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VOLUME 2, ISSUE 1

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

The Political Science Undergraduate Association is pleased to published the second volume of the Political Science Undergraduate review. The PSUR is dedicated to publishing exceptional undergraduate works by students of Political Science Classes. We believe that the peer-review process is an important tool to help foster our skills as writers and as researchers. By reviewing the work of our peers, we become more knowledgeable in our field as well as experience different perspectives of our colleagues.

For the PSUR to be possible, the editorial team and myself would like to thank the PSUA executive team for their unwavering support to help make this project a reality. The PSUA is committed to providing as many services as possible to students in the faculty and the PSUR is just one example of these services. Secondly, we would like to thank all of those who contributed to the journal. Without your contributions, this journal would not be a reality. Additionally, we sincerely appreciate the interest of all students who participate in this process by viewing the journal.

Personally, I would like to thank the PSUR editorial team for their hard work and dedication to the journal and the process of producing it. It is inspiring to witness a team of individuals who are committed to the common goal and have a willingness to collaborate to create the best possible journal. I hope that you enjoy the first issue of the second volume of the PSUR and we look forward to continuing to work hard on this project.

Sincerely,

Cole Goshulack

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Cole Goshulack', with a stylized, cursive script.

Vice President, Academic,
Managing Editor
2016-2017

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 1

Fall 2016

Legacies of Violence: Examining the Relationship Between Gender and Ethnic Cleansing

By Liz Dolcemore

Traditional examinations of genocidal violence tend to focus on ethnic divisions and often fail to consider the impact of gender with respect to conflict. Building from the work that critical gender studies has made in post-conflict peacebuilding, this paper will look at cases that illustrate how targeting women within specific ethnic groups is an effective means of achieving genocidal goals. It will pay particular attention to the well-known events of the Rwandan genocide and draw comparisons to the legacies of the Indigenous genocide in Canada. Moreover, it will argue that the current crisis of murdered and missing Indigenous women in Canada is related to a project of genocide fuelled by settler colonialism.

Violence is an incredibly personal and traumatic experience, which is frequently thought of as occurring between individuals. In many instances, however, violence is committed against entire groups of people delineated along any combination of ethnic, racial, class or gender lines. Traditional examinations of genocidal violence tend to strictly focus on ethnic divisions and often fail to consider relationships between ethnicity and gender. Building from the work that critical gender studies has made in post-conflict peacebuilding, this paper will look at cases that illustrate how targeting women within specific ethnic groups is an effective means of achieving genocidal goals. Both the Rwandan genocide and the Indigenous genocide in Canada will be explored as a means of emphasizing connections between gender and ethnic cleansing. In the case of Rwanda, I will examine how commission of rape against women was used to destroy the social structure of Tutsi communities. In the case of Canada, I will examine how legally erasing Indigenous women's identity works to eradicate Indigenous communities in order to sustain settler colonial dominance. This paper will argue that genocidal violence is inherently gendered and that understanding the relationship between ethnicity and gender

is crucial to addressing the experiences of women who have been, or continue to be, targeted by violence. In doing so, it will challenge sentiments that societies can be rebuilt after mass violence without thoughtful insights on women's experiences.

Rape as a Weapon

In discussing how rape is a weapon for conducting violence in ethnic contexts, it is first important to understand that violence itself is gendered. The political, social and economic consequences of conflict manifest in unique and differing ways for men and women (Bell 2013: 2). Women's experiences of violence in ethnic conflict are greatly influenced by existing systems of subordination and marginalization within a society. Involuntary prostitution, economic instability due to widowhood, increased barriers to employment and education during conflict, and forced immigration are potential aspects that affect women's experiences of violence. Rather than solely being expectable by-products of conflict, these aspects are deeply rooted in the social and political climates that characterize conflict societies. Thus, instances of wartime and mass rape in ethnic conflicts, often falling under this by-product category, are "systematically implemented for specific political goals" (Hirschauer 2014: 2). This is not to suggest that every instance of rape is meticulously planned beforehand, as any person can commit sexual violence under any motivation, but that patterns exist in when and where it occurs (Buss 2009: 148). As part of genocidal conflict, rape becomes systemic when it targets a specific community of peoples with the intent to destroy them in part or in whole (2009: 150).

This specific targeting is crucial to understanding how rape becomes more than a random individual crime; it is a crime against humanity deeply rooted in ethnic divisions (Hirschauer 2014: 5; Buss 2009: 150). Emphasizing this notion of collectivity is extremely important in addressing the reality of its instrumentalization during conflict. As Sabine Hirschauer argues in her book, *The Securitization Of Rape: Women, War And Sexual Violence*, rape has consistently fallen to the margins of conflict examination because of beliefs that it is a private act between two individuals (2014: 69; Brouwer et al. 2009: 18). The "unpunished licensing of rape was deeply entrenched in its perceived character, which – even if utilized during war – maintained throughout a distinct domestic feature" (2014: 69). Relying on views of rape as a private act serves to position it as less important in comparison to other forms of genocidal violence, such as torture or murder (2014: 69; Marochkin and Nelaeva 2014: 477). Therefore, it is crucial to highlight connections between acts of rape and ethnic divisions if we are to properly address the scope of genocidal conflict and the realities of communities it targets. Exposing a fuller truth is necessary if any society hopes to rebuild and recover following mass violence (Bijleveld et al. 2009: 209).

Targeting Rwandan Women

As an atrocity that continues to astound people today, much can be learned about the connections between ethnic violence and rape from the Rwandan genocide. Rape is an effective tool that spreads terror, diminishes civilian resistance, emasculates enemy males, and traumatizes or kills enemy women (Bijleveld et al. 2009: 208). Examining how rape specifically targets women to achieve goals of ethnic cleansing illustrates how it is a seminal factor in genocidal conflict. An estimated two hundred and fifty thousand to five hundred thousand women and girls were raped from April to July of 1994, the majority of whom were ethnically Tutsi (Brouwer et al. 2009: 3). Although sexual violence existed prior to the genocide, such staggeringly high rates of rape occurred in a context of intense ethno-national division where Hutus sought to eradicate Tutsis. The conflict between Rwanda's two main ethnic groups was underscored by legacies of social, political and economic division facilitated by colonial forces. Upon their arrival in 1916, Belgian colonists quickly favoured the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority. Deeming Tutsis as more intelligent, colonists provided Tutsis with greater educational and employment opportunities by establishing segregated school systems (Brouwer et al. 2009: 12). Moreover, Belgians solidified Tutsi superiority by classifying Rwandan citizens based on physical traits, such as height and skin colour, and organized citizens around these ethnic traits through the implementation of identification cards (2009: 12; Bijleveld 2009: 212). Belgian colonists effectively sent the message that Hutus were not only less deserving of power but also less deserving of being treated as human, a division which would later manifest during the genocide (Hirschauer 2014: 142). Indeed, when the violence began, "the ideology of Hutu power was underscored through the dehumanization of Tutsi women" (2009: 11). Once Hutu groups gained control over the government, they worked quickly to dismantle the societal structure of Tutsi communities in order to eradicate them as an ethnic group (Hirschauer 2014: 140). In attempting to achieve an ethnically homogenous area, the Hutu government actively utilized sexual violence. It openly promoted propaganda that Tutsi women looked down on Hutu men and thought they were too good for them, leading to very public occurrences of violence (Brouwer et al. 2009: 15; Hirschauer 2014: 152). Oftentimes, women were raped in schools, churches, and government buildings; if they were killed, their bodies were left in public view "as a reminder of the brutality and power of the genocide's perpetrators" (2009: 17).

Even at the onset of the Rwandan genocide, acts of rape were brutally systematic with victims chosen based on their ethnicity and age (Bijleveld et al. 2009: 213). Gang rape, forced incest, and brutalization of women's corpses were all extremely common (2009: 213; Brouwer et al. 2009: 17). The murderous intent of raping Tutsi women is apparent through the fact that Hutu rapists intentionally tried to infect Tutsi women with HIV/AIDS (Hirschauer 2014: 139). To these men, "inflecting a Tutsi woman with HIV served as an effective means to infect her future sexual partners and any children she bore as well to eventually kill her and leave her dependents without her support" (Bijleveld et al. 2009: 15). Given that close to seventy percent of all rape survivors contracted HIV/AIDS during the genocide, it is undeniable that the trauma experienced by Tutsi women was intended to leave long-lasting scars that would reverberate throughout the entire ethnic community (Hirschauer 2014: 139). As the center of familial and cultural reproduction, women are strategic targets for unraveling the social fabric of a community and weakening people's capacity to resist violence (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008: 379). The loss of identity that

many rape victims experience isolates them from their community and hastens ethnic-cleansing processes.

For many female victims in Rwanda, the physical and mental trauma of rape was exasperated by social ideals of womanhood that led to their stigmatization in post-conflict Rwanda. Those dealing with HIV/AIDS were ostracized by their family and peers, and labeled as irreversibly spoiled and damaged (Hirschauer 2014: 140; Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008: 382). But even those who had not contracted the virus faced social exclusion as “sexual violence survivors were also often portrayed as traitors, having exchanged sex (as sex slaves or ‘wives’) for life – their survival” (Hirschauer 2014: 140). These attitudes towards female victims significantly impeded the country’s ability to recover politically and economically and created lasting effects of social upheaval (2014: 141; Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008: 383). As the sole survivors of their families in post-conflict Rwandan society, women comprised the majority of the population. Those who had been the victims of rape were deemed to be unsuitable for marriage, which significantly undermined their social and economic prospects given the critical source of resources provided by marriage (Hirschauer 2014: 155). Widows were equally affected as they were prohibited from inheriting family property or other financial assets, ensuring that the entire country felt the impacts of women’s economic insecurity (2014: 155). By preventing the new majority from rebuilding Rwandan society, “rape was not only an immediate existential threat – but a structurally damaging, prolonged and a lasting one” (2014: 156). Although the genocide ended after one hundred days, the gruesome tactics of ethnic cleansing were successful in shattering Tutsi communities through legacies of trauma experienced by women. Considering these long lasting impacts, it is undeniable that rape serves to tear an ethnic group apart from the inside out.

Setting a New Standard – Indigenous Genocide in Canada

When we hear the word genocide we typically think of cases including and similar to Rwanda; rarely, if ever, do we think of ourselves, Canadians, as implicated in a genocidal past. The selective narratives we are told overlook Canada’s identity as a settler colonial nation that systemically destroyed Indigenous nations. Although we presume that there is some sort of threshold that allows conflict to be labeled as a ‘true genocide,’ closer examination of our violent history against Indigenous groups would illustrate that Canada fits the criteria of committing genocidal violence. Inevitably, by denying Canada’s genocidal past we deny that any true reconciliation must be achieved and allow for genocidal violence to persist in contemporary contexts. Similar to the Rwandan case, denying that genocidal violence is gendered creates substantial barriers in our understanding of why this violence occurs and how we may move forward from it. As Ward Churchill argues, “the motives underlying imposition of such radical constraints upon the meaning of genocide have been anything but pure” (2004: 79). This is not to say that Canada is explicitly murdering Indigenous peoples in labour or concentration camps, or outright promoting the extermination of Aboriginals through popular media; more indirectly, our society continues to hold beliefs that Indigenous people are an obstacle that require eradication (Sheehy 2012: 89; Johnson and Santos 2013: 98).

The motivations at the beginning of the Indigenous genocide were largely focused on land acquisition, a motivation that continues in our contemporary society (Simpson 2014). Even if the desire to impose a classification system persists, it is undeniable that the violence committed against Indigenous peoples meets the standard definition as developed by the United Nations. Under this definition, genocide constitutes:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (United Nations 1).

It is important to note that killing constitutes only one criterion; the other four involve non-lethal actions to achieve genocidal goals (Churchill 2004: 82). To suggest, as others have, that a threshold of a specific type of violence must be met in order to label a conflict as genocidal greatly limits how visible genocidal violence is. Although not every ethnic conflict should be categorized as genocide, we must consider the implications of not labeling a conflict situation, with clear goals of ethnic cleansing, as genocidal. In ignoring this consideration, we run the risk of creating situations similar to Canada's where the state refutes its genocidal past and allows certain groups to continually be victims of violence.

Targeting Native Women

The primary goal of the Canadian state for total land acquisition remains at the root of ethnic conflict between settlers and Indigenous peoples (Simpson 2014). Here too, targeting Aboriginal women serves to tear at the social fabric of Indigenous communities in order to eradicate Indigenous peoples. Although some may argue that the violence Indigenous women experience does not 'count' as genocidal because it is not state-sanctioned murder, I argue that the genocidal violence these women experience occurs through lethal legal indifference. Similar to the Rwandan case, Indigenous women's experiences of violence and ethnic conflict intertwines with a history of colonial forces imposing strict ideals of which groups count as 'human.' As an essential indicator of when conflict escalates into genocide, dehumanization constructs particular understandings and values of Indigenous peoples as human or non-human (Sheehy 2012: 88). At the core of Canadian assimilation policies, "to be discernibly Indian was to be other than human; to be human, one could not be discernibly Indian" (Churchill 2004: 87). Within many Indigenous societies, women predominantly uphold the maintenance of culture, language and history (Ralstin-Lewis 2005: 73; Barker 2006: 132). Because of their role in creating new life, Aboriginal women hold immense power over political, economic, social and spiritual decisions within Indigenous political orders (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 7; Ralstin-Lewis 2005: 74). This connection between life, spirituality and governance generates a unique relationship between Indigenous women and the land that serves as the antithesis to settler colonial rule that is white supremacist and patriarchal (Simpson 2014). In order to gain unabridged access to the land, Indigenous women, carrying with them the cultural and historical identity of their communities, must disappear (Simpson 2014;

Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 9; Johnson and Santos 2013: 101). Various legal tactics have been, and continue to be, used by the Canadian state to target Indigenous women over the course of the Indigenous genocide, a select few of which will be discussed in the following sections.

Drawing from Audra Simpson's analysis, the techniques of elimination utilized by the Canadian state exist in legal frameworks. Enacted in 1876, the Indian Act contained a number of marital provisions designed to regulate "Indian status" of Indigenous women by rendering them as property of their husbands (Simpson 2014; Barker 2006: 131; Smulders 2006: 39). Under this legislation, women were not able to pass their status on to their children and would retain the status of their father's band unless they chose to marry, in which case she would assume the status of her husband (Barker 2006: 131). Moreover, if a status woman married a non-status man, she would lose her status entirely and would become a white woman under the law (Simpson 2014). By legally eliminating the identity of Indigenous women, "this move to patrilineal-patriarchal governance in Indian territories was a legal femicide of sorts" (Simpson 2014). The imposition of policies completely opposite from the matriarchal structure of Indigenous societies placed immense strain on social and interpersonal relations within their communities (Barker 2006: 132). Granting privilege to Indigenous men, the act's sexist ideologies has led to a drastic increase in physical and sexual violence against Aboriginal women (Ralstin-Lewis 2005: 74). An alarming statistic from 1996 showed that Indigenous women between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four, with status under the Indian Act, were five times more likely than other women of the same age to die as a result of violence (Barker 2006: 134; Smulders 2006: 48). Numbers such as these indicate that the Indian Act's policies have been successful in undermining collective Indigenous identity by facilitating conflict between Indigenous men and women (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 13; Johnson and Santos 2012: 109). For Indigenous societies affected by the Indian Act's policies, "community-based and interracial violence against Indian women indicates a complex social matrix of oppression within and between Indian and non-Indian communities" (Barker 2006: 134).

As I argued previously, eradicating an ethnic group is achievable by tearing at its social fabric and laying the ground work for it to break itself down; it does not require killing explicitly. Establishing these deep gender divisions enabled the Canadian state to halt the transmission of Indigenous language and culture by separating women from their Indigenous identities. This, in turn, disconnected entire generations of Aboriginal children from their heritage since their mothers were separated from their language, traditional cultural practices and community peers (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 14). Imposing patriarchal expectations that women should be quiet and reserved, subservient to men and should not assume socio-political leadership positions, Canadian colonial forces worked hard to further undermine Indigenous women's roles as preservers of culture (Native Women's Association of Canada 2012: 14; Stote 2012: 139). Moreover, these gender divisions were also instilled in young Aboriginal children who were forcibly removed from their homes and sent to residential schools. Young Aboriginal girls were socialized to believe that the matriarchal communities they came from were morally repugnant, which served to facilitate their integration into white patriarchal society and deterred them from attempting to reconnect with their original communities (Smulders

2006: 41). Simultaneously cutting off Indigenous women and girls from their traditional roles ensured that attempts to wipe out Indigenous culture would be long lasting and cross-generational.

Of course, Canada has also taken more direct approaches to target Indigenous women, which have been equally 'lawful'. In Alberta, the Sexual Sterilization Act was implemented in 1928 to prevent mentally disabled individuals from having children through forced sterilization (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 12; Ralstin-Lewis 2005: 72; Stote 2012: 120). An amendment in 1937 expanded the category of mental disability to include individuals deemed unfit for intelligent parenthood, and effectively led to an increase of Indigenous women who were forcibly sterilized (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 12). Under justifications that they were "savages" with "loose moral character," Indigenous women comprised twenty-five percent of all sterilization cases, of which consent was sought in only seventeen percent (Stote 2012: 121). Moreover, forced sterilization was seen as an economically efficient way to curb the number of people who depended on governmental support programs (Ralstin-Lewis 2005: 77; Stote 2012: 140). Indigenous women who were forced into these procedures not only lost the ability to make decisions regarding their own lives, but must continue to live with the reality that the state took full control over their body and, by extension, over all Aboriginal bodies (Stote 2012: 137; Simpson 2014). Yet, going even further than disconnecting them from their communities,

the break that comes from robbing Aboriginal women of the ability to reproduce cannot be undone, and effectively terminates the legal line of descendants able to claim Aboriginal status, thereby reducing the number of those to whom the federal government has longstanding obligations, whether these are founded in treaties, or are obligations stemming from the occupation of Aboriginal peoples' lands (Stote 2012: 139).

The finality of forced sterilization permits the Canadian state to abandon its responsibilities to compensate Indigenous peoples as a result of land dispossession (Stote 2012). The effects of the act undoubtedly align with Canadian social and economic interests that were first prioritized through the Indian Act. Rather than properly addressing the extreme socio-economic depravity afflicting Indigenous communities, the state could wipe their economic burden, and gain greater land access, by taking full control over Aboriginal women's reproductive choice.

Perhaps the most important contemporary issue that the Canadian public must address is that of Indigenous women that are murdered or missing. Coinciding with arguments of how Canada works to legally erase Indigenous women, the overarching issue of missing and murdered Aboriginal women centers on Canada's gross legal negligence. Both our government and criminal justice system have failed to not only bring justice to these women, but to adequately acknowledge that Indigenous women live under a constant threat of violence. A National Operational Overview put out by the RCMP reveals that, as of 2015, there are 174 missing Indigenous women and 1,100 homicide victims in Canada (RCMP 2014). The majority of victims are under the age of thirty-one, are mothers who have children or grandchildren, and are victimized in urban areas of western provinces (Native Women's Association of Canada 2010: 13; Johnson and Santos 2012: 109). Simply

by ignoring this epidemic of violence, Canada's genocidal intent persists precisely because "states do not always have to kill, its citizens can do that work for it" (Simpson 2014). Throughout their time in power, the Harper Conservatives were adamant that crimes committed against Indigenous women were a result of random individual acts and did not require critical analysis of the historical and socio-political framework they occur in. Yet, Indigenous peoples comprise approximately four percent of Canada's overall population (RCMP 2014); certainly, such high rates of overrepresentation of Indigenous women in murdered and missing categories is not merely due to random individual acts of violence. The Canadian state condones beliefs that Indigenous women's lives do not matter; that they are, in fact, expendable and should be killed. In a settler society that acquires its sovereignty through resource extraction and killing of land, Indigenous women's bodies must be destroyed because of the meanings they carry; they are "conflated with land and are, thus, both disposable and contaminating to a white settler social order" (Simpson 2014). The disappearance and destruction of Indigenous women is not random, then; it is one more part of the Indigenous genocidal process that Canadians are unable to see.

