Council Committee Chair Marina Banister. This paper will analyze the backlash Banister received in the online commentary sections by breaking apart four articles from CBC News Edmonton, Yahoo News Canada, and the Edmonton Journal. The online comments written in reaction to news articles about Banister's motion to City Council will be assessed in how they delegitimized her argument and undermined her political credibility. Ultimately the paper will conclude that the online comments focused on Banister which distracted from the motion itself and challenged her credibility as an expert on this issue.

Introduction to Case Study

"A slew of sexist and threatening online comments isn't stopping a University of Alberta political science student from encouraging Canadians to think about food sustainability" (Yahoo News Canada 2015) was the opening line of an article posted in Yahoo News Canada on July 9, 2015. In the summer of 2015 the City of Edmonton Youth Council proposed a motion to City Council to adopt solely vegetarian or vegan food for all catered meetings for the purpose of environmental sustainability. The motion garnered national media attention, starting with a focus on the motion itself, however quickly transformed into a story about sexism when the online reader commentary started to attack the Youth Council Committee Chair Marina Banister.

This paper will analyze the backlash Banister received in the online commentary sections by breaking apart four articles from CBC News Edmonton, Yahoo News Canada, and the Edmonton Journal. The online comments written in reaction to news articles about Banister's motion to City Council will be assessed in how they delegitimized her argument and undermined her political credibility. Ultimately the paper will conclude that the online comments focused on Banister which distracted from the motion itself and challenged her credibility as an expert on this issue.

As to acknowledge any potential for bias, I disclose that the subject of study, Marina Banister, is also myself, the author of this paper. This both gives me the ability to personally understand the topic and backlash as well as to interpret findings through the perspective of first-hand experience.

Research

When conducting research to support the thesis of this study I was looking to understand the prevalent themes which arose out of the online reader commentary. This lead to my research questions as follows: How many comments focused on Banister instead of solely the motion? What were the most common themes arising from these comments? To what extent does existing literature on social media, meat politics, and gender politics help us understand these themes? After using discourse analysis on online reader commentary, this paper will determine how the online comments written in reaction to news articles about Banister's motion to City Council delegitimized her argument and undermined her political credibility. The overarching conclusions of the crisis of masculinity, representation of ecofeminism in media, women in social media, and vegan politics will be synthesized through the scholarly literature which provides concrete academic support to the nine predominant themes that arose from the online commentary.

The four articles chosen were all published online, three were centred around the harassment Banister received, the last was about the motion itself. All four articles included pictures of Banister. The first article published on July 7, 2015 by CBC News Edmonton "Council to mull vegan platter vs. cold cuts in October" (Appendix 1) focused on the motion itself and quoted both the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, Mayor Don Iveson, and Councillor Andrew Knack. This article had a total of 32 comments not including replies. The next article was also published on July 7, 2015 in the Edmonton Journal titled "Virtual vegan witch hunt serves up social media at its ugliest" (Appendix 2). This was the first article published which focused on the harassment Banister received through online reader commentary. This article had a total of 39 comments, not including replies, and linked to Facebook. The next article, published by Yahoo News Canada "Student urging Edmonton council to go meatless unfazed by online sexism" (Appendix 3) published on July 9, 2015 also focused on the online harassment Banister received, but instead narrowed in on Banister's reaction to the sexism. This article had 277 comments not including replies. The last article is from CBC News Edmonton published on July 13, 2015 entitled "Edmonton Youth Council's sustainable snacking feeds online trolls" (Appendix 4) which also highlighted the online comment sections of articles. This story quoted notable gender study scholars as well as Banister. Comments on this article totalled 149 not including replies.

There were over 20 articles published in response to the motion, however a sample of four articles were selected for this paper which totalled 497 online reader comments. These articles were selected because they cover a variety of readerships, are both about the motion and the harassment, and have publicly visible commentary sections. I chose Yahoo News Canada as a media source because they are national platforms that feature a vast variety of news stories and are aimed at younger, more urban audience. I chose The Edmonton Journal because that is where the news story about harassment originated and CBC News Edmonton because it is a local news outlet that is typically consumed by a wide demographic. Unfortunately there are articles in the National Post and the Edmonton Journal that would

have been beneficial to this study however were not selected as the comment sections have since been taken down.

Methodology

After reading through the 497 comments, it was determined that 197 comments or 39.5% mentioned Banister. The remaining comments either discussed the motion itself, veganism, or other unrelated topics and were thus determined irrelevant to this study. Through extensive coding (Appendix 5) the following nine themes were determined among the 197 comments; arguing whether Banister experienced sexism, her appearance, Banister as a pushy woman, female vegans, fame seeking, victimhood, age, sexual harassment, and physical harm. The following sections will explain these themes, provide contextual examples, as well as relate it to the overarching concept of how the online comments delegitimized and distracted from Banister's argument in order undermine her political credibility.

When analyzing these comments I was looking at the prevalence of mentions focused on Banister's appearance and sexual harassment. After reviewing the sample of 197 it became apparent that several more themes were prominent. A challenge of this study was sorting the comments into appropriate themes. As a result of the limited word count and sometimes unclear meanings behind the comment it was often challenging to determine which theme a comment best fit under. Likewise for each of the nine themes there were many applicable comments that can be used as an example, however a sample of the one or two most fitting comments were chosen to support each theme. A strength of this online reader commentary analysis was the quantity of comments reviewed which ensured the total collected comments were an accurate representation of the public backlash.

Theme One: Veganism

The most prominent theme from the online comments was the occurrence of veganism and more specifically Banister's eating habits. This theme came up in 34% of the comments studied. A sample comment along this theme was from Yahoo News Canada:

> "Typical girly girl hates her meat. It's so hard living with women when all they want is meat free "veggie meals". No wonder they have to rely on men to do the heavy lifting as they don't have the strength as a result of eating only rabbit food, chocolate and cream" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015).

In fact, the concept of meat consumption is an inherently gendered practice. This is exemplified by in the academic paper "Metrosexuality Can Stuff It: Beef Consumption as (Heteromasculine) Fortification" by Wesley Buerkle, the idea that "masculinity claims for itself the right to consume" (Buerkle 2009 253) is discussed in relation to how female food consumption is heavily criticized by the populous as well as the media. Moreover that "consuming animal meat, actual muscle, translates into the acquisition of strength and power" (Buerkle 2009 255) a strength characteristic of hegemonic masculinity. When Banister urged male City Councillors to reconsider the amount of meat they consume, it was seen as a direct confrontation of their masculinity and freedom to consume without restriction. In media and advertising men are often portrayed to be eating "meat as a rejection of

feminine influence [which] renders beef consumption a male activity that revels in a retrograde masculinity, one that celebrates more traditional gender performances" (Buerkle 2009 256). Going further, in advertising and media "women and meat are one in the same. They are both prizes: they both represent dominant masculinity's goals, and they both emphasize men's consumption impulses (both sexual and dietetic) as essential to their maleness" (Buerkle 2009 258). Beef consumption is most problematic in the meat industry as it is the biggest sector of animal agriculture that contributes to environmental destruction. As the motion was to reduce meat consumption in Alberta - colloquially known as "beef country" - this dynamic of the modern cowboy rang especially true. Aggravated by Alberta's recent election of a female Premier, the idea that women are taking over and changing the lives of men made much of the population especially sensitive to a bold suggestion by another woman. Deeming an effective way to reduce that power by sexualizing and delegitimizing the appearance of a women as an easy way to distract from the credibility of her ideas.

Theme Two: Arguing Over Sexism

The second most prevalent theme was arguing over sexism. The articles that discussed the sexist nature of the online reader comments debated whether these comments were sexist or justified. In total 33% of the comments debated this matter. A CBC Edmonton comment captured this best:

"She's wrong...If males would have made the same comments the reaction would have been the same. Don't turn this into something sexist that totally isn't. We had a guy in our class suggest replacing donuts with a veggie tray and man did he get grilled.... ." (ORC CBC News Edmonton "B" 2015).

Although it is unclear how the backlash towards the motion would have been different if the gender expression of the Chair was male, it is important to note that environmentalism is a gendered practice at its core and certain types of environmentally friendly practices are more likely to be picked up in the media. When Banister proposed the motion to eliminate meat at catered City Council meetings the makeup of City Council was 12 men and 1 woman. This change in balance, whereby a young female was advocating to older males, exacerbated the motions controversy. Typically women are tasked with being environmentally responsible, and messaging to encourage that practice is directed at them. It is seldom that older white men's food choices are questioned. Women are often found in a binary whereby "there is growing social acceptance of the idea that women have unique environmental agency and an obligation to ensure that their families are living in an environmentally responsible manner" (Nutter Smith 2010 66) but at the same time, they are not empowered to promote environmentalism to the men in their households, instead reducing their personal consumption to compensate. Acknowledging this binary helps bring the "gendered tendencies in environmental communication" (Nutter Smith 2010 67) into focus. Moreover, Nutter Smith's analysis helps shed light on why Banister's motion gained so much media momentum.

Often ecofeminism is not picked up in mass media, however what this motion advocated was a small symbolic change to the infrequent and tax-dollar funded meals of elected officials. The symbolic approaches to environmentalism may actually serve to undermine more far reaching and systematic behavioral reevaluations that are needed for true environmental solutions, "yet it is precisely this

discourse -- built around the idea of simple, painless changes in personal behavior -- that has been most eagerly picked up by the mass media" (Nutter Smith 2010 68). This highlights some of the reasons the motion received such wide media attention, as well as a major criticism of the motion itself - which was that it was symbolic but had little real effect on environmental sustainability. It illustrated how green consumerism is appealing to the masses as it is an easy symbolic alternative to confronting more institutional elements of environmental destruction (Nutter Smith 2010 69). The motion falls within this category because instead of positioning for a reduction in consumption entirely it advocated for green consumerism. In this same way "the more significant behaviors are the hardest to modify, and they don't tend to fit well with the marketing approach's rhetoric of environmentalism as a series of small, painless changes" (Nutter Smith 2010 69). Moreover, while women are in fact seen as being in touch with nature and are expected to be environmentally responsible, it is not often that they actually define the perimeters of societal environmentalism, as such "women either support the environmental agency of men or act as an obstacle to the environmentalist goals of men" (Nutter Smith 2010 70). This picks up on a major theme of valid criticism that Banister encountered over social media which is that "a truly feminist 'green' political stance would imply a need to consume less rather than just consuming differently" (Nutter Smith 2010 78).

Theme Three: Pushy Perception

The concept that Banister was pushing her opinions and beliefs onto others was another prevalent theme in the online reader comments of the selected four articles. This theme was discussed in 31% of the comments. This idea of a women pushing her ideas on men can be directly related to the crisis of masculinity.

The motion being lead by a woman draws upon a common theme whereby men feel women have for too long imposed their food preferences upon them, and it is now time to stand against this oppression of rights. Hegemonic masculinity exists on the assumption that men still desire to hold privilege in society, privilege that is only gained through the oppression of women and non-human animals. In an act of defiance against the accepted norm of meat as a token of masculinity, the patriarchy has no choice but to dominant and animalize anyone who challenges this notion of meat consumption. Banister was compared to farm animals either in appearance or in relation to the torture and eventual slaughter of those animals. As astutely pointed out by Rogers in the notorious burger king "I am Man" commercial, "the narrative is clear: Women have emasculated men through the ingredients as well as the preparatory and presentational style of their preferred food" (Rogers 2008 259). Moving further, although the case for food sustainability is soaked with class politics, Rogers points out that meat media often portrays "all men have a desire to return to "real manhood" defined by the rejection of small portions, bourgeois aesthetics, quiche, and tofu, as well as by eating meat and performing acts of physical strength" (Rogers 2008 295) and dominance over women and animals. More broadly, many environmental ideologies challenge the privilege of dominating men, as such vegetarianism is considered a threat to hegemonic masculinity as well as male privilege (Rogers 2008 97). The ecofeminist movement "introduced the connection between the oppression of women and the exploitation of animals and nature" (Rogers 2008 298) which was eventually broadened to include many other dimensions of intersectionality.

Alberta specifically has a predominant culture in which meat consumption is linked to traditional hegemonic masculinity. In present times, many men who are seen as progressive or metrosexual may acknowledge the looming impact the beef industry has on global climate change and water consumption. This idea of men caring for the environment has become labeled as a feminine quality. A major parallel theme that was stated in the media coverage and online commentary of Banister's sustainability motion was that she was infringing on the rights of others. By her requesting other people reduce their meat consumption she was being bossy, preachy, and inappropriate. An example of the commentary directed at Banister is in response to the Edmonton Journal article Virtual Vegan Witch Hunt Serves up Social Media at its Ugliest "The only "witch hunt" was conducted by Ms. Banister and her colleagues, who aren't content to live and let live but instead want to force their dietary preferences on others" (ORC Edmonton Journal 2015).

Theme Four: Victimhood

Another common theme that emerged was the idea that Banister was too sensitive, playing the victim card, and could not handle the pressure of political life. A total of 30% of the 197 comments fell into this theme of victimhood.

When Banister proposed the motion, it read "vegan or vegetarian" food. However even though Banister is not a vegan herself (she is a vegetarian) the media almost exclusively picked up on the word vegan instead of vegetarian. This made both Banister and the motion appear to be more radical, as while vegetarianism is gaining more widespread social acceptance, veganism is still largely stigmatized as radical and extremely limiting. Although in this case the motion was specifically about food consumption, the media often paints veganism and vegetarianism as diets, even though there are a variety of reasons one makes these consumption choices. These include but are not limited to ecofeminism, animal ethics, health, religion, culture, and sustainability. In the article "Vegaphobia: derogatory discourses of veganism and the reproduction of speciesism in UK" Matthew Cole and Karen Morgan explain how the media portrays vegans as "ascetics, faddists, sentimentalists, or in some cases, hostile extremists" (Cole and Morgan 2011 134). The articles also explains how there are approximately twice as many female vegans than male, and female vegans are far more likely to be vilified in the press (Cole and Morgan 2011 144). Going further, "vilification of women's responses to nonhuman animal exploitation therefore combines sexism with a trivialization of a compassionate ethical response as 'sentiment'.... Women, including leading female politicians, were largely depicted as hysterical in their calls to stop eating beef while the voices of 'reassurance' were provided by male experts" (Cole and Morgan 2011 145). When the articles about online sexual harassment came out, many criticized Banister for being overly sensitive to the harassment, which very much fits with the idea that "when discussing veganism in the abstract, the oversensitive discourse is also a form of tacit feminization as it draws on gendered stereotypes of women as 'over-emotional' or irrational" (Cole and Morgan 2011 145). However when older, more established men such as Councillor Andrew Knack or then Councillor Amerjeet Sohi came to Banister's defence, the motion gained a little more credibility.

A comment which exemplifies the accusation that Banister was simply being sensitive to criticism was on Yahoo News Canada:

"Of course play the sexism card, there is power in playing the victim. All I saw from the examples were people questioning her health. Why does the media not play the sexist card whenever the feminist hate train spews their hateful filth to anyone who simply questions them?" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015)

Although the sentiment expressed in this comment was a common theme, its argument is rendered moot after analyzing who is systematically the target of vilification in media.

Theme Five: Appearance

When originally conducting this research, the focus on Banister's appearance was at the forefront because they were the comments which were highlighted in Paula Simons original article on sexism. However, on closer inspection only 19% of the sampled comments mentioned Banisters appearance. Most notably a large portion of the comments which focused on her appearance mentioned her makeup and the perceived effort that she put into her looks. This content is exemplified in the quoted comment from Yahoo News Canada:

"I guess if she didn't want the conversation to be about how she looks she maybe shouldn't have posted a picture of herself (at least not one where she has obviously gone the extra mile to make people focus on her appearance. i.e; full on makeup, jewelry, blown out hair, and a "sexy smile"" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015).

Many readers assumed Banister had control over the pictures selected in the articles. However the reality is quite the opposite as none of the photos used in articles were provided or vetted by the Chair. For example the picture used in the Yahoo article was pulled off Banister's public Twitter profile. Moreover in the Yahoo article, Banister stated "Ultimately I don't want the conversation to be about how I look" (Yahoo News Canada 2015) which this commenter responded to by saying:

"It doesn't make the remarks about her looks right, but on the other hand, her later statement and her choice of photo are conflicting. Also, nothing against vegans, but they often come across as really pushy and preachy. If it was about a religious person trying to force their beliefs on someone, it would be considered not cool or acceptable, but in this case it is o.k?" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015).

These comments on Banister's appearance did serve to delegitimize her political credibility. Professor of Women's Studies Cristina Stasia was quoted in one CBC article on the case stating that "It's much easier to say to Marina or the youth council: 'You don't know what you're talking about, you're just a skinny babe, you should listen to us,' she said." (CBC News Edmonton "B" 2015). This showcases a popular idea that focusing on women in politics appearance instead of their ideas is one method of distracting from the credibility of their ideas. Similarly PETA's use of conventionally attractive women to promote vegetarianism did a disservice to Banister because there is a stigma against trying to promote vegetarianism through women in the media. The study "Selling Ideology: Commodification of women's bodies in PETA media campaigns" by Megan Tabag explains how PETA often gets backlash for using stereotypical feminine beauty to sell the ideology of vegetarianism. Going so far as to say "PETA has

appropriated mainstream sexual tactics to sell vegetarianism" (Tabag 2009 3) which is a controversial strategy. Similar to Banister's motion, the Edmonton Journal received backlash for the photo they used of Banister, some claiming that the Journal was using it as "click bait" to try to drive traffic to the article. Some of the criticism the picture received was that it didn't have anything to do with the motion itself, which parallels criticism PETA receives about its media strategy which is using women who have little to do with the ideology to try to advertise vegetarianism.

Namely in this particular case, Banister was seen as a classic neoliberal women. As a result of her makeup, blown out hair, and jewelry she was not depicted as what an environmentalist "should" look like. This is a counter discourse to many women in mainstream media because women who conform to traditional modes of heteronormative beauty are typically more widely accepted by the public. This however worked against Banister as the products used to achieve her appearance were seen as directly conflicting her ability to be an environmentalist. In the Edmonton Journal article, Paula Simons wrote "Other commenters, she said, attacked her for wearing makeup, suggesting she couldn't be a serious environmentalist or real feminist if she used nail polish" (Edmonton Journal 2015) which further reinforces this idea. This discourse has footing in the wider ecofeminist realm. The 2007 article "Friend or Food: Raising the Flag for Feminist Vegetarianism" by Aimee Dowl articulated the discrepancy between male and female vegetarians as well as the differences between feminist vegetarians (Dowl 2007 60). Dowl focuses on how meat has been sexualized and objectified to emulate women and vice versa going on to say that "we reduce the animal to a piece of meat packaged in the supermarket. And it is the same psychological objectification that results in sexism and rape" (Dowl 2007 61). The article also points out how vegetarian feminist messaging has not yet gone mainstream in media because of the movement's lack of sex appeal (Dowl 2007 63). This dialogue is relevant to the Edmonton case study because it both highlights how traditional environmentalists or vegetarians are seen to look a certain way, a neutral, non-sexual way. The mass public used Banister's appearance to delegitimize her credibility as an environmentalist because she supposedly didn't look the part. That being said, Banister's look also propelled feminist vegetarian dialogue into a media focus, because she exemplified the ideal female neutral; that of white, upper middle class, conventional attractiveness. Normally women who conform to white neoliberal forms of beauty are rewarded in the public sphere for their mainstream appearance, however in this situation that worked against Banister as the ideal feminine environmentalist is not supposed to seem consumeristic.

Theme Six: Age

Marina Banister was the Chair of the City of Edmonton Youth Council Sustainability Committee which is a volunteer organization tasked to provide policy recommendations to City Council Community Services Committee. This is important because the motion Banister proposed was well within the mandate of the organization she served. Likewise the Youth Council is a group of Edmontonians between the ages 13 to 23. During the time the original motion was proposed Banister was 20 years old, and her young age was mentioned in 19% of the online comments sampled. Most commonly she was referred to as "pretty young", "little girl", and a "child". An example from CBC comment was "Pretty young to already be espousing her own political agenda and forcing it on others" (ORC CBC News Edmonton "A" 2015). When commenters refer to Banister as young it pulls ideas of inexperience. Moreover Paula Simons from the Edmonton Journal noted that in her research most of the people

posting negative comments were adults, which "given the amount of time Canadian adults spend obsessing about teen cyberbullying, it was disturbing to watch the spectacle of adults taking to the Internet to gang up, dog-pile style, on well-meaning youth volunteers" (Edmonton Journal 2015). Youth apathy was also mentioned in the conversation surrounding Banister, Councillor Andrew Knack related Banisters case in his comment to the Edmonton Journal when he said:

"These are people volunteering their time to try to make this country, this province, this city, better for youth. This type of bullying and sexual harassment does nothing to encourage more people to come forward." (Edmonton Journal 2015).

The idea that Banister was not only a woman but a young woman added an intersection of potential criticism and delegitimization from online commenters.

Theme Seven: Fame Seeking

"Well we all know she's looking for people to look at her" (Yahoo News Canada 2015), this comment from this Yahoo News Canada reader captures the theme of how Banister was perceived as seeking fame when she presented this motion, or in other words, her intentions were self-serving instead of altruistic. "The Complex Visual Gendering of Political Women in the Press" by Asa Kroon Lundell and Mats Ekstrom discusses how the pictures media chose to include in articles differs greatly depending on if it is a man or a women photographed. As well, the type of picture used is a tool to convey a certain message about that politician. The photograph of Marina Banister was taken by a male Edmonton Journal Photographer Shaun Butts outside of the Edmonton City Hall. The shot was of Banister from elbow up, wearing a draped sky blue top with a high neckline, a delicate gold chain necklace, and pearl earrings. Most notably Banister had obviously applied makeup consisting of smoky lined eyes and a pale glossy lip, as well as curled hair. It is no secret that Banister put time into her appearance the morning that the photograph was taken. Interestingly enough, Banister's photograph was originally used exclusively with online media, whereas the original print articles had instead chosen a photograph of elected Councillor Andrew Knack. This could be seen as reaching the different demographics to which those two forms of media are designed to appeal to, as young media consumers read articles digitally, whereas an older profile reads paper news copies. Andrew Knack was a supporter of this motion and defended Banister once the media backlash ensued, but he still undeniably a white, cis-gender, straight, upper middle class man, in his late 30s. Andrew Knack's photo appeals to an older and more traditional demographic, whereas Banister's photo was often tagged as click bait. Click bait is described as material which boasts sensational or provocative headlines or photos in order to draw attention and visitors to an online feature (Oxford Dictionary). Ekstrom and Lundell point out how "first general tendency when it comes to visualizing women in politics involved in a media-driven scandal is to emphasize their femininity" (Ekstrom and Lundell 2008 895). This is relevant to Banister as "women in politics are gendered with a focus on appearance as they are framed from a male point of view and with a male gaze" (Ekstrom and Lundell 2008 906). This article also highlights how women in politics are often pushed into categories in the media namely the princess, mad women, and witch (Ekstrom and Lundell 2008 906). Banister's categorization evolved, initially she was painted as a witch enforcing her opinions onto others, but then transformed into a princess once gaining public sympathy. Banister squarely fell into the princess role as "she was cast as young and vibrant, and the reader is reminded that the papers often used to comment on

her long legs, lipstick and clothes that markedly differed from the men's grey suits in parliament" (Ekstrom and Lundell 2008 906). Media habitually categorizes women into roles and uses pictures designed for the male gaze.

Theme Eight: Sexual Harassment

A main reason the story of cyber bullying got picked up by the media is because of the sexual harassment Banister received in many online comments. The comment that got the most wide spread use was pulled from the National Post and used in the Paula Simons Edmonton Journal article "She looks great until you get her clothes off and she proceeds to just lay there exhausted from all that walking and not eating real food" (Edmonton Journal 2015). Other comments include "I would like to treat her like a piece of meat" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015) and "She calls herself a vegan, but with a pretty face like that I bet she gobbles the protein stick just fine." (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015). The paper "Online incivility or sexual harassment? Conceptualizing women's experiences in the digital age" by Jessica Megarry published in the School of Social and Political Sciences indicates how online sexual harassment is disproportionately directed at women and is a factor in women's voices being silenced on the internet. Overwhelming there is a "widespread culture of misogyny that exists online" (Megarry 2014 46). This online harassment many women experience inhibits them from voicing their opinions, in turn limiting their ability to participate equally to men (Megarry 2014 46). It is important to note that the internet is considered a subsection of the public sphere, an area where ideas are brought forward, discussed and debated; a place women continue fight to gain equal access (Megarry 2014 48). Moreover, because women are placed in a position of disadvantage in patriarchal societies they are sometimes less able to portray themselves as agents of social change in the online public space (Megarry 2014 48). Megarry also goes on to discuss how "women face significant structural barriers to having the issue of online harassment [by] taken seriously in the public eye" (Megarry 2014 49). Moreover "the prolific rise of social media sites has resulted in an increased blurring between our online and offline lives, rendering our bodies more central to our online personas" (Megarry 2014 29).