Conclusion

In examining the cases of the Rwandan and Indigenous genocides, this paper depicts how relationships between gender and ethnicity interact and result in women being uniquely targeted by genocidal violence. It has shown how destroying women's bodies, either in part or in whole, and their identities serves to destabilize a particular ethnic group. This destabilization functions to complete aims of ethnic cleansing by undermining social or cultural structures, and illustrates how genocidal violence does not necessarily mean killing. By destroying the foundational networks that comprise societal cohesion between individuals of the same ethnic group, an aggressor group can successfully work towards forcing the slow death of the group they wish to eradicate. Whether it is an episode of genocide that leaves residual destruction, similar to Rwanda, or a prolonged genocidal process less visible to the masses, similar to Canada, it is imperative that we avoid a ranking system of genocidal violence. Shifting our thinking away from this ranking system and fully acknowledging the vast, and sometimes indirect, tactics of genocide is vital if appropriate reparations are to be made following instances of mass violence.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 2

Fall 2016

The Silent Forces of Agency: War as Experience and Girls in Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front

By Helen Zhang

This paper looks at young female soldiers in Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in order to study Christine Sylvester's concept of *war as experience*. The common narratives of females who engage in political violence often detail their status as either victims or perpetrators. These frames essentialize women's experiences of conflict, violence, and politics. Applying the idea of war as experience, the girl soldiers of the RUF can be understood as both victims and perpetrators of violence during times of conflict. This paper identifies how experiences of war can be perceived through the lens of physical experience, emotions of fear and self-security, and the further, ongoing implications of victimization. The RUF case helps explain how one can begin to understand why a girl would engage in violent acts and not just be a powerless victim. Through analyzing

interviews conducted by Myriam Denov, it is discovered that victimization can be an opportunity for agency to some degree. There are significant consequences for essentializing women as victims since post-conflict programs often exclude women because they are not seen as ex-soldiers or ex-combatants.

Introduction

Women who engage in political violence are viewed in many different ways by the public, media and scholars. Prevalent frames of victim or perpetrator, end up essentializing these women's experiences. A pertinent example of the imbalanced views regarding female participation in violence is girl soldiers in Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Using Christine Sylvester's theory of *war as experience*, (particularly looking at physical and emotional experience) the RUF conflict can be understood as the different ways in which individual human bodies are affected. How can examining this type of experience inform a different and more accurate understanding of the girls who engage in violent acts within the RUF? In this paper, I will argue that an approach of war as experience can help us understand how a girl in the RUF can be both a perpetrator of violence and a victim of it. While considering their victimization as a chance for agency, it is important to understand that war is about harming bodies and girls' experiences cannot be separated from their roles as direct targets of injury. One also needs to be careful to not let victimization define an entire story of an individual's experience. This paper will begin with background information on Sierra Leone and the rise and nature of the RUF. Sylvester's war as experience approach will be analyzed through her writing and applied to Myriam Denov's studies and interviews with former RUF child soldiers. Finally, these findings will be compared to some conceptions of female political violence found in literature.

Sierra Leone and RUF Conflict

As a civil war, the RUF conflict was marked by violence (of various kinds) from civilians against other civilians.¹ Many factors contributed to the rise of the RUF. In the early 1990s, over half of the population of Sierra Leone was under the age of eighteen, many of whom were disillusioned and angry.² The RUF started recruiting with the rhetoric of "freedom, justice and democracy to all Sierra Leoneans."³ This message did not gain traction and the RUF's political goals were deserted for wealth, power, and control of the diamond mines. Ultimately, they went on to devastate institutions and commit extreme violence against the very people the movement was claiming to liberate.⁴ The majority of the RUF was made up of abducted children who were turned into soldiers. Denov describes

¹ Denov, Myriam, "Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 12, no. 5 (2008): 814.

² Myriam Denov and Christine Gervais, "Negotiating (In)Security: Agency, Resistance, and Resourcefulness Among Girls Formerly Associated with Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front," *Signs* 32, no. 4 (2016): 887-8.

³ Denov and Gervais, "Negotiating (In)Security," 888.

⁴ Myriam Denov, *Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 63.

how child soldiers are either seen as “extreme victims, extreme perpetrators or extreme heroes.”⁵ Almost all of the women interviewed in an article by Chris Coulter state that they were raped, and many were “bush wives.”⁶ Many authors who write about female perpetrators of violence argue that we need to stop viewing them as victims in order to really understand their personal motivations.⁷ There are certainly tensions between these two situations as victimization can be a motivation to engage in violence against others. The experience of war cannot be separated from the way that humans are always the targets of harm. Everyone deals with this differently and in the case of the RUF, some will even actively participate destructive activities. The RUF case is a bit different than other topics authors write about in relation to women and political violence as the subject of focus is on young girls, many of whom were abducted and forced into their situation. These girls may not have had agency in a conventional sense (for example, voluntarily joining and actively fighting for a political purpose). However, in a personal sense, literature shows that these girls were often pursuing to secure power and protection for their own sake. The actions of the RUF members were shaped by the reality of their everyday lives, where violence became a normal daily feature that instilled a fear and compliance.⁸ Girls played a crucial role in the RUF, with training and role allocation, they helped fuel and support the conflicts.⁹ Whether or not they chose to participate in violence, they were a part of a violent organization. For boys, the violence introduced to their lives eventually became normal and sometimes even seen as exciting or a skill.¹⁰ The same could occur for girls, but frequently, violence was used for self-security in response to damages inflicted upon them, most commonly sexual abuse. Girls are typically seen to be victims, which tends to denote a lack of agency, but actually, being a victim does not have to mean that no agency is possible.¹¹ The word “victim” does not have to be perceived as something *happening* to the body, but also something that initiates feelings that can be put into action. To further clarify this idea, Sylvester’s concepts can be applied to the case of girls in the RUF.

War as Physical Experience

Sylvester provides an approach to view war as an experienced event in which ordinary people “observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations.”¹² She argues that one of the key elements of war is the “mission of injuring human bodies and destroying normal patterns of social relations.”¹³ Human bodies are brought into focus as the main units of war. Sylvester’s argument is important as it brings neglected ideas into focus, such as the diversity in an individual experience, the possibility

⁵ Denov, *Child Soldiers*, 2.

⁶ Chris Coulter, “Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions?,” *Feminist Review* no. 88 (2016): 58.

⁷ Shirin S. Deylami, “Saving the Enemy,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 15, no. 2 (2013): 180.

⁸ Richard Maclure and Myriam Denov, “‘I Didn’t Want to Die So I Joined Them’: Structuration and the Process of Becoming Boy Soldiers in Sierra Leone,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 126.

⁹ Denov, “Girl Soldiers,” 821.

¹⁰ Maclure and Denov, “‘I Didn’t Want,” 127.

¹¹ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 68.

¹² Christine Sylvester, “War Experiences / War Practices / War Theory,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 3 (2012): 483.

¹³ Sylvester, “War Experiences,” 484.

of being a victim at one point and then a villain in another.¹⁴ Scholars make the same assumptions of gender roles when writing about war (men are the soldiers while women and children are victims), despite how war is a time when regular laws and norms are suspended.¹⁵ This is especially relevant to the RUF case as the normal application of a “victim” does not apply. A child soldier in a civil war does not exist in normal conditions. Perhaps in a non-conflict context, the position of children in the RUF are clearly seen as victims, but during this war, victimization and efforts to avoid victimization have unique circumstances. Viewing anyone as only a victim or combatant is inaccurate, especially for children as, they often have flexible roles and experiences changes that can socialize them into “a culture of violence.”¹⁶ To acknowledge the locality of every war, it should be stated that in rural Sierra Leone traditional culture, women are not believed to be inherently peaceful, they are “by nature wild and dangerous... need to be controlled and domesticated.”¹⁷ This could help explain the overwhelming amount of girls who were targets of a specific and gendered type of harm. As many girls were stuck in this position, many used violence to get out of it. This violence could be used to a greater extent, in terms of personal power, than for boys as it highly contrasted from their initial positions. Coulter points out how female fighters were considered to be “more wicked” or more brave than some men.¹⁸ During a conflict, girls have the ability to adopt violent behaviour in order to gain a sense of power over others.¹⁹ The stringent categorizations of victim and perpetrator are insufficient because in reality, they can cross over and intersect with one another. While being a victim to the everyday workings of the RUF is sad and tragic, agency does not have to be an insurmountable force as some may perceive. When girls are physically victimized, they can also put their consequential feelings into action.

Emotions of Fear and Self-Security

Evidently, war is a physical experience, but Sylvester also describes how it is an emotional one, especially when these feelings regard one’s own safety. Sylvester states that “emotions intertwine with the body and create suffering.”²⁰ There are a lot of competing theories about what a body even is and what emotions are, but to put it simply, people can experience war through the loss of people, grief, trauma, or even exhilaration.²¹ Girls in the RUF are applicable to this idea as they were seen to redirect their feelings of hurt and anger onto civilians.²² There were many different reasons in which a girl felt like she needed to use violence, but they are all related to feelings resulting from a war context. As Coulter

¹⁴ Sylvester, “War Experiences,” 493.

¹⁵ Christine Sylvester, *War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2013) 70.

¹⁶ Susan McKay, “Girls as ‘Weapons of Terror’ in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean Rebel Fighting Forces,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 5 (2005): 391.

¹⁷ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 65.

¹⁸ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 59.

¹⁹ Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure, “Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone’s Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence,” *Anthropologica* 48, no. 1 (2014): 81.

²⁰ Sylvester, “War Experiences,” 497.

²¹ Christine Sylvester, “War, Sense, and Security,” in *Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives*, ed. Laura Sjoberg (New York: Routledge, 2010) 24-5.

²² Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 62.

summarizes, when engaging in violence, “survival and control was an issue for some; for many others it was fear, anger, and even resignation” while few were interested in “prestige and resources involved in being a fighter.”²³ There are various instances in which a girl would use violence to protect herself. For example, the use of guns often brought a sense of “power, authority, and supremacy” over civilians.²⁴ Gradually, guns were seen as a tool for increasing self-security, still this rests in the frame of being a victim to those that hurt them.²⁵ One girl describes her experience as feeling empowered with a gun, feeling strong and fearless when firing it, although the actual killing of people was not attributed with positive feelings.²⁶ It is crucial to view this story through a victim frame as these skills were taught through being terrorized and desensitized with militaristic training, in which they had no chance to refuse participation.²⁷ Some girls embraced this training, such as those who were promoted to a commander recall it with nostalgia and pride. For these girls, violent acts became an accessible launch to power. McKay describes a paradox, in which, victims become “allies with individuals who were responsible for abducting and victimizing them and who continue to sexually abuse them.”²⁸ In this example, girls gained power through their victimization. They take advantage of the only opportunity they have to improve their situation, by building connections with the very same people who caused them harm. In some cases, this can get to a point where they can reverse their position of vulnerability and turn it into a higher position within the RUF hierarchy, which “in a sense empowered them and rendered them some sense of authority in the trajectory of their own lives.”²⁹ While this is an unconventional portrait of female agency, it has significance. To be precise, engaging in violent acts can make one feel as though they are no longer the victim.³⁰ Initially, girls did not have much power within this situation but recognizing their ability to turn a victimized position into power offers insight into the lived experience of war. War as experience offers an effective way to understand the possible motivations of girls and contrasts from some existing works.

Further Implications of “Victimization”

Sylvester’s approach to looking at war is extremely useful in acknowledging all the different roles a girl can play and how they operate within constrained spheres. Accordingly, the dichotomy of victim or perpetrator is not enough to explain the full experience of war.³¹ In reality, girls in the RUF are “neither ill-fated victims with no agency, nor ferocious perpetrators in command of their own destiny.”³² Nonetheless, the frames of victim or perpetrator are used quite often. When authors discuss child soldiers, they are

²³ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 61.

²⁴ Denov and Gervais, “Negotiating (In)Security,” 896.

²⁵ Denov and Gervais, “Negotiating (In)Security,” 895.

²⁶ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 60.

²⁷ Denov and Gervais, “Negotiating (In)Security,” 896.

²⁸ McKay, “Girls as ‘Weapons,’” 391.

²⁹ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 61.

³⁰ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 61.

³¹ Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 67-8.

³² Coulter, “Female Fighters,” 69.

denied any agency, turned into either an innocent victim or inherently wicked.³³ It is not a false claim to say that children are often victims, but using their encounters of harm to define their entire experience of conflict is unfair. In particular, girls are portrayed as “silent victims” which does not accurately represent their lived experiences.³⁴ Denov argues that, while it is important to illustrate that girls’ bodies are often targets, it also risks the danger of girls becoming “personified as voiceless victims, often devoid of agency, moral conscience.”³⁵ An appropriate way to counter this effect is by using Sylvester’s approach. Any position that a child held in the RUF could involve some agency. Specifically, girls (although most of them were evidently victims) had agency in the ways they chose to belong in their groups. However, Denov and Gervais state that, acts of agency and resistance can only be perceived as “small victories in light of the circumstances of ongoing victimization and terror within the RUF.”³⁶ This statement poses some concerns. While Denov has written a great deal highlighting the diverse experiences of children in the RUF, the above quote seems to essentialize them as victims by diminishing their feelings of success. A victory of feeling safe in their given situation can be a big victory. As girls climbed their way up the ranks in response to feelings of fear and lack of security, the significance of their newfound force should not be dismissed. It is tricky to talk about this subject without completely falling into the common frames. However, it is paramount to recognize how personal victories are perceived by the individual, no matter how insignificant they appear to be. A small victory for an individual experiencing a war, where they are essentially powerless, can be considered an instrumental and special victory. Deylami further illuminates this issue. She criticizes how authors use various narratives to make women’s political violence solely about their victimization by men, and thus, about men. It produces ideas of men as the protectors of society and women as those to be protected.³⁷ Although she does not discuss Sierra Leone in particular, she emphasizes the authors who tend to make victimization focus on the acts of men, when this is not necessarily the case. Even though girls’ victimization is primarily because of men, their use of violence is about protecting their own bodies and feelings (and in some cases, other girls too), rather than *about* men. Discussing girls’ status as victims does not have to result in a discussion about men. As much as authors talk about men in relation to women’s political violence, for the most part, being a perpetrator is about protecting oneself, and there is a sense of agency in that, no matter how limited it may appear.

Conclusion

Sierra Leone’s RUF is a thought-provoking subject to look at when studying political violence. As the RUF included a lot of children, it is vital to understand that they are easily socialized and influence, but also to be careful about falling into a “reductionist *cul de sac*

³³ Denov, *Child Soldiers*, 13.

³⁴ Denov, *Child Soldiers*, 13.

³⁵ Denov, *Child Soldiers*, 13.

³⁶ Denov and Gervais, “Negotiating (In)Security,” 903.

³⁷ Deylami, “Saving the Enemy,” 190.

that discounts youth capacity for reasoning and independence of action.”³⁸ In viewing war as the experiences of individuals, one can begin to understand how a girl could engage in violent acts and not be completely powerless while being a victim. As this case has demonstrated, victimization can be an opportunity for agency to a degree. Looking forward, there are problems concerning post-conflict reconciliation. Today, many child soldiers involved in the RUF conflict still struggle with feelings of trauma, guilt, shame, etc. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission attempts to create a historical record of violations and abuses of human rights, there are still struggles in fully recovering.³⁹ Similar to any war torn state, former children of the RUF have lost their childhoods and were brought up in a society where violent acts became normal.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs often exclude women as they are not seen as ex-combatants.⁴¹ This is a very real consequence of only viewing women as victims, without recognizing the possibility for any other roles they may have played. The fact that a girl was victimized, does not mean she does not have the same fears a boy soldiers would have had in combat. Sylvester’s work can inform an understanding of conflict that fully realizes the duality of women’s roles without essentializing them and can also be beneficial when it comes to post-conflict healing programs.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 3

Fall 2016

The Privileged Guardian Angel: An Examination of White Saviour Complex in Western Media

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Many Critical Race Theorists today are focusing not on overt forms of racism, but instead on subtler, insinuated perpetrations. These include but are not limited to visual microaggressions. Microaggressions are embedded in everyday interactions within society and serve as subconscious visual reminders to People of Colour of their inferiority and hierarchical subjugation. I argue in this paper that the White Saviour Complex (WSC), typically seen in an imperialistic sense in the West versus Africa dichotomy, can also be studied in the visual mainstream media of Western countries. Therefore, representations of WSC in media act as visual microaggressions towards People of Colour and reinforce racial and intersectional hierarchies present in Western colonial societies. This is argued in examining three case studies from USA, Australia, and Canada. This paper then addresses possible criticisms and critiques of this position through an examination of allyship in relation to WSC.

Introduction

Following the election of Barack Obama in 2008, many mainstream media outlets provided theories that American society was becoming post-racial. This, however, is highly contested among race scholars and Critical Race Theorists. Instead of boasting about the absence of racism, Hill Collins (2004) leads us to acknowledge the 'new racism' that "relies more heavily on the manipulation of ideas within mass media" (54). Instead of obvious perpetrations based on racial slurs and race-based violence, this 'new racism' relies on fundamental racial hierarchies present in society and perpetuated by everyday practices (Essed 2002, 203). Microaggressions are crucial to this 'new racism' and are defined as "forms of systemic, everyday racism used to keep those at the margins in their place" (Huber and Solorzano 2015, 224). *Visual* microaggressions are subsequent constructions where the racialization has a visual aspect to it, such as pictures, videos, or posters. Visual microaggressions are used to remind People of Colour that they do not belong in mainstream society by perpetuating white supremacy in order to justify the Other's

subordination (Huber and Solorzano 2015, 230). Because 'new racism' is defined as being perpetuated by mass media, looking at today's social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram is crucial to understanding the way racism still has roots deeply embedded in Western societies. In this article I focus on personal as well as corporate social advocacy campaigns on these social media platforms. These campaigns are mostly rallying cries of affluent Whites to collectively rescue the global poor. The campaigns and the subsequent actions of the privileged social media users attempting to liberate the global racialized poor (typically portrayed as 'Africa') is what Teju Cole (2012) labels as the White Saviour Complex (WSC) (Cole 2012). In his article responding to the Kony 2012 video he states the WSC is "about having a big emotional experience that validates privilege" (Cole 2012). It is perpetuated by a narrative that implies white people full of agency offering up salvation to the world in order to post "the obligatory Facebook cover photo...of the ubiquitous / emaciated / malnourished African child" (Carr 2013). However, WSC is not specific to the West versus Africa dichotomy, but instead, works within the racial hierarchies and power relations present in Western societies. While profile pictures of starving black children in the arms of a white guardian angel are prolific, I argue that representations of domestic WSC are equally as prevalent and serve as visual reassurances of white benevolence and observable reminders of the agency that People of Colour seemingly lack in society. Therefore, I argue that visual representations of WSC act as visual microaggressions on popular media sites to repress People of Colour and to reproduce power hierarchies in colonial, white dominate societies (specific examples from USA, Australia and Canada are used). Firstly, I will explain the origins of WSC and the role imperialism has in the reproductions and domestication of the phenomenon. I will then turn to three case studies, in which the WSC is perpetuated: an Instagram post by Leigh-Ann Tuohy explaining how she donated money to two black men for a basketball game, the video posted by Stacy Eden showing her defending a Muslim couple against a verbal attacker, and the poster designed by One Billion Rising that shows an Indigenous woman with a hand across her face, silenced. I will end off with a discussion of possible counter arguments by saying that these representations of WSC are simply a form of solidarity politics among dominant white discourses.

Imperialism and the White Saviour Complex

Imperialism is a central tenant to the white saviour complex (WSC) since it is one of the ways in which WSC across international borders is justified. Imperialist discourses are reproduced through elitist conversations surrounding the White Saviours. This is seen in a plethora of different examples in mass media, however, for the purpose of this section I will focus on the Kony 2012 video. This video directly supplements the imperialist conversation by inciting the US military to intervene in the Lord's Resistance Army created by Joseph Kony (Kony 2012, 15:20). This call on US military is a plea to use imperialist, militaristic powers to solve problems. Moreover, the legacies of colonialism that have caused of the power vacuums that allow warlords like Kony to exist are completely forgotten. The incitement of American military forces and rejection of historical colonialism is a such a gross reproduction of WSC because not only is it advocating for direct military intervention where a country did not ask for it but it also presents Africa as full of "barbarism and

passive suffering” while showing the White world as full of agency and empathy (Adyanga Akena 2014, 57).