Theme Nine: Physical Harm

In the worst circumstances of online abuse, Banister was presented with threats of physical harm in the comment sections of online articles. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon when women are presented as leaders in social media. Moreover, although Banister said in many interviews that "When I saw someone post, 'Well, it's a good thing she's pretty, because she isn't very smart,' I felt bad. But after a while, I started to find the comments sort of amusing. I didn't let them faze me." (Edmonton Journal 2015), these comments, which occurred in roughly 0.5% of the comments, should still be taken seriously as they are representative of a larger battle women face in safe social discourse. Some of the comments Banister received include "Good! She should be beaten to death with a zucchini!" (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015) and "What a clown. I hope she gets cancer." (ORC Yahoo News Canada 2015). It is important to note that a commonality of abuse experienced by women online is that they are targeted "on the basis of their identities as women, and that stereotypical ideas of femininity are consistently utilized in a derogatory manner" (Megarry 2014 49). This draws parallels to what happened to Banister as her appearance that was discussed in online comments served to delegitimize her ideas. The comments written in the online articles regarding Banister's motion also "displayed a preoccupation with physical

appearance and suggested that a woman's worth and value lies in her sexual appeal to men" (Megarry 2014 50). This parallels a "kind of pornographic invitation which perpetuates hierarchical gender norms and incites others to display threatening sexual behaviour towards the victim" (Megarry 2014 50). Banister experienced this sort of commentary through a variety of rape threats and sexual innuendos written in online comment boards. Moving further, many of the insults to Banister where not critics of the motion but instead insults to her appearance, as Megarry states "in a paradigm where women are consistently valued by their attractiveness to men, unattractiveness is seen to be the highest form of insult" (Megarry 2014 50). Marina Banister's case was a prime example of how "the internet is a male space to which women have limited access, and communicate to women that their presence online is tolerated only on the basis of their sexual value and appeal to men" (Megarry 2014 50). One of the biggest media backlashes Banister received was the notion that trolls on the internet cannot be taken seriously, and that the threats were empty and thus should not be taken seriously. I disagree with this rhetoric, as Megarry points out "the harasser is not, as such, concurred with their own private access to a specific women, but rather with creating an atmosphere online where she is made to feel continually scared, threatened and vulnerable" (Megarry 2014 51). Lastly, "online sexual harassment is a political term, and it identifies the abuse of women online as a manifestation of male dominance which functions to perpetuate male social control in cyberspace" (Megarry 2014 52) and thus "by conceptualizing the harassment of women on the internet as online sexual harassment it is possible to convey the specific social message that sexual inequality online is harmful to women, and limits their ability to achieve equality in the online public sphere" (Megarry 2014 53).

Overarching Findings

In conclusion, the study of online comment sections in response to Marina Banister's motion from the City of Edmonton Youth Council for Edmonton City Council to adopt vegan or vegetarian catering was met with widespread and gender specific backlash. This analysis shows us how a significant portion of the comments focused on Banister herself and not the motion in principle, the distraction from the issues serving as a disservice to the mission Youth Council was trying to accomplish. These comments delegitimized Banister's credibility by removing her power as an expert through rampant criticism of her appearance, which was seen as consumeristic and vapid, as well as her perceived image as being pushing her feminine and radical values on the public. Time and time again women are torn down in the public sphere for reasons that are unrelated to their ideas or qualifications, but instead are attacked for who they are as a person and women. Coupling this notion with the intersection of gendered meat politics, it is not surprising that Banister's motion received such criticism by the public.

Furthermore, when this case study is synthesized with existing literature on the gendered politics of meat consumption it becomes apparent as to why the public responded in the way they did. Although the Youth Councils motion was led by a woman, the intersectionality of the young woman, challenging consumeristic attitudes, who did not fit the visual mold of an environmentalist were all equally important factors which led to the harassment she received. This is because "while some took issue with the philosophy behind the council's recommendation, calling Banister a "veggie Nazi" – others targeted her in a much more physical sense, including hostile and sexually-suggestive comments" (CBC News Edmonton "B" 2015) which many would argue was a result of the pictures used in the online articles. In the words of Paula Simons "It was as if Banister personally embodied, in microcosm, all the things online

trolls love most to hate. It all devolved into a post-modern witch hunt, a shocking display of social media's power at its ugliest." (Edmonton Journal 2015). In this way, Banister's case study was not an anomaly but instead the manifestation of the way the public reacts to women who challenge accepted culturally practices in our patriarchal and speciesist society.

Conclusion

This inquiry into the backlash against a young female political activist is significant to the study of gender politics and mass media. It exemplifies how the proposed motion to reduce meat consumption was handled differently because the face of the initiative was female. The research reveals how online reader commentary responds to women who challenge a societal norm by refuting their argument through delegitimizing their person. It points out similarities between the oppression of women and the dominance over animals and exemplifies how the crisis of masculinity is still present in 2015. The research provides quantitative data on the number of comments which discussed the motion compared to the individual bringing it forward. Women who prompt society to reflect on accepted cultural norms of consumption and hegemonic masculinity often face challenges in both traditional and social media. Time and time again, the core issue of what these women want to discuss can be side tracked by attention to their appearance, age, or gender. A common discourse of the politics of the meat industry is that people justify the oppression of non-human animals through their objectification. This study compared how Banister was oppressed similar to non-human animals in this regard, commonly known as women being treated as "a piece of meat".

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Queering the Docile Body

By Emma Kauffman

Increasingly, there is a view that the recent emergence of sexual and gender diversity has helped to move mainstream society towards the eradication of the normative privileging of particular genders and sexualities. However, when we look beneath the surface it is more likely to be a reconfiguration of the heterosexual matrix, a term defined by Judith Butler as that grid of cultural intelligibility through which norms are created and maintained in bodies, genders, and desires and how they appear natural (Butler, 24). Using Judith Butler's heterosexual matrix as my foundation, this paper will demonstrate the ways in which gender and sexuality become naturalized in order to explore the normalization process of both heterosexual desire, or orientation, and the gender binary. It will argue that although we are in the midst of a historic mobilization of diverse and complex (trans)gender movements, the sphere of intelligibility continues to be subject to hegemonic interpretations. These interpretations privilege a binary model of genders and sexual behaviors, thus resulting in a continuation of normative identities and desires. Further, as this essay will explicate, the heterosexual matrix, in accordance with neoliberalism, work as a mechanism of power that designates what is an intelligible life. As such, without first locating these functions of power, the push for a more fluid and open understanding of gender, sexuality[1] and desire will continue to fail, and the space for widespread change will dissolve.

Introduction

Increasingly, there is a view that the recent emergence of sexual and gender diversity has helped to move mainstream society towards the eradication of the normative privileging of particular genders and sexualities. However, when we look beneath the surface it is more likely to be a reconfiguration of the heterosexual matrix, a term defined by Judith Butler as, that grid of cultural intelligibility through which norms are created and maintained in bodies, genders, and desires and how they appear natural (Butler, 24). This paper will explore how gender and sexuality become naturalized in order to

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[1] For the sake of clarity, throughout this essay, gender and sex will not be considered separate entities. Both are culturally constructed when considering the body as a situation that has always been interpreted by cultural meanings, consequently sex (male or female) by definition is not a biological quality, but a designation of gender. Both gender and sex require each other to exist.

demonstrate the ways in which both heterosexual desire, or orientation, and gender are performative rather than inherent qualities. It will argue that although we are in the midst of a historic mobilization of diverse and complex (trans)gender movements, the sphere of intelligibility continues to be subject to hegemonic interpretations. These interpretations privilege a binary model of genders and sexual behaviors, thus resulting in a continuation of normative identities and desires. It will further argue that the failure to penetrate the heterosexual matrix has simultaneously, and counter-intuitively, resulted in a widespread assimilation into neoliberal hegemony. As this essay will explicate, the heterosexual matrix, in accordance with neoliberalism, work as a mechanism of power that designates what is an intelligible life. As such, without first locating these functions of power, the push for a more fluid and open understanding of gender, sexuality and desire will continue to fail, and the space for widespread change will dissolve.

Genealogy of Sexual Desire

The ways in which bodies come to inhabit certain spaces rather than others is the preliminary point of analysis. The heterosexual matrix functions as a divide- designating what is culturally intelligible from what is not. Therefore, the naturalization process of gender and sexual desire, functions simultaneously through the reiteration of normative ways of living and the exclusion of other categories. In Foucaultian terms, the restrictive process that imposes specific trajectories on our bodies is the result of bio-power.[2] With the emergence of bio-power came the marginalization of certain values, lives, information and the legitimization of others. Historically, sex was not judged as much as it was administrated as an attempt to enhance the political economy (Foucault, 25). As a result, sex for procreation and bio-politically-oriented population hinge together at the nexus of bio-power (Foucault, 24). Procreative sex has embraced a long history of control: in the eighteenth century sex became a police matter, an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces (Foucault, 25). Governments, instead of acting in regards to subjects, acted in regards to populations: "birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation" were prioritized (Foucault, 25). At the heart of this political and economic project was the state enforcement of heterosexual desire.[3]

This facilitating of sex through control has evolved over one hundred and fifty years, through both the economy of pleasure, and an ordered system of knowledge, into the making of complex machinery for producing true discourses on sex (Foucault, 68). It is this deployment that enables something called 'sexuality' to embody the truth of sex and its pleasures (Foucault, 68). Sex, as bio-power, has long operated to secure certain forms of reproductive sexual ties and to prohibit other forms as a way to order and expand societies. Its general function subordinates characters to one another, specifically linking them in terms of function and thus arranging them to fit a specific design. The historicity of heterosexual desire has posited itself as authentic and natural and has simultaneously naturalized and authenticated the sex binary with the gender binary. Subsequently, alongside the state administration of heterosexual desire came the entrenchment of gendered subjects. Gender, as such, has

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[2] Bio-power, a term used interchangeably with bio-politics, is a mechanism developed to administer life. It is a particular technology of power by which human life can be controlled and managed in its natural intermediacy (Kirstensen, 11).

[3] Throughout this essay heterosexual desire, heterosexuality and hetero-normativity will take on Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner's definition: "the institutions, structures of understanding and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality—but also privileged" (qtd. in Waites, 140).

become "an index of proscribed and prescribed sexual relations by which a subject is socially regulated and produced" (Butler, 48).

Sex As Bio-Power

Throughout history, bio-power has orientated bodies towards specific trajectories and away from others. These specified trajectories initially functioned as overt impositions on people's bodies until, through repetition, they transformed into self-impositions. No longer did the state have to administrate what people could and could not do with their bodies and consequently, bodies, genders, and desires were naturalized. The process has therefore deeply entrenched heterosexual desire, thus, (re)producing heterosexuality as an institution, and simultaneously, strengthening the heterosexual matrix. This chronicle of increasing repression affects what spaces bodies inhabit, a process that involves "orientation devices; ways of extending bodies into spaces that create new folds, or new contours of what we could call livable or inhabitable space" (Ahmed, 11). The sphere of intelligibility has come to govern what bodies orient towards, in the process of inhabiting space.

Gender is neither what one 'is' nor is it explicitly what one 'has.' Instead it is more productive to think of it as the apparatus through which the production and normalization of masculine and feminine take place. Although heteronormativity remains dominant to this day, it has become increasingly evident that its dominant presence is not the result of natural, authentic or inherent human qualities. Norms govern intelligibility, they allow for certain kinds of practices and actions to become recognizable, impose a grid of legibility on the social, and define the parameters of what will and will not appear within its domain (Butler, 42). A norm[4] as such, is established as a direct result of the apparatus of bio-power as it seeks to penetrate the body and its faculties in order to consolidate power over life (Repo, 74). As history demonstrates, this restrictive discourse that insists on the binary of man and woman as an exclusive way to understand the gender field, "performs a regulatory operation of power that naturalizes the hegemonic instance and forecloses the thinkability of its disruption" (Butler, 43). The body becomes both a passive and active agent of its subjectivity. Passive in the sense that the grid limits its comprehension, constraining the body to become an instrument of appropriative and interpretive willing that determines cultural meaning for itself; but active in its perception of itself making decisions as a seemingly autonomous being.

A preliminary analysis, as such, posits this conceptual framework: the foundational categories of sex, gender, and desire are formed by power and are formations of power. At the very essence of the gender binary therein lies bio-power, in all its glory, and thus, the capacity to maintain or dismantle the heterosexual matrix. This has grave results, as it produces a field of reality that specifically designates what can and cannot be conceived. Our bodies are regulated by gender norms, and because of this, bodies that exist that do not, or cannot, abide by these gender norms, are forced to exist in inhabitable spaces; spaces not only unintelligible to others but also to themselves. This posits an interesting

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[4] A norm is the measure, which simultaneously individualizes, makes ceaseless individualization possible and creates comparability. It is a principle of comparison, of comparability, a common measure, which is instituted in the pure reference of one group to itself, when the group has no relationship other than to itself, without external reference and without verticality (Butler, 51).

dilemma, if the very notion of a subject is defined by how it can be understood in the world, what results when gender and sexual diversity force themselves into social, political, and cultural life?

A Reconfiguration of the Heterosexual Matrix

Discipline through bio-power not only produces individuals through management and utility, it also actively constitutes them (Butler, 50). This determines, more or less, what we are, and what we can be. Therein lies the problem. When dealing with the conditions of intelligibility by which humans can emerge, become recognized, and loved by others, they are at the same time inextricably bound by the history of norms, and practices that govern bodies and their understanding of each other. Within the heterosexual matrix, gender identity tends to privilege notions of a clear, coherent, and unitary identity over conceptions of blurred, or fluid identification (Waites, 147). Bodies have been repetitively administered to occupy certain spaces over others and as a result, even with the emergence of gender and sexual diversity, spaces continue to embody similar qualities.

The most tangible example of this can be exposed through an analysis of current transgender rights and politics. As transgender groups move forward towards more inclusive societal and juridical policies, a new kind of conformity has simultaneously emerged. Specifically, when assessing the implications of *Gender Identity Disorder* (GID), it becomes increasingly evident that the current mainstream transgender presence holds problematic connotations. GID is a psychological disorder understood to describe the "phenomena such as unhappiness or unease with one's sex, distress caused by the social roles associated with one's birth sex, and subjective experience of incongruity between genital anatomy and gender identity" (Joel et al., np.). It is, therefore, based on the perception of enduring gendered traits of the opposite sex, which perpetuates the assumption that boys' traits will lead to a desire for women, and girls' traits will lead to a desire for men (Butler, 79). In both cases, heterosexual desire continues to be presumed.

The concept is problematized further due to the assumptions it carries regarding an unchanging gender dichotomy. GID leans on the dichotomous perception of gender, a norm that explicitly relies on two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories: man and woman (Joel et al., n.p). Such a framework depends on a stable sex expressed through a stable gender and this continues to be hierarchically defined through the practice of heterosexual desire, and as a result, the hegemonic presence of the heterosexual matrix persists. Moreover, this framework perpetuates the normative assumption that the cultural gender is an effect of the natural sex (Butler, 31). Hence, the sexuality and genderedness emerging within this matrix of power relations—although they are not simple replications—swerve from their original purpose and inadvertently mobilize possibilities of 'subjects' that no longer exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility but instead effectively expand them (Butler, 39).

The result of this expansion is not a new grid allowing the fluidity of what can constitute an intelligible body, but a repetition of bodies inhabiting pre-given spaces that continue to conceal the 'giveness' of their existence. This suggests that the construction of selfhood is not simply a result of what is and is not intelligible; regulations imposed on the body are also influenced by regimes of value, which administrate, employ, and arrange bodies within and across spaces that facilitate or deny certain trajectories. Ultimately, the presumption of heterosexuality creates a society that propagates compulsory

heterosexuality and by doing so maintains a normative gender binary that excludes all others that do not fit within itself, thus making the event a cyclical process; naturally these life stages will reproduce themselves.

The expansion of the heterosexual matrix, though problematic, does attest to the reality that gender and sexual desire are not authentic or natural human qualities. The replication of gender inverted in transgender bodies, or even the reiteration of heterosexual constructs in non-heterosexual frames, calls into question the very essence of heterosexuality as an institution (Butler, 41). Bodily feelings of disorientation, feelings that have been explicitly felt by queer subjects, have forcefully dislodged the world and the body from the ground in which it has been historically rooted. By recognizing the fluid reality of personhood, queer individuals have symbolically opened the boundaries that are constrained by bio-power and culture; an initial step that has provided this paper with its very foundation. The most significant result of this disorientation is that it disturbs order; it forces us to question the status quo and this is crucial to any move towards a society that is better able to accommodate sexual and gender diversity. However, the point is not whether we experience disorientation, but how such experiences can have an impact on the orientations of bodies and spaces (Ahmed, 158).

It is clear, however, that current Western environments–environments presumed to be the most sexually progressive in the world–have not rid themselves of heterosexuality as an institution. The institution of a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation, an old dream of symmetry that is presupposed, reified, rationalized and reproduced (Butler, 30). This perpetuates a process of differentiation, in which the masculine term is differentiated from the feminine term. This differentiation is accomplished through the practices of heterosexual desire (Butler, 30). Arguably, this means that the very concept of genderedness becomes meaningless in the absence of heterosexuality as an institution, which is compulsory and enforced both through rewards for appropriate gendered and heterosexual behaviors and through punishments for deviations from the conventional or "normal" ways of being either a girl or a boy (Butler, 30). Subsequently, a reconfiguration of the heterosexual matrix, one that continues to subject itself to hegemonic norms, appears. While this modified sphere of intelligibility is a clear and important step, it does not prove to suffice. Bodies continue to be constrained under the binary and dichotomous spaces continue to dominate legibility, thus drawing a line between the intelligible subject and the unintelligible Other.

Conclusion: Locating Bio-Power in the Body

An inquiry into the body is an inquiry into the social, the cultural, and the political. The body is the main site of bio-power, a force that creates and maintains docile bodies and as a result effectively (re)produces normative spaces in order to (re)articulate the status quo. Bodies do not dwell in spaces that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwelling and take shape by dwelling: "spaces are like second skin that unfolds in the folds of our body" (Ahmed, 9). The orientation of bodies towards specific spatial areas over others is influenced by cultural impressions; our bodies are sites for cultural meaning. That being said, the social or cultural also has its skin, a skin that works as a border, a border that is shaped by the impressions left by others. It is affected by the comings and goings of different bodies, creating new lines and textures in the ways in which things are arranged (Ahmed, 9). Just as bodies are malleable, so are the cultural or social spaces they orientate towards. Both work together to form each other, which

means that together they have the capacity to form new spaces with new meanings. The work of inhabiting space, as such, involves a dynamic negotiation between what is familiar and what is unfamiliar, and through this negotiation it is possible to create new impressions on the world, depending on which way we turn (Ahmed, 7). The body provides us with a perspective, it provides us with a point of beginning, of being 'here', and a point from which the world unfolds (Ahmed, 8). Consequently, any interrogation into the naturalization and authentication of gender and sexual desire is simultaneously an interrogation into the ways in which bodies are scientifically, societally, economically and politically rendered pertinent, ordered and governed (Repo, 83). Locating bio-power in the body is, thus, the necessary first step in order to move past an expansion of the heterosexual matrix, reclaim the fight for sexual emancipation and dismantle the status quo. By recognizing the body's docility we can liberate the mind, and as a result, liberate society.

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Seeing Flesh: Naked Body Protests and Gender Performance in Post-Soviet Ukraine

By Sarah Labahn

In attempt to understand the recent rise of naked body protests and its function in a post-Soviet public sphere, this paper explores the effectiveness of the use of naked body protests in highly politicized zones to bring about social and political change. By engaging in a literature review and drawing heavily from Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity, I attempt to draw connections between how the body interacts in Ukraine's public and private sphere since the emergence of Femen in 2008. My research explores the ways in which deviant gender performances – such as the use of sextremism and hypersexualized acts in a hyper-masculine domain - have the ability to alter past meanings associated with the body. In such, the body becomes empowered through its own redefinition. Despite conflicting opinions about the effectiveness of this form of protest, this paper argues that Femen has successfully challenged conventional norms of femininity in the public sphere through its naked body protests by redefining the body as a political tool and as a site of liberation – thereby creating a space for politically active women in the traditionally masculine sphere of politics. The implications of this research provide insight into similar radical feminist movements that engage the body in overtly sexual and public ways. By understanding the body through Butler's theory of gender performance, these feminist movements can be critically understood as resistant, empowering, and liberating.

Key Terms: *Femen; Gender Performance; Naked Body Protest; Sextremism; Post-Soviet Ukraine*

In 2008, a group of young women founded a feminist topless protest group called Femen in response to the state of gender inequality that existed in Ukraine. These women have shown a new side of the breast. By analyzing Femen as a political protest group, this paper attempts to answer the following question: how effective is the use of naked body protest in highly politicized spheres to bring about social and political change in both post-conflict and conflict areas? In pursuing this research question, I will draw on Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity to analyze how naked body protests redefine the image of the female body in the public sphere as a political tool. Butler's theory of gender performativity argues that gender is socially constructed through various historical and cultural expectations that emphasize certain feminine and masculine traits as being acceptable. Using this theory, Femen's

sextremist tactics in bare breasted protests can be understood as a gender performance that defies traditional expectations of feminine bodily actions in the public sphere. I explore the protests strategies and images that Femen employs and how these protests have challenged conventional gender norms since 2008 and moving into the recent Euromaidan Revolution of 2013-14. During this revolution, an increase in women's participation in both supportive and combative roles demonstrates a shift away from traditional gender performances in conflict zones. Throughout this paper, I argue that Femen has successfully challenged conventional norms of femininity in the public sphere through its naked body protests by redefining the body as a political tool and as a site of liberation and choice.

The Emergence of Naked Body Protests

The exposure of women's naked bodies is nothing new. In fact, in Western capitalist societies, "scantly clothed or unclothed female bodies are commonly visible" on magazine covers, television shows, and in advertisements that become common in our day-to-day lives (Sutton 142). These images of naked or near-naked women are often sexualized and objectified to attract consumers and promote the consumption of products. The use of nudity in these instances places women on display (143). In contrast, the phenomenon of naked body protests that has recently grabbed media coverage can be understood very differently. Beginning largely in the twenty-first century, naked body protests have emerged as a new mode of feminist activism. Political activists use their bodies to dismantle the gender divide that has historically relegated the women's body to the private realm and bringing it into a highly political space that is traditionally dominated by men. In this way, the naked body can be examined "as a subject of political resistance and as an object of repression" (139). The naked or scantly clothed body is used to draw attention to female subordination through political opposition; rather than being put on display to be consumed, which perpetuates the patriarchal objectification of women's bodies, naked protests give women agency and autonomy. Through their acts, the personal – bare breasts – are made political (Butler 1988, 522). Further, the naked body is used to dismantle conventional ideas of femininity like vulnerability and passivity. By intentionally exposing women's breasts in politicized spaces, women can actually adopt values of the male naked body – virility, strength, and sexual agency (Sutton 143). One can look to examples of feminist activism like SlutWalk (O'Keefe 2014), Pussy Riot (Channell 2014, Bernstein 2013), and Femen (Channell 2014, O'Keefe 2014, Rubchak 2012, Zychowicz 2011) to further understand how sexualized protests can give women agency and autonomy in their actions. In all three of these movements, the female body is used to actively dismantle oppressive policies that have historically attempted to depoliticize the woman's body.