Another imperialist element in WSC is an overestimation of the positive impact on the subject of aid. In Kony 2012, the commentator, Russell (2012) explicitly states that plastering posters on street corners, wearing shirts or bracelets, and sending a preprinted message to your political representative will “change the course of human history” (8:43). This is a gross overestimation on the impact of global aid and a glorification of the work done by the NGO Invisible Children (the NGO responsible for this video). It presents the young, mostly white people living in America as the omnipotent bearers of justice and peace while those so unfortunate enough to have been born in Africa as the beneficiaries of these white hearts. Imperialism is rampant in this because imperialism is practiced with the intention of producing societies similar to the imperialist ones, societies in which the Western world becomes exalted and superior (Tomlinson 2002, 3). Therefore, inherently, a positive impact is believed to be made on the subject countries and while often there is an enormous impact, it is not largely positive. Therefore, imperialism is reproduced in the falsification and dramatization of positive impacts such as the claims made in the Kony 2012 video.

Another imperialist power hierarchy at play is the overidentification with the racialized group. The narrative that a privileged, white, middle class activist from America could relate to and represent an impoverished, former child soldier would be laughable situation, if it weren’t for the fact that it has grave implications. It serves to trivialize the experiential knowledge of the racialized Other. In this case, Jacob, “our friend from Africa” (Russell 2012, 5:58), experienced horrific events in which Russell and the rest of the Invisible Children claim to understand. His victimhood is appropriated in order to be played out in the video and he is revictimized as he is forced to relive horrific memories of his brother being slaughtered simply for the reproduction of the video (Bex and Craps 2016, 36). As Russell reassures Jacob, he surely has no idea what the man is experiencing yet tries to insinuate that his life will be okay now because he has a white saviour by his side. Imperialist powers often play out this relationship, claiming to know what is going on, how to fix it, and feigning innocence in the reasons these countries are in these situations to begin with.

All of these implications serve to reinforce the imperialistic tenants of WSC when it is played out in the international community, however, the scope of this essay is on domestic versions of the complex. Therefore, while WSC has its roots in imperialism, a more appropriate label should be discussed. The term I will use is neatly defined by Young (1999) as cultural imperialism. In her book she describes what takes place as a paradoxical oppression where People of Colour are both marked out as the Other but also rendered invisible and silent (285). While not including international imperialistic discourses, domestic WSC represents aspects of it as well as the cultural imperialism just described. The objects of WSC in the following examples are not inhabitants of another part of the world, yet they are part of different social and racial groups and, therefore, cultural imperialist discourses are enacted when they are simultaneously pointed as different and silenced in conversations surrounding their own personal experiences. While studying

first the realm of international imperialism, then turning to domestic cultural imperialism, it is apparent that these two forms interact with each other to produce the ruling tenants of WSC. Imperialism and cultural imperialism then render representations of WSC to act as visual microaggressions against People of Colour in colonial white dominant societies.

Case Studies

Leigh-Anne Tuohy's Instagram Post

This case study follows the story of an Instagram post made by Leigh-Anne Tuohy, who became a small-scale celebrity after the release of the cinematic blockbuster "The Blind Side" in 2009 (Montez de Oca 2012, 131). This film follows her story as a white, upper class mother who takes in a homeless, black high school student. He then becomes a football prodigy and presently has a successful career in the NFL. While this story has its own implications of WSC, this study focuses on another incident: a recent social media post made by Tuohy. The post, uploaded with a picture of Tuohy with two black teenagers smiling trepidatiously by her side, tells a story of the black men who were sitting at a table in a fast food restaurant. After hearing a racial stereotype by a colleague, Tuohy proceeds, in her quest to prove the friend wrong, to approach the boys and demand why they were in the restaurant. After proving to her they were just trying to "scrape together" three dollars in order to afford entry into a basketball game, Tuohy graciously gives them money for two entries, bus fare, and popcorn (The Belle Jar 2015). She sends them on their way, not before coercing them into taking a glorifying photo with her, which she proceeded to instantly upload to her Instagram profile.

The perpetuation of WSC is rampant in the above event for a multiplicity of reasons. Firstly, the boys in the photo did not seek out the help of Tuohy. They had her aid thrust upon them when they were silently sitting in a corner of a fast food restaurant. They were presumed guilty and poor. With the theories of cultural imperialism used in Young's article, they were transcribed with common attributes of their race (Young 1988, 279). Money was thrust upon them, as they became the medium for a white woman to perform her morality. Tuohy's narrative is further stripped of its benevolent façade in the subsequent publication of the other, forgotten side of the situation. In this opposing narrative, one of the black teens (who deliberately remains nameless to protect his own privacy) told a Facebook user that he and his friend could have easily gotten into the game with their own money. The other friend wanted to wait for his uncle to pay for him, hence why they said they were trying to find money for the game. To add insult to injury, the game was three blocks down the street, therefore, they did not need nor receive the so called bus fare that Tuohy had allegedly provided them with (The Belle Jar 2015). When asked about the picture, he replied with:

Yeah she never actually asked for it as she was handing us the money she was like "hey you know what I think this would be a great picture" and everyone with her was yeah totally so we just kinda went along with the situation (The Belle Jar 2015).

Only later on did they realize what her intentions were. When the experiential knowledge of the teenager and his personal narrative of the event surfaced, obviously it became

further entrenched in the WSC narrative. Tuohy exploits the falsified stories of these young men to further her persona as a philanthropic white woman.

This acts as a visual microaggression because of the ways in which it is a reminder for the boys, and People of Colour, that they consistently need help from the privileged class. Not only did she share her narrative, but she also had to create a visual (therefore more pertinent) representation of the event. Cultural imperialism acts alongside WSC in the fact that the historical connotations and power relations that favour whites are completely ignored. The privilege of the rich, white woman is further perpetuated when she refuses to acknowledge this privilege and claims that racism does not exist within this interaction (Essed 2002, 210). She ignores the intricacies of the 'new racism' that Hill Collins (2004) discusses and in doing that, perpetuates the forces of power that serve to enforce white people as superior and keep People of Colour below. Therefore, in this post, Leigh-Anne Tuohy creates a visual microaggression in the representation of the WSC to remind the racialized Other that she will always be around to save the day.

Stacy Eden's Train Video

In this video that went viral in 2015 a young Australian woman (Stacey Eden) defends a Muslim couple on a train in Sydney. The couple was getting verbally attacked by a white, middle-aged woman who was making confused and racist links between the Islamic State and the women's hijab. Eden jumps in after allegedly listening to it for ten minutes, but not before turning on a recording device so that she could subsequently post it on social media (Youtube 2015). The response to the video, which was labeled 'Legend' Stacey Eden defends Muslim couple on Sydney train, was generally positive, with people praising her for countering Islamophobia and saving the poor couple (Youtube 2015). However, she was also scathingly referred to by some as "a white knight in shining armor [who] swoops in to save the day" (Nagesh 2015). I argue that the video by Stacey Eden is problematic for a number of reasons, and helps form a microaggression which all but disappears against the blatant racism of the first part of the video.

The way in which she frames the women's hijab creates a discourse void of a Muslim voice. While some discourses around the hijab do indeed cite modesty concerns as the reason for it, Muslim women have very different personal reasons for wearing this garment. The hijab is a very pious and personal part of Islam and there are many different interpretations of the Qur'an that leads women to wear it (Arabs in America 2016). As it varies greatly across the religion, it is neither right nor prudent for Eden to speak for this woman and take over the conversation of the hijab. Eden also labels her as a "poor woman" when she is responding to the hijab comment. In doing this, Eden perpetuates the woman as a helpless victim and appropriates the conversation over the hijab. She overidentifies with the Muslim woman and claims to know and understand why the woman is wearing the garment and seeks to explain it, whereas, in reality, being a white, non-Muslim, she simply cannot claim to understand at all.

The mainstream discussion following the release of this video follows the frame that she stepped in and saved this couple from being abused since they were not standing up for

themselves. However, in the video, there is a moment when the man looks as if he wants to speak, opens his mouth to take a breath but is cut off by another one of Eden's counterpoints. So, not only is she appropriating the conversation over Islamophobia but she is physically repressing the ability for them to defend themselves personally (Youtube 2015, 00:07). In flying to the rescue with her personal account of Islam she takes the voice away from the people who are actually affected and who have to deal with the repercussions. It takes agency away from the couple and, instead of supporting them she speaks over them.

The aftermath of this video furthered the entrenchment of the WSC in this situation. Eden's name was posted everywhere and talked about on every media outlet. Contrarily, the affected couple remained relatively silent and nameless, without a public voice in this issue. This is problematic in the fact that Eden directed, starred in, and produced her own narrative on the racist rants that do not oppress her but someone else completely. In doing this she appropriates the situation to further her own goals of making her benevolence a public commodity. Stacey Eden, then, is acting as a white savior and producing a visual microaggression since it reminds People of Colour that even when the conversation is directed to explicitly marginalize and oppress, the racialized voice will not be heard in the debates. It serves to reinforce the invisibility inflicted on them from all sides, even by the ones who are trying to help it. Therefore, it reinforces that when dealing with overtly racist situations, only another white person can confront it.

Poster for One Billion Rising

The last case study in this essay is perhaps the most nuanced in its reproduction of the White Saviour Complex as a microaggression. The poster studied is one in which an Indigenous woman (Ashley Campbell from the Enoch Nation in Alberta, Canada) is featured with a male's hand over her mouth with the message that Native women of Canada are vanishing (One Billion Rising 2013). Not only was her picture used without her consent but it also symbolically perpetuates Indigenous women as silent within mainstream discourses (Daniels 2016, 17). The poster revictimizes the already marginalized group in Canada and serves to paint them as a group in dire need of saving from outside sources. While the poster itself might not explicitly depict WSC, an examination of the organization behind the poster makes the reproduction of WSC and subsequent visual microaggressions very apparent.

The poster in question is a piece of advertising for white feminist Eve Ensler's One Billion Rising campaign. This campaign calls for February 14 as a day in which women from across the world dance in protest of violence perpetrated against them. In 2013, they chose to spotlight Canada to bring awareness to the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women movement (MMIW). However, February 14 was and still is an extremely significant day for MMIW. Their own grassroots organizations have organized and participated in awareness marches on February 14 since 1990, starting first in the Downtown Eastside Vancouver (Daniels 2016, 17). One Billion Rising is rooted in white, western feminism and, therefore, the appropriations of this particular day as well as the insinuation that Indigenous women

in Canada need the help of huge, transnational movements are a perpetuation of the WSC. The poster consequently serves as a visual microaggression against the grassroots activism and Indigenous women in Canada, silencing their voices and directing people to believe in the vanishing nature of Indigenous culture and their women.

There was also backlash due to the universal language used in the poster and campaign. This language include “we all unite” with “all rape victims” in order to describe the “solidarity” of all women in the world. It is furthered with the following phrase: “[Indigenous] women can be dehumanized and disregarded, so can every woman in that country” (One Billion Rising 2013). This is delegitimizing the extreme violence Indigenous women face disproportionately to white women. Nobody else can embody and understand the use of systemic and state-led violence against Indigenous women in Canada except Indigenous women themselves. The campaign and the poster serve to essentialize all women’s experience and serve to group sexual violence as one experience, when in reality rape is a heavily politicized atrocity, especially for Indigenous women. The erasure of the politics of rape is extremely problematic. When discussing rape as something only perpetrated by civilians against civilians it erases the politics of MMIW and erases the narratives from grassroots movements that are trying to speak out. Therefore, the poster and campaigns perpetuate the racial hierarchies and whitewash deeply racialized and colonial experiences in Canada. The poster serves as a salient visual microaggression and literally depicts the silencing of Indigenous women while simultaneously speaking for and over them. This renders the Indigenous women mute in the global arena and with belief that they do not have the agency required to emancipate themselves from the universalizing discourses of white feminism.

An Ally versus White Saviour

The previous case studies and subsequent discussion of WSC can be interpreted as controversial by some. To many, WSC is just an over-labeled form of allyship. In that, the individuals and organizations mentioned above are simply trying to save People of Colour from damaging forms of oppression. Acts of unsolicited generosity, verbal defense, and campaigning are seen as ways to liberate and protect People of Colour from the ‘real’ and blatant racist practices. However, there is a line between White Saviours and allies, albeit a very thin one. While the academic literature focusing on allies is sparse, the distinction between allies and white saviours that I choose to focus on is *privilege*. One blog post suggests that the difference between being a white savior and an ally is accepting and acknowledging your privilege (Safeek 2014). None of the White people in the case studies acknowledge their own forms of privilege that allow them to be inhabit a position of aid. As an owner of thousands of restaurant chains around the country, Leigh-Anne Tuohy does not account for the historical connotations and the exploitation of human labour that allows her to inhabit a rich, colonial space dominated by Whites and used to exploit People of Colour. Stacey Eden does not acknowledge that, as an Australian-born, white citizen, she is in no danger of being further attacked or unfairly arrested for her actions on the train. In opposition the brown couple have strict mores on how they can react due to social structures and acceptable identities pertaining to their race. Lastly, One Billion Stars Rising fails to realize the intersectional violence, including systematic rape and murder that

happens not simply because of gender, but specifically because of the intersectionality of gender *and* culture *and* race *and* socioeconomic status. Confronting and admitting these privileges, according to Safeek (2014) would lead to a potentially less harmful discourse than WSC.

However, in Andrea Smith's blog she specifically states that the unraveling of privilege occurs not by people simply understanding or stating their privilege but "through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the system that enable those privileges" (Smith 2013). I argue that this framing is more destructive to cultural imperialism than the last. Even if the above case studies recognized that they are privileged because of systemic, historical, and institutionalized practices it would not change the deep-seated racial hierarchical creation that is rampant in white dominant countries. Smith (2013) goes so far as to say a confession of privilege serves to reinforce those racial hierarchies. Likewise, some scholars argued the admission of privilege (in this specific example the admission of "I am a settler") turns into a performance in which the performer is dismissing guilt specifically because 'if they are aware of it they can't be guilty' mindset (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, and Corntassel 2014, 16). Therefore, simply an acknowledgement of privilege is not enough to transform white saviours into allies as it only serves to reinforce the hierarchies present.

Smith (2013) does make note in her blog post of addressing privileges collectively, rather than individually. Addressing privileges individually serves to make people partake in the 'Oppression Olympics'. What she does say to do is collectively address issues regarding this oppression. This logic makes sense when returning to Young's (1988) discussion of oppression. In it she says that the word 'oppression' has been swapped for 'discrimination' in most discussion circles, which is problematic because oppression brings the collective into the conversation whereas discrimination is rooted in individual situations (Young 1988, 277). She upholds that oppression has not been eradicated with the laws and policy changes of the Civil Rights Movement, yet continues on in a collective manner in everyday interactions (279). Therefore, just as oppression should be discussed collectively, so should privilege.

This relates back to the conversation of allies and white saviours due to the fact that, to be an ally one must firstly understand (however not flaunt or perform) a privilege, but also try to dismantle the *collective* privilege that exists in institutions and everyday racisms. This needs to happen, not in trying to save the People of Colour from these institutions but by standing in solidarity with them as they do it themselves. It means not pigeonholing them to a particular activity or social class (in the case of Leigh-Anne Tuohy), not talking over them or for them in pushbacks against racist language (in the case of Stacey Eden), nor assuming all experiences are the same and ignoring the implications of colonialism (in the case of One Billion Rising). What it does mean is working with them to dismantle the very ways in which our society and culture is reproduced, and to restructure societal institutions to be more equitable in relation to one another and the land.

Conclusion

This essay has explained visual microaggressions and how representations of the White Saviour Complex in white dominate societies serve as reminders for People of Colour enforcing their otherness and invisibility. Usually, the White Saviour Complex is discussed in terms of international situations where white, rich westerners are believed to have lasting and meaningful impacts on the foreign societies that they are 'helping'. Representations of the White Saviour Complex usually take the form of white volunteers in a huddle of black, malnourished children. These representations are posted to Facebook, Instagram, and other social media sharing sites to reinforce the benevolence and agency of the white saviour in wanting to change these injustices and, more importantly, *being able to* change these injustices. Imperialism is an important tenant of WSC because of the mindset and actions it reproduces in the international society. This article takes a different approach to WSC as it examines it within the context of white dominant, racialized societies (specifically America, Australia, and Canada) and not as an imperialistic phenomenon). Although imperialism is still an important aspect of domestic WSC, cultural imperialism is brought to the forefront when discussing the particular examples of visual microaggressions previously mentioned. Although all the examples are of women perpetrators, to be clear, this is incidental and not intended to produce a critique of white women saviours only. It might, however, lend itself to the theory of the feminization of aid for disadvantaged Others. Though this is a pertinent topic, it is not in the scope of this article to address it. I end with a discussion of white saviours versus allies in an attempt to respond to what skeptics might say in relation to the case studies. In conclusion of that debate, WSC is only avoided when collective privileges are not just recognized but confronted. Therefore, defying racism does not mean performing a benevolent act or voicing personal opinions and solutions and publishing them. Allyship is a firm stance *beside* the community allied with and a helpful yet ambient role in the dissolution of power hierarchies that serve to keep them in a state of cultural imperialism.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 4

Fall 2016

Colombia and the FARC: Peace and Amnesty

By Juan Felipe

This policy brief takes a look at the issue of the 50-year war that has been ongoing between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army). It is "written" by Colombia's chief of the government's negotiating team at the peace talks in Havana, and is to be "presented" to the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos. It looks at the background of the conflict, as well as efforts to end it. The brief highlights 3 pieces of proposed ways in which the conflict could be ended. It looks at strict government guidelines, all-out war, and amnesty. It specifically highlights amnesty as the most effective method that should be pursued by the government. (Between the time when this brief was written in March 2016 and the present, the peace talks were concluded, brought to a referendum on October 2nd that would fully accept the agreements, and failed to pass.)

Issue

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejercito del Pueblo —FARC—EP*) are a Colombian insurgency group that has been engaged in constant conflict with the Colombian Government since its creation in 1964. Since then, around **222,000 deaths (176,000 of which were civilian) can be attributed to the conflict**. In addition, **the conflict has also displaced around 6,000,000 Colombians internally** (Hataway, 1). These displacements have disproportionately affected indigenous peoples and afro-descendant peoples of the country. This is largely due to the fact that rebel groups tend to set their bases in the rural areas that are often also occupied by indigenous and afro-descendant settlements. All of the harm, however, cannot be attributed to the FARC. Many problems have also been perpetrated by other guerrilla forces (such as M19 and ELN), the Colombian military, as well as right-wing paramilitary sources (Murillo, 3). Apart from the large amounts of murder attributable to these groups, many other sorts of human rights violations have been perpetrated by these groups. Among many of the crimes committed by the FARC, many are drug-related and many are related to civilian and public official kidnappings. In

the 30-year span before 2010, FARC allegedly **kidnapped 9,447 people. 3,325 of these have been confirmed** (Manrique, 5).



Background

FARC was born out of a violent era in Colombian named *La Violencia* that lasted from 1948-1957, and claimed the lives of 300,000 Colombians (Molano, 2). This era was defined by endless violence between Colombian Liberals and Conservatives. Fuelled by Marxist ideals in a bipartisan state, FARC claimed its fight to be against the oligarchic state of the country. It was created by rural workers and peasants mostly in need for legitimate advocacy for rural needs, instead of elite needs (Hataway, 5). Soon after, it began to receive claims of legitimacy and funds from the Soviet Union. Apart from these, the group, as well as other guerrilla groups, started to take more charge of their own funding in the 1970's through the heavy production and distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Large amounts of these funds were allocated towards more weapons, as well as the resources to recruit more troops (Hataway, 6).

Throughout FARC's history, there have been many attempts at peace. However, many of these attempts fell through after complications from the government or from FARC leaders and members. The largest faltering points for peace have generally been a lack of trust in the government or a FARC inability to recognize their crimes as anything other than political crimes. Many also saw peace as a way to delegitimize their struggle (Hataway, 5).

Shortly after taking office in 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos secretly organized various meetings with FARC, to discuss the renewal of peace talks. In 2012, Santos also set up meetings with the Governments of Venezuela and Cuba, with which the FARC shares similar communist ideologies (Hataway, 8). After various meetings in Havana, these

parties and more came upon an agreement to have proper participation towards an agreement of peace. This initial agreement came to be known as the Havana Accord (Government of Colombia, 1).

Recommendation 1: Strict government guidelines

In the early 80's, a committee for peace was created by then president Belisario Betancur. Part of this peace included legitimizing the FARC's political attempts and giving them political power. The FARC renounced kidnapping and effectively created a political party named the *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union — UP), which succeeded to some degree in the elections. However, any sort of future growth was stunted by further acts of guerrilla violence, including the taking of the Palace of Justice by the M19 on November 6, 1985 (Molano, 5). To make things worse, constant assassinations throughout the decade had left around 3,000 UP ex-FARC members dead, mostly at the hands of the paramilitaries, who had been receiving large sums of money from Pablo Escobar (Manrique, 6; Molano, 5). While many FARC members lay down their weapons, many others returned to violence, and attempts at peace fell through (Molano, 5).

Another attempt at peace began in 1998 under Andrés Pastrana and failed in 2002. Again, recurring themes to this failure revolved around the inability to compromise, inability to claim responsibility, and fragmentation within the government and within FARC. Again, a huge barrier to proper agreement was the inability on either side to have a proper ceasefire, as well as unexpected paramilitary actions (Harvey, 112).

A main barrier to proper compromise remains the inability of the Colombian people to see FARC in the way that FARC wants to be seen. (This will further be developed in recommendation 3.) Without this consensus from the people, it would seem that the Colombian people would demand similar processes to previous ones. **The Colombian people do not want to cede the FARC the image that it wants to project onto itself, and as long as this remains the status quo, new peace talks can easily be doomed to play out like their predecessors.** Under strict government guidelines that lack the ability to compromise, FARC will never be willing to go through on talks. As an insurgent group, FARC still has an agenda and it will not give it up easily.

Following strict government guidelines would give the people of Colombia what they want, if it were to work. There would be large demilitarization of these groups, as well as a full range of punishment for their crimes. Through Colombia's extradition laws, many of these criminals would also face extradition to the United States, because their crimes would likely fail to be described as political (Hataway 3). Generally, these are the expectations of the Colombian people, but there is no consensus on this from guerrillas, and guidelines like this would cause talks to fail once again, as they have many times before under similar

situations. Even worse, **it would also create distrust within FARC ranks, where these tensions have been hugely decreased in the past few years.**

Recommendation 2: All-out war

The second recommendation bases itself on much more theoretical views of the Colombian conflict, as explained by Andres Fabio Diaz and Syed Mansoob Murshed (281). It calls for all-out war to defeat insurgency groups in Colombia, not just FARC. Essentially, **this recommendation calls for Colombia to grasp a monopoly on the use of force within the country.** In doing so, Colombia would find peace and properly build a state which is built on this peace. It observes a country with a monopoly on force also being a state that can effectively put in institutions that properly preserve this monopoly. As shown in the first recommendation, all past peace processes to deal with guerrillas in Colombia have failed, and have seen a return to war. Through a decisive military victory, **Colombia would properly ensure that these groups would have an incredibly decreased ability to have strong returns to violence.** In the end, war would be seen as beneficial for the sake of the country. It is also pointed out that around 37% of peace treaties fail within 5 years (Diaz and Murshed, 283). In their theory, they see war as having a longer-lasting effect on the country than a seemingly dubious treaty in terms of effectiveness.

One of Colombia's strongest allies in its fight against the FARC and other guerrillas has been the United States. In 2000, it began Plan Colombia, an increased tactic in fighting against guerrillas, as well as against narco-trafficking. The United States invested \$1.2 billion into the training the Colombian army, as well as equipping it to fight against traffickers, more so than against insurgents (Dube & Naidu, 4). However, seeing as most insurgent groups were also tied to drugs, this training hit both. **Plan Colombia did however work into driving FARC farther more into the jungle** (Hataway, 6). Colombia seeking war with its insurgent groups would greatly be backed up by the US government, who would continue to serve as an ally and help Colombia in the war.

Many problems arise with the idea of Colombia pursuing a war against FARC, ELN and M19. The main one comes at the sake of the people of Colombia. Diaz and Murshed (281) give us perhaps the "easier" and shortest attempt at fixing the problem, yet we see a complete disregard for civilians and victims of the war that would further be entrenched as this war develops around them, as well as the accelerating death toll that goes hand in hand with these policies. Furthermore, **there are large issues with completely getting rid of a problem while not getting rid of the factors that bred the issue in the first place.** Diaz and Murshed also tell us this, saying that the problems regarding inequality in the country would remain untouched, and would offer great risk to the longevity of this peace (282). By eradicating guerrilla forces, the government could also effectively create a vacuum for newer groups to emerge.

Risks from US aid are also prevalent with this solution. The paramilitary has often been very tied to the Colombian Military, and giving more resources to the latter would see an echo of resources from within paramilitary ranks (Dube & Naidu, 2). **There is no benefit**

in giving this sort of aid to paramilitary groups that have a very notorious record of human rights abuses. Furthermore, observing the US' actions through realist theory, we can see that a lot of the reasons for which the United States gave much of its aid to Colombia was to curb drug trafficking, an issue that greatly plagued the US. In this self-serving nature, we realize that Plan Colombia effectively dealt more with drugs than with guerrillas, a problem that didn't directly threaten the United States, as opposed to the distribution of drugs. The US showed that it cared more about problems that affected it most. (Dube & Naidu, 2).

Recommendation 3: Amnesty

On August 26, 2012, after months of conversation, the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP agreed upon an agenda for the process of peace in Havana, Cuba. Cuba, and specifically Fidel Castro, were crucial in ensuring the initiation of these talks (Hataway, 19). In a document released by the Government titled "*General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace*" (Now known as the Havana Accord), the two sides defined what was to come out of the talks, setting six main resolutions. On September 23 2015, the promise that peace would be complete in 6 months was sealed by President Juan Manuel Santos, in a historic handshake with FARC leader 'Timochenko'. These talks were overseen by the Governments of Cuba, Norway and Venezuela. This process has as a final objective, the goal of amnesty towards members of the FARC. The following are the six resolutions proposed by the Accord and what they generally comprise.



- a. Integrated agricultural development policy — Rural reform**
- Safe access to the use of productive land
 - Development programs with territorial focuses

- Proper infrastructure surrounding land
- Social programs that seek to ameliorate quality of life and the eradication of poverty
- **This resolution deals with many of the problems that led to the creation of the FARC**
- The negotiations for this resolution reached an agreement on May 26 2013 (Hataway, 10)

b. Political participation

- The ability to be a participating part of the Colombian democratic system
- The ability to work on a political system that can be accessible to everyone regardless of where they live
- A huge factor in this part of the resolution is the ability to recognize the FARC's crimes as political, which are defined as crimes committed in relation to their insurgency. **This would give them and their struggle governmental legitimacy, and would recognize the government's immense harms in the conflict.** In regards to how this affects the Colombian people, this would take away much of the legitimacy of the crimes that it committed against the Colombian people. Furthermore, this would not allow extradition to the US, as political crimes in Colombia do not warrant extradition, by law (Hataway, 16).
- An agreement was reached on November 6 2013 (Hataway, 11)

c. Solution to the problem of illicit drugs

- Solution to the production and sale of narcotics
- Programs set into place to deal with consumption and addiction
- Programs set in place to have stronger transitions towards legal crops
- Perhaps the most important resolution in respect to the international community, negotiators reached an agreement on May 16, 2014 (Hataway, 12)

d. Victims

- This resolution seemed to have stronger discussions about truth and the nature of the conflict
- It also sought the truth about victims and the human rights violations that came with the conflict
- The UN-Colombia, along with the National University brought together a group of victims from throughout Colombia to speak to negotiators. They discussed the circumstances surrounding the talks and the process with which the guerrillas should be treated. While negotiators came to an agreement on September 23 2016, **many victims do not see the guidelines chosen as true justice** (Hataway, 15).

e. End of the conflict

- A definitive bilateral ceasefire
- Disarmament and demobilization
- Reincorporation of the FARC into civil life
- A guarantee of security

- Stronger attempts to decrease the issues of corruption within the country, as well as human rights abuses
- As of March 29 2016, the conflict has still not reached an end. This means that the deadline set in September was not met. This now greatly damages ties and can potentially be fatal to the talks. President Santos said earlier in February that if this could not be met, it would show that perhaps the FARC was not ready for peace, as the Washington Office on Latin America reports.
- Throughout the duration of the talks, the FARC have not pushed for their own cessation of their actions. In late 2014, talks had to be suspended when a General in the Colombian army was kidnapped by the FARC (Barbari). Smaller events of violence and other kidnappings, as well as continuous trafficking of drugs did not help in decreasing suspicions of the FARC's sincerity.
- Part of the ceasefire would **include creating demilitarized concentration zones for FARC members**. These zones will be crucial to ensuring that the FARC demobilizes and disarms properly (Isacson). The government must ensure that these areas are as respected and as effective as possible, as a large stake of successful peace rests on this. **International verification and oversight must also be allowed**. The United Nations will also take a large part of ensuring this process goes through efficiently.
- Despite missing the deadline for a ceasefire, it still seems as if officials and guerrillas are closing in on a final agreement, signifying the end of the conflict with the FARC (Ayuso and Hansen).

f. Implementation, verification and ratification

- Through several mechanisms, the negotiators call for proper implementations of the agreements reached. However, without having met the demand for a proper ceasefire and the end of FARC activities, this resolution is not yet on the horizon.
- Despite agreements on most resolutions, the peace talks fail to garner support from a large amount of Colombians. For many, the actions of the FARC have had direct impacts on their lives, and giving amnesty to these people is not a popular solution.
- Researchers from the Universidad Javeriana in Bogota interviewed around 400 people from the city, and found varying results regarding whether certain groups deserved forgiveness in varying scenarios.

	Never	Hesitant	Depending	Always	Total (Means)
Condition					
• Paramilitary	14	31	35	20	100
• Guerrillas	43	31	12	14	100
• Military	49	27	12	12	100

• Drug Dealers	48	27	12	13	100
Participants					
• Female	70 (36%)	60 (31%)	39 (20%)	26 (13%)	195
• Male	84 (41%)	56 (27%)	32 (16%)	33 (16%)	205
• Mean Age	32	35	34	36	34
• Very Poor Class	43 (29%)	40 (27%)	35 (24%)	29 (20%)	147
• Poor Class	67 (41%)	46 (28%)	25 (15%)	25 (15%)	163
• Lower-Middle Class	23 (46%)	17 (34%)	8 (16%)	2 (4%)	50
• Upper-Middle Class	12 (48%)	10 (40%)	2 (8%)	1 (4%)	25
• Wealthy Class	9 (60%)	3 (20%)	1 (7%)	2 (13%)	15
Total	154 (38%)	116 (29%)	71 (18%)	59 (15%)	400

Table 1: (Lopez-Lopez, W et al. 293)

- While this study showcases well the general attitudes regarding the process, it still has its limitations. The small sample size has fault in not representing Colombia's 48 million people as effectively. The people chosen for the study, from the capital, also show a great bias, as many of them may not have had to have direct experience with paramilitaries, who have had greater presence in rural parts of the country. (Lopez-Lopez, 13)
- In regards to the United States, it is likely that if extradition is avoided, the US could demand for FARC leaders to be tried and punished in Colombia. The US still sees the effects of the Colombian drug trade in the US, and will unlikely be lenient on the leaders and their actions. Clearly, the Colombian people will demand the same. **This however will not be enough to greatly affect Colombian relations with the United States, as refusal to follow extradition orders have not damaged the relation before** (Hataway, 26). **The Colombian government must choose the option that effectively balances justice and reconciliation.**
- It is imperative for Colombians to understand the process. Colombians need to understand the precedents that have been set in regards to peace talks. **While it may not be what most Colombians want, amnesty is the only viable option to peace.** In order to get the best outcome for the country in the long run, **the most pragmatic option is the one that must be taken.** While victims may not get full justice, ensuring that the FARC disassembles also ensures that they will not have any more victims. However, the suspicion felt towards FARC by Colombians is not

something that will go away easily. **It is clear that the path towards reconciliation is one that every Colombian must walk.**

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 5

Fall 2016

A Summary and Analysis of J.R. Miller's "The Southern Numbered Treaties," and Sharon Venne's "Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective"

By Miranda Watters

There are many accounts of the history of the treaties between the Crown and the Indigenous peoples in Canada. This paper summarizes and analyses two of them. J.R. Miller, history professor emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, gives an account of treaties one through seven in his article, "The Southern Numbered Treaties," which is contained in his book *Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada*. Sharon Venne, an accomplished First Nations lawyer and member of the Cree Nation, also writes about the treaties in southern Canada, focusing particularly on treaty six, in "Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective." These two articles analyze the processes of treaty making, and offer perspectives contrary to the popular narrative, as well as arguing that the popular narrative does not include the entire history. This paper starts by summarizing each article separately, then analyses some of the main points. The analysis will argue in favour of the arguments put forth by Venne and Miller.

Miller's piece, "The Southern Numbered Treaties," explains why treaties between Canada and the Indigenous peoples were necessary, and recounts the negotiations that took place. Miller also outlines some of the injustices the Indigenous faced. He writes that the Crown made promises in the verbal agreements that weren't included in the written treaties, and explains that although Metis people played a significant role in some of the agreements, they weren't included in the treaties (Miller 2009). Miller writes that the approach Commissioner Morris, the treaty commissioner, had taken for the first treaties was to take advantage of the disagreements among the Indigenous peoples, and emphasize the benevolence of the monarchy to them (Miller 2009). By Treaty 5, the Commissioner changed his approach to be more frugal, and Treaty 5 awarded much less land and monetary compensation to the Indigenous peoples than in the previous treaties; The Crown also refused more of the requests for reserve lands (Miller 2009). By Treaty 7, the Indigenous peoples were becoming more worried about their livelihoods, with the Crown making unclear promises to protect the buffalo (Miller 2009). Miller concludes by stating

that the proceedings of these treaties show that the European colonizers grew to be more selfish, and less respectful of the Indigenous peoples' cultures (Miller 2009).

Similar to Miller's argument of the written treaties being incomplete, Sharon Venne criticizes the written version of Treaty 6, claiming it is not the full account of the agreement, in her writing, "Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective." Venne explains that the verbal agreement made during the treaty talks is much different than the written version, and describes the accuracy and importance of verbal accounts in Indigenous culture (Venne 1997). To better describe the Indigenous peoples' perspective of Treaty 6, she explains the governance and customs of the Indigenous people who were party to the treaty talks, emphasizing that a sophisticated form of democratic governing was in place at the time, and that the Indigenous people had their own very distinct culture and society (Venne 1997). She corroborates Miller's perspective of the treaty predominantly benefitting the settlers, as opposed to the Indigenous peoples, and gives examples of ways Treaty 6 has been violated per the verbal agreement; such as the Canadian government taking advantage of the provision for education, and dishonouring the hunting and fishing rights of the Indigenous peoples (Venne 1997). Venne concludes her piece by urging Indigenous peoples to tell their stories, and share their experiences of colonialism (Venne 1997).

The argument Miller and Venne make that treaties were necessary for the Europeans to continue to settle on what is now known as Canadian lands is contrary to the popular narrative surrounding the treaty making process, which suggests that the Indigenous peoples agreed to treaties because they were desperate for help. Venne gives her position on the matter in her explanation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, stating that colonial settlers were bound by their own laws to obtain the consent of the Indigenous peoples to use their land. Miller makes his contribution to the argument when he explains that "First Nations...made it clear to the Canadian government that failure to negotiate with them prior to the entry of settlers would lead to difficulties" (Miller 2009). These statements show that the Indigenous peoples were self sufficient and held the political power at the time, and that the Crown needed their favour in order to continue to settle on the land. Venne highlights that the Indigenous peoples had "well established and functioning" (Venne 1997) governments, emphasizing that these societies were a "democracy, in the full sense of the word" (Venne 1997).

To argue further that the Indigenous peoples faced injustices due to the treaties, Miller writes about the provisions contained in Treaty 1 that the Crown did not include in the written agreement, such as hunting rights. Excluding a provision so important to the livelihood of Indigenous peoples foreshadows the disrespect the Crown would grow to hold for them as the negotiations continued. This disrespect manifests itself more clearly in Treaty 5, when the Crown representatives lower the compensation and the amount of reserve land for the Indigenous, and in Treaty 7, when concerns for the livelihood of Indigenous peoples is met with vague promises to protect the buffalo. By these acts, the Crown reveals their greed, and that they take their kinship with the Indigenous peoples for granted.

Venne adds to the argument of the Crown omitting provisions from the written treaties in her details of Treaty 6. She writes that the oral account of the treaty differs from the written document, and explains that the oral account is what was truly negotiated. To give claim to this argument, she states that “the means of passing on information [in oral culture] is via storytelling” (Venne 1997), and that these stories hold great accuracy. Some of the examples she gives of the oral account contradicting the written account include the education and hunting provisions. Of these, Venne explains that Treaty 6 promised “universal access to education for all Indigenous peoples” (Venne 1997), but that forced attendance, although never discussed, was implemented by way of residential schools. As well, the treaty commissioner promised that the animals would stay under the jurisdiction of the Indigenous peoples, however, the Natural Resources Transfer Act declared that the provinces have jurisdiction over the natural resources in their borders, which is a clear violation of the agreement.

Miller and Venne make bold claims in arguing that the treaties were required for settler’s livelihoods, and that the written treaties and their implementations tend to be contrary to the verbal agreements. However, both offer enough evidence to support their arguments throughout their writing. From the evidence provided, it is clear that the Crown did not honour their word in many instances, and manipulated the implementation of the treaties for their benefit. It is also clear that the accepted history of the treaties’ proceedings is fictitious.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 6

Fall 2016

The Canadian Upper House and the Need for Reform, Not Abolition

By Mitch Bartrem

This paper describes several issues facing Canada today. The Senate is plagued with problems regarding its effectiveness and current rules for engaging with both the public and our government. Arguments for the complete abolition of the Canadian Senate have been proposed time and time again, however, these are unnecessary. It is important to remember that our Upper House has many important and continually relevant functions; the Upper House needs reform in order to reach its maximum potential, and these options for change is the focus of this paper.

"The Canadian Senate came into existence in 1867 as a result of the British North America Act, becoming the second, or upper, house of the Canadian Parliament. The notion of Senate reform has been discussed since its inception and in fact since the 1960s, there have been twenty-eight major reforms proposed, all of which have failed. From the turn of the twenty-first century, the discussion has once again returned to the federal agenda, with reform or even abolition of the Senate presented as viable options."¹ Ever since the fathers

¹ Tunstall, Lee, and Sarah E. Eaton. "Senate Reform: An Overview." *Canadian Points of View: Senate Reform*, 2015.

of Canadian Confederation sat down and made the decisions that they did, almost every single aspect of the operation of the Dominion's parliamentary system has been called into question. Such is the nature of the democratic state; the needs of the citizenry and our understanding of what smooth democratic operation resembles is constantly evolving. Since 1867, any facet of our democratic institutions can be expected at the discussion table concerning parliamentary reform. Some propose that our Westminster parliamentary system is wildly different than models elsewhere in the world, especially in the terms of party discipline and the number of political parties found within the legislature. However, this paper's focus is on one aspect of parliamentary reform, possibly the most hotly debated in the country's history: the Senate. It is difficult to deny that our Senate is simply not working. Many Canadians are talking about Senate abolition, and none are quick to forget the 2012 Senate expenses scandal, which certainly does not help the case of the Upper House. The Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Senate of Canada sums up this specific event and why it's so problematic in the context of Canadian opinion: "We concluded that not all Senators' expenses and other Senators' transactions were properly controlled or incurred for parliamentary business and with due regard for the use of public funds."² This general sentiment can be found in many reports on the status of the Canadian Senate: "[...] public opinion polls make it very clear that very few Canadians support the Senate status quo[...]"³ It is difficult to argue; a parliamentary body that misuses public funds is a serious problem, and this is not the only problem with our nation's Upper House. But what is to be done? The best course of action regarding the reform of the Canadian Senate is to transition to the 'Triple E' model designed for this legislative body, as it ensures proper regional representation, effective and accountable membership and the ability for the Senate to continue to perform the actions it does which are useful. This argument will be supported by outlining exactly how the proposed 'Triple E' Senate would be successful, and by demonstrating not only that Senate abolition is the wrong course of action, but that it may also be impossible to pursue.