The SlutWalk movement developed after a police officer advised to the women present at a safety information session at York University that "if they wanted to stay safe they should avoid dressing like sluts" (O'Keefe 2). Enraged by this sexist comment, four Toronto women called upon their community to flaunt their "inner slut" and publicly denounce the officer's remark in a march that took place on April 3, 2011 with 3500 protesters present (2). Since this march, the SlutWalk movement has expanded internationally, drawing attention to rape culture, victim blaming, and patriarchal institutions that perpetuate this type of violence against women.

Pussy Riot uses similar political protest tactics in Russia to draw attention to the patriarchal nature of its current regime. Pussy Riot's feminism "is rooted in an understanding of global patriarchy"

which is embodied in Russia's current political regime under President Vladimir Putin and the lack of women's rights (Channell 612). Founded in 2011, one of their most famous protests came one year later when five women members walked into Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior, dressed in bright coloured sleeveless dresses, neon tights, and their signature balaclava ski masks to perform a punk song. The lyrics criticized "the close relations between the Russian Patriarch Kirill and President Vladimir Putin, and the Orthodox Church's conservative anti-woman and anti-LGBTQ rhetoric" (Bernstein 220). Through these highly politicized protests, the bodies of members of Pussy Riot become "vital sites for the enactment of sovereignty" (222). Pussy Riot uses sexualized language and bodies to dismantle the apolitical assumption of women's bodies.

Finally, looking at the Ukrainian founded activist group Femen, it is possible to draw similarities between both the performative protests of SlutWalk and Pussy Riot. Femen is perhaps the most radical of the three groups and has slowly become an international force to be reckoned with. Founded in 2008 by four women living in Kyiv, Zychowicz states that "Femen's formula is at once simple and spectacular: scantily clad topless women stage highly theatrical demonstrations to draw attention to various facets of gender inequality in Ukraine" (Zychowicz 215). Their main goal is to "undermine the fundamental institutes of patriarchy – dictatorship, sex-industry, and church" (*FEMEN*). Femen's ideology is sextremism which is defined on their website as "female sexuality rebelling against patriarchy and embodied in the extremal political direct action events" to deconstruct patriarchal understandings of female sexuality (*FEMEN*). Like both SlutWalk and Pussy Riot, Femen politicizes its members through sexualized and provocative protests to call upon the institutions that perpetuate patriarchal subordination of women.

Looking briefly at the protests tactics of SlutWalk, Pussy Riot, and Femen, it is clear that the body has become a highly politicized locale that is used to draw attention to patriarchal institutions and practices that continue to subordinate women. Although I will only be focusing on Femen as a case study throughout this paper, naked body protests are proving to be a controversial and highly mediatized mode of resistance internationally. In this light, it is important to consider why nakedness – although not a new phenomenon – becomes less accepted when it is employed as a means of social and political resistance. Unsurprisingly, naked body protest is controversial and is seen by some as feminist and by others as anti-feminist.

Naked body protests can be best theorized using Butler's gender performativity. According to Butler (1988, 1990), "gender is in no way a stable identity" but is socially constructed through different historical and cultural understandings of gender and what it means to perform femininity and masculinity according to these expectations (Butler 1988, 519). Through the repetitive "bodily gestures, movements, and enactments," gender performance either conforms to gender norms or defies these norms (519). The use of naked body protests challenges traditional understandings that place women in a subordinate position to men in the private sphere and ultimately restrict their participation in the public arena. On the one side of the debate, scholars like Zychowicz (2011) and O'Keefe (2014) understand these performances as conforming to patriarchal norms of femininity. O'Keefe states that these performances indicate "the uncritical embodiment of hegemonic, heteronormative corporealites that are unquestionably rooted within patriarchal and capitalist values" (O'Keefe 5). From this perspective, women's bodies – the majority of Femen activists are slim, fit, attractive, and sexualized – are

simultaneously depoliticized while reinforcing the female body as a site of objectification rather than of agency and autonomy. Femininity remains rooted in sexualized and patriarchal norms and the actors become the objects for male gaze rather than subjects of their political aims. These scholars see naked body protests as reinforcing gender norms. On the other side of the debate, the hypersexualized female body in a masculine sphere calls into question broader historical issues like women's inequality in attempt to dismantle the structures that support sexism. While it is true that the body is gazed upon by an audience, the body is seen as a political tool because of its nuanced relationship in the public sphere. It is their performance that politicizes their bodies. By engaging with this theory, I argue that Femen's protests can be characterized as political feminist movements because of their ability to disrupt traditional gender expectations.

Dismantling Private/Public Divide in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Politicizing the personal is achieved in two ways: first by dismantling gender binaries that relegate women to the private sphere and men to the public; and second by taking these broken binaries and feminizing the public sphere. Butler argues that "the body is understood to be an active process of embodying certain cultural and historical possibilities" (Butler 1988, 521). This quotation suggests that gender performance is based on particular gender expectations that vary across time and place. Historically, women's feminine characteristics like being caring, nurturing, weak, and passive, relegated her to the duties of the private sphere. On the other hand, with masculine characteristics like being aggressive, strong, protective, and active, men were relegated to roles in the public sphere. This dichotomy assumes that an individual's sex is indicative of their gender role. Looking at gender in Ukraine, it is important to understand how gender equality has changed overtime. During the Soviet period, all women officially had equal rights and were granted equal access to employment and education. However, in post-Soviet Ukraine (Ukraine's independence came in 1991), gender inequality became a widespread issue and women's access to equal opportunities in employment and education was limited (Kozloff).

Ukraine became an independent state on August 24, 1991 with the signing of the Act of Declaration of Independence Ukraine. For many people, independence was celebrated, but for women, the time to celebrate did not come for many years later. Along with the state's newfound independence, widespread corruption and numerous cases of abuse created an environment unfit for women's participation in the political sphere (Rubchak 57). And despite the enactment of multiple laws like the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and the Law on Equal Rights and Opportunities both signed in 2001, state and family violence littered across the country (60). It was not until the Law on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men that was introduced and later enforced in January 2006 that gender inequality was finally recognized. This was the first time in Ukrainian history that a legal definition of discrimination based on sex had been introduced – although its "implementation remains elusive" (Rubchak 60).

When four young girls created a feminist protest group in 2008, it was in response to the state of gender inequality that persisted throughout Ukraine. Femen is said to have come together "in an attempt to counter the lack of women activists in Ukrainian society, and what they saw as the passive role often assumed by women" (O'Keefe 9). At this time, Femen addressed issues such as sex-tourism,

prostitution, and women's rights but moving into 2010, their protests became more provocative through topless rallies covering a wider range of political issues (Arhipenko 2). In her article "Reconsidering the Conventional Private/Public Dichotomy: Examining the Femen Movement through the Arendtian Lens of the Social," Viktoriya Arkhipenko argues that Femen's scandalous and provocative protests disrupts the patriarchal divide that has historically relegated women to the private sphere and men to the public based on an individual's assumed feminine and masculine characteristics. By entering into the public sphere as formerly private actors, Femen has successfully femen-ized the public through their ongoing gender performances. By bringing the intimate body into the public sphere, Femen simultaneously dismantles the dichotomy between private and public and also creates a new feminized space within an old masculine space.

The Drag of Sextremism

In many ways, Femen's theatrical protests can be related to the performances of drag. Butler suggests that drag "plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed" (Butler 1990, 137). Although the majority of the members in Femen are women and they are performing as hyper-feminized and hypersexualized subjects, they are acting in a masculine sphere of protest, which, much like drag, alters particular understandings and expectations associated with gender. O'Keefe describes the women of Femen as:

> The public face of Femen consists of roughly forty topless activists who resemble high-fashion models in appearance – mostly white, with long blonde hair, able-bodied, conventionally attractive, with striking facial features and toned, slender, hairless bodies that make them statuesque figures (O'Keefe 8).

She continues to write:

> These theatrical topless protests, which they brand as 'sextremism,' often include women who are heavily made up, wearing bright red lipstick, and if their bottoms and genitals are clothed it is often in fishnets, hot pants or shorts that go below the pubic bone. High heels and other clothing associated with sexual appeal is also common adornment (O'Keefe 9).

These two descriptions match the image of an ideal female body in a patriarchal society. Much like drag, which is a man or woman dressing as the opposite sex to perform an alternative gender identity, Femen activists are performing an alternative form of gender identity as well. Through this act, "women's enacting nakedness on their own terms and for their own political ends may disrupt dominant notions that depict women's bodies as passive, powerless, or as sexual objects for sale" (Sutton 145). Females performing as females demonstrate a recognition of what the ideal image of femininity is perceived to look like, but they are parodying this image through the politicization of their bodies. In this manner, women's bodies become active, empowered, and subjects to be consumed critically.

More than their bodies alone, the symbols and tactics that Femen engages with are crucial to their brand. The flower crown is worn as a symbol of femininity and proud insubmission: a crown of heroism. The body markings are considered "the truth delivered by the body by mean of nudity and the

meanings inscribed on it." The Cyrillic letter ф is the shape similar to women's breasts that are the key symbol of the Femen movement (*FEMEN*). The slogan "My Body Is My Weapon!" along with their sextremist tactics, Femen has been dragged through the streets of Ukraine, quite literally. Their website states that their protests are an...

> ...Unsanctioned format of the sextremism events represents the historical right of woman to make her protest anywhere at any time and not to concern her action with the patriarchal law-enforcing structures. ... Sextremism is a non-violence but highly aggressive form of provocation; it is an all-powerful demoralizing weapon undermining the foundations of the old political ethics and rotten patriarchal culture (*FEMEN*).

Sextremism, then, can be understood as a provocative form of protest that attempts to capture the gaze of a public audience. Although these protests are considered non-violent, the aggressive nature of the protests themselves is extremely masculine. Butler states that "the possibilities of gender transformation are to be found precisely in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction" (Butler 1990, 141). This suggests that the failure to abide by traditional gender norms is what transforms the meaning of gender. As discussed above, gender is being performed on a day-to-day basis according to cultural and historical understandings of what gender *should* look like. But when gender performances are de-formed, re-shaped, and then repeated, these norms start to break down. Femen uses hypersexualized images which conform to the heteronormative ideal woman and places them in a hyper-masculinized political sphere. Indeed, the personal becomes political (Butler 1988, 522). Moving forward, I will discuss how Femen's ideology and images have created a new space for the participation of women in the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

"Women on the Maidan Don't Just Make Sandwiches"

Femen played a significant role during the Euromaidan Revolution including multiple protests that took place all across Ukraine as well as on an international platform. Many of which became highly theatrical in their protests against Russian President Vladimir Putin's occupation of Crimea and the bloodshed he was accused of causing. The events of Euromaidan took place from November 21, 2013 to February 22, 2014 "in efforts to oust the corrupt and discredited president Viktor Yanukovych and his administration" (Phillips 415) and continued to unravel into the Crimean Crisis later in 2014. Demonstrations and civil unrest began in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv (which translates into Independence Square) demanding the resignation of President Yanukovych as well as closer integration with the European Union. Topics of corruption, the abuse of state power, and human rights violations all fueled the protests. And rest assured, Femen played a role in these protests by painting "STOP PUTIN'S WAR" in black across their chests, by pouring red wine of their chests to signify the loss of Ukrainian lives at the hands of Putin, and also protesting against Yanukovych's administration. However, more than just Femen's role on Euromaidan, masses of clothed women filled the square.

Women's role in the public sphere continued to expand along with the highly political Femen protests. I maintain that Femen's gender performances have transformed the political arena to a space that is more accepting of women's participation. Many scholars and journalists have pointed to the

masses of women who lined the streets of Kyiv during the Euromaidan Revolution. More than being a protest against corruption, Philips states that it became a "space for citizens to negotiate new strategies for articulation of rights" – particularly in the case of women's rights (Phillips 415). Phillips describes the conflict in the following light:

> Maidanivtsi (Maidaners) hailed from all sectors of society, all age groups, and all political affiliations – elderly and children, urban and rural, among them leftists, feminists, nationalists, and LGBT activists. Maidan was (among other things) a protest against corruption, the mind-boggling scale of self-enrichment of the political elite, widespread societal anomic, and, later, police violence (415).

Throughout her article, Phillips maintains that Euromaidan created a new space for women's participation, expanding women's role in the public sphere alongside men in conflict. This is a stark change to women's roles in past conflict like the Orange Revolution[1] (November 2004-January 2005) when women performed a supportive role because of their understanding of gender in post-Soviet Ukraine. Not only was protest considered "ineffective" and "counterintuitive" to women's groups at this time (Hrycak 215), but their domestic role took priority because for the fathers, husbands, and sons who protested during the Orange Revolution; "they needed to be fed, they needed to be kept clean, and they needed a change of clothes" (216). Since this time, Femen's radical protest tactics and the politicization of the personal has transformed conflict zones like Euromaidan into a sphere for men and women. No longer do women feel the need to only occupy a supportive role.

During conflict, men are typically the ones occupying more active and public roles including protesting, fighting, and killing. In contrast, women traditionally occupy more supportive and domestic roles like caring for children or their husbands in the private realm. Much like Femen's progress in dismantling these two spheres both during and outside of conflict, the participation of women on the Maidan transformed gender roles. Like Femen, these women "violate the boundary between the traditionally male space of the street and female world of the household" (Arkhipenko 5). Although women continued to occupy supportive roles in the private sphere and many times "were not regarded as complete, responsible persons, whereas a man, even a minor, may decide to risk injury or death for the sake of the homeland" (Phillips 416), women "donned gas masks, helmets, padded vests and camouflage jackets while fighting alongside men. In addition, women even prepared Molotov cocktails and brought them to the front lines. What is more, a women's brigade trained women in self-defence tactics" (Kozloff). Women cheered out: "Women on the Maidan don't just make sandwiches, they also build barricades. Glory to the Heroes!" and "Today we are shouting that Yanukovych is not just evil, he's a very specific evil, which we call patriarchy. We are inviting all of you, men and women... to protest not just Yanukovych but the evil system that he represents. So we say Down with Yanukovych! Down with

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[1] The Orange Revolution began in the fall of 2004 when more than twenty percent of the adult Ukrainian population protested against election fraud that occurred during that year's presidential elections. The revolution emerged when authorities under the Leonid Kuchma presidency (1994-2005) attempted to steal the election despite the fact that the polls demonstrated strong support for the leader of the opposition and former prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko. In attempt to keep Yushchenko out of the presidential office however, Kuchma hand-picked Yanukovych as his successor. In response to this outright state corruption, citizens brought to the streets sporting orange – the colour of Yushchenko's campaign – to resist the dirty election. However, during this conflict, the role of women was extremely limited despite an increase in women's organizations devoted since Ukraine's independence in 1991. See Hrycak 2009.

Patriarchy!" (Phillips 416). From the images and descriptions of women on the square to the topics and language that they engaged with, both these examples demonstrate the underlying purpose for women's participation in the violent events, proving that women challenged gender stereotypes in overtly visible and performative ways.

The appearance between members of Femen and their radical bare-breasts protests is shockingly different from the images of the full-clothed and armoured mothers and daughters of Euromaidan[2]. This being said, their roles were not so different from one another. Both groups of women protested against the corruption and abuse of state power that was evident within Yanukovych's administration. Both groups of women stood for the advancement of women's rights in the future state of Ukraine. Both groups of women performed in a traditionally masculine and political sphere, holding their own weight and marking their place in the events of the revolution. Importantly, women's participation during Euromaidan has changed the role of women during conflict in Ukraine.

Going Topless for Equality

Throughout this paper I have discussed the ways in which Femen has dismantled gender stereotypes and the dichotomy between private and public spheres through their bare-breasted protests. Nakedness in the public sphere gives women the ability to reclaim the female body as an active figure and to challenge the authority of patriarchal boundaries that once restricted these bodies (Sutton 146). Although women's equality existed during the Soviet era, Ukraine's shift to independence eliminated past opportunities that were once granted to women. Despite some improvements during the mid-2000s with legislative changes, the implementation of these legislations remained inadequate to many degrees. As a result, Femen emerged out of a need to dismantle traditional gender roles that limited women's opportunities and to feminize an otherwise masculine public sphere. By engaging with Judith Butler's theory of gender   performativity, Femen's theatrical protests illustrate the importance of bare breasted protest and women's participation during conflicts like the Euromaidan Revolution. Women's participation during the events of Euromaidan, demonstrate how traditional gender roles in times of conflict have shifted over time in Ukraine.

O'Keefe notes that "the gendered body in protest can be used to manipulate, challenge and seize the power that seeks to confine and define it" (O'Keefe 4). By exposing new dimensions of the female body, Femen has manipulated and challenged patriarchal norms that once governed it. And, as mentioned earlier, other feminist protest groups like Pussy Riot and SlutWalk are also engaging the female body with alternatives understandings of gender performance and gender identity. Returning to Butler's theory, she states that "there are political acts which are deliberate and instrumental actions of political organizing, resistance collective intervention with the broad aim of instating a more just set of social and political relations" (Butler 1988 523). In this vain, naked body and other bodily based protests become politicized in their acts with the broad aim of instating a more just society. For Pussy Riot, this just society challenges political institutions that reinforce patriarchal structures; for SlutWalk, this just society similarity challenges state institutions that place blame on victims without warrant; and for Femen, a just society is the dismantling of dictatorship, patriarchy, and sexism. While there has been little evidence to suggest these performances have brought about radical legislative changes, they have

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[2] See Images in Appendix

reengaged women to participate more actively in the public sphere and become subjects of their political goals.

Exposing the influence of bare-breasted protests beyond Ukraine, Femen serves as an interesting case study to examine because their protests are so controversial and can be applied to many different societies and the ways in which nakedness is consumed. In popular culture, it is clear that bare breasts, busts, nipples, and cleavage are not offensive when displayed across large billboards and mounted on the side of busses. However, once these breasts become deliberate politicized locales that provoke critical thought rather than images for pleasurable consumption, their desirability is literally stripped away. Femen's breasts are deemed offensive because of the political message that is written across them; the space in which they are occupying; the gender norms that they are dismantling. And by making people flinch or double take, it is clear that their gender performances and gender resistance are working. While many argue that their bare-breasted protests are replicating patriarchal images of women and ultimately, what men want to see, I argue that their bodies are successfully used as political tools to deliberately bring what is traditionally considered private and intimate into the public. Femen has successfully done this by de-forming, re-shaping, and repeating their new gender performances. In such, the exposed body has slowly redefined itself as a resistant, empowered, and liberated site of protest.

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Appendix

Image retrieved from:
https://36.media.tumblr.com/82c6995a465575fe520db7d4ddee7a62/tumblr_nbuuhpsauP1qzsj
ico1_500.jpg

Image retrieved from:
https://euromaidanberlin.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/women_maidan.jpg

The Dangerous Reproduction of Gender Inequalities Within the UN in the Politics and Institutions of Peace

By Susie Hermaszewska

The UN agenda for Women, Peace and Security, and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and stresses the importance of their equal participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Despite this, the United Nations continues to ease the reproduction of gender inequality in post-conflict reconstruction due to a lack of commitment to the principles of 1325 and an unwillingness to restructure their own conflict mediation teams. Examples from Cyprus, Bosnia, and Herzegovina demonstrate that the underrepresentation of women at the negotiation table during conflict resolution results in women's underrepresentation in post-conflict institutions of government, and therefore fails to challenge ingrained gender inequalities in society more widely. The United Nations should adhere to the agenda for Women, Peace and Security and target their own institutionalized inequality to better lead by example.

Historically constructed binaries of masculinity and femininity, and the gender roles that they prescribe, are prevalent in the United Nations, the formulation of the negotiating table or peace talks, and in the institution and politics of post-conflict peace. The inability of the UN to champion its own Security Council Resolution 1325 and produce conflict mediation teams which demonstrate gender equality has instead contributed to a reproduction of gender inequality in the negotiation process and institutions of peace. The UN's failure to overcome inherent obstacles to women's empowerment in conflict settlement models such as consociationalism and centripetalism, the way in which they structure and deploy their mediation teams, and their failure to reciprocate women's inclusion in grassroots initiatives from an institutional level, all contribute to the reproduction of institutionalized gender inequality. I argue that greater inclusion of women in the institutions of the UN would facilitate increased representation and participation of women in peacetime politics and by extension, would challenge socially ingrained conceptions of the role of women. The restructuring of the UN's mediation teams and the inclusion of a feminist perspective would precipitate increased equality of men and women across the political and civil spectrum in post-conflict zones.

Despite the enactment of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, which emphasizes the importance of women's representation, participation and the adoption of gender perspectives in peace building, fifteen years later, the UN remains a prominent culprit of

institutionalized gender inequality.[1] In addition to a lack of awareness within the UN of Resolution 1325, 'Women made up less than 8 per cent of delegates to UN mediated peace processes'.[2] In the UN Stand-By Team, which I was asked to give recommendations for how it might more successfully mediate peace in conflict zones, only one-quarter of the members are women.[3] This means that the mediators who are advocating for women's inclusion and empowerment in post-conflict states are representing male-dominated institutions which have themselves been unable to overcome problems of inherent gender inequality and historic conceptions of masculinity and femininity in international relations.

There are inherent obstacles to the inclusion of the women in peace settlement models which the UN must first overcome by working within the framework of Resolution 1325 in order to empower women to participate in post-conflict institutions and politics. Byrne and McCulloch assert that the exclusive nature of consociationalism, centripetalism and complex power sharing limits the ability of post-conflict governance to facilitate women's representation and participation.[4] Such models of institutional design recommend macro-level structures- such as state construction, the institutions of government and the protection of rights in recognition of identity conflict- which provide incentive for micro-level accommodation of peace building in ethnicized conflict.[5] Power sharing primarily identifies conflict protagonists and national elites as the most important actors in settlements. Moreover, they argue that power sharing recommends constitutional designs which overlook the inclusion of women in state mechanisms in addition to gender quotas in elections because they are preoccupied with the accommodation of ethno-national groups.[6] This results in the reproduction of gendered social hierarchies in post-conflict institutions as the negotiators and political elites are predominantly male.[7] The institutionalized gender inequalities in the UN inadvertently endorse this proliferation of exclusivity.

By identifying common weaknesses between the UN mediating teams and the politics of peacebuilding, I argue that the shortcomings and limited perspectives of teams which fail to adhere to the principles of Resolution 1325 have been reproduced in the settlement of conflicts. In this context the UN mediators have made recommendations suffering from missing academic expertise, which results from the underrepresentation of women. The Stand-By Team for example, is rarely deployed as a unified force, decreasing the chances of a women being deployed even further. In order to champion the importance of the inclusion of women, there is a need to have women in positions that prove that women's inclusion is beneficial in more ways than just to fulfil tokenistic requirements looking to appease gender equality protagonists fighting for representation.[8] This is demonstrated by the reflection of the underrepresentation of women within the UN in the consistent underrepresentation of

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[1] Siobhan Byrne and Allison McCulloch. "Gender, Representation and Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Institutions." *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 5 (2012): 565

[2] ibid. 567

[3] "Standby Team of Mediation Experts 2015/16", *United Nations. Department of Political Affairs*, accessed 20 October 2015, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SBT-2015-Oct.pdf.

[4] Byrne and McCulloch. "Gender, Representation and Power-Sharing" 565

[5] Wolff, Stefan. "Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center." In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, edited by Robert A. Denmark: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 1-2

[6] Byrne and McCulloch. "Gender, Representation and Power-Sharing" 566, 569

[7] ibid. 566

[8] ibid. 568

women in post-conflict politics. In Cyprus, until the UN Secretary General's intervention in his Good Offices Mission reports, Resolution 1325 never featured in any documents related to the Cyprus Problem.[9] Concurrently the negotiators and the UN failed to implement recommendations for the inclusion of women by the Gender Advisory Team (GAT), and women remain excluded from UN structures and politics. The GAT recommended framing gender equality within the constitution, introducing a quota system for government elections and a transformation of the gendered language used in state documents.[10] As demonstrated by the case in Cyprus, the neglected inclusion of women in the UN mediation team and in the team's recommendations was reciprocated in the Cypriot peacebuilding institutions and politics, resulting in sustained conceptions of masculinity, femininity and ingrained gender roles. There is a need to create spaces in conflict resolution in which women can be seen as effective leaders in a multitude of different areas. This will instigate a reconceptualization of ingrained gender roles within international relations. The institutions of the UN should be utilizing Resolution 1325 to be at the forefront of expanding women's participation and recognition in the realm of international security and relations.