To begin, it is important to understand exactly what the 'Triple E' Senate model looks like. This paper will address how the model is outlined in the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, although this was not the first place this model was proposed. 'Triple E' is understood as equal, elected and effective. "An equal Senate of 62 members, composed of 6 Senators from each province and one Senator from each territory."⁴ The result of equal membership from each province and from each territory is that the Senate can effectively transition into a House that can be much more receptive of regional concerns, which was intended to be a very important function of the Senate. When it was proposed, the concept of the Senate was a major bargaining chip to bring the West and the Maritimes to the table to talk about Confederation. These regions were immensely concerned that in a unicameral

² "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Senate of Canada." 2015. Accessed November 10, 2015. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_otp_201506_e_40494.pdf.

³ Hays, Daniel P. "A New Senate for Canada: A Two-Step Process for Moving Forward on Senate Reform." Accessed November 10, 2015. <http://site.ebrary.com/login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/lib/ualberta/reader.action?docID=10241308>.

⁴ "The Charlottetown Agreement: A Response to the Critics." Accessed November 10, 2015. http://www.ceocouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/archives/OCT_1992_ENG_Charlottetown_Agreement_A_Response_to_the_Critics.pdf.

system the massive relative populations of Ontario and Québec would drown their voices in the system of representation by population of the Lower House. With the 'Triple E' model, all regions of Canada would be able to effectively voice their concerns at the federal level without having to worry about the overwhelming influence of party discipline in the House of Commons. This piece would ensure the return of regional representation to the legislative system, which was the intent of the Senate upon its creation: "Senators to be elected, either by the population at large, or by the members of the legislature. Election of the Senators to take place at the same time as elections to the House of Commons."⁵

The second working function of the 'Triple E' system corrects the next large problem that the population has with the current model of the Senate; namely, the fact that it is devoid of any sort of real accountability for its actions. With elected Upper House representatives, the praise and blame rests firmly on the shoulders of the Premier who appointed them, or the populace that voted for them, depending on the method used. This is further strengthened by the 8 year term limits that would be imposed upon Senators. Under 'Triple E,' Senators are forced to respond to the concerns of their constituencies if they wish to be re-elected, instead of being allowed to continue to serve until the age of 75, with no questions asked. "The idea is that Canadians should have an upper house for our federation, as is the virtually universal practice in major federations around the world. The serious flaw (there are others) lies in the manner of appointing its members."⁶ Bicameral systems with two chambers filled with elected members is common place all around the world; it is not a radical idea or a new step in the advancement of the Westminster model.

The third component of the 'Triple E' Senate model is concerning its effectiveness, and this pertains to its ability to stop legislation that comes out of the House of Commons. This piece will be addressed in greater detail later, but for the sake of effectiveness as it relates to regional representation, this paper will look at the National Energy Program (NEP) in the 1980s. Regardless of individual stance on the Alberta oil industry, it serves as an example of where an effective Senate serving constituents would become useful for addressing regional concerns at the federal level. The goals of the NEP program were: "security of supply and ultimate independence from the world oil market; opportunity for all Canadians to participate in the energy industry; particularly oil and gas, and to share in the benefits of its expansion; and fairness, with a pricing and revenue-sharing regime which recognizes the needs and rights of all Canadians."⁷ These goals were manifested as federal incentives for businesses to explore in the North for alternative sources of energy, a policy that badly hurt the Alberta oil industry. This is what the effective portion of the 'Triple E' Senate model would be capable of doing. It would have the power to wield "a 30 day suspensive veto with respect to "supply bills",⁸ and "a veto over bills that result in

⁵ "The Charlottetown Agreement: A Response to the Critics."

⁶ Gibson, Gordon. "Challenges in Senate Reform: Conflicts of Interest, Unintended Consequences, New Possibilities." *Public Policy Sources*, no. 83 (2004).

⁷ MacEachen, Allan J. "The Budget." 1980. Accessed November 10, 2015.
<http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/1980-plan-eng.pdf>.

⁸ "The Charlottetown Agreement: A Response to the Critics."

fundamental tax policy changes related to natural resources.”⁹ Under this model, the Upper House would have the power to actually alter the legislative process and ensure that the concerns of all regions are addressed by other than just the partisan membership of the Lower House.

When this topic is discussed, the alternative view to Senate reform is typically Senate abolition. This is certainly an option; there is no reason as to why Canada couldn't stay afloat with a unicameral legislature. This being said, there are some major issues and roadblocks to Senate abolition which quite simply make 'Triple E' Senate reform the drastically better option. To commence with the most concrete problem, Senate abolition is, at its core, most likely impossible. This is outlined in the Constitution Act of 1982 which is interpreted as meaning that the abolition of the Senate would not follow the usual '7/50' amending procedure, outlined in section 38 of the Constitution Act, which requires: “resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and [...] resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.”¹⁰ Instead, the abolition of the Senate would require the majority support in all ten provincial legislatures, the House of Commons and the Senate itself. This is the beauty of the 'Triple E' model; it requires no constitutional amendment whatsoever. “In particular, some proponents of a Triple ‘E’ Senate (equal, elected, effective) argue that at least the ‘elected’ E could be achieved without constitutional change. Elections could be held for the purpose of identifying ‘nominees,’ and prime ministers could routinely appoint the election winners, without the formal power of appointment being altered. The effect would be the gradual replacement of the existing Senate with a body composed of ‘elected’ senators.”¹¹ The method by which the Senators are elected isn't really important; the Provinces would be able to decide the exact method which is most appropriate for their province. While the other ‘E’s of the model would eventually require minor reform, the step towards this model beginning with elected as described above would be the first step needed to bring about the Senate change needed. Moving past concrete barriers for the abolition cause, there are very real reasons as to why Canada should keep the Senate. Already covered, the regional representation of voices at the federal level is something that we would lose if we moved to a unicameral system. However, it extends further than just a loss of voice. It is sometimes said that no one in the democratic world has more power than a Canadian Prime Minister with a majority government.¹² This comes as a result of our Lower House's strict party discipline, which is known for its ability to quickly pass legislation. In a unicameral system, this effect would only be compounded and perhaps not for the better. Any Prime Minister in a majority government could effectively and efficiently pass whatever legislation he or she pleases, as party discipline would ensure, as it always has, that no member of your party would vote against your ambitions. This is quite obviously

⁹ "The Charlottetown Agreement: A Response to the Critics."

¹⁰ "A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982." 2013. Accessed November 10, 2015. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/CONST_E.pdf.

¹¹ Stilborn, Jack. "Senate Reform: Issues and Recent Developments." 2008. Accessed November 10, 2015.

¹² Blythe, Dion. Lecture, University of Alberta, Edmonton, October 13, 2015.

not tremendously democratic, but this process does come down to citizens' personal preferences regarding a democratic versus efficient government. Again, this only scratches the surface of the issue posed by Senate abolition. The Senate also currently performs a function described by Sir John A. MacDonald as: "[...] the Upper House [...] which has the sober second-thought in legislation [...]."¹³ MacDonald defines it in the context of the Upper House as such: "It must be an independent House, having a free action of its own, for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and preventing any hasty or ill considered legislation which may come from that body, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people."¹⁴ Sober second thought is concerned about "hasty or ill considered legislation," which is not an uncommon occurrence in the House of Commons. The Senate regularly corrects errors in the legislation originating from the House. Without the Senate, the task of interpreting what the House meant despite the errors in its legislation would fall upon the already overly taxed Supreme Court of Canada. The legislative branch should be the part of our government that is concerned with errors in legislation; this is not the task of the judiciary. These aforementioned reasons are why abolition quite simply isn't a viable response to the Senate problem in Canada.

Canada needs a legislature that is capable of representing the concerns of all of the provinces equally and effectively. These members need to be elected and accountable for their actions to ensure that we have a response to senators that break the rules and a method to prevent representatives from sitting until they are forced to leave. Finally, there is no need to abolish the Senate when it quite clearly performs useful functions, and at that, functions that we would be hard-pressed to replace should we decide that the House of Commons is the only legislative body we need. The Senate model is capable of furthering their current work under the "Triple E" model by ensuring power is properly diffused between the two houses of our legislative system. This way, there is not enough power concentrated in one body of government. Furthermore, under the proposed new system, our Senate can ensure that a less experienced House of Commons makes fewer errors in bills that are passed. The Canadian Senate may be a slightly out-dated body, but this is not cause to kick it to the curb. With the right push, Canada's Upper House could become the shining model of equal, elected and effective that would fit the needs of a unique federalist nation such as Canada.

¹³ "Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces, 3rd Session, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada." Accessed November 10, 2015.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 7

Fall 2016

Drinking in Private: A Public Concern

By Ryan McCarville

The privatization of the liquor distribution system in Alberta was undertaken by a Conservative government motivated by achieving fiscal austerity, along with greater consumer benefit, both in cost and selection. The privatization of this Crown corporation was rationalized as an action that, above all else, held the individual's best interest in mind. I argue that, in fact, this decision created the opposite effect. By analyzing the neoliberal governing paradigm and the structures created with New Public Management (NPM), this paper will outline the forces driving privatization of Crown corporations. I will advocate for a return to a public system of distribution by classifying alcohol as a unique product in the consumer market. Finally, I will analyze the indirect costs associated with alcohol consumption by comparing public and private markets across Canada. Viewing alcohol distribution in a holistic lens will quell the notion that the market mechanism is capable of managing liquor distribution, and highlight the mischaracterizations and flaws in the Progressive Conservative government's 1993 decision.

Introduction

In the 23 years since the Progressive Conservative party of Alberta, under Premier Ralph Klein, privatized the Alberta Liquor Control Board (ALCB) it has, in turn, contributed to nationwide debate regarding the logical evolution of Crown corporations. Within this debate resides a question pertaining to the pragmatism of privatization; is it in the best interests of Canadians to privatize Crown corporations? While this question, in and of itself, is arduous, a more feasible area of research within this topic can be found in analyzing Canadian liquor distribution systems and policy. This is not to say that liquor distribution in Canada is miniscule in any way, as the Canadian liquor industry occupies a market that generated \$20.5 billion in total revenue in 2014 (Statistics Canada, 2015). Former Supreme Court Justice, The Honorable Morris J. Fish, stated that since Canada's infancy, liquor has held contentious notions, not only in terms of regulations and constitutional debate, but also in the magnitude of effects it has on the social and physical well-being of the population (Fish, 2011: 194). In terms of administration, liquor distribution and regulation in Canada falls within the realm of provincial jurisdiction, aside from the wholly private system in Alberta mentioned above. It should be noted, however, that the majority of provincial jurisdictions operate in a 'mixed system', in which a cluster of private firms are

granted rights to operate small scale specialty retail stores (the majority being wine boutiques), but are still undoubtedly considered public Crown corporations. However, British Columbia exemplifies the closest balance that is associated with a truly mixed system. Starting in 2003 there was a sizeable expansion of privately owned and operated liquor retail stores in British Columbia, while development of publicly owned stores was stymied. This essay will further explore the British Columbia system, for the purpose of analysis and contrast, as it can provide unique insight into the distinct characteristics of both systems. With regards to the systems, the dichotomy of public and private structures can be viewed in two distinct interpretations through the role of government in the economy as a whole. The principles of the free market economy, advocated by renowned economist, Milton Friedman, are inclined to prefer full privatization. This system is rooted in the belief that the free market mechanism is competent at meeting the needs of the population (Peck, 2010: 3). While, on the other side, Noam Chomsky relays that "Standard economic history recognizes that state intervention has played a central role in economic growth." (Chomsky, 1999: 30). Another shortcoming of neoliberal doctrines, which will be used to refute privatization, is the way in which health and social factors are undoubtedly delegitimized and undermined in favour of economic gain (Chomsky, 1999: 32).

By analysing the underlying political, economical and social factors of the fully privatized structure of Alberta's liquor distribution system and contrasting it with fully public and mixed systems, all relevant stakeholder needs in provincial liquor distribution systems will be identified. By understanding varying degrees of privatization and public ownership, and taking into account New Public Management (NPM), this essay will present an argument advocating for the continuation of publicly owned liquor distribution systems, through a refutation of the foundations of privatization. Drawing upon the three underlying factors, and establishing their holistic nature will undoubtedly quell the notion that the market alone is capable of managing liquor distribution and regulation.

Neoliberal Governing Paradigm and New Public Management

To understand the framework of intellectual reasoning in the privatization of Crown corporations it is paramount to identify the current governing paradigms and forces that influence the Canadian political landscape, as a whole. The stark shift from the postwar welfare state, influenced by John Maynard Keynes, to the principles of the neoliberal state can be seen in the work of Milton Friedman and the vehement opposition to the principles of an interventionist state:

The thirty-year war that Friedman and his colleagues waged against the Keynesian intellectual occupation began in earnest in the mid-1940s, reaching its moment of vindication in the mid-1970s. The arc of the ideational project of neoliberalism is closely synchronized with that of Chicago School economics, beginning with a postwar reconstruction, maturing into an increasingly assertive critique of Keynesian theory and practice...prompting an urgent search for new approaches. (Peck, 2010: 84)

This new approach is seen as the shift to a neoliberal state and is built upon a market oriented philosophy, where freedom of choice among individuals and a highly competitive global free market have become hegemonic. The emergence of neoliberalism forged systemic changes in public service structure and philosophy, which is seen through a system known as New Public Management (NPM). The principles of NPM were derived from the belief that “bureaucracies were inefficient and self-serving...it was argued that the ‘discipline’ of the market and customer pressure would provide the lever for ‘better’ public services and the control emphasis moved from process to outputs.” (McLaughlin, 2002: 100). NPM can best be described as promoting efficiency over equity, in that the system is, first and foremost, concerned with efficiently facilitating the provision of goods and services to the market (Lane, 2000: 95). The distinction in viewing a collective population as a market ultimately illustrates that NPM represents a radical departure from a view that defines a population as citizens that collectively benefit from public services to another that portrays these citizens as customers who, in turn, consume products and services in order to maximize their individual utility. This shift undoubtedly causes individuals to act as such, and therefore places more importance on personal gain, rather than public welfare. While this specific shift within neoliberalism can be seen as nuanced, when it is used to describe the relationship between citizens and public services, it becomes fundamental in its nature and hegemonic in contemporary political discourse. With an understanding of the principles of NPM, a discussion regarding the evolution and current status of the liquor distribution system in Alberta follows below.

Alberta’s Private Distribution System and Influences

As outlined in the above sections of this essay, the privatization of the ALCB can be attested to the hegemonic governing paradigm of Canada, along with the rise and ubiquity of NPM in Crown corporations. The political influences of 1993 should also be noted, as the financial circumstances that Ralph Klein and the Progressive Conservative party inherited assisted in the decision of privatization; the ALCB model of ownership was shifted from the public arena to the private sector in an attempt to differentiate from the previous Tory government and provide revenue to contribute towards the accumulated public debt (Bird, 2012: 329, 333). The emergence of the new Reform party, although it had posed no provincial threat of competition at the time, also forced the Progressive Conservatives to increase fiscal austerity measures. This was, in large part, because of the aggressive Reform rhetoric that called for lower taxes and an outright rejection of government deficits (Bird, 2012: 330). The action of the Progressive Conservative party to privatize the ALCB can be seen then as a calculated and pre-emptive political manoeuvre. Provincial Crown corporations, as seen by the Progressive Conservatives, involved in the liquor retail market were viewed as inefficient and disadvantageous to customers because of the monopoly in which they operated. The fundamental nature of a monopoly, seen as a structure that serves to control all aspects of a particular industry, is not a favourable alternative for the free market principles of neoliberalism, NPM, and those political parties who advocate for reduced government presence. Finer details of reasoning behind liquor privatization are argued in an observance of the minutiae visible in the retail environment of publicly run liquor distribution boards. Advocates for privatization relay that there is a major restriction of choice among inventory, limited access to physical locations and the

marginalization of smaller breweries and suppliers from the market (Masson and Sen, 2014: 4). Finally, in terms of accessibility, privatization undoubtedly saturates the market. Retail stores in Alberta are open seven days a week and can operate from 10 a.m. until 2 a.m. (ALGC, 2012: 4.1). Along with increased hours, since privatization, there has been a sizeable increase in the density rates of retail liquor stores within all of Alberta (Popova et al., 2009: 514).

Classifying Alcohol in the Market

As a product for consumption in the market, alcohol can be described in a number of radically different ways. The purpose of this section is to succinctly highlight the characteristics of alcohol that separate it from all other consumable goods, hence, requiring a sound regulatory body presiding over it. Unique to most other consumable goods available in Canada, increases in alcohol consumption has been proven to be associated with chronic diseases, and alcohol specific death and injury, such as impaired driving crashes, domestic abuse and homicides and suicides (MADD, 2014; CAMH, 2010; Rehm et al., 2006). Every province and territory in Canada is responsible for defining the legal drinking age for purchase and consumption, with the range falling between 18 and 19 years of age. Restriction on age can, in part, be interpreted as recognition by governments that alcohol does, in fact, possess qualities that has the potential to negatively impact society if not administered in a responsible manner. With regards to economic impact, a recent study found that alcohol related addictions, injuries and deaths led to a total indirect loss of just over \$7.1 billion (Rehm et al., 2006: 9). So while many consumer goods possess the possibility to limit an individual's economic contribution, few have as strong of an effect as alcohol. This loss in economic contribution, overall health of the population and negative social consequences that are linked to increased alcohol consumption prove that special consideration is needed when defining alcohol as a consumer good. Alas, as will be described in further detail below, deregulated markets and the principles that guide privatization cannot be considered when evaluating provincial liquor distribution systems.

A Holistic (and Public) Approach to Alcohol Distribution and Regulation

Privatization has been described above as an act that can be attributed to short sightedness and a narrow focus based around ideological influences that shape economic and political strategy. This type of discourse, present in political discussions and the media, facilitates and perpetuates a dissemination of deficient information on privatization. While benefits are clearly articulated, the glaring omission that proponents of privatization largely fail to account for are broad, overarching societal risks. Campanella and Flanagan noted that "Managing the supply of alcohol, both economically and physically, ensures the greatest level of social welfare, and evidence indicates a public liquor monopoly is institutionally superior to succeed at this level." (2012: 6). With this being the case, the degree of interconnectedness of negative effects that alcohol possesses requires a deeper

and more connected analysis on the associated social, economic and health costs to Canadian citizens.

A recent publication that aggregated retail price studies of private establishments in both Alberta and the select private outlets in British Columbia found that there was, in fact, no solid evidence that would support the notion that private retailers offer lower prices (MADD, 2014: 14). Another recent report conducted a survey of alcohol prices across Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, and discovered that the prices in Alberta were, in fact, no lower than those in the other two provinces, which was consistent with the findings of more comprehensive studies they had also examined (Campanella and Flanagan, 2012: 11). The authors of this study do reveal, though, that a closer examination of individual liquor prices in Alberta revealed something that is largely unique to the province:

Alberta is one of the only provinces in Canada without a minimum pricing policy in retail stores. The absence of a regulated price floor allows private liquor retailers to offer certain products at heavily-discounted prices. It is common in Alberta to see advertisements for alcohol products listed at “door-crasher” prices. “Door-crasher” specials feature loss-leaders, products sold below cost in order to bring customers into the store, where they might then purchase other products with larger profit margins. (Campanella and Flanagan, 2012: 20).

But does the potential for lower prices in the market provide overall cost effectiveness, or any other economic benefit to Canadian citizens? Quite simply, no. A more sophisticated answer to this question can be developed by understanding the burden that lower prices have on hospital admissions, loss of individual economic contribution and impacts to tax revenues.

A study that analysed the relationship between minimum alcohol pricing and hospital admissions in British Columbia over a 20 year span concluded that as minimum alcohol prices were raised, hospital admissions for alcohol related injuries (and overall consumption) declined (Stockwell et. al, 2013). This relationship illustrates the destruction that unregulated liquor distribution can have on the Canadian population, but also raises further questions regarding the other factors mentioned in the introduction of this essay. The linkages between economic factors and individual security and well being, specifically, targeted crimes, are also a contribution that privatization and NPM fail to fully account for and effectively manage. A group of researchers found a strong inverse relationship between levels of minimum alcohol prices and the amount of reported crimes against individuals in British Columbia from 2002-2008 (Stockwell et. al, 2015). The clear articulation that higher minimum alcohol prices lead to less crime against individuals provides a necessary and sobering balance to the profit motive of private retailers that comprise the landscape of neoliberal markets. Further examination of injuries associated with alcohol, as outlined earlier, leads to a realized decline in an individual’s ability to positively contribute to the Canadian economy.

A discussion on general tax burdens from increased hospital admittances and reported crimes against individuals leads to another compelling public issue that is outside of the realm of privatization. While governments are faced with the perpetual problem of public pressure to deliver public services without an increase in taxes (Bird, 2015: 4) and advocates of privatization generally lobby to reduce taxation (Campanela, 2014: 4), an argument could be made in favour of liquor privatization, albeit severely flawed. The Progressive Conservative party of 1993, and, generally, all right-leaning political organizations possess an ideological stance that resists raising tax rates. The privatization of the ALCB can then be seen as having a foundation built upon a distinct ulterior motive, in that “Essentially, through privatization, the Alberta government created a new political actor likely to lobby the government for precisely the sort of tax policy to which the government is ideologically predisposed.” (Campanela and Flanagan, 2012: 14). The direct nature in which the privatization of liquor control boards has on public welfare service expenditure levels serves more as a cost than benefit (socially and economically). As noted above, alcohol has a variety of externalities that manifest in an increasing trend as consumption increases. The main external costs related to alcohol, and ones that cause the highest levels of tax burdens, are a loss of economic contribution from injury, law enforcement, and hospital admittances and rehabilitation. A study that compiled all of these related costs found that Canadian citizens were faced with a \$14.6 billion loss in 2002, and within that national loss, Alberta accounted for \$1.6 billion, which was third highest among all provinces and territories (Rehm et. al, 2006: 2, 10). This is evidence that viewing liquor through a lens of a purely privatized profit motive actually negatively affects the province more than, say, the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO). The publicly owned liquor control system in Ontario values a dedication to ensuring that all alcohol products are distributed in a socially responsible manner, in part by ensuring that staff members are properly trained to identify potential underage citizens and acquire credentials from any member of the public that attempts to make a purchase (Campanela and Flanagan, 2012: 20; Bird, 2015: 8). Whereas in Alberta, individual retailers are more likely to not enforce age restrictions to alcohol purchases because of the highly competitive nature of a privatized market (MADD, 2014: 12). This is troubling, because as this essay has highlighted, increased consumption is inherently linked to unfavourable economic and social costs.

Finally, this essay would be remiss if it did not briefly describe the impact that increased density rates of alcohol retail stores, due to privatization, has had on the health of the general public. An examination of privatized stores in British Columbia found that as density rates increased, so did the rate of consumption and alcohol related hospital admittances (Stockwell et al., 2013: 2019). So whereas privatization can be seen to satisfy accessibility demand, it comes at a cost that contributes to the already staggering economic burden placed on the collective population of Canada by ubiquitous supply and consumption.

Conclusion

When political ideologies are used as a main driver for achieving privatization of liquor distribution systems, calamitous results will undoubtedly be realized, as the analysis

in this essay proves. The difficulty in refuting privatization resides in the sophisticated manner in which these impacts must be viewed. The superficial façade of privatization, that highlights cost efficiency and rampant availability, is one that can have initial appeal to a large percentage of the Canadian population; but as the social costs (direct and indirect) of privatization policy are presented in a holistic manner, the framework of neoliberalism and NPM can be viewed as illegitimate in serving the public's best interests. While this essay does not totally refute neoliberalism, it does strive to delineate the governing paradigm as one that cannot be hegemonic in an absolute sense. The interconnectedness of liquor consumption to economic, social and health factors raises legitimate doubts about the ability of the free market mechanism to adequately serve citizens. Ultimately, there should be no uncertainty that liquor distribution and regulation is best left within the public sphere of governance.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 8

Fall 2016

The United Nations: Implications of Soft Power

By Sara Montgomery

The United Nations is often looked to for guidance in conflict prevention and intervention, but its lack of hard power has proven to be extremely limiting. Although the United Nations has been a major improvement from the League of Nations, its ability to maintain world peace is restricted by the aspirations of its member states. The Security Council is especially significant, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia. Each state in the Security Council has the ability to veto any initiative proposed by the United Nations. Additionally, the United Nations cannot take action without leadership

from one or more of its states, and many states are hesitant to sacrifice their military resources even in the event of major human rights violations. This hesitancy to intervene is especially evident in the case study of the Rwandan genocide, but can also be seen in the Cold War and the Syrian Civil War, amongst other conflicts.

Established in 1920 in the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations was formed with a mandate to provide a forum for settling international disputes. Although initially receiving broad support from numerous powerful countries, a combination of factors led to its eventual failure. In 1945 the United Nations was founded in its place. However, the original failures of the League of Nations to resolve international issues alongside critical errors made by the United Nations has led many to question the legitimacy and stability of the United Nations. This paper will argue that the United Nations has ultimately failed to serve its role in international conflict resolution because it does not hold substantial power to forcefully intervene in conflicts and similar mistakes were made in its founding as were made in the League of Nations. This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will discuss the creation of the League of Nations and the circumstances that led to its failure. The second section will discuss the creation of the United Nations and instances in the past, which exemplify the inability of the United Nations to prevent conflict, such as during the Cold War and the Rwandan genocide. The third section will demonstrate that despite a growing number of members and support from the major world powers, the United Nations does not hold a substantial amount of power to enable preventing or interceding in international conflicts today. Finally, the fourth section will summarize the failures of both organizations to provide peace and security within the international realm.

The League of Nations was created shortly after World War I and its principle goal was to maintain world peace. However, in the aftermath of the war, the League did not play a large role in deciding territorial divisions and as the League itself had no armed forces, it relied on the armies of its member nations to enforce its policies. Most powers were reluctant to exercise any hard power due to the tensions after the First World War and the fact that some of the biggest world powers, namely the USA and the USSR, were not initially members of the League. In the case of the United States, even though the idea for the League of Nations was first proposed by President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, he failed to convince the US Senate that joining the organization would be beneficial and resultantly the US did not become a member. Although this alone did not cause the League of Nations to fail, it is often attributed as one of the biggest failures of the League in securing international power. Another major contributing factor to the failure of the League was the sanctions placed on Germany as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, and the fact that due to the treaty Germany was not invited to join the League. Some clauses of the treaty included forcing Germany to concede territories to Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland, in addition to making Germany take full responsibility for the war and all the debt for the material damage the war had caused.¹ Due to the lack of support from large world powers and the fact that the League of Nations had no hard power, it was unstable and

unable to enforce the sanctions placed on Germany under the treaty. This instability caused many states to withdraw from the League. Eduard Beneš observed that, "Of the five European Great Powers, three were in the throes of revolutionary ferment: Germany was under the influence of Hitler's revolutionary movement, Italy under that of the Fascist revolution, and Russia under that of the Communist revolution." ² Due to the onset of World War II, any hope that countries had placed in the League of Nations to prevent conflict was shattered, and the organization formally dissolved in 1946 to make way for the United Nations.

After the failure of the League of Nations to prevent another war, there was still heavy international support for a forum that would assist in resolving international disputes. Thus came about the idea for the United Nations, proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Determined to avoid the mistakes of the Wilson administration, the Roosevelt administration sought bipartisan support, and in July 1945 the Senate approved the UN charter by a vote of 89 to 2. ³ In addition to US support, the United Nations also had support from the USSR, making its support base significantly stronger than that of the League of Nations. However, despite support from the US and the USSR, the United Nations could not prevent the onset of the Cold War that would last for decades. Ragnar Müller observed that, "In terms of securing peace, the United Nations found itself in a deep crisis in the Seventies and Eighties: although it continued to maintain a presence in the Near East and Cyprus through a series of peace-keeping missions, it failed to prevent repeated military confrontations taking place in both conflict zones. It was equally wanting in making a contribution to the settlement of newly burgeoning warring conflicts in Nicaragua, West Sahara, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and the growing war between Iran and Iraq." ⁴ Yet another significant failure of the United Nations was its lack of intervention during the structured mass killings of Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, despite indisputable evidence that these killings were taking place. After the Holocaust, the vow of "Never Again" was adopted by the international community. Nonetheless, over a period of months, hundreds of Rwandans were systematically slaughtered daily and the United Nations took little action to intervene in the genocide. Illustrating the implications of a lack of strong leadership by the United Nations, the troops sent to Rwanda by Belgium and France were pulled out as soon as there was an imminent threat, and two thousand Rwandans who had gathered around the UN headquarters for safety were left abandoned to fight for themselves. ⁵ Although arguably one of the United Nations' biggest failures, the Rwandan genocide is not the only instance in which the United Nations failed to act.

The question arises as to why the United Nations has chosen not to intervene in certain international conflicts. One factor is that much like the League of Nations, the United Nations does not have a military of its own and instead relies on contributions from its member states to enforce its policies. In addition, the permanent members of the Security Council, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia all possess the ability to veto any substantial action clause proposed by the United Nations. ⁶ Security Council approval is also required to enact the UN's "responsibility to protect" clause, which allows humanitarian intervention to override state sovereignty in the case of systematic human rights violations. ⁷ In this regard, the United Nations has run into problems similar to those of the League of Nations in that it is impossible to adapt any

resolutions without full support from the major world powers. This has been the case in the Syrian Civil War, in which UN intervention was vetoed by China and Russia, demonstrating that even though an action proposal may have significant support within the United Nations, it can still be easily overthrown by the Security Council if there are one or more countries that do not support it. Another key factor in the actions of the United Nations is the measures taken by its member states in order to prevent conflict. Even if a motion is passed, if member states do not take action, it may lead to that motion not being implemented. This was the case in the War of Darfur, where the motion to intervene was passed by the United Nations but little action was taken and the small number of troops sent lacked the necessary equipment.⁸ Whether this be due to a lack of will, resources, or a combination of the two, it points to another fundamental weakness of the United Nations: the lack of an unambiguous effort to better the United Nations by its member states, and the expectation that other member states will take action.

In conclusion, the United Nations has ultimately failed to live up to its responsibility to protect human rights because it does not hold hard power by itself and irrevocable mistakes were made in its founding, such as giving veto-wielding power to a small number of powerful states. This has prevented the United Nations from being able to prevent or intervene in conflict on numerous occasions, including during the Cold War, in Rwanda, and in Syria. Due to the fact that the United Nations is not an individual entity, it cannot act without the approval and assistance of its member nations, and can only become stronger when its member states decide to take action. Specifically, the members making up the Security Council must agree to take action. Without full approval from the Security Council, the United Nations is unable to take action even if there is major support from other states. And even with full support from its members, all missions require army and weapon contributions from states, and thus the United Nations is at the mercy of how much each state contributes. It is important to remember that the United Nations is nothing more than a forum provided to assist in international disputes, and not a self-governing state or organization with its own hard power. Therefore, due to the fact that the United Nations was founded in the spirit of cooperation from its member nations, it can only be as strong as the collective investments that states make.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 9

Fall 2016

The Arab Springs: A Comparison of the Uprisings in Libya & Syria in 2011

By Halima Al-Turk

The Arab Springs is known as “a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, riots, protracted civil wars and other forms of opposition (both violent and non-violent) in the Arab territories” (Elfaith. 2015, 121). Starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi a street vendor, set himself on fire after being harassed by municipal police officials. Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation sparked international attention, leading Tunisia into a revolution. After being in power for 23 years as Tunisia’s President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia (Bunton 2013, 16). Tunisia’s revolution led both the Arab and non-Arab world to witness “spontaneous explosions of protests, [revolutions] and popular political upheaval” in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania (Ismael and Ismael 2013, 229). The high levels of political corruption, economic hardships and the desire for a free democratic government all inspired the citizens of these countries to take action against their governments.

The uprisings in Libya and Syria sparked massive worldwide attention. In February 2011, anti-government protests, movements and demonstrations spread all across of Libya in order to end Muammar Gaddafi’s long-term reign. Gaddafi’s forces began to use violence and other repressive tactics in order to stop protests and demonstrations from occurring, in the process killing the lives of many. However, rebel forces formed all over Libya in order to stop Gaddafi’s suppression. Shortly after, NATO intervened, with all 28 member states collectively working together in order take down Gaddafi’s regime (BBC 2013).

In Syria, “the uprisings against Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorial regime started midway in March 2011” (Gelvin 2012, 72). Syrian citizens were dissatisfied with the Al-Assad’s 48-year regime because no other political parties besides his was permitted to run in elections (Gelvin 2012, 72). In addition, Syria was under a state of emergency from 1993 up until 2011, which is when the uprisings began (Gelvin 2012, 72). Al-Assad not keen to give up his authority, began to use “brutal military force against his own people to suppress their demands for democratization” (Gelvin 2012, 72). The rise of rebel groups broke out against

Al-Assad causing the situation in Syria to further deteriorate. As of March 2016, more than 250,000 Syrian lives have been lost and more than 11 million Syrians have been displaced (BBC 2016). With many Syrians seeking asylum in Europe, the Middle East and Canada. The international community has yet to find a plausible solution to Syria's situation.

The political uprisings in both countries progressed into revolutions and gradually, they transitioned into civil wars: the ongoing 2011 Syrian civil war and the 2011 Libyan civil war. However, Libya's civil war was a success compared to Syria's current, ongoing civil war. This is because Gaddafi, the authoritarian leader that caused Libya's deterioration was removed from power. In 2012, reports illustrated that a French secret service man infiltrated the National Transitional Council's rebel group and was responsible for Gaddafi's death (Telegraph 2012). Unfortunately, Al-Assad still remains in power despite the citizens' wishes of a new body of government, causing Syria to further demolish. Despite the similarities present in both countries civil wars, this paper will argue that Libya's 2011 civil war was a success compared to Syria's ongoing civil war because of the international community's intervention in Libya and not in Syria. This paper will begin by discussing the similarities that led both countries to experience civil wars such as popular discontent, the high levels of state repression and the occupation of the major rebel forces; the *Thuwar* in Libya and the Free Syrian Army in Syria. This paper will then transition to assess the causation that led both countries to experience different political outcomes by examining the different ethnic and religious groups that each authoritarian leader favored, as well as the role of the United Nations and the rest of the international community in both countries. Lastly, this paper will explain why the role of the United Nations and the rest of the international community contributed to the success of Libya's 2011 civil war and not Syria's which is ultimately why they present different political outcomes.

Methodology

In order to provide an effective comparison of the cases of Libya and Syria, I will be using the most-similar-systems design (MSS). Most-similar-systems is a research design that compares two or more cases that present similar dimensions but have distinct political outcomes (Dickovick and Eastwood 2015, 15). I will be using this research design because Libya and Syria present many similar factors that caused both countries to experience civil wars. For instance, the citizens of Libya and Syria were completely dissatisfied with their governments because of their desire for a democracy. As well as, the economic hardships and political corruption present in both countries. Additionally, both authoritarian leaders used high levels of state repression to stop protest movements and demonstrations. Lastly, both countries were occupied by rebel groups who opposed the authoritarian regimes. However, what is remarkable, is that despite their similarities, the cases present diverse political outcomes. Gaddafi was removed from power, whereas Al-Assad still remains. Certain factors may have led both these countries to experience different outcomes such as, Gaddafi and Al-Assad favored different ethnic and religious sects. Al-Assad favoured the Alawites, a Shia Muslim group. Whereas Gaddafi favoured his tribe the Qadhadhfa as well as, many other tribes that were loyal to him. This may be one of the underlying factors that caused the fall of Gaddafi's regime and the resilience of al-Assad's regime. Or, NATO's intervention in Libya and not in Syria may have contributed to the fall of Libya's

authoritarian regime. The following similarities and differing outcomes will be evaluated below.

Popular Dissatisfaction

According to Kamal Eldin Saleh, the uprisings that took place in many Arab countries were caused by a mixture of the following factors: economic deterioration and political corruption leading citizens to desire a democratic government (2013, 187). This theory can be applied to the situations in Syria and Libya because, prior to the revolution both countries suffered from economic hardship. In addition, the upper-class elite were the ones that controlled and influenced the authoritarian regimes as well as the rest of society. The 40-year rule of Gaddafi and the 48-year rule of the Al-Assad family caused the citizens of both countries to desire a democracy in which they can choose other political parties as their body of government. Since 1972, Libyan political parties were banned from running in elections (Schiller 2009, 163). However, Syria was under a state of emergency from 1993 until 2011 (Gelvin 2012, 72). A state of emergency which gave Al-Assad's Ba'ath party complete authority all over Syria not allowing any other party to come into power.

Furthermore, most of Libya's economic growth is generated from the oil and gas sector. In 2006, Gaddafi set up a 'sovereign wealth fund,' a state owned account of money in which was used to invest in Libya's financial assets, since Libya was experiencing a budget surplus of 70 million dollars (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). Gaddafi placed the money into the 'sovereign wealth fund,' to use for "personal enhancement" (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). The money was spent on his family and tribe in Sirte, as well as his government and military officials. In addition, to create "contracts with international companies" that would operate under his command (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). The unequal distribution of wealth illustrates how corrupted Libya's government is. Depending from which tribe a citizen originates from, plays an important role in how much money he or she will receive. Those from Gaddafi's tribe received more money than other tribes. However, those acquainted with Gaddafi received "employment and advancement in security force" (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). Correspondingly, the political corruption in Syria was just as extreme. The highly ranked political and military positions were given to individuals from the Makhoul and Shaleesh families because they had family relations to Al-Assad (Darwish 2014, 13). For example, Al-Assad's cousin Rami Makhoul, controlled 60% of Syria's economy, owning economic assets in "telecommunications, oil and gas, construction, banking, insurance, airlines and retail" (World Time 2012). Unfortunately, this one example of the many political and military positions Al-Assad gave to his family members.

Moreover, Libya was experiencing high rates of unemployment and economic hardship. In 2011, prior to the revolution, approximately one-third of the Libyan population was unemployed as well as 50% of the educated youth could not find any jobs (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). This ultimately sparked high levels of displeasure among the Libyan population, as the "government was unable to create jobs or provide economic improvements" (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 103). Similarly, Syria experienced high levels of unemployment and economic hardship as well. Between 2006 till 2010 farmers faced high

severity of droughts. Approximately 75% of farmers were unable to produce crops as well as 80% of the farmers in Syria had lost their livestock (The Washington Post 2013). With the Al-Assad regime's failed response, approximately 1.3-1.4 million Syrian farmers moved into cities because how harshly severe their lands were damaged (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 108). After the 2006 droughts and prior to the uprisings, 30% of Syria's population lived under the poverty line as well as approximately 11% of the population lived under "subsistence level," the inability to support oneself with a basic income (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 108). Additionally, in the beginning of 2011, the exportation of oil decreased from 380,000 barrels per day to 200,000 (The Economist 2013). The citizens of Libya and Syria both exhibited high levels of dissatisfaction with their governments because of the political corruption and economic hardships which led them to want a democratic government in which the will of the people truly matters.