In addition to the detrimental negligence of the UN's top-down institutional approach to reconstructing gender binaries, peacebuilding processes similarly suffer from the historic construction of gendered notions of citizenship. the UN's neglect to reconceptualize the role of women in politics and the international arena, reinforces ingrained gendered conceptions of citizenship within the conflicted society. Hadjipavlou's assessment of the constructed "ideal" citizen as a heterosexual, able-bodied male and the women as his accessory, and not a citizen in her right, is particularly salient in the hyper-masculinized and militarized zones of ethnic conflict.[11] Women's grassroots movements which challenge this conception of citizenship would greatly benefit from the reconfiguration of women's role in political institutions, as could be led by the UN which would abide to its commitment to Resolution 1325 by first reconceptualising its own membership ideals and thus restructuring its mediating teams such as the Stand-By Team.

The patriarchal and binary divisions of gender are maintained in post-conflict institutions and politics when international organizations such as the UN fail to encourage strongly, through the implementation of Resolution 1325, the inclusion of women in their recommendations for peace. In Cyprus, women remain confined to the private sphere and their civilian role as 'reproducers of the family and nation'.[12] Hadjipavlou contends, " Even when women took up other roles as wage earners, this perception of gender roles remained intact, shifting inequalities into the plane of feminized migration (Agathangelou, 2004). This legacy must be addressed on both the institutional and societal level."[13] Without UN leadership in the inclusion of women there has been a failure to challenge ingrained gender roles and hierarchies from above, thus the challenges to the patriarchy from

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[9] Cyprus 2015 'Gender Participation in the Peace Talks' *Cyprus 2015 Policy Brief*, (2012), accessed 20 October 2015, http://www.interpeace.org/documents/publications/cyprus/338-gender-participation-in-the-peace-talksenglish/file,

[10] Demetriou and Hadjipavlou. "A Feminist Position on Sharing Governmental Power and Forging Citizenship in Cyprus: Proposals for the Ongoing Peace Negotiations." *Feminist Review*, (2014): 99, 101

[11] ibid. 102-3

[12] ibid. 98-9,103

[13] Demetriou and Hadjipavlou. "A Feminist Position on Sharing Governmental Power and Forging Citizenship in Cyprus" 103

grassroots women's movements such as the GAT have been unsuccessful. The situation in Cyprus is emblematic of a very real need to marry institutional and societal advances for the inclusion of women.

The acuteness of this problem is evident in the unfolding of the peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Where the impressive formal commitment to gender equality laid out in their post-conflict constitution failed to come through in the realities of unfulfilled election gender quotas, and the consequential absence of women's participation in post-conflict politics.[14] The UN sits in the perfect position to facilitate this marriage of top-down, bottom-up initiatives. Yet as it stands the gendered construction of groups such as the Stand-By Team inhibit the ability of the UN to achieve this.

The UN would make valuable advances in the transformation of the politics of peace so that they may better address women's inclusion, needs and concerns, if it restructured its mediation teams- such as the Stand-By Team- in a way that aligned with the mission of Resolution 1325. By including an equal number of women to men in its mediation teams, and by selecting women for positions which require expertise outside of the realms of gender inclusion- such as security experts- the UN would reassert the need to restructure political institutions to include women, highlighting the importance of reconceptualising ingrained patriarchal norms. Moreover, it would reduce the risk of including women in institutional designs for peace on an essentializing level. As Hadjipavlou asserts, "The point is not to prioritize women's needs over men's in an essentialist way, but to allow greater representation of a number of groups that have hitherto been marginalized."[15] The restructuring of the UN's mediation teams would change the politics of peace so that they challenge equality of men and women across the political and civil spectrum in post-conflict zones.

Moreover, the negotiations would better address women's concerns and needs through the incorporation, through the inclusion of women, of a feminist lens in the formulation of settlement institutions and in diverse post-conflict policies. The feminist lens recognizes and respects the importance of intersectionality in International Relations, security and conflict resolution. It is able to form bridges between human security and ordinary experience, the economy, the state, peacebuilding theories, differences between issues of civic and political importance, religious and cultural traditions and the inclusion of minorities.[16] This provides a de-centralization of the preoccupation with militarized nationalism, leading to the advice of better considered measurements which challenge stereotypes of masculinity and femininity. Feminism's endorsement of women's grassroots conflict resolution movements reinforces this reconstruction of conflict and security. Movements such as GAT, the Women's Coalition in Northern Ireland and Jerusalem Link in Israel and Palestine emphasize the importance of dialogue between organizations like the UN and grassroots movements in post-conflict society.[17] Additionally they employ transversalism to avoid essentializing identity politics in ethnicized

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[14] Byrne and McCulloch. "Gender, Representation and Power-Sharing" 570-1

[15] Demetriou and Hadjipavlou. "A Feminist Position on Sharing Governmental Power and Forging Citizenship in Cyprus" 99

[16] Christine Sylvester. "Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/Theory." *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 619-620

[17] Siobhan Byrne. "Troubled Engagement in Ethnicized Conflict." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 16, no. 1 (2014): 109-10

conflict and overcome inherent problems in power sharing models.[18] Feminism is able to transcend "camped" masculinized approaches to International Relations, drawing together elements from different International Relations theories.[19] It can use an understanding of pre war gender dynamics in order to look at how they might be reconstructed post-war.[20]

In order to effectively contribute to peacebuilding processes, the UN mediating teams must marry: recommendations for different forms of peacetime institutions which may follow a consociational or centripetal or power dividing model; recommendations for negotiating interest areas which are likely to be cause for escalated conflict- such as the inclusion, representation and protection of women, how security policy might unfold and the division or protection of natural resources; and need crucial interpersonal skill-set for the diffusion of tension and encouragement of moderated, reasonable and effective negotiation. The UN's neglect of Resolution 1325 has facilitated the continued exclusion of women from peace building. As a result of this there has been a reproduction of institutionalized gender inequality and a failure to challenge historic conceptions of gender roles in post-conflict societies. Greater inclusion of women in the UN would ultimately precipitate the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and post-conflict states.

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[18] ibid. 106

[19] Sylvester condones what she calls a "camped" mentality towards International Relations which stipulates that IR scholars belong to specific groups of established theories, such as realism, post-colonialism, neoliberalism. ibid. 610

[20] Cynthia H. Enloe. *Nimo's War, Emma's War: Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq War*, Berkeley: University of California Press, (2010). 9

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The District of Sechelt, British Columbia and the Municipal System of Aboriginal Self-Government

By Nicholas Asquin

The purpose of this paper was, in exploring the details of the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act and the powers it entails, to ascertain whether or not the Municipal Model represents a viable and successful option toward Aboriginal self-government. In this paper I examined the extent to which certain key provisions of the Sechelt Act align with the traditional goals of Aboriginal self-government to gauge its usefulness to Aboriginal groups. I performed this by first exploring the concept of Right and Title, its implications and the resulting powers which self-governing bands must possess to satisfy the provisions of Right and Title. I then used these criteria to establish a basic 'report card' against which the Municipal Model's efficacy can be gauged through comparison with the provisions of the Sechelt Act. I found that not only does the Sechelt Act satisfy all vital criteria for an effective self-government agreement, but that the Municipal Model name is itself a misnomer for a far wider package of rights and responsibilities than those given to municipalities. I conclude that the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act is a highly effective iteration of the Municipal Model, contrary to criticism, and that the model's success merits consideration as a viable Aboriginal self-government solution for future cases.

Introduction

Canada is home to a plethora of Aboriginal groups who have been recognized as having certain inherent rights. Since the late 20th century, the federal government has pursued a policy of negotiating toward Aboriginal self-government, an actualization of these rights, which has manifested in various forms. The execution and extent of these rights to self-government vary widely however, with a few distinct models considered primary. The most notable models are the Public Model, the Treaty Model and the Municipal Model. The Municipal Model of Aboriginal self-government has historically received broad criticism for its perceived inadequacy and apparent subservient nature to both provincial and federal levels of government (Abele "Four Pathways"). Believing that this criticism is based more in misconception than reality, in this paper I will argue that the Sechelt agreement represents a desirable outcome for Aboriginal bands on the basis of its adherence to their aims and the system's sustainability, and that a 'modified municipal' model deserves more consideration as a practical means of

implementing Aboriginal self-government. I will further contest that the label 'municipal' is a misnomer for the system, ill-characterizing the package of self-government powers it entails. I will argue these points by drawing heavily on self-government agreement reached by the Sechelt Band, examining the powers the Band holds and comparing them to the powers held by British Columbian municipalities as outlined in the Local Government Act. Before any of these assessments can take place, however, several key terms must first be defined for the sake of clarity and coherence.

Defining Terms

It would not make sense to discuss the differences between the powers held by municipalities and those derived from an Aboriginal self-government agreement, such as the Sechelt, without first defining what these terms mean within the context of this paper. Since the greater overall topic of the paper is Aboriginal self-government, this term will be defined before going on to explain how municipalities and the term 'municipal' factors in. In order to lay the foundation for Aboriginal self-government however, it is necessary to first discuss Aboriginal 'right and title' and what exactly the ramifications of it are.

Aboriginal Right and Title

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first document to recognize the Aboriginals of Canada as possessing certain inherent rights which set them apart from other peoples of Canada ("Royal Proclamation, 1763"). In specific, it recognizes Aboriginal 'right' and 'title'. Both of these inherent traits recognized in the proclamation serve as keystones in supporting modern claims toward Aboriginal self-government, as no piece of legislation exists which overrules it ("Royal Proclamation, 1763"). Title will be addressed first, followed by right.

Title has been interpreted historically to refer to the inherent Aboriginal ownership of land in Canada, Erin Hanson writes ("Aboriginal Title"). These lands are based on ancestral inhabitation and title conveys a collective right over the use and jurisdiction of lands of such ancestry (Hanson). It especially important to note that this right is not one that is granted to the Aboriginal peoples by the British Crown, but one being recognized as inherent (*sui generis*). Although the Royal Proclamation also transferred ownership of North America unto King George III, it still recognizes the existence of Aboriginal title, a right which can only be "extinguished" by a treaty negotiation with the Crown (Hanson). This means that Aboriginal lands can only be ceded or sold to the Crown alone through treaty negotiation. In practice however, the settlers of Canada and the British Crown frequently appropriated what would be considered ancestral Aboriginal lands without treaty negotiation, especially in British Columbia ("Royal Proclamation, 1763"). Whereas Alberta has at least the Numbered Treaties, transferring title in exchange for certain rights and benefits[1], British Columbia has no such agreements. The practical value of this for BC Aboriginal bands is a legal claim against the provincial government.

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[1] These typically include a degree of self-government, annual payments, and health and education subsidies; however this kind agreement pertains wholly to the treaty model of Aboriginal Self-Government and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.

What is meant by 'Aboriginal right' however was far less specific in the Royal Proclamation, with plenty of variation in modern interpretations between courts, members of government as well as across different bands (Hanson, "Aboriginal Right"). The aspects generally agreed upon however typically include rights to the land, "subsistence resources and activities"[2], self-determination and some extent of self-government (Hanson). As it was with Aboriginal title, it must be noted that these rights are not ones that are granted by the Crown, rather the Crown has recognized them as permanent, intrinsic attributes of Aboriginal bands. These rights are therefore not sought after; rather the accommodation of these rights within the Canadian system is what is sought.

Aboriginal Self-Government

After laying out Aboriginal right and title, the claim to self-government is simply derivative from recognizing these inherent claims. The argument follows that because the Crown gained ancestral Aboriginal lands without entering into treaty negotiations, such Aboriginal bands are entitled to restitution and accommodation of their inherent right to self-government on these lands. Their right having already been recognized in 1763 and following the appropriation of their lands without the compensation promised, execution of these rights is therefore the next step required for the federal and provincial governments from a legal standpoint[3]. In negotiating the terms of an Aboriginal self-government agreement, the aforementioned rights of land and jurisdiction, resources and their use are the main items that must be discussed. Additional subjects of negotiation were listed by the federal government in 1995; they include policing, health, education and social services (Wherrett, 1999). It is my stance that these areas of interest, along with the rights previously stated, can comprise a 'report card' for which to measure self-government agreements against, such as the Sechelt Band of British Columbia. To what extent a certain model achieves sustainable control over these subjects will determine that model's measure of success for its band, and by extension, the efficacy of the model in question.

Comparing and Contrasting Powers of BC Municipalities and the District of Sechelt

Having defined the terms in which the paper will be argued, this section will demonstrate how exactly the powers held by a BC municipality under the Local Government Act differ from those of the Sechelt Band under the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act. It will be shown that the District of Sechelt is in possession of all the most common municipal powers with a few extra that truly set it apart. From this, two important points will be gleaned; first is that the District of Sechelt, having largely achieved the previously established criteria, constitutes an effective self-government agreement. Second, due to the additional powers held by the District of Sechelt over municipalities, as defined in their respective Acts, the label 'municipal' for this kind of model ill-applies and therefore requires re-examination.

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[2] Examples of subsistence resources are game and fish, subsistence activities include hunting, fishing, agriculture, etc.

[3] Opponents in the BC government contest that because British Columbia was not yet colonized when the Proclamation was made that it therefore does not apply, along with Aboriginal right and title. This can be countered on the basis that the Proclamation refers to applying to all lands under British Crown rule and therefore would in fact apply once Crown rule was applied to the lands of BC ("Royal Proclamation, 1763").

Zoning

The common features of a municipal model seek to establish a system of Aboriginal self-Government which mimics the structure and authority of a municipality. It follows that certain expected 'municipality-like' powers are indeed found within the Local Government Act. Under the Act, local governments of municipalities have zoning powers; these include the abilities to "divide the whole or part of the municipality or regional district into zones... and establish the boundaries of the zones" as well as regulate use of the zone, including the dimensions, density and purpose of all buildings and structures within each zone (Local Government Act, 903). Although zoning powers sound mundane, without them a municipality effectively has no authority over how their land may be purposed; therefore, for a self-government agreement to have any weight to it the governing band must have zoning powers. This is indeed possessed by the Council of the District of Sechelt, along with the ability to legislate on "the use, construction, maintenance, repair and demolition of buildings and structures on Sechelt lands" (Sechelt Act, 14.1b). These powers should not be of surprise; rather exclusive rights to the use of municipal land are part and parcel of any municipality and should be expected of a municipal-style model, or any self-government agreement for that matter. The exclusive right to make use of one's land expressed in zoning is one of the paramount rights outlined in Aboriginal rights the earlier criteria.

Law Enforcement

The ability to enforce bylaw and other legislation through policing is another major subject of negotiation in Aboriginal self-government. Under the Local Government Act, municipalities have extensive powers of bylaw enforcement including conviction, ticketing, and the imposition of fines, costs, penalties and imprisonment (266-267). Municipal police forces are also widely prevalent[4]. The Sechelt Council may also pass legislation concerning public order under the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, as well as impose fines and imprisonment to an extent (14.1l-p, 14.2); in addition, the District possesses bylaw enforcement as well as enforcement officers ("Sechelt Bylaw Enforcement"). Having authority over matters of policing, this subject criterion is considered met for the Sechelt self-government agreement.

Fish and Game

In order for a self-government agreement to be considered satisfactory, it must recognize and fulfill the Aboriginal right to subsistence resources and activities. In practice, this can be covered under fish and game regulations. It is at this point where ordinary municipal powers become insufficient in executing effective Aboriginal self-government. In British Columbia, policy concerning fishing and hunting are provincial matters; municipalities do not ordinarily have authority over them and are subject to provincial regulation ("Fish, Wildlife and Habitat Management branch"). In the District of Sechelt however, the Council has authority over legislation concerning both "the preservation and management of natural resources on Sechelt lands" as well as "the preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing animals, fish and game on Sechelt lands" ("Sechelt Act" 14.1j,k) These

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[4] Edmonton Police Service, for example.

powers held by the District go beyond what the Local Government Act entails; such powers are not held by ordinary municipalities, fulfilling the criterion of right over subsistence resources and activities.

Health, Education and Social Services

Similar to policing, authority over the fields of health, education and social services is a more recent objective of Aboriginal self-government agreements, as outlined earlier. These programs, similar to fish and game regulation, are ordinarily outside of municipal legislative authority. The Local Government Act has little mention of health in particular, stating that the local government's capacity for bylaw only extends to regulation toward the ends of "maintaining, promoting or preserving" public health (523.1a). These three fields are ordinarily matters of provincial jurisdiction[5]; nevertheless the District of Sechelt has the ability to pass legislation on all of these areas in their self-government Act (14.1g-i).

Revenue Generating Capacity

Besides having authority over all of the mentioned fields, the ability of a given municipality or band to ensure administration of them are financially sustainable are tantamount to success. Under the Local Government Act, municipalities have options of revenue-generation, including property taxation as well as revenue-sharing between municipalities (14.1, 808-812). The District of Sechelt also has powers concerning taxation, specifically, "taxation, for local purposes, of interests in Sechelt lands, and of occupants and tenants of Sechelt lands in respect of their interests in those lands, including assessment, collection and enforcement procedures and appeals relating thereto" ("Sechelt Act" 14.1e). In addition to this capacity, the Band may also rent their land, borrow money, sue and invest, providing additional revenue-generating options (6). Sections 32 and 33 of the Act also enable the Band to enter agreement with the government of Canada for the purpose of transfer payments to the Band. This is important for the Band's finances because it means they are never truly 'cut off' from the option of federal funding. A Sechelt-style municipal model therefore has reasonable ability to sustain itself, its programs and responsibilities financially, fulfilling the final criterion of success.

Addressing Other Criticisms

Having shown how the Sechelt Band municipal-style model succeeds in many regards of Aboriginal self-government agreements, some final criticisms of the model must be addressed before the issue can be considered concluded. One major criticism of the municipal model comes from Frances Abele and Michael J. Prince, where they write in "Four Pathways to Aboriginal Self-Government" that "band councils have even fewer powers and less independence than the elected representatives of Canadian towns and cities". I believe that I have shown sufficient evidence in the case of the Sechelt Band that this notion is not entirely accurate, the District is equipped with many areas of authority that ordinary municipalities simply do not possess. A counterargument might suggest that the District of Sechelt shouldn't be considered a municipal-model on this basis, though one who argues this would be forgetting that a more frequent criticism of the Sechelt Act is that it resembles a "municipal-type arrangement, governed by provincial legislation" (Wherrett, 1999). Such a criticism

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[5] The organizations of Alberta Health Services, Alberta Education and Alberta Support for example.

actually bolsters the municipal model by associating it to the Sechelt's relatively successful self-government agreement. It cannot be denied that the District is legally considered a municipality under provincial legislation (Ibid.), although the criticism that this aspect makes it subservient to the provincial and federal government levels overlooks the reality that the Sechelt Act specifies that where Canadian laws and BC laws are inconsistent with Band laws that the Sechelt Act takes precedence (37-38). Having dealt with several of the most prominent criticisms of the municipal model, there is no further reason this style of municipal self-government agreement does not deserve more consideration as a serious execution of Aboriginal self-government rights.

Conclusions

It has been clearly demonstrated that the powers of the Sechelt Band cover key areas of concern for Aboriginal self-government, namely those of land ownership, resource use, policing, health, education, social services as well as the ability to pass legislation and finance all of these key areas. Given their success in these regards, I would consider the agreement reached in the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act a highly effective execution of a municipal-style model. The most prominent criticisms of the municipal model have been addressed and overwhelming evidence has been provided for its success with respect to the Sechelt Band. For these reasons I have argued that the municipal model, especially the kind the Sechelt has reached, deserves to be recognized as a viable and successful option toward Aboriginal self-government. It has also been shown that the additional powers the Band holds set them apart from a generic municipality under the Local Governments Act. It is precisely because the Sechelt agreement surpasses municipal areas of jurisdiction in a wide list of powers and that their Act takes precedence in areas of legal inconsistency that I in return contest that 'municipal' is a misnomer for the package of powers the model offers. Perhaps agreements such as this should merely be called Sechelt models in lieu of pioneering such an expansive iteration of a municipal-type Aboriginal self-government agreement.

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Recovering from The Great Recession: A Comparative Analysis of the Nature and Effectiveness of Global Reactionary Policy to the 2008 Financial Crisis

By Evan Truscott

The 2008 'subprime' financial crisis caused intense economic recession and instability on an international scale, creating the need for immediate reactionary and interventionist policy from most governments. With a wealth of large-scale dedicated studies to this specific topic emerging in recent years, we have a unique opportunity to synthesize these findings in a way that could indicate potential effective policy actions. This paper intends to identify, categorize and compare an array of policies enacted by utilizing a specific cross section of nations similar in political culture (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), in an attempt to broadly asses and isolate global trends of reactionary policy making and the effectiveness of these policies, in nations of comparable institutions, over a relatively small time frame.

Being the most recent major economic downturn, and the alleged worst since the great depression (The Guardian 2008), it should be somewhat clear why the 2008 financial crisis would a desirable topic of contemporary study across disciplines. Politically speaking, this crisis was a catalyst for a wave of policy output both social and economic in nature, as world leaders attempted to mitigate the negative effects of this downturn. The purpose of this paper is to specifically identify the nature of these policies and their degree of effectiveness in relation to the category of policy that they reside in. As this was a global recession, the potential list of nations for study is long, so for precisely this reason this paper chooses to specifically use the commonwealth nations of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada as the sample group. These countries are generally accepted to be very similar in political culture, and this was a conscious choice in attempts to diminish the range of dependant variables and focus more acutely on the effectiveness of policy by category. The main dichotomy between the types of policy implemented by these three nations is that of public spending and social services versus revenue-side measures and tax cuts. It is coincidental and interesting to note that quite often these opposing schools of thought on recessionary policy are also divided along ideological lines, with social services and public spending seen as the leftist or liberal position while revenue-sides measures and tax cuts are generally associated with right wing or conservative ideology. Although in this paper ideological lines are not the topic of observation, the effectiveness of social policy versus fiscal policy emphatically is. It is the thesis of this paper that social reactionary policy is overall more effective in mitigating the

negative effects of an economic downturn, due to their nature of specifically targeting unemployment on a public scale, as opposed to fiscal reactionary policy that hopes that increased liquidity and ease of lending will revive the economy and restore GDP and unemployment to an acceptable level, and in this way employs indirect means.

In addition to being commonwealth nations with similar political cultures, all three nations in this instance implemented federal stimulus packages that included multiple categories including public policy and fiscal measures, to greatly varying degrees. Australia allocated the greatest amount (as a percentage of GDP) to their own stimulus package at 7% (Starke 2013), and this capital was primarily targeted at a new national building and job creation plan. Conversely, the stimulus package employed by New Zealand and Canada were not only less funded, at 5% (Starke 2013) and 3.2% (World Bank 2013) of GDP respectively, but were starkly rooted in the fiscal and revenue-side in nature, with the largest share of the stimulus package in both instances earmarked for tax cuts across multiple levels of industry in the hopes of reversing the falling annual GDP growth rate. In addition to the national building and job plan initiated by Australia, part of the stimulus package was aimed at social services at the state level, effectively re-investing in the automatic economic stabilizers that were already in place in the form of employment insurance and welfare programs. Canada also invested to a much lesser extent in public spending, providing approximately $26.1 billion to social policies including additional employment insurance, investments in infrastructures of universities and colleges, but the lion's share of this social policy budget was allocated to public infrastructure and social housing construction (at approximately $14.5 billion (Bernard 2014)). But this expenditure is dwarfed when compared to the $200 billion (Bernard 2014) earmarked by the Canadian government to provide liquidity to the Canadian financial system, which was specifically disbursed through the Extraordinary Financing Framework in attempts to maintain the velocity of lending to businesses and consumers. In contrast to both Australia and Canada, New Zealand invested in no large-scale social services in direct reaction to the 2008 crises (Starke 2013). To summarize the specifics of the stimulus packages created by the three nations in question, we can categorize the Australian policy set as primarily social in nature, the Canadian policy set as primarily fiscal with minor social policy integration, and the New Zealand policy set as almost exclusively fiscal.

To measure the effectiveness of these nations and their policies, the metric chosen in this paper is annual GDP growth rate and Unemployment rate, measured annually at regular intervals between 2008 and 2012. These rates were chosen because they are barometers that are inherently economic in implication, and therefore should provide a more reasonable representation of how well a nation recovered from this economic crisis. New Zealand, although performing better than the OECD average between 2008 and 2012, had a relatively slow and stable correction (perhaps reminiscent of the automatic correction of the market) from -0.7% annual GDP growth rate in 2008 to 1.5% in 2012 (Starke 2013). Their unemployment rate however, spiked from ~4.1% in 2008 to ~6.4% in 2010, and moderately increased again to ~7% in 2012 (Starke 2013). This results are unsurprising, considering the stimulus package employed by New Zealand consisted almost entirely of revenue-side measures, which seems to have resulted in a stabilization of GDP growth rate, but ineffective in curtailing rising unemployment. In contrast, Australia's stimulus package appears to have been effective in stemming the rising rate of unemployment, going from ~4.1% unemployment in 2008 to ~5.2% in 2010, before falling slightly to ~5% in 2012 (Starke 2013). They were also successful in stimulating the rate of GDP

growth, progressing from an annual growth rate of 2.2% in 2008 to 3.8% in 2012 (Starke 2013). Initially this seems to confirm the thesis that social policies are more effective in mitigating the effects of economic crisis, as Australia was able to effectively recover from their rising unemployment rate, and still raise annual GDP growth by a significant amount. Lastly, Canada had a more drastically fluctuating GDP, declining steeply from 1.2% in 2008 to -2.7% in 2009, before rising a dramatically to 3.4% in 2010, and settling at 1.7% in 2012 (World Bank 2013). Concurrently with this comparatively tumultuous period in GDP growth, unemployment showed an overall rise from 6.1% in 2008 to a peak of 8.1% in 2010, before dropping to 7.3% in 2012 (Statistics Canada 2013), still above the nominal rate before the financial crisis. In the case of Canada, we cannot draw as firm conclusions, due to the more mixed approach to their stimulus plan than New Zealand and Australia, but we can draw the correlation that the relatively mitigated rise in unemployment could have been due to the percentage of GDP the Canadian government did earmark for social policy, and the wildly fluctuating annual GDP growth could then be seen as arising from an overdependence on fiscal policy on the part of the Canadian government.

In conclusion, this paper has found examples of a possible political cleavage between social and fiscal reactionary policy, and from observing how focused on social policy the Australian stimulus package was, and how effectively Australia recovered both in terms of unemployment rate and annual GDP growth, we may say that in this case social reactionary policy was more effective in mitigating the negative effects of an economic crisis than fiscal policy, by a moderate degree. It is important to note however, that this correlation could arise from extraneous factors, such as the effectiveness of individual policies, rather than the categories of social and fiscal, or the effectiveness of the governments themselves to see these policies through, but in either case, in the time frame between 2008 and 2012 in these three countries, the governments who applied social reactionary policy more effectively controlled for the detrimental effects of the 'subprime' crisis.

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Sovereignty and Jus Cogens Laws

By Shireen Bangash

This paper attempts to address the conflict that arises from the simultaneous implementation of state sovereignty laws and universal Jus Cogens laws within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. As a multilateral platform with membership from 193 of 196 world nations, the rules of non-intervention and sovereign equality are paramount to within the framework of the UN Security Council. However, the Security Council also espouses the sovereignty limiting rules that give it the prerogative to prohibit human rights violations such as genocide and crimes against humanity. Using the 1994 UN Resolutions 929, 933 and 934, this paper attempts to establish how the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council played a role in the decision making process, due to the ambiguity arising from the simultaneous application of two fundamentally conflicting international laws.

The United Nations' Charter endorses human rights and non-intervention at the same time, despite the fact that the two concepts seem to inherently be at odds with one another[1]. If a state cannot intervene in the affairs of another, then how can intervention based on human rights abuses be justified, considering that the prerogative to use force against citizens is within the jurisdiction of the state? International relations scholar Ian Hurd claims that by looking at different sources of international law, humanitarian intervention can be characterized as being both legal and illegal at the same time[2]. As a multilateral body that boasts membership from every nation in the world, the United Nations acts as a platform for inter-state relations, where the ideals of non-intervention and sovereign equality coexist with the sovereignty-limiting rules that give the Security Council the prerogative to prohibit human right violations such as genocide and crimes against humanity[3]. As the United Nation's most influential body, the Security Council has the authority to make decisions that are binding for member states under the United Nations' Charter[4]. However, the Security Council's decisions are greatly influenced by its five permanent, veto holding members[5]. In this essay, I will look at some examples of the Security

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[1] Stephen D. Krasner, "Think Again: Sovereignty," *Foreign Policy,* November 20, 2009. http://goo.gl/UoIkkh

[2] As quoted in Carmen Pavel, *Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and Limits of State Authority* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 25.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "What is the Security Council?" *United Nations Security Council*, accessed November 15, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/

[5] Ibid.

Council's decisions to intervene in internal state affairs in the name of humanitarian concerns, to show how the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council played a role in the decision making process. The United Nation's decision to allow the subversion of state sovereignty, through the actions of the Security Council, in favour of upholding *jus cogens* international laws opens the door for potential abuse by the powerful nations within the Council against less politically dominant nation states. The actions of the Security Council, taken under the guise of protection of human rights, is nothing more than an example of "organized hypocrisy"[6]. The Security Council chooses which violations to address at the international level based in part on the influence that any potential involvement might have on the national interests of its permanent members[7]. In order to justify infringement in the domestic affairs of a state for the sake of upholding humanitarian causes, unified action taken by an apolitical body is necessary – otherwise any claims at humanitarian intervention made by the United Nations are tainted by the personal national interests of the intervening states.

The concept of an international society of states, all of whom are procedurally equal, is founded in the idea of state sovereignty. Sovereignty acts as a barrier against dominance by powerful states in an international system that has an imbalance of power[8]. Sovereignty, defined in jurisdictional terms, refers to the extent to which a state can exert its control regarding its domestic activities and internal decision making[9]. Politically, sovereignty refers to the extent to which political assets constrain a state's actions[10]. Both of these definitions of sovereignty work in unity to explain the actions of nation states at the international level – states with substantial political assets can act out their own jurisdictional sovereignty within their territory more easily than less powerful states. While even the most powerful states might find their political sovereignty circumscribed in some circumstances, more often than not, it is the less powerful states that find themselves to be confined, either directly or indirectly, to the influence of the politically powerful states[11]. Historically, few states have had almost complete autonomy and control over their domestic affairs, but the polities of weaker states are more likely to have been "persistently penetrated" not only through direct interference by other nation-states, but also by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations[12].

The increased concern over human rights violations and the frequent involvement of the United Nations in helping to protect citizens from governmental abuse has created many questions and concerns about the UN Security Council's methods. *Jus Cogens* laws are norms within international law that are accepted by the international community[13]. Rights, including human rights, are societal

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[6] Carmen Pavel, *Divided Sovereignty*, 26.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002): 82, DOI: 10.1080/714003751

[9] Alan James, "The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society," *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (1999): 457, DOI: 0.1111/1467-9248.00212

[10] Ibid, 458.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Stephen D. Krasner, "Think Again: Sovereignty," *Foreign Policy,* November 20, 2009. http://goo.gl/UoIkkh

[13] Reza Hasmath, "The Utility of Regional *Jus Cogens*" (presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, USA, August 30 – September 2, 2012), 2.

constructs that need to be legitimized by implementation within a legal system[14]. Human rights have always existed as *jus cogens* laws because the term 'human rights' invariably evokes "an extraordinary force of social attraction"[15]. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969) formalized the *jus cogens* status of human rights within Article 53, by allowing peremptory norms to become entrenched into the international legal system[16]. However, there is no universal agreement as to which laws have achieved the status of *jus cogens*[17]. Considering the vast divergence of values, beliefs and interests within the international community, universal agreement over what constitutes *jus cogens* laws is hard to come by – at a minimum there is agreement over the *jus cogens* status of murder, torture, genocide and slavery[18]. The official entrenchment of *jus cogens* norms into international law without specifications over which norms have achieved *jus cogens* status raises the question: who decides what these rights are? Who decides when a violation has occurred of these fundamental rights, and an intervention is necessary? Overall, there is a reluctance among world leaders to create a framework of institutionalized, universally binding limits on state autonomy, even if the limits would be in place to provide a semblance of protection for citizens[19]. This reluctance of world governments to be held responsible to a supranational entity is to be expected – every state tries to protect its sovereign authority. However, this creates an interesting situation in the global community, as violations of human rights are determined by powerful world states on an arbitrary, case-by-case basis that leads to "organized hypocrisy"[20]. This leads into our second question of who decides when violations have occurred, and what action is to be taken. In the current global system, the United Nations' Security Council is the only multilateral, international organization with the mandate to call for military intervention within states, as well as the authority to make decisions that are binding on member states[21].

To understand the functioning of the United Nations, it is important to understand that this institution was created in the aftermath of World War Two and as such, it overwhelmingly reflects the norms and values of its founding members. An example of this can be seen in the current permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council – France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China and the United States – the five great powers that were considered victorious in the aftermath of WWII[22]. These states use the power of their veto to push for decisions that will ultimately benefit them. The final decision of when a state has failed to fulfill its obligations to its citizens cannot pass through the Security Council without the approval of the five permanent members, who can

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[14] Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty", 81.

[15] Andrea Bianchi, "Human Rights and the Magic of *Jus Cogens*," *The European Journal of International Law* 19, no. 3 (2008): 491, DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chn026

[16] Carmen Pavel, *Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and Limits of State Authority* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 30.

[17] Ibid

[18] Reza Hasmath, "The Utility of Regional *Jus Cogens*", 3.

[19] Carmen Pavel, *Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and Limits of State Authority* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 30.

[20] Ibid, 26.

[21] "What is the Security Council?" *United Nations Security Council*, accessed November 15, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/

[22] "Current Members." *United Nations Security Council.* Accessed November 15, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/

choose to veto Resolutions that intrude on their national, political, military and economic interests. Intervention decisions by the Security Council are undertaken on a selective basis – even former Secretary General of the United Nation, Kofi Annan stated:

> If the new commitment to intervention in the face of extreme suffering is to retain support of the world's peoples [...] it must be seen to be fairly and consistently applied, irrespective of region or nation[23].

The United Nations' Security Council decision to intervene is often "made on the basis of strategic and economic considerations that have little to do with humanitarian concerns even if they are justified with reference to such ideals"[24]. A clear example of how humanitarian concerns do not play the primary role in the decision-making process within the UN Security Council can be seen in the Council's decisions to enact UN Resolution 929, Resolution 933 and Resolution 934[25]. All of these Resolutions were voted on in 1994 – in a decade that saw increased global reception to humanitarian justifications for the subversion of state sovereignty[26]. In 1994, at a time of various global conflicts, each of the five permanent members traded their veto votes in order to garner support for their own favoured interventions[27]. The French wanted to expand their mandate in Rwanda, the Russian Federation was interested in taking on a larger role in the Georgian conflict and the United States was looking for international approval to get involved in Haiti. The Security Council chose to increasingly involve itself in world conflicts, especially during the 1990s, because of the *quid pro quo* system of bargaining between the five permanent Council members. Committing human and material resources in the long term is domestically unpopular, however, the Security Council's permanent members could justify intervention based on a cost-benefit calculus[28].

United Nations Resolution 940 led to the implementation of Operation Uphold Democracy, which was an operation led by the United States to get rid of the military regime of Raoul Cédras in Haiti[29]. While there were innumerable human rights violations committed under the Cédras regime, those violations were not what primarily motivated the United States into action. In fact, US intelligence was involved in the training of PRAPH – a paramilitary wing of the Haitian government that was largely responsible for many flagrant violations of human rights[30]. The United States was interested in deposing the Cédras regime largely due to the influx of Haitian refugees that were escaping to the United States. It was in the national interest of the United States to support a stable and democratic Haiti. The rhetoric promoted internationally was that the actions of the US, authorized by the UN, were being taken for the protection of the basic human rights of Haitians from their dictatorial government.

[23] As quoted in Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002): 86, DOI: 10.1080/714003751

[24] Ibid

[25] Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002): 87, DOI: 10.1080/714003751

[26] Ibid

[27] Neil Macfarlane and Thomas Weiss, "Political Interest and Humanitarian Action," *Security Studies* 10, no. 1 (2000): 127, DOI: 10.1080/09636410008429422

[28] Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," 85

[29] Ibid, 89

[30] Ibid

However, the influx of Rwandan refugees escaping genocide under the Hutu government was not a similar priority for the US. In fact, although the refugee flow from Rwanda was greater than Haiti, the United States was disinclined to intervene in Africa[31]. A report by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities from the Organization of African Unity reported in 1998:

> The US repeatedly and deliberately undermined all attempts to strengthen UN military presence in Rwanda [...] the Security Council, ignoring the vigorous opposition of the OAU and African governments, chose to cut the UN forces in half at the exact moment they needed massive reinforcement. As the horrors accelerated, the Council did authorize a stronger mission, UNAMIR II, but once again the US did all in its power to undermine its effectiveness[32].

The inaction of the Security Council, influenced by the United States, created a situation that allowed the Hutu government in Rwanda to carry out a genocide without any threat of international intervention. Exacerbating the problem was French interest in Rwanda[33]. While the United States, the United Nations Security Council and other western nations allowed the genocide to happen by adopting a neutral stance on the issue, the French government explicitly supported the Hutu Rwandan government[34]. The United Nations Resolution 929 allowed the French government to lead a mission for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda, called Operation Turquoise. This mission mandated the creation a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda which allowed many government and military leaders involved in the orchestration of the genocide to cross the border into Zaire and escape[35]. To further its own foreign policy interests in the region, Mitterrand's French government provided arms to Rwanda as late as June 1994 – a month before they decided to send in troops due to "humanitarian concerns"[36]. The genocide in Rwanda was allowed to happen because the main concern among the permanent members of the Security Council related to their own national interests, with humanitarian concerns coming in second. Similarly, the "humanitarian" intervention in Haiti was successful because it benefitted the national interests of the United States' government.

While humanitarian intervention for the protection of at risk populations is a moral obligation entrenched in the international system, its implementation means a direct subversion of state sovereignty. The ramifications of intervention are grave, and the decision should not be taken *ad hoc* by a political body to further national concerns over international concerns. In the current system,

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[31] Ibid

[32] "Executive Summary: OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events," *Institute for Security Studies,* accessed November 15, 2015, https://goo.gl/Fp2Ekc.

[33] Critics of the French government's role in Rwanda claim that France was blindly supporting the Hutu government because they wanted to maintain French language and culture in Rwanda – the Tutsis rebel forces of Rwandan Patriotic Front spoke English. Chris McGeal, "France's shame?" *The Guardian,* January 11, 2007. http://goo.gl/V8FO70

[34] "Executive Summary," *Institute for Security Studies,* accessed November 15, 2015, https://goo.gl/Fp2Ekc.

[35] Ibid

[36] John Lichfield, "Rwanda mass killers armed by France," *Independent,* October 22, 2011. http://goo.gl/o3VJtI

intervention based on humanitarian concerns is not implemented consistently and the decision making process is not transparent. To create a world system where intervention in internal state affairs in extenuating circumstances is acceptable, those circumstances need to be clearly outlined. While seemingly unfeasible in the current international political climate, an independent body of rotating membership with equal voting powers between world states would be an ideal replacement for the Security Council – it would reduce the chances of ulterior national motives. The criteria for involvement must be stringent, restrictive and non-discriminatory and the decision to intervene or not must be transparent and set within the constitution of an international intergovernmental institution. A transparent process, implemented by an apolitical body would allow world governments to respond appropriately to world crisis without concerns for national politics.

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Religion in The Central African Republic Is Not the Problem, But Could be the Solution

By Corbin Zoeteman

This paper examines the current conflict in the Central African Republic. I first outline the history of the region, beginning with its colonialization, showing that generations of its citizens have never experienced a stable and just government. I suggest this has lead its people to identify more with their religion instead of their collective nationality. Next I examine the religious undertones of the current conflict, emphasizing that religion is not the source of the problem, but rather a tool used by political factions to justify their destructive actions. I then examine religious peacebuilding exercises used in other conflicts and how they could be applied in the Central African Republic. Finally, I examine how religious leaders are already attempting to unite the country through religion. Overall I believe reconciliation between the factions is possible, and that peacebuilding exercises will lead to a stable and unified democratic government.

Introduction

The Central African Republic (CAR) has had a tumultuous history. After their independence from French rule nearly 55 years ago, the country has never had a truly stable, democratic government. The current situation is bleak, with the country still in turmoil and the possibility of a genocide being committed. The divides among the populous have shifted from being political to having the appearance of a religious conflict. Religion has been used by political factions to divide the country but can potentially be used to end the interreligious violence and unite the people of the CAR once again. In this paper I will argue that religion should play an important role in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in the CAR. First I will provide an overview of the history of the CAR to show that the state has never been stable enough to allow citizens to take pride in or derive their identity from it. I will then examine the current religious demographics of the state and examine a few ways both rebel and state leaders have used religion to justify their actions. Then I will examine how religion has been used as a peacebuilding tool in other conflicts and how this should be applied in the CAR. I will also show how religion is already being used by Christian and Islamic leaders to promote peace in the region.

A Bloody History

The CAR has a past full of political strife. The French colonized the area now known as the Central African Republic in the late 1800s, and was officially claimed by the French in 1903. From 1890 to 1940 nearly half the population was killed by a combination of microbial shock and Colonial Violence (International Crisis Group. 2007. 3). Beginning in the 1950s, there was a nationalist movement in the CAR for independence, with them gaining independence in 1960.

David Dacko was elected their first president when they gained independence. His electoral win was hardly legitimate; he surrounded the parliament building with an army of pygmies armed with poisoned arrows and forced the deputies to choose him. He quickly established an authoritarian regime by passing legislation which prohibited the formation of an opposition (International Crisis Group. 2007. 4). After five years of poor leadership, Dacko was overthrown in a military coup by General Jéan-Bedel Bokassa on December 31 1965. He remained president until 1977 when he declared himself Emperor of the Central African Empire in a thirty-million-dollar coronation ceremony modelled after Napoleon's (French. 1996). Initially France Supported Bokassa until 1979 when it was alleged he participated in a massacre of 100 schoolchildren. On September 20 1979, the French military overthrew Bokassa and returned Dacko to power (International Crisis Group. 2007. 6).

Dacko's return to power was short-lived; General Andre Kolingba overthrew him in a bloodless coup two years later. Kolingba successfully led the CAR for 12 years. In 1993 external pressures forced him to implement a multiparty system and subsequently lost the democratic election to Ange-Felix Patassé. This was the first time in the CAR's history since independence that their leader was democratically elected (International Crisis Group. 2007. 9). Patassé's leadership was just as troubled as his predecessors, with no less than three attempted mutinies in 1996. Various agreements were signed in 1997 and a UN peacekeeping force, MINURCA, was deployed to help maintain stability. MINURCA operated under Patassé until 2000, when the UN decided to change their tactics from peacekeeping to peacebuilding (UN Statement by Security Council President. 2001).

In 2003 Patassé lost control of the state in a military coup to Francois Bozizé, who maintained power until 2013. During his rule the country was rife with conflict, as multiple rebel groups fought for control of the country (International Crisis Group. 2007. 9). The Central African Republic bush war devastated the country until its end in 2007, when Bozizé and the rebels agreed to a truce (Baptise. 2014).

From the creation of colonize French Equatorial Africa and through the creation of an independent state in 1960, the CAR has seen very few years of peace and stability. A violent colonial history, a large number of coups, and a 5-year civil war do not create an environment conducive of a peaceful society. Individuals who have never experienced rule under a stable government will inevitably turn to other sources of support which often comes in the form of religion. When more support is being given by a religious institution rather than a national one, citizens may begin to identify primarily with their religion over their nationality. When citizens feel closer to their religion than their state, religion could become a divisive factor within state borders, leading to religious violence.

The Beginnings of a Religious Conflict

In a country with such a tumultuous history, it is likely most of its citizens would have experienced some sort of interpersonal trauma during their lifetimes. Bryant-Davis and Wong argue that interpersonal trauma, such as war, causes individuals to turn towards religion as a coping mechanism (2013). Many atrocities were committed during the Central African bush war, causing many people to turn to religion for support, increasing the potential for religious conflict between groups in the CAR.

The current wave of conflict erupted in 2012 when Francois Bozizé failed to uphold his promises made in the 2007 ceasefire agreement (Baptise. 2014). In March 2013, the primarily Muslim rebel group, Séléka, ousted Bozizé and established Michel Djotodia as president. Djotodia was unable to reign in the Séléka as they continued to commit atrocities across the region, especially against non-Muslims, which sparked the formation of the anti-balaka, a primarily Christian rebel group. On January 10 2014, Djotodia resigned as president due to international pressure after his failure to stop the religious violence in the country (Nako and Ngoupana. 2014.). Catherine Samba Pamza was appointed interim leader of the state on January 20 2014 and currently holds the position (Nossiter. 2014).

After the rise of the Séléka, religion has played a central role in the ongoing political conflict in the Central African Republic. Approximately 50% of the population practices some form of Christianity, half being catholic and the rest dispersed among other protestant denominations. 35% still practice traditional beliefs, and 15% form the Muslim minority (CIA World Factbook. 2014). Both Christians and Muslims in the CAR practice a syncretic type of faith, with animistic beliefs being interwoven into the more popular world religions. Prior to the current conflict, religion was not a major source of controversy in the unstable country.

There are no clear motivations behind the current conflict in the CAR. It would be unjust to call it a religious war, even though from the surface level that is what it appears to be. Séléka, while being composed of the Muslim minority, was motivated to overthrow the government because of Bozizé's refusal to fulfill promises made in the 2007 truce, rather than having any sort of religious motivations. The religious aspect of the conflict did not present itself until the Muslim minority rose to power. Djotodia was unable to maintain control of the Séléka forces, which refused to disband when ordered to (Smith. 2013). They quickly started abusing their power, a prominent theme in the Central African Republic's history, and many took this as an attack against the Christian minority thus heightening the religious tensions.

During Francois Bozizé's reign, he often used anti Muslim rhetoric in order to delegitimize the Séléka rebels in an attempt to maintain order. He promoted violence against them by having his children distribute knives to civilians in the outskirts of Bangui, commanding the young people to fight an invasion from the "foreigners." A common rhetoric was used accusing the Séléka forces of being composed of mostly Chadian or Sudanese fighters, rather than citizens of the Central African Republic, further painting Muslims as foreigners in their own country (Kam Kah. 2014. 38).

The rise of the Anti-Balaka, a group composed of non-Muslims has also increased the religious tensions in the country. After UN peacekeepers forced Séléka to retreat, they quickly filled to power void left. Some groups started attacking Muslim civilians as retribution for crimes committed by Séléka and

have been accused of committing atrocities worse than what the Séléka ever did (Katz. 2014). Again, this has only increased the religious undertones of the conflict.

The conflict has had massive implications on the people of the Central African Republic. An estimated 5000 people have died since December of 2013. The death toll may be much higher as it has never been officially counted because some of the violence was committed in remote areas, and overwhelmed aid workers may have overlooked many of the victims (Larson. 2014.). 554 800 people have been displaced internally and 359 834 have sought refuge in other countries as of May 2014 (Einsporn. 2014). The UN initially stated there was a risk of genocide in the country, but has since declared the actions of the anti-balaka to be an ethnic cleansing, rather than falling under their definition of genocide (Nichols. 2015).

The UN is currently operating in the Central African Republic. The operation, called MINUSCA, started April 10 2014, and took over operations from the previous mission, BINUCA (UN Resolution 2149. 2014.). The mandate uses the 6200 troops already stationed there as their force (BBC News. 2014). The principle goals of the peacekeeping mission are to protect civilians, with increased protection for women and children, to support the transition process, and help create a stable, democratic and authoritative government, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, protect United Nations personnel, promote and protect human rights, support national and international justice, and to disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and repatriate the former combatants. They currently have authorization to operate until April 30 2015. The only mention of religion in the Mandate is their intention to "[work] with relevant regional and local bodies and religious leaders, including through inclusive national dialogue, transitional justice and conflict-resolution mechanisms, while ensuring the full and effective participation of women" (UN Resolution 2149. 2014).