State Repression

According to Maria Jousa and Mirjam Edel, the use of repression is a strategy that regimes use in order to achieve any goal they set, regardless of how much harm it may create towards their citizens (2015, 291). For leaders, the preservation of power and maintenance of political authority is important, therefore they engage in repressive strategies (Jousa and Edel 2015, 291). During the Arab Spring, different levels of repression were present in the Arab countries. Libya and Syria, exhibited high levels of political repression, as both leaders repressed their citizens through the use of violence and the censorship of media. This strategy was used by Gaddafi and al-Assad to immobilize protesters and rebel groups from coming together to take down both their regimes. Since the uprisings in both countries evolved into civil wars, Gaddafi and Al-Assad sought the use of repressive strategies as ultimately the only way to maintain the survival of their existing authorities (Jousa and Edel 2015, 289).

In Libya, Gaddafi's forces were heavily armed, able to massacre many citizens. Since 2005, Britain has sold Gaddafi 120 million-euro worth of weapons. As well as, Russia supplied Gaddafi with "2,000 tanks, 2,000 armored fighting vehicles, 350 artillery weapons, dozens of ships and fleets of aircraft" (The Guardian 2011). According to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry, "Gaddafi dispatched the head of military intelligence, and mobilized [his] forces in Benghazi to swiftly suppress the protests with brute force" (Bassiouni 2013, 150). As well as in June 2011, documents were found in the city of Misrata containing orders from Gaddafi to his generals to "unleash torture and arrest those who have torn the country apart" (The Guardian 2011). In other words, Gaddafi wanted to suppress or even kill the rebel forces and citizens who were revolting against him. In addition, Gaddafi "ordered his army to inflict starvation on every man, woman and child in Misrata" (The Guardian 2011). Similarly, the authoritarian regime in Syria was willing to use lethal force against its citizens. Al-Assad's regime used "traditional security operations" which are the "monitoring and arrest of activists either by intimidating them or torturing them" (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 57). As well as, Al-Assad deployed soldiers and heavy artillery that used airstrikes, missiles and cluster bombs in order to stop the protests and anti-government demonstrations (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 57). In March 2011, the police took the streets shooting at innocent civilians, killing 20 people in the process for

protesting against Al-Assad in the city of Daraa (Al Jazeera 2011). In August 2013, more than hundreds of people were killed because of Al-Assad's forces firing rockets filled with Sarin, a chemical generally used in weapons of mass destructions (BBC 2015). As of August 2015, more than 250,000 Syrians have been killed (BBC 2016). Furthermore, Russia and Syria have a strong bilateral relationship. Since 2011, Russia has been providing Al-Assad military aid such as "28 fighter jets, 14 helicopters, dozens of tanks, anti-aircraft missile systems and about 2000 troops into north-western Syria" (Sydney Morning Herald 2015). In addition, Iran has also played a role in funding Al-Assad militarily by providing "ammunition crates full of mortar shells" such as bombs and other explosives (BBC 2016).

Besides the use of violence, another way in which both authoritarian regimes repressed their citizens is by the censorship of media. Social media had played a significant role in giving individuals "a space to express their dissatisfactions, to increase solidarity around a common cause, and to organize themselves" (Davison 2015, 4). As well as many protesters use social media in order to show the uprisings to those who live outside of Libya and Syria. It is a means of attracting international attention. When violent protests broke out all over the cities of Libya on February 17, 2011, Gaddafi's regime "intentionally cut Internet connectivity across of Libya for 48 hours" specifically shutting off the internet sites Al-Jazeera, Facebook and Twitter (Stottlemire and Stottlemire 2012, 26). In addition, many cellphone and Arab news satellite telecoms were jammed (Reuters 2011). Furthermore, foreign journalists were subjected to harsh treatment by Gaddafi forces. Many journalists were taken blindfolded to undisclosed locations as well as some "have been held overnight, physically assaulted by militia or threatened with loaded weapons" (The Guardian 2011). Reporting from Libya became very difficult, as most media reports were censored and scripted to illustrate pro-Gaddafi demonstrations. Therefore, the citizens of Libya relied heavily upon Facebook and Twitter to show the world what was truly going on. The internet connection was not fully back online until August 2011, six months after the blackout (BBC 2011). Moreover, Al-Assad's regime in 2012, "shutdown the internet, crippled phone networks, cutting voice and web communications all across Syria". (The Guardian 2012). This tactic was used to stop all protestors and rebel forces from communicating and mobilizing with one another (The Guardian 2012). Furthermore, many foreign journalists in Syria were taken hostage when reporting about the horrendous situation of the ongoing conflict. For example, Mohammed Al-Harrari a journalist, was arrested after giving an interview for Al-Jazeera about the situation in Daraa (Reporters Without Borders 2012). As well as many journalists were forced to give fabricated media reports that cover up all of Al-Assad's crimes (Reporters Without Borders 2012). Additionally, Al-Assad's regime "arbitrarily arrested and tortured activists, writers, and journalists who have reported on or expressed support for the anti-government protests, detaining at least seven local and international journalists since protests began" (Human Rights Watch 2011). Both authoritarian leaders were willing to take extreme measures in order to stop the political uprisings.

Occupation by Rebel Forces

With the continuous uprisings transitioning into a civil war in Libya, rebel groups began to form against Gaddafi forces in order to eliminate the authoritarian regime.

Although there were various rebel groups formed against Gaddafi, the most significant group of rebels were known as the *Thuwar* or “revolutionaries” (Gelvin 2012, 84). The *Thuwar*, were under a governing body that formed against Gaddafi’s forces. The governing revolutionary body was established on February 2011 in the city Benghazi called the National Transitional Council (NTC) (Gelvin 2012, 85). The NTC aimed to “maintain order, organize rudimentary services and defense, gain international support, claim Gaddafi’s overseas assets, and sell the national patrimony oil” (Glewin 2012, 85). The NTC become recognized by “France, Gambia, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives and Qatar as Libya’s legitimate interim governing body and the UN General assembly followed suit in September 2011” (Bassiouni 2013, 143). In order to stop Gaddafi’s regime, the *Thuwar* “relied primarily on weapons and vehicles taken from Gaddafi forces, such as aK-47 rifles, rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks” (Bassiouni 2013, 147). In addition, the *Thuwar* forces creatively constructed worn out equipment into weapons of combat such as “modifying pickup trucks into armored vehicles, and constructing portable launchers for old Russian air-to-surface missiles” (Bassiouni 2013, 147).

Similarly, with the continuous uprisings transitioning into a civil war in Syria, rebel groups formed against Al-Assad. However, a major rebel group that formed against Al-Assad is the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which consisted of defected Syrian Armed Force officers, local and international volunteers. The FSA formed a base in Turkey under Colonel Riad Al-Asaad. Although the FSA is not recognized as legitimate by the international community, they did receive military training from the U.S foreign intelligence service. Throughout 2013, the CIA trained, armed and guided fighters as the size of the FSA grew from 10,000 men to 60,000 men dispersed all over Syria (International Business Times 2015). In 2014, the FSA collaborated with Christian rebels and together formed the Syriac Military Council in order to fight ISIS and Al-Assad’s regime (International Business Times 2015). In order to take down Al-Assad, rebel groups were willing to work together. Both countries exhibited the occupation of major rebel forces in order to take down the authoritarian regimes.

Different Outcomes

Despite their similarities, Libya and Syria both present different political outcomes. In order to assess the reasoning behind this, there are certain factors that need to be examined. In Libya and Syria both authoritarian figures favored specific ethnic and religious sects. With groups loyal to their regimes, Gaddafi and Al-Assad had the ability to maintain the survival of their authority as these groups are willing to go to extreme lengths to support them. However, the favoritism of ethnic and religious sects differed in both countries. In addition, the role of the international community differed in both countries.

Ethnic & Religious Favoritism

Gaddafi was from a town called Sirte that is located in Western Libya. Unlike most Arab countries, Libya’s balance of power was in the hands many tribes and clans, not its security forces. Under Gaddafi’s rule, military positions were filled up with his own

tribesmen family members (Silverman 2012, 30). For example, Gaddafi's nephew, General Al-Damm "held important positions [such] as the commander of the Tobruk military region" (Taylor 2014, 163). As well as, Gaddafi's tribe the *Qadhadhfa* held high ranking positions in Libya's secret services and military such as the Central Military Region in Sirte, the Southern Military Region in Sabha and the Military Region of Tobruk (Taylor 2014, 164). However, since the *Qadhadhfa* was a small tribe, Gaddafi favored other tribes such as the *Warfalla* tribe and the *Magharaha* tribe due to their location in the country, and their large population size (Taylor 2014, 164). These tribes occupied lower positions such as armed force positions, air force positions and military administrative positions. For their loyalty, Gaddafi promised them luxurious social services, money, as well as employment promotion (Taylor 2014, 164). In 2011, when the uprisings broke out, these tribes especially the *Qadhadhfa* remained loyal to Gaddafi aiding him in repressing those who defied the regime. However, in 2011 during the civil war, the *Warfalla*, a major loyalist tribe to Gaddafi joined the National Transitional Council that defied Gaddafi (Christian Science Monitor 2011). Favoritism in Syria differed, as Al-Assad favored certain religious sects over others. Syria is made of various religious sects such as the "Sunnis and Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds and other minorities" (Silverman 2012, 35). The Alwaite, who made up only 12% of Syria's population, dominated in the Al-Assad family regime holding high ranking positions in military and security forces (Silverman 2012, 35). In order to receive the loyalty of the Druze and Christian sects, Al-Assad offered them protection and freedom to practice their beliefs (The Globe & Mail 2011). The Alwaite, Druze and Christians supported aAl-Assad since the beginning of the uprisings. However, dissent slowly arose from the Druze and Christian minorities as many Christians collaborated with the FSA against Al-Assad's regime (The Globe & Mail 2011). In addition, speculations have arisen as of 2016 that the Alwaite sect is slowly "dissociating itself from al-Assad's leadership (Telegraph 2016).

According to Ranj Alaaldin, the ultimate causation of the downfall of Gaddafi's regime is the alliance of other tribal groups with the *Warfalla* tribe (Telegraph 2011). However, this argument can be repelled because the *Qadhadhfa*, the *Magharaha* and numerous other tribes remained loyal to Gaddafi until his death. Additionally, when Gaddafi seen some of his support beginning to diminish, he recruited African mercenaries, mostly from Chad and Niger, "to carry out atrocities against unarmed civilian protesters" (BBC 2011). In addition, this argument cannot be applied to al-Assad's resilient regime because although some religious sects began to oppose him, Russia and Iran are still supplying him military and at any moment they can send troops over. Therefore, this argument can be repelled in terms of Libya's 2011 civil war being a success compared to Syria's.

Role of the International Community

With the escalation in violence and the heavy losses of casualties in Libya, the international community intervened. In February 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1970 condemning Gaddafi's forces against civilian protesters. Resolution 1970 "imposed an arms embargo and other restrictions on travel, [as well as freezing] Libyan assets, and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court"

(Garwood-Gowers 2013, 602). Gaddafi's regime ignored this resolution, invoking the United Nations Security Council to pass resolution 1973 in March 2011. Resolution 1973 required the "immediate establishment of a ceasefire, a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of civilians" (the Guardian 2011). It also established an arms embargo, a no-fly zone list over Libya, banning any member of Gaddafi's regime from travelling as well as further freezing any financial or economic assets of anyone who is associated with Gaddafi (The Guardian 2011). All 28 member-states of NATO agreed to collectively work together to bring down Gaddafi's regime. NATO went into Libya with "dozens of ships and hundreds of airplanes and commenced military operations" as well as "surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to monitor Qaddafi's forces" (The New York Times 2011). In October 2011, when Gaddafi was executed by a French secret service agent, NATO terminated its mission in Libya.

On the other hand, the international community has "responded to the Syrian regime's crackdown on the uprising with far less resolution than it showed in the case of Libya" (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 115). In 2011, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions and then authorized military intervention against Gaddafi's regime in Libya, but did nothing in Syria (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 115). Finally, in May 2011, the European Union and the United States "imposed sanctions against Al-Assad in response to his brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests" (The Guardian 2011). In addition, the EU placed a travel ban and froze the assets of 13 senior Syrian officials that are associated with Al-Assad (The Guardian 2011). However, the UN Security Council in 2012 did somewhat intervene by implementing resolution 2043 which consisted of the "deployment of 300 unarmed military observers, including an appropriate civilian component and air transportation assets, to monitor a cessation of armed violence" (United Nations 2012). Unfortunately, the UN Security Council's intervention was not militarily or effective. Why did the UN mandate a NATO-led intervention in Libya and not in Syria? In order for UN mandate to pass, the UN Security Council's five permanent members must agree. Both Russia and China have vetoed against any proposed mandates that would allow military intervention in Syria. (The Journal 2012). Russia has extremely close relations with the Al-Assad regime, funding him militarily, where as China perceived intervention as "disrespecting the sovereignty and international integrity of Syria" (United Nations 2011).

The UN's mandate for NATO's intervention in Libya was the ultimate cause of the fall of Gaddafi's regime, making Libya's 2011 civil war more successful than Syria's. NATO was able to locate Gaddafi's base in Sirte and through the use of airstrikes, ships and aircrafts, NATO deteriorated Gaddafi's regime. Once Gaddafi's base was known, rebel units of the NTC as well as British and French forces began to infiltrate Gaddafi's base with the use of tanks, heavy artillery and rocket launchers, attacking all those who were in support of Gaddafi. Gaddafi's reign came to an end when a French secret service man disguised himself as a rebel killing Gaddafi. On the other hand, the reason why Al-Assad still maintains power and Syria is still experiencing its civil war, is because of Russia and China veto very UN mandate that wishes to authorize military intervention. This ultimately is why Libya's political outcome differs from Syria's.

Conclusion

This paper examined the similarities present between both countries 2011 civil wars. The high levels of discontent and state repression as well as the occupation of many rebel forces that formed in order to overthrow the Gaddafi and Al-Assad regime. This paper also assessed what contributed to both countries having distinct political outcomes by examining the differing ethnic and religious favoritism present by both regimes as well as the role of the international community. Lastly, this paper concluded that the UN's mandate of NATO's intervention is what caused Libya's 2011 civil war to be a success compared to Syria which is why they both have different political outcomes.

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The Impact of NAFTA on Australia's Trade and the Implications of Preferential Trade

By Jarrad Marthaller

This article will be exploring and evaluating trade relations between Australia and The United States of America, with a particular focus on the effects of NAFTA (North American Free Trade agreement) on the amount of trade between these two countries. I used trade data available over a narrow span of several decades in order to create several tables that document the change in volume of trade between Australia and The United States in an attempt to demonstrate that NAFTA and Preferential Trade Agreements in general run contrary to the principles of free trade that the World Trade organization espouses. By showing a strong relation between a downturn in the demand for Australian exports and the timing of the NAFTA's signing, I show that Preferential Trade Agreements such as NAFTA and more recently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership may be leading to protectionist regional blocs.

In the rapidly globalizing world we find ourselves living in, it is important to question and examine the usefulness, efficacy, and legitimacy of actors on the global stage. This includes entities and organizations that seem to be, or even are, acting in good faith. This includes the World Trade Organization (WTO) whose mission statement says, in part: "The WTO's founding and guiding principles remain the pursuit of open borders, the guarantee of most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory treatment by and among members..."¹ Stating this more generally could be that the aims of the WTO include global trade liberalization and reciprocal trade agreements extended by members to other members. In this light, take note that the WTO does make exceptions for things such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). This article will attempt to ascertain and prove that these PTAs run contrary to the stated and principal aims of the WTO and are harmful to the trade of states that are not included in these agreements. I will analyze the trade between NAFTA, with a specific focus as The United States as the cardinal member, and Australia

¹ WTO overview page

while showing that exclusion from NAFTA had negatively impacted Australia's trade and conclude with the ideological problems associated therein.

Summary of NAFTA

In 1988, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was signed. It agreed to gradually reduce tariffs according to sector over a ten year span and put a complete freeze on increasing any tariffs between the two nations. It was after this accord was signed that Mexico entered negotiations, and the talks to create The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began. NAFTA was eventually signed in 1994 by U.S. President George H. W. Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Mexican President Carlos Salinas and marked a significant move towards regional cooperation and integration, with the final provisions of the agreement not reaching maturity until 2008. This agreement has had multitudinous effects on the member states. "Trade relations have broadened substantially, and U.S. manufacturers created supply chains across North America that have made companies more globally competitive. These factors may have stimulated economic growth..."² Furthermore, while it would be academically dishonest to claim that NAFTA has been the sole cause, intraregional trade between Canada, The United States, and Mexico has increased from "\$290 billion in 1993 to more than \$1.1 trillion in 2012."³ Seeing these figures as well as accounting for the cross border investments and increased travel/tourism in the region, it is a safe claim to make that NAFTA has had a large impact on the member states with obvious benefits to trade.

Why Australia?

Before exploring the various effects that NAFTA has had on Australia, I feel it is necessary to explain some of my research methodology. Specifically, why I chose Australia to compare to The United States. The United States was a simple choice due to its comparatively much larger economy and volume of trade compared to the lesser partners in NAFTA. However, Australia is less immediately obvious. I narrowed my search of countries by geographic proximity to The United States, and despite being separated by a large swathe of the Pacific Ocean, I determined that it was close enough to both be affected by NAFTA and could theoretically have been included in a PTA with The United States. This was determined by Australia's status as being a part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that has recently completed negotiations. It could be hypothesized that the effects of NAFTA, that I will later explore, drove Australia to seek membership in the TPP. However, without access to data about the effects TPP will have, I will not make that claim other than speculate that it could be a motivating factor.

Australia's Historical Trade Data

² cfr.org

³ cfr.org

Before I start arriving at a conclusion about whether Australia was harmed by not being extended reciprocal trade terms that NAFTA members received, I will first give a very brief overview of some significant downturns in Australia's global exports. Table 1 shows the top and bottom five performing industries by percentage change per year from 1991-2014. There are several statistically notable upwards and downwards spikes, but for the scope of this analysis I will be focusing mostly on the downward spikes in reverse chronological order. The incredible drop between the years 2008-09 coincided with the global recession that occurred due to the crash in The United States housing market. The next most aggressive negative change in Australia's global exports was in 2001, which also coincided with a recession in The United States, Japan, and some other countries, which drove down the demand for Australian exports. Finally and most critically for the topic at hand, we have the downturn that occurred in 1998, which coincides with the gradual reduction of trade tariffs between member states of NAFTA between 1994 and 1997. Another significant point on the graph that is worth mentioning is in 2004, which is concurrent with the signing of AUSFTA, which I will go into further detail about later.

Comparison between Agriculture Exports in NAFTA and Australia

I will take a focused look at the agricultural exports of Australia for this case study. Once again referring to Table 1, we see a much sharper change relative to most other industries in the same time frame by an approximate 20% shrinkage in Australian global agriculture exports. It stands to reason that this market share has to be ceded elsewhere. It is indeed impossible to say with any certainty that all of this demand directly shifts to being satisfied by intraregional trade among NAFTA member states. However, according to the Agriculture and Agri-Food section of The Government of Canada website: "NAFTA has created a continental marketplace of over 420 million consumers for North American farm and food products. As provided for in the FTA and the NAFTA, virtually all tariffs have been eliminated on Canadian agricultural exports to the U.S. (January 1, 1998) and Mexico (January 1, 2003). The only exceptions to this general tariff elimination are chicken, turkey and egg products, as well as refined sugar. As a result of the NAFTA, agricultural three-way trade in agricultural products between the three NAFTA partners exploded after 1993, almost doubling between 1993 and 2003. Canadian agri-food exports to the U.S. have more than doubled (+110%) during this period, while those to Mexico have more than tripled (+210%). This dramatic growth, which has been far more rapid than the growth in agricultural exports to countries outside North America, has led to changes in the trading patterns between the partners, and has resulted in a more integrated, North American marketplace."⁴ This rapid expansion of trade between these states would have had a direct impact on the amount of agricultural imports they would need from outside of North America, since they were bound to give preferential trade to these neighbours as well as benefiting from reduced costs of transporting these goods due to the proximity of these states.