Moving Forward: Religion as a tool for Unity

Religion can play a major role in the peacebuilding effort in the Central African Republic. Their current conflict bears a striking resemblance to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the Yugoslavian conflict, sides were drawn upon cultural and religious lines, yet religion was not the only factor, or even the primary factor in the division (Coward and Smith. 2004. 232). Former communist leaders, who never previously held religion in high regard, used it as a tool to fuel their causes after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The state was incredibly unstable before the uprising, just like the current situation in the Central African Republic (Coward and Smith. 2004. 232).

Coward and Smith suggest that peacebuilding efforts used to bring religious communities together need to be focused at the grassroots level; "For any religion-based solution to have a lasting impact, it must be convincing to the average layperson" (2004. 233). They also argue that in societies where no consensus exists between ethno religious groups, pure democracy will not work. The minority will fear the tyranny of the majority and eventually pursue separation and formation of their own state. This is of special concern in the Central African Republic where the sizeable Muslim minority has been unhappy with the state, and was unable to maintain power under Djotodia. Pure representative democracy must be abandoned and a system must be put in place which minorities are also given fair voice.

In order for a religious based peacebuilding process to be successful in the long term in Yugoslavia, it must be lead by religious leaders who genuinely believe it will be successful. Religion and politics cannot be completely isolated from each other in these situations, as we have come to expect in liberal democracies. Religious leaders should play a small role in government decisions; they will have a better idea of what the state needs than any foreign consultant. The religious leaders must also encourage their followers to reflect upon their actions and recognize that the atrocities committed by them were wrong (Coward and Smith. 2004. 236-7). All these suggestions are equally applicable to the situation in the Central African Republic and will help establish a peaceful, strong and stable government.

Religious freedom must play a central role in the peacebuilding efforts. When a stable government is established in the CAR it must promise religious freedom to their citizens which helps ensure no group feels discriminated against for their beliefs and practices. This does not mean government should be devoid of all religion; but all should be treated fairly and equally. Having input from Islamic, Christian, and indigenous religious leaders could lead to a more unified and legitimate government in the eyes of its citizens. While the previous constitution promised religious freedom, the government did not fully uphold it. It refused to register a new political party which had the explicit goal of defending Muslims in the country (US Dept of State. 2010). In cases where religion is a primary sense of individuals' identity over a nation or state, perhaps the western ideas of the separation of church and state are damaging rather than helpful.

There is also a potential for possible channels of dialogue and reconciliation through indigenous religion. 35% of the population still practices indigenous religion, and the both the Christian majority and the Muslim minority integrate indigenous beliefs into their practices. Important figures in the indigenous belief system could advocate for the unity of both sides of the conflict. It provides common cultural ground between groups and could help them form a resolution.

Media can also play a positive role in the religious peacebuilding process in the Central African Republic. The media has been used as a way to spread the news of atrocities committed by both the Séléka and the anti-balaka. Faseke suggests, in the context of the Nigerian conflict with the terrorist organization Boko Haram, that religious leaders can also use media in a positive way. He argues that in communities affected by religious violence, those who want to use religion as a peacebuilding tool may be the minority. If the peacebuilders use the media to convey their messages into these communities the same way the terrorist do, they can help reduce recruitment into the terrorist organizations (Faseke. 2013. 56).

Any time religious or cultural differences become the face of conflict it becomes inventible to discuss Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory, which is the belief that in the new world all wars and conflicts will have primarily cultural motivations. After the fall of the Soviet Union, most ideological and economic wars have ended and many conflicts are now based in cultural differences between peoples (Huntington 1993. 22-23). Clashes will occur between civilizations in countries on the fault lines between what Huntington considers the main world civilizations (1993. 25). He argues that basic, fundamental differences between these civilizations will be the primary fuel for future wars.

It would be a mistake to label the conflict in the Central African Republic an example of a "clash of civilizations". Cultural differences are not the primary source of conflict in the area. Years of political mismanagement and unstable governments with a history of war and military coups are. Religion, rather than being the source of the conflict has become a tool used by militias to gain support for their political ambitions. The Séléka began as a group of rebels who opposed the government for not adhering to treaty obligations, not because they opposed the Christian leadership of the country. Religion just happened to be dragged into the conflict because of the composition of the opposing groups, not because of an ideological or cultural difference between them.

The Beginnings of Religious Peacebuilding in the CAR

There has been some effort put forward by a few prominent religious leaders in the Central African Republic advocating for peace. In March of 2014, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon met with three prominent religious leaders at the UN headquarters. The meeting included Mgr. Dieudonne Nzapalainga, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bangui, Imam Oumar Kobine Layama, President of the Islamic Council in the Central African Republic, and Reverend Nicolas Guérékoyame-Gbangou, President of the CAR's Evangelical Alliance. The secretary reiterated that the conflict is not religious in nature, but religion has been twisted and used for political purposes. He also called upon the international community to support the three religious leaders in their fight to end the violence in the Central African Republic (UN News. 2014).

Nzapalainga and Layama have been working together to spread their message that the conflict is motivated by social and economic inequalities rather than religion. Both are now working to bring divided communities back together. They have been advocating for funding to establish interfaith schools as well as interfaith hospitals where people can learn and be treated no matter what their beliefs are. They also would like to establish a radio station that can broadcast across the country, rather than just inside Bangui to spread a message of peace and reconciliation (IRIN Africa. 2014). These two provide a model as to how religion can be used to encourage peace in the region, and as the country becomes increasingly stable under a new government their actions will lead to greater peace.

Conclusion

Religion is a powerful tool that throughout history has driven many to war, but can also be used as a tool for peace. In the Central African Republic corrupt governments and military coups have become the norm, leading to a civil war in the early 2000s, followed by a small period of peace, and the sudden eruption of violence in the past few years. Muslim Rebels, motivated by political reasons rather than religious ones overtook the Christian government, leading to what some believe is a religious war with a risk of genocide. Religion has become a dividing line between the sides, but can also be used as a tool of reunification after stability has been returned to the country. Increasing religious involvement in government, increasing reflection within religions, as well emphasising common religious beliefs shared by both sides can be used as unification and reconciliation tools to help build a rhetoric of peace in the region. The media is a powerful tool religious leaders can use to spread the message that this is not a religious conflict and does neither the Christian or Muslim sides are truly fighting in the name of their religion. The Central African Republic has a long way to go in its efforts for peace and reconciliation, but

religion can help mend the broken bonds and help finally establish a strong, fair and peaceful government to the country.

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A Re-Examination of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Rwanda Genocide

By Erika Hage

This paper explores the Rwanda Genocide of 1994 and the lack of global response that was given to the atrocities committed against Rwandans. In light of the failure to act, the paper examines why this occurred and proposes a multi-national response to large-scale violence in the global community.

The topic of humanitarian intervention has long been contentious in the realm of international politics. Deciding whether or not to intervene in instances of strife and, if so, how, is fraught with debate. One of the reasons that this is so is because there is no over-arching policy prescribed for humanitarian intervention. I do not believe that the question of humanitarian intervention should be an unequivocal yes or no. The issue is complex and each situation is unique. While there can be no one policy for humanitarian intervention that fits every situation, there should at least be a competent organization, or a coalition of organizations, that are responsible for assessing each situation. Through the course of this paper, I will examine the concept of motivation that is an inherent part of humanitarian intervention as it relates to the Rwanda Genocide. When this blight is examined closely, it becomes apparent that humanitarian intervention should be a joint effort between the UN, global organizations, and regional organizations. This collaboration would mitigate the risk of any one entity acting unilaterally and reduces the risk of non-action by a single body due to political motivations.

The staggering loss of lives in Rwanda over a period of one hundred days in the spring of 1994 will forever be remembered by the international community as an embarrassment and as an utter failure of humanity. As the country descended further into civil war and animosities towards the Tutsi escalated, global governments neglected to act, even when confronted with evidence that violence was imminent. In fact, as Jared Cohen writes in his book, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*, as early as January 1993, "the CIA had warned of a likelihood of large-scale ethnic violence" (28). Furthermore, he writes, "policymakers received information from a variety of sources, both Rwandan and UN, concerning arms caches, distribution of arms to civilians, and the existence of extremist anti-Tutsi militias" (31). In the face of such damning evidence, one may beg the question of why there was no response or call to action from the global community. Exacerbating the issue was not just the lack of response, but also the fact that the US, Belgium, and France all withdrew the few forces they had lent to the UN mandate in Rwanda as the genocide began (Burkholter and Pocar 43). This blatant

betrayal of Rwanda reveals where the Western nations' political priorities lay. Their chief concern was to save their own people at the expense of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan lives. Indeed, Burkholter and Pocar write, "that the US government avoided opportunities to save even a few Rwandans or engage in even small diplomatic measures to stigmatize the genocide regime, as if such activities would be seen as shameful in the light of killing so many" (42).

The fact of the matter, though, is that genocide is a threat that impacts all global citizens. To stand by as a group of people is indiscriminately slaughtered exhibits a certain kind of callousness. On the other hand, one may argue, the resources, both financial and in terms of personnel, required for a humanitarian intervention are staggering. Cristina Badescu concurs, saying that "the costs and risk of lives for personnel involved in any intervention makes it politically imperative for the intervening state to claim a certain degree of "self-interest" to convince its citizenry of the appropriateness of such operations" (57). Here, then, we see the confluence of political motivations and the risks and benefits of intervention. To place the responsibility of a humanitarian mandate on any one particular state is to ensure that the intervention fails. The cost of human lives is a huge burden for any one state to bear. Corroborating this is the fact that states simply do not act if there is no benefit to them. In the case of Rwanda, the US in particular refused to acknowledge that a genocide was being committed because to do so would have obligated them to act as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Burkhalter and Pocar 41). There was no benefit to the US to intervene in Rwanda and after having suffered a great loss of personnel in Somalia only six months previous, the perceived risk was heightened.

In the absence of a global policy for humanitarian intervention, it is time that this aspect of international politics be re-examined and a reformation of sorts take place. We have already see how the refusal of one nation to intervene can be detrimental. The challenge facing humanitarian intervention is how to alleviate any one nation of the task of intervention and truly make it a global effort. It should be a multi-faceted endeavour that encompasses at least several nations and the resources of those nations. Daniele Archibugi contends that when it comes to the question of humanitarian interventions, "the more these interventions are self-assessed by single states, the more likely they are to be self-interested and, consequently, the less likely they will be humanitarian" (8). Left to act on their own, single states are more likely to intervene when there is a motivation for something other than simply assisting others. Unfortunately, the humanitarian aspect then becomes merely a stepping stone towards a bigger, politically-driven goal and those who pay the price are ultimately the ones who are in need of intervention in the first place. This was clearly the case in Rwanda, when the US government was motivated more by reducing their own loss of personnel and less about the fate of the Rwandans.

While the UN's Security Council is a primary player in cases of uprisings and mass violence, regional organizations are a strong counter to the lack of motivation to act that plague some nations. These organizations are close (or closer) to the unstable nation or nations and as such, anything that occurs in the unstable area will have a greater impact on those nations that border or have stronger ties with that country. Their motivation for acting will be greater simply because violent uprisings or the threat of genocide is a more immediate threat to them. Organizations like these would be an invaluable liaison for any international group and nation debating whether or not intervention is required. Not only would their greater sense of urgency provide a useful foil to nations who are less eager to intervene, but these groups

possess a greater knowledge of the situation and of the details involved with the strife and any potential aid. As Badescu writes, "it is clear that states bordering on a war zone have strong interests in resolving the conflict (in addition to humanitarian concerns) and therefore will be likely to take action. Regional organizations may be better than the UN because they are familiar with the intricacies of the local situations and actors" (69).

While intervention could be improved with a greater involvement from varying organizations, it is useless if a country or a government is absolutely opposed to intervention. In such cases as these, intervention could possibly do more harm than good, even if a nation's people are already suffering. Humanitarian intervention should not be carried out in situations where intervening would knowingly do more harm than good. Darfur, for example, has been unstable for a long time. However, "the central government in Khartoum has constantly refused to allow non-African troops into the region, threatening that Darfur would become a 'graveyard' for any multinational force sent without its consent" (Badescu 72). As it pertains to Rwanda, there appears to have been no such warning issued from the country to the Western nations. There is always a risk of providing any sort of aid or intervention in areas of unrest, however there was nothing to indicate that troops would have faced a higher than normal risk.

Taking this information and evidence into consideration, I believe that humanitarian intervention is a global responsibility and to fail to act when a genocide is imminent is a failure not only to the country and people in crisis, but to the global population as a whole. However, intervention that is driven solely or largely by one nation runs the risk of losing its humanitarian focus. Instead, intervention should be decided by a collective of nations, not least of whom should be nations who are closest to the violence and can provide thoughtful insights and recommendations. The only instance in which taking action would be imprudent is in cases where the evidence is explicit that more harm than good would be done if intervention were to take place than if things were just left alone.

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He's Just Not That Into Yu(goslavia)

By Jelena Macura

The Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an interesting case study that is applicable to various aspects of international relations scholarship. During a time where different regions struggled to coexist, questions of nationalism and ethnicity evolved into conflict. Slobodan Milošević was a Serbian politician, and capitalizing on the discontent of the Serbian nation, rallied support, and mobilized an army dedicated to achieving the dream of a "Greater Serbia". It can be argued that rhetoric and discourse played an important role in formulating the view of a superior Serbian nation, while assembling a population ready for war. Long after Milošević's death, his words still resonate with the Serbian nation, and severely impede reconciliation efforts. To illustrate how ancient hatred prevents states from moving forward, in the Serbian context, this essay specifically takes into consideration Milošević's 1987 Kosovo Polje Speech and his 1989 Gazimestan address.

Introduction

In one of two important addresses, then leader of the Serbian Communist Party, Slobodan Milošević stood before a wave of supporters. At the now famous Kosovo Polje Speech, delivered on April 24, 1987[1], he preached:

> "The premise of an ethnically pure, economically and politically autonomous, untethered Kosovo isn't possible by political ideals or ethically, but at the end of the line, that premise isn't in the interest of the Albanian nation. This kind of nationalism would exclude it from all circles, and it wouldn't just slow down, but stop its growth in both economic and a completely spiritual sense. [...] the tiny Albanian nation still one very

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[1] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," in *Razprave In Gradivo- Treaties & Documents* 52 (April 2007): 274. *SocINDEX with Full Text,* EBSCO*host* (accessed November 11, 2015).

underdeveloped people, isolated from Europe, shut off from any possibility of taking part in the dynamic life of today's world".[2]

In a 2012 interview with German newspaper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", current President of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić made the following remarks:

"Vukovar (a Croatian city) was a Serbian city, and my dream of a Greater Serbia has been left just that. There are dreams that an individual can never fulfil and how things stand currently, [this dream] will never be achieved [...Croatians don't belong in Vukovar]".[3]

It is interesting to note how attitudes from more than 20 years ago are significant enough to pervade contemporary politics. Milošević used specific rhetoric to facilitate nationalist discourse in his first Kosovo speech, ultimately rallying ethnic Serbians behind his political cause. While this is only an excerpt from a larger work, it is evident that Milošević is attempting to segregate the Albanian nation from the Serbian nation. By referring to them as "underdeveloped people", he insinuates that the Albanians are heathens in comparison to the sophisticated and "dynamic" Serbians. Milošević implies that in order for the Serbian nation to move forward, it must cleanse Kosovo of the Albanians that hinder progression. This mentality is carried into 2012, with President Nikolić declaring that Vukovar belongs to Serbia, and Croatians are unwelcome to a city that is legally Croatian territory. He also laments that his dream of a Greater Serbia has been stifled to the point where it is a distant thought. Taking both excerpts together, Milošević sets the groundwork for nationalist sentiments of a superior Serbia, and Nikolić echoes these ideals.

Rhetoric and discourse is powerful enough to shape, nurture or enable a certain mentality. This can be seen in various political arenas such as those moderated by Slobodan Milošević. Utilizing specific public settings, such as the backdrop of Kosovo, he was able to successfully mobilize the Serbian nation in a fight against surrounding ethnicities. Armed with words, Milošević is arguably one of the primary instigators for the violent clashes that ensued amongst Balkan states, leaving a legacy of ethnic distrust and hatred. In the midst of attempts at reconciliation and memorialization of shared Balkan traumas, Milošević's employment of divisive discourse and his influence has prevented these processes, thus halting ethnic progress in contemporary Balkan states. This paper will first examine the origins of conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, and will then analyze Milošević's utilization of discourse to perpetuate ethnic hatred. It will conclude by looking at modern examples that echo Milošević mentalities and history, thus impeding reconciliation and memorialization efforts. The case study of Former Yugoslavia offers a wealth of information, and it is often difficult to incorporate all involved entities and narratives. While this paper will mention other regions of Former Yugoslavia, it will focus exclusively on Serbia.

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[2] "Speech of Slobodan Milošević at Kosovo Polje," translated by Tim Skorick, accessed November 11, 2015. http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic-1987-3-eng.htm.
[3] "Tomislav Nikolić-Vukovar Je Srpski Grad," YouTube video, 2:22, posted by "The Assling," May 25, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_pysymLuzF4.

Yugoslav History and Milošević Motivations

While the history of Yugoslavia dates back to the 19th century, for this research it is necessary to look at its story from World War II. On April 6, 1941 Hitler's Germany invaded the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.[4] This invasion revealed the growing ethnic disconnect in the nation, as Croatian nationalists saw the event as an opportunity for independence, while Serbians remained faithful to the Yugoslavia as a Greater Serbia vision.[5] This conflict spawned the Croatian Ustaša (extreme right-wing nationalists) and Serbian Četniks (a guerrilla resistance group response). What followed was a bloodbath described by researcher David Anderson as "the cruelest of all internecine wars that would torment Europe during the Hitler years".[6] This statement is further supported with empirical evidence, as an estimated 325 000 Serbians were killed by the Ustaša, prompting increased recruitment and desirability to join the Četniks.[7] The clash of the Ustaša and the Četniks is only a snapshot of the atrocities committed by many ethnicities within the Former Yugoslav regions. What WWII revealed was a divided state harbouring multiple ethnicities with varied nationalist goals. In this example, the desire for Croatian independence is at discord with the pursuit of a Greater Serbia, prompting an environment for political figures to manipulate. After WWII, a "second Yugoslavia" emerged with new communist leaders pursuing mandates that attempted to unite the divisive competitiveness between Yugoslav states.[8] Led by President Josip Tito, many efforts were made to mitigate brewing ethnic tensions, however not all methods were mutually desirable. For instance, under Tito internal boundaries were redrawn in Yugoslavia, but they heavily favoured the Croatian and Slovenian population in terms of territory allocation.[9] Tito can be summed up as a utopian, and while his political tenure will not be forgotten, his death revealed fundamental problems in Yugoslavian internal affairs.

After his death in 1980, Tito's government was scrutinized as weaknesses in institutional functioning were exposed. First, the economy was inefficient, and the absence of a stable public finance system created greater economic disparities between ethnicities.[10] To put it in perspective, in the 1980s the per capita Gross National Product of Slovenia was over twice the average for Yugoslavia, while Kosovo was less than a third.[11] Economic inequality proved to be another source of tension between the ethnicities of Former Yugoslavia, as certain individuals enjoyed a higher standard of living than others, while living in the same nation. This revealed another fundamental problem with the Yugoslav regions. Regardless of Tito's efforts to address the needs of different ethnic groups, too many interests were at conflict, with the "national problem" inhibiting national reconciliation.[12] Finally, Yugoslavia lacked a concrete institutional structure that was capable of addressing the aforementioned problems.[13] Without a

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[4] Parliamentary Research Service, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary Research Paper 14*, by David Anderson, Department of the Parliamentary Library (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), 3. https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/1995-96/96rp14.pdf.

[5] Ibid., 3-4.

[6] Ibid., 3.

[7] Ibid., 4.

[8] Ibid., 5.

[9] Ibid., 5.

[10] Ibid., 5.

[11] Ibid., 5.

[12] Ibid., 5.

[13] Ibid., 5.

strong government entity to mitigate internal affairs, Yugoslavia became a breeding ground for nationalist mentalities. Taking the above issues into consideration, Yugoslavia was plagued by economic and political crisis for almost a decade. During this time, social issues came to a head and tensions amongst different ethnicities became more apparent. U.S. academic Lenard Cohen describes how the Yugoslav economy was "afflicted by skyrocketing inflation, high unemployment, a huge foreign debt, and serious food shortages". [14] These issues fostered an atmosphere of citizen discontent and disenchantment with the current system. At times like this, individuals seek an entity that will guide them to a haven from their misery.

One of the key events that expedited conflict was the appointment of Slobodan Milošević as leader of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986, and then as President of Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1989. [15] Before examining Milošević, Vesna Pešić, a Serbian academic and politician, outlines a concept called 'ressentiment'. According to Pešić, the mid-1980s created an environment for the breeding of the Greater Serbia movement. [16] In this context, Pešić defines ressentiment as a psychological state that is the result of suppressed feelings of hatred and jealousy.[17] She describes this term as a mentality that produces an atmosphere of fear amongst ethnic groups, with one viewing the other as a threat that would lead to extinction.[18] At this time, Serbs had already been affected by the Ustaša and neglected during post-WWII reconstruction. These events created divisiveness and fostered animosities, leaving fragile minds susceptible to external influences. This concept can be applied to the region of Kosovo, where Milošević delivered speeches both when he was a party leader and later as President. In the 1980s, without Tito alive to sweep away the ethnic tension, Milošević began his verbal conquests. In order to understand the significance of the 1987 Kosovo Polje Speech and the 1989 Gazimestan Speech, some context must be established. By 1985, Kosovo was a state in perpetual crisis, and its instability raised questions with regards to the relationship between Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as the fate of a unified Yugoslavia.[19] During this time, the majority population of Kosovo was Albanian, and Serbs felt threatened that their ethnic group was going to become extinct. This is what Pešić describes with ressentiment as a motivating factor in the Yugoslav conflict. What must also be stressed, is that Kosovo is important to Serbs because it is the site of several critical battles that encompass Serbian history and mythology[20]; Kosovo is the crown jewel in Serbian pride. Former U.S. Ambassador to the SFRY, Warren Zimmermann, outlines how his personal discussions with Milošević predominantly focused on Serbian history. He suggests that Milošević's obsession with Serbian history encouraged his followers to leave their "hearts in the past, not the future", and how he went to "fetishistic lengths" to achieve the dominion of Greater Serbia. [21] This fixation on history can be seen in Milošević's Kosovo

[14] Ibid., 8.
[15] Ibid., 9.
[16] Pešić, Vesna, *Serbian nationalism and the origins of the Yugoslav crisis / Vesna Pesic*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), 14. *Government Printing Office Catalog*, EBSCO*host* (accessed November 11, 2015).
[17] Ibid., 32.
[18] Ibid., 2.
[19] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," 272.
[20] Ibid., 273.
[21] Zimmermann, Warren, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 74: 2 (March 1995): 3. *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies*, EBSCO*host* (accessed November 30, 2015).

Polje and Gazimestan speeches, in addition to acting as an inhibitor for Yugoslav reconciliation and memorialization.

Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan

The Former Yugoslavia was a multiethnic state, and because of this, political leaders would assume the position of spokesperson for their specific nation or ethnic group.[22] As such, these speakers often utilized techniques of "statesman's oratory", where speakers project an appearance of intelligence, rationality and steadfastness of ideology.[23] Watching clips of Milošević's Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan speeches reveals that he is not overly passionate or behaving trivially to gain attention. Rather, Milošević utilizes a booming and authoritative voice free from extraneous diction, and with each passing word, it is clear that he is operating with a clear objective in mind. During the 1987 Kosovo Polje Speech, he addresses supporters firmly, projecting an image of stability, something that the Serb nation needed in a time of uncertainty. By the time of his presidency, his 1989 Gazimestan Speech garnered increased support, and with this, Milošević increased his use of "charismatic oratory" skills.[24] With this progression, Milošević was publicly viewed as someone with extraordinary powers, similar to that of an apostle, ready to lead his people to safer ground.[25] After WWII, the subsequent ignoring of Serbian territory allocation, the economic inconsistencies across Yugoslavia, and an absence of a stable authority figure or institution, were all contributors to the discontent of Serbs. Milošević emerged as an answer to their grievances. He became a beacon of hope that painted Serbs as victims, not just at the hands of Ustaša, but sufferers in the aftermath as well. With his speeches, Milošević evoked a strong nationalist attitude amongst Serbs by creating a new hierarchy of Yugoslav ethnicities, where Serbs reigned above all others.

The importance of public speaking is something that should not be undervalued. This is especially true with the speeches of Slobodan Milošević. Rhetoric is the utilization of language to induce a degree of social control, thus dictating political outcomes.[26] Oration is interesting because utilizing specific diction can enable the speaker to conjure up certain emotions of past traumas from the audience, thus rallying support and encouragement that ignites "violent passions".[27] In her examination of the role of rhetoric in ethnic politicization, Agneza Roberson defines a rhetorical act as a public speech where a major political party addresses a large audience about political issues.[28] Roberson dissects the anatomy of a speech by dividing it into four sections: the context and audience, the speaker, the speech, and the results/aftereffects.[29] Before dividing up the speeches, it is important to once again analyze Milošević's rationale behind diction choice. Former Ambassador Zimmermann argues that Milošević viewed people in terms of groupings, or as abstractions[30], and therefore his approach to politics was group oriented.

[22] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," 271.

[23] Ibid., 271.

[24] Ibid., 271.

[25] Ibid., 271.

[26] Ibid., 270.

[27] Ibid., 270.

[28] Ibid., 270.

[29] Ibid., 270.

[30] Zimmermann, Warren, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," 5.

This correlates to the work of Rogers Brubaker. Brubaker characterizes individuals who seek to capitalize on the discontent of others through speech as ethnic entrepreneurs. As Brubaker argues, these individuals "invoke" groups in an attempt to "evoke" them.[31] Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs tailor their speeches so that they "stire, summon, justify, mobilize, kindle, and energize" an audience.[32] He also looks at how the reifying of groups, that is giving life to something abstract, enables these capitalists to "contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate".[33] Taking the aforementioned into consideration, Milošević is an ethno-political entrepreneur. He carefully calculated the economic, political and social situation of Serbs, and created speeches that specifically encompass the categories that would garner enough support to incite violent confrontation in order to be achieved. Ethnic entrepreneurs are individuals that are capable of driving the process of the politicization of ethnicity. In this sense, individuals utilize rhetoric to emphasize ethnic differences, prompting the perpetuation of hatred and stereotyping.[34] This is again seen with Milošević and his vision for a Greater Serbia. With various public speeches, Milošević denounced other ethnicities, declared Serbs were the dominant group, and rallied support to achieve his dream.

The Kosovo Polje Speech is significant because it symbolizes Milošević's first foray into grand stage politics. In 1986, the Kosovar Serbs, a radical faction, invited Milošević to speak at well publicized event.[35] What is "legendary" about this speech is that he was able to accurately harness the emotions that Serbs were feeling at the time.[36] The sentiments of Kosovo Serbs can best be described in video footage of the event, where a woman asserts, "If I have to leave [Kosovo], I would rather die before I leave".[37] Milošević consistently utilizes the words "brotherhood" and "unity", and preaches that Kosovo is the land of the Serbs, and that it is their physical home, as well as a home for their history.[38] He urges that the Serbs must stay in Kosovo because of "forefathers and [...] decedents" or else they risk "shame" and humiliation.[39] These words and phrases strongly emphasize the importance of history. Milošević almost hypnotizes his audience by discussing how Kosovo was and always will be Serbian territory. He also alienates and creates a feeling of hatred towards the Albanian people by insulting their intelligence and blaming them for the halting of Serbian progression. According to political observers, the Kosovo Polje Speech transformed the image of Milošević "from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader".[40] After his address, Milošević acted in a manner that supported his statements. First he fired the Albanian Kosovo chief of police, then commenced reducing the autonomy of Kosovo.[41] Milošević's actions indicate to the public that he is a man of his word, and that under his leadership, everything promised to the Serbs will be carried out. This being said, the Yugoslav regions continued to suffer, and divisions

[31] Brubaker, Rogers, "Ch. 1: Ethnicity without Groups," in *Ethnicity without Groups,* 10: Harvard University Press, 2004.

[32] Ibid., 10.

[33] Ibid., 10.

[34] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," 270.

[35] Ibid., 273-74.

[36] Ibid., 274.

[37] "Slobodan Milošević 25. IV 1987. u Kosovom Polju: 'Ne sme niko da vas bije," YouTube video, 7:07-7:21. Posted by "Duklja-Zeta-Crna Gora," March 22, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m__csVX8-Vg.

[38] "Speech of Slobodan Milošević at Kosovo Polje," translated by Tim Skorick, n.p.

[39] Ibid., n.p.

[40] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," 274.

[41] Ibid., 275.

became even clearer. The streets were plagued with Milošević supporters claiming that "as long as Slobodan walks the earth the people will not be slaves to anyone".[42] These rallies translated to the overwhelming support Milošević received at his Gazimestan Speech. On the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milošević's address sent a disturbing message to other ethnicities of Yugoslavia. Milošević stated that "we [the Serbs] are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles although such things cannot be excluded yet".[43] Not only does he view the situation at the time as a battle, but hints that Serbian nationalism will be protected by any means possible, even with force. Taken in its entirety, the Gazimestan Speech is overwhelmingly dedicated to instilling pride in the Serbian audience. With repeated diction such as "brotherhood", "bravery", and "sacrifice", Milošević imprinted honour into the Serb nation.[44]

In both of the mentioned speeches, Milošević appealed to the emotions of grieving Serbs. With his words, the Serbian ethnic group was painted as victims that deserved compensation by any means possible, even if it included the employment of violence. Referring back to Roberson's anatomy of a speech, Milošević was extremely calculating in his employment. First, Milošević considered the context and audience in both his speeches. In the Kosovo Polje Speech, he answered the call of Kosovar Serbs and addressed spectators that shared in the ideology of Greater Serbia. By emerging after being beckoned, Milošević was perceived as a heroic and reliable leader that listened to his disciples. This image was translated to the Gazimestan Speech and an increase in support indicated Serbs were receptive to his ideas. By choosing to address his public during a significant event, such as the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo War, he elevated his status into memorialization. Now, when June 28th comes around, Milošević is associated with a day in the history books. Looking at the speaker category, Milošević began his political career as the leader of a political party, and his speeches quickly elevated him to presidency. Starting off as a bureaucrat and climbing to the top of the totem pole in a relatively short time, made Milošević a voice Greater Serbia supporters wanted to hear. The speeches themselves evoke a sense of nationalism through the employment of specific uniting diction. A true ethno-political entrepreneur, Milošević used his speeches to portray the importance and dominance of Serbian history, and argued that the Serbs were robbed and victimized by lesser ethnic groups. Invoking a mentality and evoking action, the aftereffects of Milošević's public addresses in Kosovo are the perpetuation ethnic hatred, and the encouragement to preserve Serbian nationalism using any means necessary.

The Agony of History

Slobodan Milošević's employment of public speeches to entrench the idea of Serbian historical dominance, ethnic superiority and victimization from other ethnicities can be seen in contemporary Balkan political systems. With political leaders weaving Milošević diction into political addresses and comments, coupled with nationalist Serbs holding on to the Greater Serbia dream, there is an inhibition to the reconciliation and memorialization process. With Tito's Yugoslavia a figment of the past, the fragmented and divisive nature still lives on in the Balkans. International relations studies can look to

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[42] Ibid., 276.

[43] Political Speeches, "Slobodan Milošević's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech," last modified April 12, 2009, accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm

[44] Roberson, Agneza Božič, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Politicization of Ethnicity: Milošević and the Yugoslav Ethnopolitical Conflict," 280.

Former Yugoslavia to examine traumatic events and to formulate alternative methods that could be utilized for explanation purposes. This is especially the case when looking at how the events were, and are still "experienced, felt, perceived, memorialized and forgotten", and how they influence/are influenced by aspects of world politics.[45] Erica Resend and Dovile Budryte argue that when violent or traumatic occurrences happen, they are defined by an individual's response and the lasting effects resulting from the said reaction.[46] In their work, both assert that "trauma is a slayer of certainties [and] a shaker of truths".[47] With this in mind, looking at the case of Serbs in Former Yugoslavia under Milošević rule, in both of the above speeches, there is an emphasis on history. This being said, this is the history as Serbs would visualize it. Former Yugoslav regions do not share a common narrative, and many are often "exclusive, contradictory, and irreconcilable".[48] Looking at the Serbian narratives during this time period, it is difficult to believe one side over the other because all the ethnicities present at the time had, and continue to hold, different ideologies and histories. There is a risk of oversimplification of narrative but there is also a rabbit hole of information that complicates each story. Due to this, reconciliation and memorialization efforts in Former Yugoslav regions are difficult to implement because even certain experiences are shaken in meaning.

Milošević's indoctrinating words are still felt in modern day Serbia, and this is one of the contributing factors that prohibit pacifying and remembrance initiatives. While there has been marginal progress in the aforementioned motivations, some of the structures of Milošević's regime are still present, with the political scene filled with people from his time.[49] Vladan Batić, the Former Serbian Justice Minister states that "Almost all of the most important posts in the nation are once again filled with Milošević cronies".[50] These individuals share the mentality of a Greater Serbia, and this is seen with current President Nikolić's statements outlined earlier in this paper. What is interesting is that Nikolić served as the Deputy Prime Minister during the Serbian conflict under Milošević.[51] Working close with Milošević, Nikolić echoes previous sentiments with his claims that Vukovar is Serbian land, and should only be composed of a Serb population. In addition, Nikolić announces his support for the Greater Serbia vision, something that Milošević attempted to create. With a political figure high up in the hierarchy of government infrastructure making these statements, it is extremely influencing on the general Serbian public. During the 2012 Serbian election process, Nikolić played a patriarchal role, similar to Milošević. He painted himself as a protector of Serbian history, and made himself relatable to

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[45] Budryte, Dovile, and Erica Simone Almeida Resend, "Introduction" in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates,* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 1. *eBook Collection (*EBSCO*host),* EBSCO*host* (accessed November 24, 2015).

[46] Ibid., 1.

[47] Ibid., 3.

[48] Subotić, Jelena, "Remembrance, Public Narratives, and Obstacles to Justice in the Western Balkans," *Studies In Social Justice* 7:2 (July 2013): 266. *SocINDEX with Full Text,* EBSCO*host* (accessed November 20, 2015).

[49] Clark, N. Janine, "Chapter 7: Serbia After Milošević," in *Serbia in the Shadow of Milošević: The Legacy of the Conflict in the Balkans,* (London:I.B. Tauris, 2008), 118. *eBook Academic Collection.* EBSCO*host* (accessed November 24, 2015).

[50] Ibid., 119.

[51] Aljazeera, "Profile: Tomislav Nikolić," *Aljazeera,* May 21, 2012, accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/05/201252186557623i.html.

the Serbian public.[52] These tactics were similarly employed by Milošević, and successful in gaining public support.

The issue with reconciliation and memorialization processes in Serbia is that there are too many accounts of a shared atrocity. Some scholars argue that in the case of Former Yugoslavia, national memorialization efforts are counterproductive, because they have the capability of deepening the divide between different wartime narratives.[53] Because of this, the cyclical wheel of mistrust and injustice continues to spin.[54] This author has made multiple trips to many countries that make up Former Yugoslavia, and it is safe to say that while there is no threat of extinction of any one ethnic group, there are still rooted tensions present. While there are select groups that rally and project their nationalist tendencies more than others, there have been genuine attempts at moving forward. This being said, Former Yugoslav regions are reminiscent of Tito's practices, where the proverbial rug has made a reappearance, and differences are often suppressed. Because there are still ancient ideologies present in these states, there seems to be no room for meaningful progression. A small, yet revealing example of this concept is when Serbia attempted to rename city streets. The objective was to replace all names associated with extreme politics with heroes or heroic events that exemplified Serbian tradition.[55] This is counterproductive because the state purposefully wants its people to forget memories of when the Serbian state inflicted pain on others, thus neglecting to acknowledge events beyond Serbian borders and histories.[56] This is a reflection of Zimmerman's opinion where the Serbs are stuck in their own memories and recollections, hence isolating themselves from other narratives and stifling memorialization efforts.

Conclusion

Slobodan Milošević will be remembered in many ways, with perceptions differing from one ethnic group to another. What is undeniable is that Milošević was an exemplary public speaker. His Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan speeches illustrate how he utilized calculating rhetoric and discourse to disseminate his dream of a Greater Serbia. By systematically herding individuals into specific groups, and stating that the Serbs were dominant, Milošević proved to be one of the significant factors leading to the dismantling of Yugoslavia. Milošević's history is alive and well in modern Serbia, as his influence and words are interwoven into contemporary politics and even bureaucratic processes. In addition, his legacy of perpetuating ethnic hatred and his obsession with Serbian history, has prohibited even the simplest of reconciliation and memorialization attempts. The roots of ethnic hatred still peak in Balkan regions, and they show no sign of being nipped in the bud.

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[52] Gec, Jovana, "Tomislav Nikolić, 'Toma The Gravedigger,' Elected Serbian President," *The World Post*, May 21, 2012, accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/21/tomislav-nikolic-serbia-president_n_1532736.html

[53] Subotić, Jelena, "Remembrance, Public Narratives, and Obstacles to Justice in the Western Balkans," 266.

[54] Ibid., 266.

[55] Ibid., 271.

[56] Ibid., 271.

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Chinese Democratization: An Inevitability or Possibility?

By Yany Siek

China's rapid economic growth since its late 1970 reforms has produced significant debate among scholars concerning whether or not it will democratize. Despite extensive liberalization of its economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains an iron grip on its political system. Modernization theory and the potential for a stagnating economy present two compelling arguments for a democratic future. Although Chinese authoritarianism faces significant pressures, the CCP's use of pragmatic political reforms, adaptation, and alternative forms of legitimacy make it resilient. Economic growth or decline is not a sufficient condition for democratization. Rather, the likelihood of democratization will depend on the ability of the CCP to address emerging challenges such as political corruption that could threaten China's authoritarian resilience.

Introduction

China's rise and stellar economic growth is attributable to its pragmatic shift from a Maoist centrally planned economy to one based primarily on free market principles under Deng Xiaoping. Although its economic system is open and liberalized, its political system remains closed and authoritarian. For decades, pundits have explored the relationship between economic development and democratization. They ask, "to what extent does economic growth lead to democratization?" Some scholars predict that China (PRC) will begin democratizing as early as 2020[i], while others highlight its authoritarian resilience.[ii] In this essay, I argue that China's transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not guaranteed. Firstly, I briefly describe China's rapid growth and authoritarian political system. Secondly, I assess emerging challenges to China's authoritarianism, focusing on arguments drawn from modernization theory and the impact of a stagnating economy. Thirdly, I reveal the limitations of the preceding perspectives and assess three characteristics of Chinese authoritarianism: the ability to adapt, pragmatic political reform, and deriving alternate sources of legitimacy. Economic growth or decline is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of a Chinese democracy. This narrow perspective fails to recognize that an authoritarian or democratic future will depend greatly on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to address factors that make a democratic transition likely.

Charting China's Economic Development

An empirically sound assessment of the future of Chinese authoritarianism requires a systematic analysis of its post-war economic and political development. Under Mao Zedong, China adopted a centralized single-party system coupled with a centrally planned economy. By the late 1970s, after years of failed policies (e.g. the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), China changed. Deng Xiaoping spearheaded China's incremental transition to a market-based economy that, "lay the groundwork for a remarkable economic transformation . . ."[iii] As part of this new pragmatism, Deng supported market-oriented policies including the household responsibility system, the establishment of special economic zones, and a strategy of "going out" that encouraged Chinese investment abroad.[iv] This shift contributed to China's, "steroid-paced growth,"[v] greater than tenfold increase in GDP,[vi] and average growth rate of 9.9% from 1979 to 2008.[vii]

Political Authoritarianism and Chinese Capitalism

China's economic liberalization did not signal the cessation of authoritarianism.[viii] After the events of 1989, foreign scholars generally agreed that Chinese authoritarianism was in a "state of atrophy."[ix] Among their concerns were China's post-Tiananmen legitimacy, widespread corruption, and a reduced capacity to deliver public goods.[x] In spite of these concerns, the PRC, "brought inflation under control, restarted economic growth, [and] expanded trade . . ." while crushing political opposition from the Christian Democratic Party and the Falun Gong spiritual movement.[xi] The PRC's model has been commonly referred to as illiberal capitalism,[xii] the Beijing Consensus,[xiii] and the China Model.[xiv] Despite its various titles, the model clearly combines a state-directed market economy with strict political control. Similar to the East Asian miracle economies, it emphasizes economics over politics, evident in Deng Xiaoping's decision to, "replace Mao's 'Politics in Command' with economics in command.[xv] Authoritarianism is, "a political system in which political power is highly concentrated and centralized [and] . . . the regime typically governs through a political party."[xvi] The China Model challenges the Western assumption that authoritarianism and economic growth are mutually exclusive. It is a model that has allowed China to achieve multi-generational goals of power and wealth, as well as related goals of stability and legitimacy.[xvii]

Democratization, Modernization and an Emerging Middle Class

Despite the strength that China's authoritarian system has shown, it faces significant challenges. The 2012 purging of Bo Xilai and internal power struggles among party leaders was a sign of the regime's fragility.[xviii] China's growth coincided with the continuation of its authoritarian system. However, how long can this model last? One subset of individuals who perceive a democratic future are modernization theorists. Modernization theory asserts that economic development in authoritarian states results in an increasingly powerful middle class that, "develops interest in politics and places demands upon the regime."[xix] As they become well-off, their demands expand from material needs to a desire for political reform. The primary reason for this is that democracy affords them a greater ability to protect their property and individual rights from state encroachment.[xx] Increasing wealth produces factors that are conducive to democratization including the proliferation of mass media, higher rates of education, and urbanization.[xxi] These factors expose Chinese society to Western systems of governance, civil rights, and

interests beyond material considerations. In China, three decades of economic growth lifted 600 million citizens out of poverty[xxii] and will likely produce a 2025 upper middle class composed of 520 million people.[xxiii] Based on this theory, economic growth alone and an emerging middle class will pressure the CCP to pursue political liberalization. These demands may lead to democratic concessions which could trigger a stronger push towards democracy. In considering these factors, some scholars assert that, "China is moving closer to vindicating classical modernization theory . . ."[xxiv]

Stagnation and Declining Economic Growth

Alternative perspectives on China's democratic future assert a similar prediction, but a different cause. Modernization theory fails to account for the democratizing effect of stagnation and economic decline. China's period of double-digit economic growth appears to be ending. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that China's 2015 GDP growth will likely be 6.9%, while growth in 2016 will be 6.4%.[xxv] These declining growth rates contrast greatly with prior average growth rates of 10% over three decades. China is likely to, "experience major economic downturns – just as all capitalist economies do."[xxvi] Declining economic growth could have a greater liberalizing effect on Chinese authoritarianism than increasing economic growth. The core reason for this derives from the fact that since 1978, the CCP's legitimacy has been based primarily on, "the continual delivery of prosperity."[xxvii] The ability of the CCP to increase living standards is a key determinant of how it is perceived by Chinese citizens. Although China's current growth rate remains significant relative to other advanced states, the declining rate may indicate a reduced capacity to use economic growth to maintain, "performance legitimacy."[xxviii] If we combine this with the fact that younger Chinese citizens are more likely to perceive, "education , medical care, and decent housing as welfare entitlements,"[xxix] the negative impact of declining growth on regime legitimacy is clear. Without a strong basis for its rule, the CCP's governance as well as the authoritarian system in general, may be subject to increased pressure for democratization.

The Role of the CCP and China's Authoritarian Resilience

Based on the evidence presented, China's economic trajectory, whether it be positive or negative, predicts a democratic future. These arguments fail to recognize that there exists mechanisms by which the CCP can address these democracy inducing factors. My argument does not assert that China will remain authoritarian, but that China's authoritarian regime has proven its ability to address challenges to its existence. Firstly, modernization theorists assume that the political interests of an emerging middle class are consistent across societies. They suggest that China's increasing prosperity and burgeoning middle class leads to democratization. However, this future isn't guaranteed. A growing middle class does not equate to a desire for greater democratic reforms. In fact, the middle class could calculate that, "further democratic concessions may actually threaten the stability of the regime and their newfound prosperity."[xxx] This fear causes the middle class to, "ally with the authoritarian regime," and results in a potent anti-democratic middle class force.[xxxi] The CCP has strategically focused on granting the middle class economic freedom at the expense of political freedom.[xxxii] Middle class citizens are unlikely to desire democracy if doing so would reduce their ability to achieve prosperity.

Chinese authoritarianism has three characteristics indicative of its ability to address challenges to its continued existence: adaptability, incremental political reforms, and alternative sources of legitimacy.

In 2003, Andrew Nathan described China's political system as one of , "authoritarian resilience."[xxxiii] He argued that regime institutionalization consisting of norm-bound succession politics, meritocratic elite promotion, institutional specialization, and the creation of avenues for political participation, allowed the CCP to adapt to emerging challenges.[xxxiv] It should be noted that democratization and political reform are not necessarily the same concept. The CCP uses small political reforms to satiate social desire for liberalization, while maintaining control.

Firstly, China's authoritarian resilience focuses on, "institutional adaptability and responsiveness."[xxxv] Scholars skeptical of a democratic transition highlight the ability of the CCP to adapt. Hongxia Chai and Xiongwei Song argue that China's recent 2012 reforms display an adaptive quality that strengthens, rather than threatens, the capacity to govern.[xxxvi] This strengthening occurs through the, "selective devolution of power to civil society and local representative institutions."[xxxvii] As an example, they refer to greater (yet still restricted) freedom for NGOs and a stronger role for business associations in regulating the economy. By permitting these groups to engage in beneficial activities (e.g. natural disaster relief), the central government maintains tight control[xxxviii] while pragmatically adapting policies to address regime needs.

Secondly, in relation to adaptability, the CCP uses political reforms to address grievances and consolidate control. Xi Chen explains that gradual reform may be best, if rejection of reform, "seems likely to trigger a sudden regime collapse."[xxxix] Chinese authoritarianism does not preclude political reforms. In fact, like other East Asian miracle economies, China's, "successful economic reform has been accompanied by parallel incremental political reforms."[xl] These reforms are targeted in areas that do not pose a challenge to regime control. Mainstream scholars assert that the expansion of party membership, the implementation of rural elections, and the strengthening of intra-party democracy, augments the CCP's legitimacy.[xli] Jiang Zemin's 2002 Three Represents policy expanded CCP membership to include emerging or "red" capitalists. This reform embodied the desire for greater inclusiveness, but was also a process of *co-optation* designed to address an emerging middle class that could oppose CCP control.[xlii] As noted previously, the middle class forms the base of efforts to democratize. Under the guise of greater inclusivity, the CCP attempted to control a significant challenge to its survival.

A second political reform was the introduction of country-wide village elections in 1998. Direct and indirect elections for various offices represented a significant political change. Under this system, villagers are empowered to make their own decisions through the election of members, vice-chairman, and chairman of Villagers' Committees.[xliii] Village elections are a compromise between the need to grant minimal political influence, while retaining CCP control. In an effort to, "maintain the CCP's politically dominant position . . ." the central party controls the election process.[xliv] Village elections exposed 70% of the Chinese population (700–800 million Chinese living in the countryside), to the democratic process.[xlv] Greater village autonomy cannot be equated with CCP desire to democratize the country.[xlvi] Rather, the goal of greater autonomy was minimal reform. Village elections exposed 70% of the Chinese population (700-800 million Chinese living in the countryside), to the democratic process.[xlvii]

Although the CCP has adapted to allow a greater role for civil society organizations and country-wide elections, it has not abandoned traditional tactics. Supporters of authoritarian resilience point to the strengthening of the CPC's Leninist control institutions including the Organisation Department, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Public Security.[xlviii] Strengthening of these institutions increases the capacity of the state to manage and control political dissent and opposition. In spite of adaptation, there is a clear focus on retaining traditional features of China's authoritarian system..