⁴ <http://www.agr.gc.ca/>

AUSFTA and U.S-AUS Trade

I mentioned earlier that since The United States is the pillar of NAFTA that I will use them as a case study to examine trade relations with Australia. I briefly touched upon AUSFTA⁵ as having coincided with an increase in global exports in 2004 across most sectors, as seen in Table 1. By 2002, many provisions of NAFTA had started to come into effect and would have had a significant impact on the source from where The United States imported their goods from, which had a negative impact on Australia's exports. After some deliberations and negotiations, AUSFTA was signed by Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick in 2004. This marked a gradual erosion of trade barriers and tariffs between the two nations.

There were some objections at the time to this deal. Shiro Armstrong, from the Australian National University said, "AUSFTA resulted in a fall in Australian and US trade with the rest of the world — that the agreement led to trade diversion."⁶ Table 2 shows the distribution of percentage of growth by quarter in trade imports to The United States from Australia by three time bins: Time before NAFTA going back to 1985, Pre-AUST⁷, namely the period between the signing of NAFTA and the signing of AUSFTA, and post-AUST which is the time between the signing of AUSTFA and 2015. As is shown, the distribution of values for growth before NAFTA had the widest spread and encompassed both the largest losses and largest gains. This is likely due to the fact that before NAFTA was signed, the exports sent from Australia to North America were less static and more prone to the whims of the market. Next, in the central bin of Table 2 we see that the distribution of quarterly change is much smaller and the median is nearly exactly in the middle of the box plot, meaning that there are many less instances of large growth, but also less instances of sharp decline in American demand for Australian goods in this time bin. Thus, we can surmise that NAFTA had a net effect of creating a stable, if smaller demand for Australian goods in American markets, likely due to their higher costs caused by still-present tariffs. In the third bin (farthest left) which corresponds with the signing of AUSFTA we see that while there is a greater frequency of negative change in American imports than previously, the largest two quartiles of this plot show positive growth. This means that after AUSFTA was signed, there were more data points showing positive quarterly change in American demand for Australian imports and thus ameliorated some of the negative effects NAFTA had on Australian exports to The United States.

Looking Forward

The data collected here has indeed concluded that The United States signing NAFTA with Mexico and Canada has had a negative impact on at least one of its trade partners, which in this case was Australia. While I am merely speculating, it is certainly possible that

⁵ Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement

⁶ Armstrong 1

⁷ AUST-Abbreviation used in Table 2 for Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement

similar conclusions could be drawn about other trade partners of The United States. Seeing the benefits that Canada and Mexico reaped from a preferential trade agreement with The United States may have been the catalyst for Australia to sign its own trade deal and not lose out on as much of the market share for their exports as they had been. This is clearly catering to a mercantilist notion of gaining as much benefit for the member states. I will, perhaps boldly, assert that these PTAs are nothing more than regional protectionism at play and in fact run contrary to the tenants of global trade liberalization and reciprocity that the WTO is expected to uphold and propagate. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, in my mind, is merely the natural extension of NAFTA and the ideological failings that are systemic to it. While it takes measures to move towards global trade liberalization by including many more countries, such as: The United States, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru, it still violates the principle of universal reciprocity and the fact that the World Trade Organization does not contest these PTAs only undermines its legitimacy as a proponent of economic liberalism. The establishment of these regional blocs as signified by NAFTA or the TPP could be interpreted as one of two emerging possibilities: A harbinger of gradual lessening of global tariffs and trade barriers that leads to a global free market, or an increasing trend of regional protectionism and establishment of trade barriers between these regional blocs.

Table 1





Table 2



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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 1
ARTICLE 11

Fall 2016

Policy Brief for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) on Behalf of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Regarding Human Rights Violations on Coffee Farms in Guatemala

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This policy paper outlines the issue of human rights violations on Guatemalan coffee farms in the form of forced labor. It outlines two recommendations for the International Coffee Organization, an intergovernmental organization dedicated to bringing together coffee's largest importing and exporting nations and tackle challenges the coffee sector faces today through international cooperation, to consider when addressing the issue. This policy is presented on behalf of the International Labor Organization, an organization dedicated to promoting social justice and human rights in the labor market that will lead to lasting and universal peace.

Issue

Behind only petroleum as the most valuable traded commodity around the world, coffee plays a crucial role in the world's economy. In the United States alone, it acts as the largest food import and billions of pounds of the bean are traded every year worldwide. Unfortunately, the conditions that workers must face on farms in Latin American countries such as Guatemala in order for the rest of the world to enjoy their daily coffee are horrific. Riddled with underpaid workers, illegal child labourers, and nasty working and living conditions, coffee farms are among the worst places of employment worldwide. Most often, the Guatemalan government will turn a blind eye to the numerous labour regulatory infractions committed by plantation owners. The ICO is dedicated to create regulation amidst the industry and provide fair and equitable practices towards workers in its member nations. However, due to the corruption of the Guatemalan government and the increasing consumer demands for coffee, there still exists mass amounts of human rights violations and infractions of labour laws in the coffee industry. The following policy will indicate two recommendations for the ICO to consider when trying to tackle this issue. The first will focus on the workers' ability to organize unions, and the role that the ICO can play in this endeavour. The second will focus on public awareness of the issue, promoting

transparency within ICO member states in order to drive consumers to make socially conscious decisions.

Background

Petroleum is the only commodity that trumps coffee as the most valuable traded product worldwide. In 1996, an anthropologist coined coffee as the beverage of postmodernism (Lyon 241), suggesting that it carries a close relationship to capitalism and globalization and is essential to the modern world. Guatemala, among many other Latin American nations, plays an integral role in the production of the much-demanded beverage, housing the proper growing conditions and climate to grow the world's finest coffee bean variety, the Arabica. Most companies that consumers are familiar with, from Starbucks to Green Mountain, use the Arabica bean as its chief product. Guatemala falls under only Columbia in its ability to grow the high grade bean, so it is deemed a crucial player in the international coffee economy.

Underneath the light-hearted banter about one of the world's favourite beverage is a much darker layer. The issues of illegal child labour, forced labour, and mistreatment of workers is not entirely uncommon in many agricultural divisions of developing nations, but nonetheless remains a problem that must be addressed. Among the most problematic areas regarding those labour issues is in the coffee industry. Despite Guatemala being considered a middle income and multicultural nation, it is riddled with inequalities, violence, and repression (Verite 4). Though there are laws currently in place that forbid child and forced labour, the high amounts of corruption within the government system prevent those laws from having any effect on the industry. Abuses that occur on Guatemalan coffee farms include non-payment of wages, retention of identity documents, child labour, deprivation of food and shelter, and confinement of work location¹ (Verite 5).

¹ Found by Verite research between 2009 and 2011, the list of labour law infractions is considerably longer than what is mentioned above. All findings regarding these labour law infractions were investigated according to International Labour Organization guides regarding how to identify forced labour practices published in 2005.

Box 1: Identifying forced labour in practice

Lack of consent to work (the "route into" forced labour)	Menace of a penalty (the means of keeping someone in forced labour)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Birth/descent into "slave" or bonded status • Physical abduction or kidnapping • Sale of person into the ownership of another • Physical confinement in the work location – in prison or in private detention • Psychological compulsion, i.e. an order to work, backed up by a credible threat of a penalty for non-compliance • Induced indebtedness (by falsification of accounts, inflated prices, reduced value of goods or services produced, excessive interest charges, etc.) • Deception or false promises about types and terms of work • Withholding and non-payment of wages • Retention of identity documents or other valuable personal possessions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical violence against worker or family or close associates • Sexual violence • (Threat of) supernatural retaliation • Imprisonment or other physical confinement • Financial penalties • Denunciation to authorities (police, immigration, etc.) and deportation • Exclusion from future employment • Exclusion from community and social life • Removal of rights or privileges • Deprivation of food, shelter or other necessities • Shift to even worse working conditions • Loss of social status

Source: ILO, UN Global Compact. The Labour Principles of the UN Global Compact: A Guide for Business. 2008.

In an article written in 2001 by Michael Laslett, he indicates many infractions that have occurred on Guatemalan coffee farms. At that point in history, the coffee industry employed 2.2 million people out of the 11 million that reside in Guatemala and coffee exports were the largest source of income for the nation. Workers were being paid a daily wage of \$1.75, which is a full dollar less than the legal minimum. Not surprisingly, women and children were paid half that amount (9). Many studies have been conducted by the ILO that indicate high incidences of child labour in the agricultural sector in Guatemala and the U.S. Department of State had similar findings with their studies. Though both of these organizations have proven the use of child labour, the Guatemalan Coffee Organization, Anacafe, has tried strenuously to dispute these facts, finding legal loopholes that attempt to refute findings regarding child labour (Verite 20).

There exist many reasons for the increasing problem of forced labour in the coffee industry outside of government corruption. For one, an increasing demand by consumers for different varieties of coffee plays a large role in why we see infractions of labour laws. An increase in demand leads to owners of plantations to 'employ' more workers in order to pump product out at faster rates. Coupled with an unstable price of coffee on the international market, plantation owners will turn to forced labour practices to save money, maximize production, and compete with other farms for continual business. The emergence of small farms due to differing consumer demands for high quality beans also contributes to high levels of corruption. Small-scale producers are generally situated in tougher environments, have more intensive farming processes, and must deal with corrupt middlemen (called *coyotes*) that grant farmers little control over pricing or quality control (Verite 9). All of these factors are responsible for the increased plague of illegal labour practices in the industry. Due to corruption within the government departments that are meant to crack down on this type of behaviour, the fact remains that responsibility for lowering labour incidences must fall to international organizations, such as the ICO or Fair Trade, to ensure restoration of human rights and consumer awareness.

Recommendations

Upon completion of research, the ILO has two recommendations for the ICO regarding the reduction of human rights violations on coffee farms in Guatemala:

- Part of the problem regarding labor law violations has to do with the lack of ability for workers on farms to form labor unions, which would enable them to fight for their own rights. Due to corruption in government labor departments and corruption among owners of coffee plantations, laborers have been blocked from being able to create unions. Through cooperation with the ICO, the ILO believes we can successfully advocate on behalf of the allowance of labor unions on Guatemalan coffee farms.
- The other aspect of the solution to the issue of labor law violations on coffee farms has to do with consumer awareness. By targeting the purchasing audience of coffee from companies that take advantage of labor law violations and making evident the illegal nature of the business they engage in, the likelihood consumers will change their outlook regarding the coffee they purchase will grow. Big coffee companies will begin to notice a reduction in sales, meaning that they will, in all likelihood, be forced to reduce business with plantations that use illegal labor practices. This can likely be achieved through public awareness campaigns and transparency within the industry.

Assisting with Labour Unions

As working conditions on Guatemalan coffee farms progressively get worse as the effects of globalization render on, the ability of workers on farms to form unions decreases. The idea of a union is that workers receive a guarantee of basic rights, like health care benefits, pensions, higher wages, and solidarity of job position. Coffee farmers do not have any of those guarantees because of the lack of union opportunity in their country. This type of mistreatment has been occurring in Guatemala for many years, and the ILO in partnership with the ICO believes that the best way to ensure fair treatment and recognition of basic human rights is through fighting on workers' behalf to provide them with labour unions.

In a study completed by Michael Laslett, a union organizer from the United States, he notes some of the hardships that workers with demands for organized unions are forced to face. Death threats, forced removal from homes, children being denied access to schools, and being denied access to basic dietary staples (8) are hardships that coffee workers have experienced whilst fighting for the right to form a labour union. He notes that the struggle is ongoing and despite having small successes in being granted protection from abusive plantation owners and guarantee of the basic minimums outlined in Guatemalan law, results have never been enforced by government officials and state courts alike. Looking even further back in history, during the mid 70's Laslett notes that 124 union leaders were murdered, which eliminated an entire generation of union activists (10).

Besides using outright illegal acts like violence and murder to rid Guatemala of union activists, plantation owners will utilize several other tactics in order to protect themselves against union formation. Dividing up plantation land in order to make their farms appear smaller, thus avoiding legal obligation to enforce labour union demands is one direction plantation owners take; hiring temporary workers that only work for stints shorter than the legal minimum required to be a part of a union is another way plantation owners can manoeuvre around legally recognizing unions. Since the government provides such little enforcement in terms of worker rights and provides little supervision of plantation owners, it becomes very simple for owners to continually deny existence of labour unions at all.

There have been attempts throughout the region to fix this problem in recent history, much of which have had support from the Church. Workers in the Costa Cuca region have launched an organization dedicated to bringing justice to the coffee industry, and several small, company based unions have emerged such as the Workers at Finca Asuncion and Other Business That Form Part of the Same Economic Entity (11). These smaller unions have difficulty gaining recognition due to the high amount of worker turnover resulting in lack of organization and legal ability to be a part of a union.

The ILO believes that a major key to restoring justice to the coffee industry of Guatemala is to provide a higher amount of workers with the legal opportunity to be part of unions, or to form unions that have organization and power. Part of the process towards this is to prevent plantation owners from constantly hiring temporary workers that do not meet legal requirements set out by the government that would allow them to be part of unions. Another aspect would be holding the department of government responsible for enforcing recognition of unions by plantation owners accountable to consistently monitor owners and their actions towards workers who have been granted legal union status by the court system, or else deny them access to the benefits of membership to the ICO. Regardless of the fact that some workers may have been granted legal union status, the point becomes null when their voices are suppressed by government departments that do not listen and by abusive, threatening plantation owners that prevent them from exercising the rights they are granted.

In November 2015, the ILO's 325th Governing Body met to discuss violations of labour rights in Guatemala². Agreed upon was the idea that the ILO must extend activities further into the country in collaboration with new Guatemalan authorities in order to strengthen freedom of association and the rights of workers to organize (International Labour Organization – ACTRAV). The new government of Guatemala plays a key role in increasing workers' rights; the ILO hopes that with new authorities comes less corruption, more supervision of plantation owners, and more recognition of the worker's right to form

² The 325th Governing Body of the ILO met in Geneva in November to discuss the violation of labour rights in Qatar, Guatemala, Fiji, and Myanmar. Also discussed was the global refugee crisis and its effects on global markets, and climate change that is the topic of discussion of the Paris Conference in December of the same year. Speaking on behalf of the issue of labour rights violations was Luc Cortebееck, President of the Workers' Group.

unions. At the time of this session, more than 70 trade union leaders had already lost their lives in the name of labour rights and a radical change in government policy is needed to protect freedom of expression, workers' rights, and trade union freedom.

The ICO has outlined in their 2007 Agreement that part of the eradication of human rights abuses is to pay particular attention to the needs of both owners and workers within the industry, which include encouraging member states to work with small scale farmers and allow them to benefit from production (ICO 2007 Agreement). This potentially means providing small and medium scale farmers with more opportunity to form unions or have their union status formally recognized.

It is evident that we at the ILO believe that in order to foster productive work environments in the Guatemalan coffee sector that not only provide workers with economic benefits, but also basic human rights, it's a fundamental responsibility of the ICO in cooperation with the appropriate departments of the Guatemalan government to provide protection for workers, allowance of freedom to form labour unions, and supervision and punishment of plantation owners that violate Guatemalan labour laws.

Consumer Awareness

There are two aspects to any business venture – the legal, technical aspects and the contribution from the consumer public. The consumer plays an essential role in the coffee industry – they act as the drive behind price, market value, and determine what types of products hit the shelves. The problem is, most consumers have but a vague awareness of where their coffee comes from and what the conditions were like for the workers farming their coveted beans. Since consumers have such influence on the coffee market itself, it would only make sense for part of the solution of labour law violations in the coffee industry to come from public campaign.

Much of the agricultural industry, including the coffee sector, have activities occurring behind closed doors, that is, away from the public eye. Since so much of the growing and production of coffee occurs in countries that are considered part of the 'global south', and much of the global south is known for corrupt governments, untrue forms of democracy, and extreme divides between the elite and the 'working class', a window is provided for the violations of labour laws to be overlooked. The aspect of corrupt government leads to a lack of transparency, and in order for the issue of forced labor to cease, the public must be made aware of where their product comes from and the process by which coffee gets from the plant to the cup.

Many may claim that the idea of Fair Trade Coffee should be enough- their goal is to ensure the eradication of poverty through paying growers a value that is higher than what volatile market prices can offer. Since it is such a large organization that works in a wide array of countries, many consumers believe that their purchase of Fair Trade Coffee is a guarantee of fair conditions on farms. That, however, is not always enough. Only small scale growers can qualify, and private estate farmers and multinational corporations that may grow their own coffee cannot qualify (Haight 77), and often those farms guilty of forced labor practices. The focus of Fair Trade is on the small farmer, and does not have an effect

on the poorest segments of the coffee industry, like the migrant workers, who do not own land (Haight 78). It becomes evident that although Fair Trade is a great initiative that aids small landowners, it does not get to the root of the issue in full.

What must be done is a heightened level of public awareness of the coffee industry as a whole. Part of the 2007 ICO Agreement was an Article on “promotion and market development with activities to include information campaigns...and studies on coffee production and consumption” (ICO 2007 Agreement). This is a crucial step in promoting public awareness within the coffee market that encourages companies that may be guilty of engaging in unethical practice to be more transparent about their business ventures in fear of losing profits. It is within the ICO’s best interest that fair and equitable practices be adopted in the coffee industry and that member nations represent the values held within the organization. Transparency within the industry is a key concept, and with the ICO’s mandate to increase transparency and access to relevant information (ICO 2007 Agreement), the worry of certain corporations to use illegal practices is lessened.

Thankfully, many coffee companies that get their product from member states have adopted policies of transparency. Starbucks, for one, and Green Mountain Coffee Roasters all report their endeavours of socially responsible business and work to ensure that farmers are receiving the maximum benefits possible, and use these tactics to advertise and draw in the socially conscious consumer (Haight 79). Coffee roasters and multinational coffee corporations serve as a proxy for consumer intention (Lyon 247), so in order for consumers to have the opportunity to purchase from equitable companies, the companies must do everything in their power to ensure they abide by equitable standards outlined by organizations like Fair Trade or the ICO.

Consumer awareness will advocate indirectly on behalf of worker rights, since consumers have such strong effects on the coffee market. If the ICO thoroughly enforces their tactics on increased transparency within the industry, consumers will be enabled to make socially conscious decisions when purchasing their beans, and will thus drive profits for multinationals who support farms using forced labor down. The ICO must ensure that their member states, in this case Guatemala, are actively representing the values ingrained in its mission and follow through with their campaign to disclose any information regarding the breaching of these values.

Conclusion

The unfortunate drawback to potentially both of these recommendations is a possible increase in the market price of coffee, forcing consumers to pay more for their product. The guarantee, however, outweighs the hike in price. Socially responsible business is essential in the modern age and it is up to organization like the ICO to ensure that responsible standards are being met. All humans deserve to have their basic rights

recognized and since the answer may not lie in government department alone, it is the responsibility to multi-governmental organizations to oversee and enforce regulation within certain industries.

The ILO is dedicated to ensuring labor standards and recognition of human rights across all borders, and with the two recommendations outlined we believe that it is possible to achieve this feat. We are willing to sacrifice costing consumers a few extra dollars in order to ensure both quality of their products as well as fair and just treatment of workers in the coffee sector.

In order to achieve this, the ICO must ensure that they oversee the actions of coffee producers Guatemala (among other member nations), and ensure that workers are in fact being granted the right to form and work within unions that protect their human rights. The demand for union formation and recognition in the Guatemalan coffee industry has been a long fight, and due to the high amounts of corruption within the government departments responsible for upholding labor and union laws, it falls on the shoulders of organizations like the ICO dedicated to the upholding of certain values in the industry to enforce just practices within its volatile member nations. Failure to acknowledge the existence of unions within a member state should result in the suspension of membership benefits.

The ICO must also ensure that member nations are open and honest with consumers and allow consumers to see where their product comes from and the processes used by farms. Public awareness is key to the entire market, for a change in demand will introduce changes in the entire industry. Enacting transparent practices within the industry, multinational corporations that are guilty of unethical practices may be forced to change their habits, thus creating heightened degrees of cooperation within the coffee sector.

If not addressed with vigor, unethical and illegal labor practices like forced labor, child labor, and exploitation of workers will persist. Through the above recommendations, the ILO believes that workers' in the coffee industry will begin to see an improvement in terms of labor within their industry and the sector will see the justice it so rightfully deserves.

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