Deriving Alternate Sources of Legitimacy

The final aspect of the CCP's efforts to strengthen its authoritarian system relates to the concept of legitimacy. Henry S. Rowen explains that the CCP's legitimacy rests on three pillars: social order, rapidly growing incomes, and the restoration of China's international prominence.[xlix] In recent years, Beijing seems to be focused on the third aspect of legitimacy. Since 2009, Chinese diplomatic behaviour and rhetoric concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea, "shift[ed] fairly sharply in a more hard-line direction . . ."[l] Chinese leaders have increasingly relied on nationalism to augment declining political legitimacy. Gordon Chang has argued that for the CCP, "without prosperity, the only remaining basis of legitimacy is nationalism."[li] Chinese behaviour internationally seems in part a response to increasingly problematic domestic issues and could be a function of Xi Jinping's 2013 Chinese Dream national rejuvenation campaign. In addition, the CCP has sought to improve its legitimacy through the implementation of meritocratic selection and norms-based processes. Promotions became increasingly based on technical savvy, administrative skills, and educational background, rather than personal loyalty.[lii] When Jiang Zemin selected Politburo Standing Committee members in the early 2000s, he could only select Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, on each individuals technical and administrative performance over the previous two decades.[liii] Merit-based selection has also extended to the civil service, establishing a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese citizens. Although the future effectiveness of legitimacy based on nationalism is questionable, in the present it may be sufficient to control desires for regime change. Merit-based legitimacy of appointments augments total regime legitimacy.

Conclusion

Chinese economic growth or decline is not the single determining factor for whether or not China democratizes. Rather, the likelihood of Chinese democratization depends on the ability of the CCP to pursue policies and reforms that address emerging challenges. Although the Chinese economy is growing at a lower level, it is highly likely that it will continue to experience substantial growth. Two emerging challenges will continue to plague the CCP and may catalyze regime transition if they are not adequately addressed. Firstly, rampant corruption threatens to reduce the CCP's legitimacy. As mentioned, the CCP has pursued merit-based promotions in various sectors of Chinese society. Corruption among party officials threatens the progress made in this area. A second issue that emerges from continued Chinese economic growth is income inequality. The gap between rich and poor as well as urban and rural communities, continues to widen. This is evident in the fact that China's Gini coefficient has exceeded 0.45 which indicates, "a very uneven distribution of income."[liv] Unequal distribution of wealth could lead to the polarization of social classes and a revolt against what is likely to be perceived as an unfair system. China's authoritarian resilience, evident in its adaptability, incrementalism, and alternative sources of legitimacy provides the CCP regime with the tools to mitigate these threats.

However, a sudden shock or major blunder could trigger a rapid domino effect leading to political instability and crisis .[lv] Critical mistakes or a failure to address emerging issues could catalyze a chain reaction of events that leads to a reversal of the belief that Chinese authoritarianism is resilient.

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ISIS' Embrace of Violence
Strategic Rationale and Long-Run Implications

By David Jones

Much of the popular scholarship on the Islamic State has highlighted the group's embrace of violence as an indication of their irrationality. Here I argue that dismissing this violence as irrational ignores the ways in which the group uses it to their strategic advantage. This paper attempts to analyze the Islamic State's embrace of violence through an instrumentalist lens, using a modified theory of outbidding to explain not only why the group has embraced violence, but also why this approach is ultimately counterproductive. Drawing on primary sources from the Islamic State's English language magazine, Dabiq, as well as Jabhat Al-Nusra's Al-Risalah, I explain violence in instrumental terms – and highlight the Islamic State's usage of it as a recruiting tool and means of differentiation. I conclude by discussing why this strategy is ultimately counterproductive, highlighting some opportunities to leverage the Islamic State's strategy to hasten the group's downfall.

Introduction

The rise and success of the Islamic State (ISIS) has been one of the most well-documented, but poorly understood, evolutions of the post-9/11 Jihadist movement. The group rose from the ashes of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and quickly seized massive swaths of land, first in Syria and Iraq, and then over much of the Middle East and North Africa as local insurgencies and terrorist groups looked to leverage ISIS's powerful brand to further their own objectives. While there are important distinctions between terrorist and insurgent groups, given ISIS's relatively fluid tactics and growing international reach, the group operates as a hybrid insurgency and terror network, and the terms will be considered largely synonymous for the purposes of this paper.[lvi] While the group's activity was previously largely constrained to the geographic areas in which it has a physical presence, recent events in Paris, Lebanon and the Sinai have indicated that the group is attempting to expand its operations and more directly attack the so-called 'Far Enemy', primarily the United States and its Western allies. ISIS has differentiated itself from both previous and many contemporary terror groups through its ability to recruit a large number of Western foreign fighters and its wholesale embrace and glorification of extreme violence. These phenomena are seemingly related, and raise questions about the apparent utility of brutality, as a means of attraction,

recruitment and governing. This has led some scholars to conclude that "brutality is working for [ISIS]" and that it forms the basis of an effective, medium to long-term strategy for the group.[lvii]

This paper will first explain why the Islamic State has embraced this sort of violence, arguing that if we accept ISIS as a rational actor, a modified theory of out-bidding serves to explain the group's promotion of overwhelming violence. Next, it will discuss why this violence is ineffective in the long-term, and briefly highlight some potential policy options for the coalition against ISIS that will exploit the group's use of violence and hasten its downfall.

Prior to delving into the paper's main argument, it is essential to address a key issue with its argument, which is premised upon a specific understanding of the actual goals of the Islamic State. Broadly, one can look at ISIS's actions as either being a step towards creating an Islamic Caliphate in the region, or as being indicative of some sort irrational, fanatical group, dedicated to hastening the apocalypse.[lviii] This latter explanation would then allow for the group's actions to be viewed as the by-product of "illogical theological imperatives", devoid of specific logic and order, and suggests that rationality should be suspended when attempting to understand the group's strategy.[lix] While its rhetoric is extreme, and at times appears irrational, the group's actual actions betray its intent to establish some sort of proto-state, and support viewing the actions of ISIS through an instrumentalist lens. Instrumentalism views the act of engaging in political violence as a rational means to achieve some goal. The group has demonstrated an impressive ability to conquer and hold land, recruit soldiers, establish some mechanisms of governance and provide social services – all indications of their sincere desire to maintain in the region for a prolonged period of time. Therefore this paper will assume that the group is "instrumentally rational and economically motivated", meaning it seeks to maximize its long-term utility, and assess ISIS's use of violence against that standard, determining whether strategies contribute to, or complicate, the group's desire to create a stable, long-term presence in the region.[lx]

The Rise of the Islamic State

To understand why ISIS embraces and promotes violence, as a rational strategy in support of its goals, it is helpful to briefly review the geopolitical and historic context from which the group emerged. While the Arab Spring was successful in sparking protests across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the movement largely fell short of its ostensible goals of pushing governmental change and reform. Rather, many governments in the region were only destabilized, not replaced, and these governments' already tenuous grip on internal security within their states was weakened further, creating large swaths of land where there was an effective power vacuum. Furthermore, there was an apparently tendency for MENA government to leverage ethnic/religious fault lines within their countries as they attempted to hold on to power. In Syria, as President Bashir Al-Assad, an Alawite, began to lose power, he began to more intensely persecute the powerless Sunni majority in the country, which provided a perfect pre-text for the reinvigoration of the Salafist Jihad movement, which is able to effectively coopt and escalate Sunni-Shia tensions for its own purposes. Similarly, after the American withdrawal from Iraq, President Nouri al-Maliki, also a Shia, began to once again persecute Iraq's Sunni population. These crackdowns and conflicts created physical safe havens and the societal preconditions necessary to facilitate the re-emergence of a strong Sunni terrorist/insurgent network.

Given the proximity of Iraq and Syria, and the relatively successful Sunni insurgency that existed in Iraq for much of the last decade, it makes sense that one would return to prominence as the civil war in Syria and the situation in Iraq worsened. The task then, is to explain why it was AQI (ISIS), and why the group severed its relationship with AQC. This explanation is critical to understanding ISIS's embrace of violence. While there were formal connections between AQI and AQC beginning in 2004 when Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance (*baya*) to Bin Laden, AQC's ability to directly influence the actions of AQI was always somewhat limited.[lxi] Whatever linkages there were began to decline after al-Zarqawi's death, and were functionally non-existent after American troops killed Bin-Laden. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his predecessor Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi, both strongly supported the application of a broad, violent, and cleansing brand of *takfir* jihad, whereas most of the senior leadership of Al-Qaeda, most notably Ayman Al-Zawahiri, argued for a more limited, strategic employment of the principle. The fundamental theological and strategic disagreements serves to at least partially explain why Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi desired to formally split from AQC, and perhaps why the group has been so violent in its newest iteration.

Beyond these disagreements, it was also becoming increasingly obvious the American campaign against AQC was working, and that while the group retained inspirational clout, its ability to successfully plan and execute notable terror attacks was declining. Alongside their operational struggles, AQC also was increasingly unable to raise money, smuggle fighters and host training camps.[lxii] In many ways, AQC's brand had become somewhat tarnished, and there was space for a new challenger to carry the banner of Salafist-Jihad. These struggles contrast sharply with AQI's persistent ability, even after the American campaign to decimate them, to recruit and bring fighters and finances into the organization.[lxiii] This simmering discontent came to a head in 2013, when al-Baghdadi decided to change the group's name from *Al-Qaeda in Iraq* to the *Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,* with the name change also denoting a geographic expansion of the group beyond the borders of Iraq and into Syria. With this rebranding, the group formally severed any remaining ties that may have remained with AQC, and relatively quickly, began to combat not only Assad's government forces but also other jihadist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, most notably the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN).[lxiv] Given that ISIS and JN, while possessing different goals, are both competing for the same base of support, this rivalry gave rise to the need for a concerted effort by ISIS to differentiate itself. Unfortunately for civilians in Iraq and Syria, the group's predilection for violence became its selling point to potential supporters and fighters.

Insurgencies and terrorist networks tend to be violent organizations, however the violence that ISIS engages in goes beyond what is considered acceptable, not only by international civil society, but also by other Jihadist groups. While JN has been implicated in a number of mass murders in Syria, its violence – and certainly its pride in that violence – is notably more muted than ISIS. This stems, in part, from AQC's apparent moderation over the last number of years. Al-Zawahiri frequently wrote about the need for very narrowly applied violence. In *General Guidelines for Jihad,* he writes that Jihadists should "refrain from harming Muslims by explosions, killing, kidnapping or destroying their wealth or property" and that they should similarly "avoid meddling with Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities living in Muslim lands".[lxv] Similarly, Hamas has spoken out against the violent excess of ISIS.[lxvi] While judgements about the acceptability of violence are somewhat problematic, given their inherent

subjectivity, the rejection by peers implies that ISIS's violence does violate some existing norms, not only within Western liberal society, but also within the Jihadist movement itself.

Comparing Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS's Approach to Violence, and the Promotion Thereof

The graphic videos created by ISIS, shared on sites like Twitter, YouTube and Liveleak, make their way onto cell phones and computer screens around the world. Many of the images in these videos are reminiscent of humanity's darkest moments: Iraqi civilians lying face down in a ditch with their executors standing behind them, hauntingly similar to photos of *Einsatzgruppen* executing Jews during the Second World War; or a group of Syrian civilians hang on crosses in a town square, evocative of the dark period of the Roman Empire. ISIS also produces a high-quality magazine, *Dabiq*, which is distributed around the world. The content of these magazines elucidates ISIS's desire to differentiate itself through violence. The magazine is filled with images of the charred bodies of Syrian soldiers and the bodies of slain Western hostages, along with text glorifying these actions.[lxvii] *Dabiq* frequently publishes articles implying that JN's strategy of limited violence, and apparent protection of Druze civilians is cowardly, and instead encourages their slaughter.[lxviii] This violence, and encouragement thereof, often seems gratuitous and irrational, and there is an apparent desire to simplistically dismiss the violence as merely being a result of a group being a "death cult", rather it is a sort of macabre marketing scheme.[lxix]

JN also produces a magazine, known as *Al-Risalah,* which is less explicitly violent, and lacks the high-gloss, graphic images of executed hostages and beheadings that fill *Dabiq*. Even when describing the execution of an Assad regime soldier, the magazine notes important distinctions between JN and ISIS, mentioning that the soldier was "treated with mercy" and that "those of you who are expecting vivid descriptions of a head being separated from its body...you're going to be somewhat disappointed with this final segment".[lxx] Similarly, JN's magazine frequently takes aim at the violence of the Islamic State, recounting an alleged chemical attack by ISIS and noting that "it's time to stop calling them 'our brothers', for they will not hesitate in attacking us and chopping our heads off – all in the name of their illegitimate khilafa".[lxxi] The differing approaches to acknowledging and promoting the violent side of Jihad are placed in stark relief, and each group's strategy to define themselves in opposition to one another is apparent, however – it appears that ISIS's is proving more successful, at least in the short term.

Violence as a Form of Product Differentiation

As with any market, when a number of sellers are competing for the same group of buyers, they will attempt to make their product appear more attractive to the buyers and increase their market share. As mentioned above, JN and ISIS are effectively struggling for the support of the same set of donors and Salafi-Jihadist fighters. While the flow of money is critical, for ISIS, their main requirement appears to be foreign fighters. Volunteers from countries beyond Syria and Iraq are playing a major role in the conflict. While estimates vary broadly, the emerging scholarship suggests that there are approximately between 20,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters comprising up to 40% of the effective strength of active jihadist groups.[lxxii] The need for ISIS to draw supporters from foreign lands is particularly critical given that while JN enjoys the support of some of the indigenous population in Syria, ISIS fighters are viewed as occupiers, and do not enjoy any meaningful support in the areas they control.[lxxiii] This disparate support is, largely, the result of differing strategies for controlling the population in Syria. Whereas ISIS has

sought to govern through fear, JN's strategy appears to be a little more conciliatory. Therefore, it appears as though ISIS has pursued escalating violence as a means of outbidding JN and other groups in the region, and winning the allegiance and support of foreign fighters and financiers, even if it means alienating and slaughtering the local population.

The literature on terrorist group out-bidding suggests that this phenomenon will emerge when "two or more domestic parties are competing for leadership of their side, and the general population is uncertain about which of the groups best represents their interests".[lxxiv] One group will attempted to portray itself as the 'real thing' and differentiate itself from ideologically similar, but more moderate groups. Escalating violence is thus a means of proving the group's dedication to the cause, and willingness to be strong champions of the cause. Both the emergence of Hamas, in opposition to Fatah, and the Real Irish Republican Army (IRA), in contrast with the Provisional IRA are examples of this type of violence-driven outbidding, but both conflicts have had a primarily internal ethnic or religious dimension to them. However, what makes the actions of ISIS rather unique is that unlike Hamas and the IRA, who concentrated this escalated violence against a clearly identifiable ethnic enemy, ISIS is applying violence against not only members of other religions, but also Shias and those Sunnis that it considers to be *takfir* (apostate). This implies that winning the support of the broadest subset of their immediate constituency is not ISIS's foremost concern. Instead, this violence is intended to demonstrate their zeal to potential supporters around the world, and out-bid JN in the struggle for foreign fighters – the group that ISIS views as critical to their goal of maintaining a Caliphate.

Radical Communities vs. Radical Networks

Globalization has broadened the ability of groups to share their messages, and ISIS appears to be expanding the process of outbidding beyond the physical borders of the conflict. ISIS is appealing not only to the broader Muslim community (*Ummah*), but also to individuals – many of whom have no deep knowledge of Islam – who are more likely to be attracted by the violence, power and prestige that the group promises. Rather than placing the focus on theological comparisons between ISIS and JN, and making a sophisticated argument to win over the support of potential foreign fighters, ISIS attempts to use images of violence to persuade supporters. The advent of social media, and the increasing ease with which one can travel across the world, has made it easier for groups like ISIS to connect with individuals who are susceptible to their narrative.

When attempting to gather support for a terrorist movement, there is a broad, somewhat radical social organization on which terrorist groups can draw, a so-called radical milieu. Within this social group, there are two broad types of sub-communities which emerge. The first are radical communities, which are small, spatially concentrated communities with regional concerns or grievances. The second are radical networks; effectively a loosely connected, but numerically large group of individuals located around the world who are supportive of a certain ideology.[lxxv] ISIS has tried to leverage the existence of this international radical network, individuals broadly empathetic to the cause of Salafi-Jihadism, and portray itself as the most radical group within this radical milieu in an attempt to cast doubt on the sincerity of JN. ISIS then can focus on mobilizing the support of the fringe elements of this radical network, rather than trying to get the support of these smaller radical communities which exist in Syria and Iraq. This dovetails within their broader narrative strategy of establishing a Caliphate in the region,

and calling on 'true' Muslims from around the world to join them. Conversely, by remaining focused on local grievances and ignoring the desire to market itself as aggressively internationally, JN has focused on winning the support of these local radical communities, from which the group can expect to draw primarily indigenous fighters. Research into the type of recruit of that ISIS attracts suggests that ISIS's embrace of extreme violence attracts more devout, 'true believers' than JN, giving the leaders of the group an extremely malleable, if questionably effective, fighting force.[lxxvi] While this strategy is perhaps a gamble, it appears to be paying short-term dividends for ISIS.

In the near-term, their strategy of trying to out-bid other Jihadist groups by embracing an extreme form of violence that appeals to the international 'community' of Jihadists appears to be successful. Since its creation, it has surpassed JN as the primary destination for foreign fighters, with somewhere around 80% of foreign fighters flowing into the region joining the ranks of ISIS, implying that its strategy of out-bidding is working. [lxxvii] As this strategy has proven to be relatively successful for the group, this sort of violence will become normalized and self-reinforcing, as "the more [ISIS] perceives that extreme violence helps the group achieve its goals, the more likely it will continue to use it".[lxxviii] While this positive feedback loop may provide ISIS with an advantage in the short term, over time this extreme violence will soon begin to damage the group. Violence appears to be an effective recruiting tool, however it undermines the group's longer term goal. If ISIS wishes to establish a Caliphate, it needs to be able to effectively control the population under its control, and to continue to recruit individuals who have something valuable to offer the nascent state. Their present level of violence undermines both of these objectives. By appealing to the aforementioned international radical networks, and focusing their recruiting on international foreign fighters rather than adopting a policy of attraction and attempting to win the broad support of the local population, ISIS has undercut the foundation of their proto-state, as it essentially exists without active or passive support of the local communities it controls.

A Western Well Runs Dry

The trouble with the majority of the fighters that ISIS is recruiting, particularly those from Western countries, is that they are not particularly skilled. For many of these fighters, joining ISIS is their first experience in any sort of combat, and they often prove to be of little utility to the organization, frequently becoming highly-expendable shock troops or suicide bombers.[lxxix] As Western countries and their MENA allies become more adept at blocking the flow of foreign fighters, which is occurring, albeit slowly, ISIS will likely struggle to recruit more experienced Arab fighters, particularly from Iraq and Syria where ISIS's brand of extreme *takfir* violence is not as widely embraced as it is within the transnational radical networks from which it currently draws much of its support. While these radical networks have proved perhaps more fruitful over the short-term than relying on radial, spatially connected communities, these networks "do not seem to be as long-lasting as radical communities, inter alia because they are not territorially and socially 'rooted'".[lxxx]

This conundrum contrasts quite sharply with JN, which appears to have moderated over time, in part due to a desire to build up a stronger indigenous base of support. One JN fighter noted that many Arab fighters with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq were of the belief that "the truth has come out – the Mujahideen [Jabhat Al-Nusra] are in fact upon the correct and 'moderate' path, with IS being the extremists. So I think that IS is a blessing in disguise for the Muslim Ummah".[lxxxi] If these challenges to

the narratives of ISIS begin to take hold in Arab countries, concurrent with a slowdown in new Western recruits, ISIS will likely find it challenging to be able to maintain its fighting strength, and the group may begin to lose ground.

History Repeats Itself

History has shown that terrorists groups that engage in extreme violence and lack the support of the population tend to become victims of their own violence. For terrorist groups and insurgencies to be successful, they must maintain the support of the actual physical population in the areas they control. Audrey Cronin identifies a number of avenues through which support for a terrorist group may decline, two of which seem applicable to the case of ISIS: "the government may offer supporters of a terrorist group a better alternative" and "populations can become uninterested in the ideology or objectives of a terrorist group". [lxxxii] In the specific case of the Syrian Civil War, while the government may not offer civilians a better alternative, it appears increasingly likely that JN may do just that. Whereas the Islamic State appears to have evolved and endorsed attacks against the Far Enemy, like further alienating civilians in the areas it controls, JN has consistently moderated, and has recently insisted on having only local ambitions, being primarily focused on removal of Assad, and espousing a relatively moderate ideology. [lxxxiii] While ISIS has centered its strategy on attracting foreign fighters and strategically portraying itself as extremely violent, its primary ideological challenger focused on making itself palatable to a populous tired of conflict. Max Abrahms notes that while terrorism is generally ineffective, the few times that it has worked, successful groups have focused on pursuing limited objectives, i.e. the removal of Assad, rather than maximal, ideological goals – establishing a Caliphate. [lxxxiv]

Most telling – and certainly most damningly – is ISIS's previous experience, when it was AQI, with employing a strategy of incredible violence. After the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, the country rather quickly declined into an incredibly bloody sectarian conflict, AQI seized this insecurity and engaged in its own campaign of extreme violence with the in an "attempt to bully the tribal leadership into conformity with the jihadists' political vision". [lxxxv] While the group initially experienced some success in entrenching itself in Iraq, American forces were able to leverage underlying discontent, resulting from the AQI's violence, amongst the Sunni tribes in the region with their new extremist neighbours and convince the tribesmen to take up arms against AQI. This was quite a remarkable event, as it was an explicit, and broad-based rejection by the group that AQI presumed to protect and represent Iraqi Sunnis. Then, as now, it appears as though "[AQI]'s positive goal of establishing an enduring stem-land for the Caliphate in western Iraq appears in retrospect to have been wildly optimistic". [lxxxvi] While AQI could have likely cemented itself as an effective insurgency, its fetishization and promotion of violence, paired with its unrealistic assessments of its own power proved to be the source of its defeat.

Hastening the Downfall: Leverage Points

As the coalition to combat ISIS begins to coalesce and look at avenues to dismantle the organization, there are a few key policy avenues that should be considered. While countering the violent narrative of ISIS directly has proven to be challenging, given the fact that foreign fighters continue to be seduced by it and flow into the region, there are other counter-messaging strategies that could be considered. The coalition should look to somehow amplify, albeit indirectly, JN's comparatively

moderate and less-violent narrative, ensuring that ISIS is forced to compete in the marketplace for ideas, and perhaps have to explain more convincingly the theological foundation for their violence. By offering individuals in Syria and Iraq, who may hold radical, but not necessarily violent, ideas about the constitution of government a constructive seat at the post-Assad table, Western governments may be able to undercut the appeal of ISIS's narrative and deny them sanctuary within that radical milieu. Further, as the flow of Western fighters likely begins to slow, there will be more fierce competition between JN and ISIS for fighters from the MENA region who may be more inclined to seriously consider the questionable religiousness of ISIS's violence.

Finally, the coalition should consider attempting to reinvigorate the Sunni tribes that united against AQI the first time for a similar campaign to defeat ISIS. While the United States has been attempting to arm groups that it narrowly defines as moderate in Syria, this process has been slow and fraught with logistical issues. Arming the Sunni tribes in eastern Syria and western Iraq, circumvents some of the issues with the highly fractured opposition in most of Syria. Additionally, while there will likely be a need to identify new, credible Sunni leaders in Iraq, the American military will certainly have existing connections and relationships that can be leveraged to expedite the process. Recognizing that finding a 'perfect' partner group to support in region is unlikely, and that there will certainly be more radical elements within these tribes, it still seems reasonable that partnering with a known entity against ISIS is preferable to continued inaction. Perhaps another Sunni-led quashing of ISIS's violent ideology will be enough to finally quash its extraordinarily violent stream of Salafist-Jihadism.

Conclusion

This paper first argued that to dismiss ISIS's violence as being irrational denies the group a reasonable degree of agency, and ignores their very strategic employment of violence as a tool of differentiation and ideological out-bidding. Then, using the concept of the existence of a radical milieu, the paper made the argument that ISIS explicitly chose to ignore local communities in favour of broadening their appeal and drawing on transnational support, in stark contrast to how JN has chosen to conduct their campaign. Finally, there was a discussion of this embrace of violence is counterproductive and the paper very briefly highlighted opportunities for members of the anti-ISIS coalition to leverage ISIS's strategic misstep. While the group's rise to power has been frightening and fraught with senseless murder, their intense focus on engaging in, and promoting, extreme violence at the expense of focusing on local concerns will lead to the group's inevitable defeat.

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